

The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin

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Karol Wojtyła's Philosophy of the Theatre

Towards a Theatre of the 'Gift'

By

Ludmila Zofia Szczecina

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Rev. dr hab. Piotr Pasterczyk

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“Man cannot live without love. He remains a being that is incomprehensible for himself, his life is senseless, if love is not revealed to him, if he does not encounter love, if he does not experience it and make it his own, if he does not participate intimately in it.”

— Pope John Paul II

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Introduction

It may seem that Wojtyła never wrote a philosophy of the theatre per se, or at least not independently from his close collaborator Mieczysław Kotlarczyk (whom he co-founded *The Rhapsodic Theatre* with). You could assume he closed the door on his acting career the minute he entered the seminary. While he certainly chose to become a man of the cloth and not follow the path to become a famous theatre pedagogue like one of his contemporaries e.g. Jerzy Grotowski, we can see that his relationship with the theatre continued to mark his entire life. In fact, he wrote the majority of his poems and plays while he was studying to become and after he was ordained a priest. While he was Pope he continued to revise and perfect his final play *The Radiation of Fatherhood* - the original version having been just recently published.

Saying this, as a Pope, Saint John Paul II never assembled a troupe of actors in the Papal Palace to work on an even newer understanding of the theatre. It seems that his theatre was now not limited by walls - his stage was the world (the seen and the unseen). His script was not limited by paper or time - rather it was the eternal *Logos*. His subject concerned not just the characters in a play but two of the most important actors in existence: God and the human person. As Dr Anna Karoń Ostrowska, friend of the Pope and author of *Teologia Teatru* (The Theology of Theatre) said, "Karol Wojtyła never gave up the theatre and never parted with it. The Church became his theatre"¹. (Ostrowska 2017, n.p)

In my opinion, by going beyond the limits of the theatre (in terms of his philosophy on man), St John Paul II was able to go further than any other theatre pedagogue has gone. He was able to reach depths that would otherwise have been prevented by the stage's hardwood floors. In his philosophical writings he did not necessarily explain what is the 'essence of the actor' but he went even further... he explained the 'essence of man'. He did not explain 'what acting was' but how 'human action was essential to defining man'. He did not explain the 'actor - audience relationship' but instead explained 'participation' and the 'law of the gift' which is essential to the realization of man's potential and thereby his fulfillment.

By going beyond the theatre, Saint John Paul II has given the actor the greatest tool he can possess... a clearer understanding of one's self... one's own 'I'. If the painter is to become a great artist, he must intimately know the way his tools work: the way the paint mixes to form the exact shades needed, the way the canvas receives that paint and the way the brush can actualise

¹ "Karol Wojtyła nigdy nie rzucił teatru i nigdy do końca się z nim nie rozstał. Jego teatrem stał się Kościół" (Ostrowska 2017, n.p)

the image held in the imagination or replicate the reality in front of it. The pianist must know intimately every note emanating from the black and white keys and the pressure and passion that he/she must exact to get the desired sound. How much more must the actor know himself if that is indeed the tool to be used? The actor - body and soul - is both the instrument and musician. To know the essence of 'personhood' is therefore fundamental to any acting methodology. If actors knew what lay at the heart of man, if they could apply an 'adequate' understanding of man to the characters that they played, how much more depth and dimension could they reach.

One could question, however, (as we alluded to at the start) if there is even a need for this thesis i.e. was John Paul II not a follower of and collaborator with Mieczysław Kotlarczyk? Should the *Rhapsodic Theatre* i.e. the *Theatre of the Living Word*, not be considered synonymous with Karol Wojtyła? Well yes and no... it seems to be more nuanced than that. Bolesław Taborski, author of *Karol Wojtyła: The Collected Plays and Writings on Theatre* is in fact sceptical of the fact that Wojtyła's plays were merely an output of Kotlarczyk's ideas of theatre, "neither then nor later were Wojtyła's plays simply 'dramatized illustrations' of the Rhapsodic theatre's theories." (Taborski 1987, pg. 16) Additionally, in a retreat given to artists in Kraków in 1962, Wojtyła seemingly expresses a very different understanding of the role of the actor compared to that found in the Rhapsodic's theory of theatre. He does not see the actor as merely a guide but an embodiment of the character, an embodiment that includes his understanding of the person in *Person and Act* and seems to draw inspiration from another Polish pedagogue Juliusz Osterwa. We after all cannot forget the influence of an entire lineage of Polish dramatists that preceded John Paul II and the milieu he would have been formed in.

One pays so much for talent! For vocal talent, for physical talent. How many attempts are needed to draw out a different theatrical character from one's own concrete, unequivocal character, to create—from the person that I am—another person. What a huge transfer of my individuality, personality; what a huge plasticity of all of the dispositions of my person is required so that in its place, a different "I" arises—authentic and original. (Wojtyła 2021, Lesson II section, para.6)

While these sources are vital to arriving at a proper understanding of Wojtyła's ideas on theatre I believe that the key to unlocking Wojtyła's original thought (if one exists) is his philosophy on man and his own dramatic works. Not only will I be attempting to uncover an original philosophy of the theatre but in this dissertation I will also investigate whether Karol Wojtyła's anthropology and its application can help realize one of his most notoriously difficult plays to stage i.e. *The Radiation of Fatherhood*. Not only do I hope to unlock a deeper understanding of the content of this text, but in the chapter *Towards a Theatre of the 'Gift'* I will try to pinpoint the foundations for a philosophy of the theatre that would best bring about this type of script. It

is my belief that Wojtyła's philosophical anthropology cannot be confined to the script in terms of content but needs to be released in order to help identify the underlying structures of theatre itself; its fundamental purpose and end.

In my opinion his philosophical anthropology needs to even impact the intentions of those involved in the production, the way the cast and crew interact with each other, the method the director adopts and even the way the actors train for his plays in order for their message to be fully realized. It needs to impact the way the set is designed, the music that is chosen - it needs to influence all practical levels for his works to be given the life he intended them to have. This thesis therefore serves as a precursor to an acting methodology that encompasses the philosophy of the *Theatre of the 'Gift'*.

The broader aim of this thesis is to help bring Wojtyła's philosophy into the acting space. Not only to bring about an effective staging of his plays but to actually help find a basis for an acting method that frees theatre from the *subjectivism* that has in recent times tried to destroy it. We may not have needed his philosophy before when art aimed towards serving 'The Good, the True and the Beautiful', but in this era of 'post-truth' where *subjectivism* (while important, or rather the increased focus on the subject has been an important shift) has been let loose to devour any meaning to art - his philosophy may prove to be the antidote. So as not to confuse *action* in the *artistic* sense and *action* in the *moral* sense but also to show their relationship, we will also have to delineate the difference between *artistic good* and *moral good* and so too *artistic beauty* and *moral beauty*.

Chapter 1: Methodology

This work is 'interdisciplinary' in nature; that is, in order to try to piece together an original philosophy of the theatre (while the primary emphasis will be on Wojtyła's philosophy of man) I will draw from Wojtyła's/Pope John Paul II's dramatic, philosophical and theological works. I use this methodological approach due to the fact that (as the Italian philosopher Giovanni Reale observed and as Professor Wierzbicki explains) Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II (1920-2005) was a "pilgrim of the Absolute" i.e. Wojtyła strove to reach the ultimate source of being i.e. the Truth itself in a threefold way of poetry, philosophy and theology.² (Wierzbicki 2015, pg. 292) Due to the fact that Wojtyła used these three separate ways of knowing as equal, complimentary yet autonomous paths to true knowledge (Wierzbicki 2015, pg. 292); I believe that my methodological approach is justified as it merely reflects the approach of the author we are investigating. Wojtyła's distinctive approach would also be one of the fundamental reasons as to why an 'original philosophy of the theatre' would exist amongst his writings in the first place. As Wierzbicki continues, Reale identifies the uniqueness Wojtyła's three pronged approach brings, an approach that sees the realisation of his philosophical thought in the realm of the artistic, "According to Reale, this spiritual and cultural novelty of the work of the poet who became Pope John Paul II influences the nature of his aesthetics, which creates poetic visions based on the material of philosophical and theological thought." (Wierzbicki 2015, pg. 292)

As seen in the above quote, while John Paul II's literature was separate from his philosophical writings one cannot deny the fact that his philosophy heavily influenced his dramatic works. This does not have to be just reserved to content however. I believe we could extend his philosophical anthropology (which is centred on the proper foundation and end of man) to the theatrical domain and actually use it to try and determine the essence of the theatre - its foundation and its end. As we know and as we will explore in more depth, philosophy and the theatre have a long-standing historical link. I believe it is then therefore justified to investigate the impact of Wojtyła's anthropology on a vision for the theatre itself. After all we cannot forget that the very emergence of the term *person* which comes to represent the object of philosophical anthropology, is adopted from the Greek theatrical tradition and later on becomes further

² Giovanni Reale określa Karola Wojtyłę jako „pielgrzyma Absolutu” podążającego trzema drogami: poezji, filozofii i religii. Poszukiwanie Absolutu na każdej z tych dróg angażuje odmienne środki poznawcze i dlatego domaga się respektu dla autonomii sztuki, filozofii i teologii, a jednocześnie nie rezygnuje z zamysłu jakiejś syntezy tych trzech dziedzin kultury w formie integralnej duchowości. Włoski myśliciel dodaje, że wyjątkowość Karola Wojtyły we współczesnej kulturze polega na tym, że zbliża on i scala w swym własnym doświadczeniu twórczym wszystkie trzy dziedziny kultury ducha, które – zwłaszcza w czasach nowożytnych – ulegały separacji, a nawet antagonizacji. Owa duchowa i kulturowa nowość dzieła poety, który został papieżem Janem Pawłem II, rzutuje zdaniem Realego na charakter jego estetyki kreującej poetyckie wizje w oparciu o tworzywo myśli filozoficznej i teologicznej. (Wierzbicki 2015, pg. 292)

deepened and enriched by the writings of Christian theologians on the Trinity. As Cardinal Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI) describes in his essay *Concerning the notion of person in Theology*; As the “ancient scholars” realised, the word “prosopon” (which is interchangeable with the Greek “persona”) arose due to the fact that the poets of ancient Greece were not simply narrating stories but there was an embodiment taking place where “persons” had “to make their appearance and to speak”. (Ratzinger 1990, pg. 441) The scholars noticed the fact that life i.e. “dramatic life” was being infused into the poetry through the making of these “persons” into living characters or “roles”. (Ratzinger 1990, pg. 441) This is why “prosopon”/“persona” was initially meant to denote the words “role” or “mask”. (Ratzinger 1990, pg. 441)

1. On the term ‘Philosophy of the theatre’

The term philosophy in the statement ‘philosophy of the theatre’ may raise a few eyebrows and a series of successive questions: What is philosophy? What is theatre? Can you have such wisdom” in his encyclical *Fides et Ratio* (Faith and Reason) as (in the broadest sense) being interested in the “question of life’s meaning and sketching an answer to it” as well as (in the a thing as the philosophy of the theatre at all? Wojtyła defines philosophy or “love of more narrow sense) asking specifically “the reason for things and their purpose”. (FR 1998, #3) He equates the emergence of philosophy as a science with the natural human thirst for truth, wonder and self-understanding, “Driven by the desire to discover the ultimate truth of existence, human beings seek to acquire those universal elements of knowledge which enable them to understand themselves better and to advance in their own self-realization.” (FR 1998, #4)

In this encyclical (as with his other philosophical works) Wojtyła agrees with the realistic cognitive approach and method of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics which looks for the ultimate foundations, causes and ends of things in accordance with right reason, “Once reason successfully intuits and formulates the first universal principles of being and correctly draws from them conclusions which are coherent both logically and ethically, then it may be called right reason or, as the ancients called it, *orthós logos*, *recta ratio*.” (FR 1998, #4) While he speaks against certain philosophies which have caused “agnosticism and relativism...widespread scepticism” due to the lack of belief that man can really know anything certain, he however does not dismiss other philosophical systems and the knowledge they bring and speaks against an arrogance amongst philosophers who try “to present (*their*) own partial and imperfect view as the complete reading of all reality.” (FR 1998, #4) His cognitive approach and therefore philosophical methodology is however (for lack of a better word) ‘broader’ as it includes (although in an amended form which we will speak about in the third chapter) the method

provided by phenomenology which provides a way for him to investigate the person as he is given in all the richness of *lived experience*. He assures his readers that he is not trying to force a square peg into a round hole and compel a connection between the two different modes of cognition that these two philosophies employ but he aims to use them “simultaneously” and show how they “complement” each other i.e. he is not performing a synthesising but a “systematic confrontation of these two methods”. (PA 2021, pg. 5)

There will therefore be “two stages” to Wojtyła’s cognitive approach - two stages to his effort to understand the problem of the person and his acts. He will first perform a ‘deep dive’ into experience and he will then perform a reduction/explanation/interpretation of this deep description,

The first stage is... an in-depth reading of the experiential fact: the contents of the experiential data need to be... thoroughly and penetratingly decoded and explicated. This is the intuitive function of intellect (*intus-legere*). The second stage is interpretation, which is linked with the second function of intellect, namely with reasoning. This is not the classic *ratiocinatio*... it is not concerned with demonstrating the truthfulness of a proposition (thesis)... (*it*) has in itself nothing of deduction - it requires a reduction... (*a*) reduction to a proper foundation... a cause or reason. (PA 2021, pg. 5 & 6)

Once reduction has been performed i.e. “To reduce what is contained in the experience” Wojtyła believes that it is not a methodological error or an “unjustified jump” but a “discovery” of what becomes the “object of metaphysics”. (PA 2021, pg. 5 & 6) I briefly refer here to Wojtyła’s methodological approach, even though it will be covered in more depth in the third chapter *I act therefore I am* where we focus on his philosophical opus *Person and Act* and so too touch on the arguments posed over whether he indeed tried to ‘synthesise’ these two philosophies. This is due to the fact that we will follow the same methodological approach with this thesis as we aim to reflect, once again, the methodology of the author whom we are investigating. In the final chapter *Towards a Theatre of the Gift* in particular we will attempt an “in-depth reading” of theatrical experience as well as a reduction when we examine the different types of participation that occur in it. This therefore also provides a methodological justification for it.

In deciding what type of methodological approach we should proceed with in the following thesis, we also have to factor in the fact that Wojtyła was part of *The Lublin School of Philosophy*. This school emerged within the four walls of The Catholic University of Lublin which is famous for the fact (amongst other things) that it was the only independent Catholic University allowed to function in Poland during communism. This fact is important as

Maryniarczyk writes that the school emerged as a “response” to not only the principal philosophies of the day e.g. “phenomenology, existentialism and logical positivism” but as a “response” to the Marxist ideology that was forced onto and into the Polish education system. (Krapiec and Maryniarczyk 2015, pg. 405) Wojtyła, who taught philosophy there from 1956-1978, would eventually come to be the head of the Department of Ethics and (while there were differences of opinion between him and the other members of the philosophical school) they all seemed to subscribe to a similar underlying mission. They believed in the great value, if not primary value, brought by “classical philosophers” and therefore encouraged a ‘going back’ to the roots of philosophy itself and bringing “classical philosophers” (Krapiec and Maryniarczyk 2015, pg. 413) into conversation with modern philosophical problems and philosophers/philosophies (Wojtysiak 2020, pg. 7). They also believed, as Wojtysiak elaborates, that Aristotelian-Thomistic realistic metaphysics (updated by Gilson and Maritain) was to be the “central philosophical discipline”. (Wojtysiak 2020, pg. 7) All the implications and nuances of this tenet e.g. realistic cognition etc while important, cannot be dealt with in this thesis. The article by Krapiec and Maryniarczyk as well as the articles found in *The Lublin School of Philosophy A comparative perspective* deals with the matter quite thoroughly.

2. The problem of the division between ‘Philosophy of the theatre’ and ‘Performance Theory’

Although (as already noted) I will also be drawing on different sources of Wojtyła’s to work out what could be called his ‘original philosophy of the theatre’, we could (by going by Wojtyła’s definition of philosophy and his own methodology as well as the influence exerted by the tradition of The Lublin School of Philosophy) formulate a working definition for the ‘philosophy of the theatre’. That it is a form of philosophical inquiry which has theatre as its object and tries, by going back to classical philosophers and through the application of philosophical reasoning (which includes a dialogue with modern philosophy and theatre theorists by an in-depth reading of theatrical experience and reduction) to ascertain its most essential aspects i.e. its foundational causes and ends. Throughout the history of philosophy, philosophers (notably Plato and Aristotle) offered differing analyses on the *essential aspects* of the ‘theatrical art’. They also tried to ascertain its *normative function* i.e. its ethical implications. According to Hamilton, philosophers once connected the, “*descriptive metaphysical* issues, such as what theatre is by its nature, with *normative issues*, such as the value of theatrical performances within a culture”. (Hamilton 2019, n.p) The historical disagreement over what theatre is and the sheer variety in styles adopted as well as the modern issue which arose in the 20th century of a “division”

between the “philosophy of theatre” and “performance theory” (Hamilton 2019, n.p), has however lead to a confusion over what a *philosophy of the theatre* actually is.

Whilst this thesis cannot do a thorough investigation of the reasons for this divide (although admittedly this would add a considerable depth to this paper) we can observe that the “division” caused philosophers of the theatre to lose one of their objects of study. What is deemed a ‘Philosophy of Theatre’ and what is deemed a ‘Performance Theory’ is now decided in two ways, says Hamilton. (Hamilton 2019, n.p) Hamilton writes that the first way follows the lead of analytical philosophers in the field of theatrical inquiry who he says have barely given any time to the *normative issues* of the theatrical act i.e. “the social or moral effects of theatre” but solely tried to discover the more basic and foundational “epistemological and metaphysical status” of theatre itself. (Hamilton 2019, n.p) Theatre studies, Performance theory and Continental Philosophy have therefore tried to fill the gap and address the ethical and social implications of theatre but Hamilton admits that a metaphysical framework has always been needed to be able to delve into these issues, “in most of those cases, ethical considerations have rested on metaphysical views.” (Hamilton 2019, n.p)

The second way of distinguishing the two has also taken the path of division and has relegated “*descriptive issues*” to the field of philosophy. Again, we find here that only philosophers deal with essential questions but they are more specific/narrow than those discussed by analytical philosophers i.e. they ask “what acting and spectating are, what the relation is between theatrical practices and practices in other art forms, what theatrical criticism is...” (Hamilton 2019, n.p). This second way has also relegated *normative issues* to the field of theatre practitioners but these *normative issues* have less to do with ethics and are more concerned with the aesthetic value of the art. Hamilton cites Philip Zarrilli a “theatre theorist” who notes that practitioners adopt “ideologically inflected theories” formed by one of the greats “Konstantin Stanislavski, Bertolt Brecht, and so on” and then work on the embodiment of these theories and discern the best manner “in which to act successfully in theatre”. (Hamilton 2019, n.p)

This removal of the object of *normative issues* from the field of the philosophy exposes a disconnect that has arisen due to, I believe, the loss of a framework provided by realistic metaphysics (the philosophy of being) which once provided the basis on which to build a philosophical anthropology (the philosophy of man) and ethics (the philosophy of morality). This disconnect has in my opinion not only helped lead to the moral degeneration rampant in contemporary art and which (albeit in a unique way) has not left the theatre unscarred, it has

helped lead to the decrease in the value theatre provides and therefore it has led to a decrease in its popularity. It is my opinion that the gap between the *philosophy of theatre* and *performance theory* might be unnecessary, and efforts should be made to close it (for the good of theatre itself).

Theatre practitioners - whether they want to admit it or not - have to face the fact that they all have or have chosen underlying philosophies or ideologies (as Zarilli says) that motivate them i.e. in what scripts they choose, the way the play is directed, the method adopted by the actors and the impact they intend to make on their audience members. This thesis additionally hopes to show that to 'theorise' about or to create an 'act of theatre' implies that a philosophy of the theatre (which is based on a philosophy of being and man) has to have been adopted. Theatre, as with any of the arts, cannot exist or be sustained in a culture without a clear sense of its foundation and purpose. This foundation and purpose cannot rest on *subjectivism*, *relativism* or *materialism* as it will not survive.

If we look at one of the most famous 'theatre theorists' of the 20th century and as I mentioned before, one of Wojtyła's contemporaries who was also heavily influenced by Juliusz Osterwa - i.e. Jerzy Grotowski (1933-1999) we see the pros and cons of separating these two sciences. In his opus *Towards a Poor Theatre* (even though Grotowski calls his theatre experimental and therefore is theoretically not closed) he states what he feels the actor does and should do in order to give a true performance, "Here everything is concentrated on the 'ripening' of the actor... by a complete stripping down, by the laying bare of one's own intimacy - all this without the least trace of egotism or self-enjoyment. The actor makes *a total gift* of himself." (Grotowski 2002, pg. 16) (*Emphasis added*)

Surprisingly we see that Grotowski (an open 'non-believer') uses the same word that Wojtyła uses (and as this thesis will refer to) in his philosophical anthropology and teachings on sexuality and morality. A word from Wojtyła's beloved phrase *Gaudium et Spes* #24 which reveals the foundational nature of man and the action that best actualises his potency: "man is the creature (i.e. a being) that God willed "for its own sake," and at the same time this being finds itself fully "through a sincere gift of self." (LR 2013, pg. 230) It is the same word that I have used as my proposition for the title of Wojtyła's 'original philosophy of the theatre' - i.e. the word 'gift'. I have used this word as a proposition not only due to the fact that it forms the basis of many of Wojtyła's writings i.e. that man is understood most profoundly through the lens of 'gift', but

because this thesis has a secondary aim of helping to bridge the gap between theatre practitioners/theorists and philosophers.

Let me explain: Grotowski never describes the basis for his statement of the actor making “a total gift of himself” in more than psychological, sociological and ‘pseudo-mystical’ terms. He states that becoming a ‘gift’ is the actor’s vocation and that it involves an actor willingly exposing, “the different layers of his personality, from the biological-instinctive source...to that *summit* which is so difficult to define and *in which all becomes unity*. This act of the total unveiling of one’s *being* becomes a gift of the *self* which borders on the transgression of barriers and *love*. I call this a total act.” (Grotowski 2002, pg. 131)(*Emphasis added*) It may be that he had read the Vatican II documents and is keeping with his tendency to secularise catholic concepts e.g. “transubstantiation” or “holiness” to explain his acting theory but it seems rather to be a word he discovers through empirical observation. Regardless of the origin of this concept I would like to point out that the words he then uses to describe ‘gift’ e.g. “summit... in which all becomes unity”, “being”, “self”, “love” - all lie outside of Grotowski’s field of study. He cannot explain or deal with them in the field of performance theory alone.

In an interview in America in 1967 - after finishing a workshop at New York University’s School of the Arts (Grotowski 2002, pg. 243) - Grotowski tries to grapple with this idea of ‘total gift’ even more i.e. “The principle is that the actor, in order to fulfill himself, must not work for himself.” (Grotowski 2002, pg. 245) Grotowski asks then who or what should the actor act for? He has no answer other than an indefinable and “secure partner” who is discovered in the experience of the theatrical act i.e. by and relative to the actor in the process of acting. He sees the total gift made out of love for “God”, “nature” and even a concrete “human being” as too old-fashioned, mysterious and idealistic, “if acting is not for the audience and not for oneself, what is left?... ‘love for whom?’ Not for God who no longer functions for our generation. And not for nature or pantheism. These are smoky mysteries. Man always needs another human being (*to*) fulfill and understand him. But that is like loving the Absolute or the Ideal...” (Grotowski 2002, pg. 247) Yet the solution he offers does not only make use of empirical language but again sounds in fact pseudo mystical/spiritual, “One need not define this ‘secure partner’ to the actor, one need only say ‘you must give yourself absolutely’ and many actors understand. Each actor has his own chance of making this discovery, and it’s a completely different chance for each... One can think of it as ethical, but truly it is technical - despite the fact that it is also mysterious.” (Grotowski 2002, pg. 247)

While one could argue that this was precisely Grotowski's *modus operandi* i.e. to point to the truth of acting not through theory but through the empirical observation of actual experience and documentation of the action of the actor; one could argue that his perception/observation is in fact wrong. One could argue that Grotowski has merely observed incorrectly or that it is all relative. Acting is precisely about feeding the ego and not about 'gift' but in fact 'taking' or 'using' - taking the time, energy and knowledge of the author, director, other actors and the audience to fuel the energy one needs to become 'another'. Grotowski's albeit immensely profound empirical observations are missing a firm anchor, philosophical anthropology and metaphysics - to understand more deeply the reality he has observed.³

This thesis is not an attack or detailed response to Grotowski's *Towards a Poor Theatre* but more so a response to the somewhat unnatural division we have already referred to between philosophy and theatre theory. While there are many advantages that come from specialisation, especially in a practical field; as I said Grotowski and his *Laboratory Theatre* conducted many insightful experiments and arrived at profound empirical observations especially with regards to the actor-audience relationship... While we obviously acknowledge here that those philosophers who are not actively involved in the theatrical art (especially the rehearsal process) may miss many essential aspects as well... There are however limits to specialisation and we see the clear need for the support of a philosophical framework.

As I have said this paper has a secondary aim of rectifying this division of theatre theory and philosophy. I believe this is possible as the person we are writing about was a theatre theorist, actor and a philosopher all in one. Not only did he personally experience the process of acting and theatre making but as a philosopher he also greatly revered experience and the in-depth observation/exploration of it, while holding to a metaphysical framework and cognitive realism

³ I do want to note however that Grotowski never claims to not be influenced by other philosophical ideas, he says he is trying to find a way to deal with a theatre that no longer exists, a theatre which more easily caused "catharsis" (a term which we will explore in the next chapter) - a theatre which was "still part of religion". (Grotowski 2002, pg. 22) Grotowski believes that because religion was once not just "intellectual" but all encompassing and ingrained into the culture and therefore the subjective "personal truth" of the spectator could be identified with "the truth of the myth"; it was therefore more easy to exact the type of *catharsis* he believes Aristotle was talking about i.e. "through fright and a sense of the sacred he came to catharsis." (Grotowski 2002, pg. 22 & 23) Regardless of whether Grotowski actually believed theatre should be cut off from religion or he is simply trying to work with what he has i.e. create a theatre for a public that no longer believes - the reality is, that by doing so, he limits himself. This is due to the fact that, (as I have said already) the sciences that describe or attempt to describe the words he uses as a theatre theorist/practitioner lie beyond the theatre in the realm of philosophy and theology. Interestingly Grotowski, as Professor Kosinski author of *The Polish Theatre of Transformation*, says; still uses Christ as the ultimate proto-type for the actor even though he cuts his form of theatre off from religion." (Kosinski 2007, pg. 31) The reality is, in this day and age when Christianity is seen as an infringement of creative freedom, actors would probably find Grotowski too religious and push back against even using Christ as a proto-type, even if it were to merely follow His actions and not His doctrine.

i.e. "he sees the existing world as something ontologically transcendent with respect to the knowing subject (that is, man), though knowable." (Ignatik 2023, pg. 32)

Still we are aware that Wojtyła was a philosopher, not of theatre but of man. This paper will therefore involve an application of his philosophical anthropology and other thoughts on theatre and the arts to the object of theatre itself. We will also be able to keep a connection, as Plato and Aristotle did, between the *descriptive* and *normative* issues of theatre; this is because Wojtyła's philosophical anthropology has a strong enough metaphysical framework (i.e. an Aristotelian-Thomistic one) to carry both of these issues.

With this thesis I hope to show that the answer to a society Grotowski diagnoses as "less and less defined by religion" and more and more defined by *subjectivism* and which has caused the problem of experiencing theatrical *catharsis* as the audience seeks a more personal connection i.e. "spectators are more and more individuated in their relation to the myth" (Grotowski 2002, pg. 23) ... that the answer (i.e. the form of theatre that would be best received in modern culture) is arrived at through the actor becoming 'gift' but for reasons and in a manner which lies beyond Grotowski's explanation. A reason that speaks to the experience not only of the actor but the experience of the human person. I believe that Wojtyła's form of theatre (as his philosophy does) will address the modern man's thirst for the subjective while rooting him in the objective and therefore enable him to experience a true *catharsis*. A *catharsis*... not brought about by indoctrination by religion or myth but through the process of self-understanding which gets to the truth of *homo religiosus* and the Divine but through a path that respects the subjectivity of the person.

3. Structure and Sources

This thesis therefore will 'go back to the beginning' as it were and ascertain the link between philosophy and the theatre. We will explore the intersection of the term *microcosm* as it pertains to man (in the Aristotelian-Thomistic realistic metaphysical tradition) and as it has been used to describe the relationship between the theatre and the world i.e. the *theatrum mundi* (a term which is rooted in ancient Greece but seems to reach its height in the time of Shakespeare). We use here material from Father Krapiec's (contemporary of Wojtyła, realist metaphysician and co-founder of *The Lublin School of Philosophy*) philosophical masterpiece *I Man: An outline of Philosophical Anthropology* as well as thoughts from Joseph Piper (German Catholic

philosopher who specialised in the thought of Aquinas and Plato) and his books *Leisure the basis of Culture* and *Only the Lover Sings: Art and Contemplation* to establish the connection between philosophy and the theatre.

We will then work to establish what Plato and Aristotle meant by *mimesis* and then move to Aristotle's understanding of *tragedy* and therefore *action* and *catharsis* - terms he uses to describe the distinguishing features of the theatrical act in the *Poetics*. We will use literature from Tom Stern's *Philosophy and Theatre*, Richard Janko (known translator of *Aristotle's Poetics* and classical scholar), Joe Sachs (philosophy professor and known contemporary translator of Plato and Aristotle) and Piotr Jaroszyński to understand these topics more deeply. We use Aristotle as a base not only because he is one of the fathers of Western philosophical thought and Wojtyła is a product of this tradition (further reinforced by his acceptance of metaphysical realism) but because in his writings on *The Rhapsodic Theatre* we see how Wojtyła and Kotlarczyk partially work off and try to develop what Aristotle defines theatre/tragedy as.

So as not to confuse *action* in the *artistic* sense and *action* in the *moral* sense but also to show their relationship, we will also have to delineate the difference between *artistic good* and *moral good* and so too *artistic beauty* and *moral beauty*. While focusing on the thought of Wojtyła/St John Paul II and his idea of beauty in the areas of 'being, morality and art' which we gather primarily from his (recently translated into English) retreat given to artists in 1962 and his *Letter to Artists* which he gave in 1999 as Pope - we will also use supplementary sources from Thomas Aquinas, Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain (both key figures in the movement to revive Thomism in the 20th century) to flesh out his views. In addition we will use material from (as we have said) one of the founders of *The Lublin School of Philosophy* i.e. Father Krąpiec and those trained in this tradition e.g. Father Maryniarczyk, Piotr Jaroszyński, Father Tomasz Duma.

We will then do an in depth discovery of Wojtyła's philosophical opus *Person and Act* using Peter Simpson's (professor of philosophy and classics) book *On Karol Wojtyła*, Tomasz Duma, Rocco Buttiglione (philosopher and author of *Karol Wojtyła: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*) and Grzegorz Ignatik (professor of theology and well known author/commentator on Pope John Paul II's writing) as secondary sources; in order to understand Wojtyła's philosophical basis for seeing man as 'gift' i.e. how he understands being able to honour man's subjectivity in light of his relational aspect. To understand the *phenomenology* of Scheler and therefore Wojtyła's connection to him we will draw from Spiegelberg

(phenomenologist and historian of phenomenology), Anthony Steinbock (American philosopher, professor and author on phenomenology) and Dan Zbavni (Danish philosopher, professor and author on phenomenology). To understand Wojtyła's use of *phenomenology* and whether he was actually a synthesiser we will also draw from Piotr Pasterczyk (philosophy professor at The Catholic University of Lublin who is occupied with (not only ancient philosophy) but hermeneutics and phenomenology as well), Piotr Jaroszyński and Grzegorz Hołub (philosophy professor who specialises in bioethics and the philosophy of man).

Next we will perform an exploration of Wojtyła's theatrical roots with a historical account of the idea of the "sacred" in the Polish theatre by turning to its founding fathers: Stanisław Wyspiański and Adam Mickiewicz. Our main sources are the fathers themselves as well as Kazimierz Braun (Polish theatre director, writer, professor of humanities), Bolesław Taborski (Polish poet, theater scholar, translator and literary critic) and Darek Kosiński (Professor and writer on Polish Theatre). We will then uncover the foundational ideas of Wojtyła's main theatrical influences i.e Juliusz Osterwa and Mieczysław Kotlarczyk. This sees us turning to Wojtyła's writings on *The Rhapsodic Theatre* as well as his letters of correspondence to Kotlarczyk which were published in *O Teatrze Rapsodycznym* on the 60th anniversary of the founding of *The Rhapsodic Theatre*.

Next we will do an analysis of *The Radiation of Fatherhood* using primary sources of the *Person and Act, Love and Responsibility* and *The Theology of the Body* which further introduces us to Wojtyła's proper understanding of man as 'gift' and the action which helps him truly fulfill all of his potentialities i.e. the 'act of love'. While this application helps to understand Wojtyła's dramatic work the primary purpose of this analysis is to arrive at a philosophy of the theatre that would best realise this play (and its philosophical content) for the stage. We then conclude with what we have discovered and apply it to the essential structures of theatre in the chapter *Towards a Theatre of the 'Gift'*. As I have said before, we will attempt a phenomenological exploration to determine the types of 'participation' that are apparent in the theatre as well.

Please note that all English translations I have personally created are due to the lack of the English version in the current canon or due to the difficulty in obtaining the English version. These translations include selected fragments from: Professor Darek Kosiński's *Polski Teatr Przemiany* (The Polish theatre of Transformation), Dr Katarzyna Flader's *Juliusz Osterwa: Teologia Teatru* (The Theology of Theatre), Piotr Jaroszyński's *Sztuka i Metafizyka* (Art and

Metaphysics), Karol Wojtyła - *Dzieła Literackie i Teatralne: Tom III Dramaty. Szkice* (Literary and Theatrical Works: Volume III Drama. Sketches) and excerpts from Wojtyła's letters to Kotlarczyk published in *O Teatrze Rapsodycznym* (About the Rhapsodic Theatre). To indicate to the reader that I have personally done my own translation of certain fragments from as yet untranslated Polish texts and so that the reader (if they understand Polish) can read the original text themselves - I have kept quotation marks and placed the original Polish text in the footnotes. In the case of one longer translation from *Dzieła Literackie i Teatralne: Tom III Dramaty. Szkice* (Literary and Theatrical Works: Volume III Drama. Sketches), I have been forced to place the original Polish text within the text and immediately after my own English translation of it.

Chapter 2: Philosophy and the Theatre

1. Microcosm - Theatre & Man

Though we currently live in the age of *technocracy* and *scientism* where progress is an ultimate value and the almost cult-like belief that science is the only way of 'knowing' dominates most sectors of society - it does not mean, as Krąpiec (contemporary of Wojtyła, realist metaphysician and co-founder of The Lublin School of Philosophy) suggests in his masterpiece *I Man: An outline of Philosophical Anthropology*, that other "forms of knowledge" should be dismissed. (Krąpiec 1983, pg. 1) Along with the almost religious belief that technology and science is the only way society will be 'saved' - there seems to have arisen with it a disdain or distortion of studies and activities that do not have some practical output. This is in some ways reasonable, Krąpiec says, as it arises from a practical need, "those studies are valued most which show themselves to be most directly useful for human living in an urban civilization, which is the most typical human environment." (Krąpiec 1983, pg. 1) We can however also point to the philosophical underpinnings that have given rise to this new attitude. Is it any wonder that a society based on a materialist understanding of man i.e. that there is nothing more to man than his physical state (he is merely a conglomeration of atoms and neural reactions) runs into conflict with seemingly 'useless' practices that embody and require more than material causes and ends i.e. "the noblest human actions - knowledge as such, love and creativity". (Krąpiec 1983, pg. 1)

Theatre may seem a largely 'useless' endeavor in this era where, as Joseph Piper (German Catholic philosopher who had a special interest in Aquinas and Plato) puts it in *Leisure the basis of Culture*, work is treated as an end in itself i.e. the activity towards which all other activities are oriented. In order to understand and solve this problem Piper suggests a return to the distinction made by the Ancient Greeks and subsequently medieval Europeans between the *liberal arts* - "forms of human activity which are an end in themselves" (Piper 2009, pg. 37 & 38) and the *servile arts* - forms of human activity "which have an end beyond themselves... an end which consists in a utilitarian... a practicable result" e.g. some service or product. (Piper 2009, pg. 38)

Piper also tries to resurrect the idea in his book *Only the Lover Sings: Art and Contemplation*, that there are human activities that have value in themselves, a value that extends beyond economic contribution. (Piper 1990, pg. 20) Krąpiec echoes this statement by remarking that man does not only act and use his powers of reason for materialistic ends but man himself is actually an "object" of eternal "values" i.e. lasting values that want to shape him and therefore

enable him to become what he was created to be. (Krapiec 1983, pg. 1) If this idea is not resurrected, Piper believes we have and may continue to lose studies and activities that lead us to our ultimate end as human persons: activities that bring about (according to our structure) our true happiness, our fulfillment, our *eudaimonia*.

Eudaimonia, in the ethics of Aristotle (and which cannot be seen as separate from his metaphysics which we will expand on), is the state of "human flourishing or of living well". (Duignan 2024, n.p) It is the end to which human beings are ordered i.e. it is the primary good for man because it is "the only human good that is desirable for its own sake (as an end in itself)". (Duignan 2024, n.p) For Aristotle, rationality, which is a power of the soul and whose object is truth, is what distinguishes man from the rest of ordered creation. He believes that if the distinctive feature of man (the power of rationality) is engaged to its fullest (helped by virtues i.e. developed traits/qualities which allow for the highest efficacy of that distinctive feature) then the highest good of man can be attained. (Duignan 2024, n.p)⁴ *Eudaimonia* according to Aristotle therefore comes as a result of the act of philosophical contemplation or the act of "beholding"; an act where man reflects on the most basic and essential questions i.e. "the world's ultimate and intrinsic foundations." (Piper 1990, pg. 22)

Piper cites Plato on seeing contemplation as helping to bring about man's true end; because in this act he beholds Truth in all her splendour (her Beauty) and is therefore raised up to the sphere he is destined for i.e. the eternal, "Here, if anywhere at all - so spoke the foreign maiden from Mantinea (Diotima) - here man's life becomes fully worth living; for here he beholds the divine revealed in the purity of beauty itself through this he becomes immortal." (Piper 1990, pg. 22) Krapiec is in agreement with Piper and states that it has long been believed that, "(T)he highest expression of the human person: contemplation of truth and beauty, along with the attainment of the good has always been recognized as the most eminent goal of man's life." (Krapiec 1983, pg. 1 & 2) Notice that Krapiec adds the "good" end (which is an object of the man's second distinctive trait i.e. the volitional power or the will) which man is called to "attain" through the actions he chooses to take in his moral life (which we will again explore throughout this paper) as being one of the "goal(s) of man's life" as well. (Krapiec 1983, pg. 1 & 2)⁵

⁴ If one develops a life of virtue and fosters habits (which we will again expand on in the following section) that preserve and predispose the ability of man to perform the characteristic trait of humans in a manner of excellence then *eudaimonia* can be reached, "if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle," and if the human good is the good performance of that function, then the "human good turns out to be [rational] activity of soul in accordance with virtue," or rational activity performed virtuously or excellently (Duignan 2024, n.p)

⁵ This is also taken from Aristotle who believed that *Eudaimonia* could also be achieved through morally good human acts even though according to Duignan he saw this as a lesser kind of *eudaimonia*, "In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle held that *eudaimonia* consists of philosophical or scientific contemplation in accordance with the

While we will not be going into an in depth comparative analysis between the end to which Aristotle thought man was ordered to i.e. *eudaimonia* and the one Aquinas did i.e. *beatitudo* it is important to note that for Aquinas *beatitudo* is a state which results from “the immediate possession of God by intellectual contemplation.” (Maher 1910, n.p) This state cannot be reached while on earth because of our reduced functioning of reason due to original sin. For Aquinas *beatitudo* is not just as a result of intellectual activity but also the result of the will whose object is God i.e the ultimate good. *Beatitudo* also signifies relationship i.e union and therefore requires love; Aquinas cites Gregory’s statement that “the contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God and our neighbor, and to desire nothing beside our Creator.” (ST II-II, q. 180 a. 1)

Could theatre be one of those ‘useless’ activities that leads to contemplation of Truth and Beauty and the recognition of the actions that one needs to conduct in order to attain one’s morally good end and therefore one’s ultimate happiness? Could theatre be one of the activities that is actually the most vital to man? One of the activities that allows us humans who as Krapiec writes, “do not know ourselves directly. (Who) do not have a direct intuition of our nature” (Krapiec 1983, pg. 2) to actually come to know ourselves ‘indirectly’? Could theatre be one of the activities that helps uncover the human person, an activity that, “show(s) us who man is, what the meaning of life is, what his essential functions and the conditions for their attainment are and what man’s destiny is”. (Krapiec 1983, pg. 2)

The Ancients saw man as an intersection between the seen and unseen reality, a bridge as it were, due to his composite nature (his material body and immaterial soul), “Philosophers... regarded man as a “microcosm”. Man belongs to the world of animals, but he differs fundamentally from them in that not only does he receive information from the world, but also understands the information...” (Krapiec 2018, pg. 598) Aquinas, as a metaphysical realist and from whom Krapiec draws, also held this belief. As the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Paul J. Glenn beautifully illustrates what is found on this matter in Aquinas’ *Summa* is the following, that “Holy Scripture (Gen. 2:7) says ‘God made man of the slime of the earth.’...Thus, the first human body has elements that belong to lifeless things...to plants and animals. And man’s soul is a spirit, like the angels. Hence man is called ‘a world in little, a microcosm, for he has in himself something of all creatures in the universe...’ ” (Glenn 2015, n.p).

intellectual virtues of (theoretical) wisdom and understanding, but he also allowed that action in the political sphere, in accordance with (practical) wisdom and the moral virtues, such as justice and temperance, is *eudaimon* (“happy”) in a “secondary degree” (Book X, chapter 8)” (Duignan 2024, n.p)

The idea of theatre as a microcosm or *theatrum mundi* "theatre of the world" where theatre is seen as a "simile of human life" seems to have arisen, according to Donald Phillip Verene, during the 16th and 17th century but has its basis in Neoplatonism and Stoicism. (Verene 2008, pg. 114) The famous Globe theatre, quite aptly named, not only is the embodiment of Shakespeare's famous line from *As you like it Act II, Scene VII*, "All the world's a stage. And all the men and women merely players" but can be understood conversely; where the stage is a specific reflection of reality and the actors reflections of human persons and their action, "The theatre as a theatre of the world is a representation of the cosmos, in which actors play the roles of human life. On the other hand, the theatre is a moral emblem which presents human life as a spectacle, governed by the human and the divine." (Verene 2008, pg. 115)

While it is illogical to equate theatre with the human person by equating both to the concept of microcosm (as theatre is quite obviously not the ontological unity that is man), theatre does seem to be an artform that has the potential to mirror not just the microcosm of the world and human history but the "microcosmic" nature of the person - the intersection of body and soul, his external and internal activity. This thought can be further deepened by the idea that Aristotle and so too Aquinas professed; that art imitates nature i.e. *Omnis ars naturae imitatio est*. I would like to preface this next section by stating that from a purely metaphysical viewpoint this is a very complex statement, one that is more thoroughly dealt with in Piotr Jaroszyński's *Art and Metaphysics*. We will however, deign to touch a few points in this text for the purposes of understanding the term *mimesis* and the underlying function of the theatre.

2. Mimesis

Plato's legendary attack on the theatre in the *Republic* is closely bound to his philosophical system. As Tom Stern notes (in his work *Philosophy and Theatre: An Introduction*) in the *Republic*, Plato is trying to envisage how to achieve an ideal and just city and asks whether art will contribute or take away from that vision. (Stern 2014, pg. 23) With regards to theatre Plato is then most concerned with the ethical impact of *mimesis*.

Mimesis is difficult to define in the English language and therefore Stern describes it as more of an umbrella term for multiple meanings. (Stern 2014, pg. 21) The first is referring to "visual imitation" - when something looks like something else e.g. the dots on this artwork look like the milky way. (Stern 2014, pg. 21) Next is "behavioral imitation" - when someone replicates someone's actions e.g. a man may desire to imitate his hero and decide to sacrifice himself (like his hero did) to save a nation. (Stern 2014, pg. 21) Then we have "impersonation or mimicry" - when a man mimics the sound of an animal perfectly or when he disguises himself and

everybody believes he is truly the disguised person. (Stern 2014, pg. 21) Finally there is “imagination or play-acting” which is normally performed by children who build imaginary worlds in which they become any number of characters plucked from their fantasies, favourite stories or from the world of celebrity i.e. their idols or heroes’ (Stern 2014, pg. 21) There is of course “metaphysical mimesis” which really is the foundation for the above mentioned definitions and is very complex. In ancient Greece, each idea of *metaphysical mimesis* is dependent on how each philosopher saw *form* and *matter* and the *imitation* of the Absolute. As we have said, Aquinas brings in the idea of *creatio ex nihilo* (based on revelation) which adds another dimension to the discussion. We will deal with the different definitions and systems throughout the chapter.

The basic commonality of all these notions is the fact that there is, in every case, “an original and a kind of copy”. (Stern 2014, pg. 22) Stern does note that while the word “copy” does not mean an identical duplication it also does not mean that there is no connection between the two, “the copy corresponds to its original in more than a merely conventional or symbolic way. The copy is, in some sense, like the original.” (Stern 2014, pg. 22) Jaroszyński notes that the word ‘copy’ is a fairly new phenomenon (gaining popularity in the middle ages and even more with the invention of the printing press) and he explains that the word *mimesis* in the Ancient Greek conception was very “fluid” and had a variety of meanings i.e. “imitation, and pretending, and expressing, and acting, and simulating.”⁶ What connects all these meanings is the fact that there is a “relation” between that which is imitated and that which is the imitation. (Jaroszyński 1996, pg. 14)

This brings us to the differing notions of *mimesis*, specifically that of the Greek philosopher Plato and his famous student Aristotle. While they both see the term as essential to the explanation of the theatrical art they use it rather differently because of their differing metaphysical systems. Plato holds *mimesis* in opposition to that which occurs during narration which merely relates a story rather than embodying it, “By narration, Socrates roughly means an indirect description of the story, in the third person: ‘the priest asked the Greeks to return his daughter for a ransom’. By *mimesis*, in this instance, he clearly means somebody pretending to be the priest, seemingly grief-stricken... ‘I’m begging you Greeks to give my darling Briseis back. I’ll give you anything you want.’” (Stern 2014, pg. 23) Plato further delineates between

⁶ “Jak widzimy, mimesis jest i naśladowaniem, i udawaniem, wyrażaniem, i graniem, i symulowaniem. Pierwotne znaczenie tego słowa jest więc bardzo płynne, tak jak większości słów zaczerpniętych z języka potocznego. Płynność ta nie oznacza jednak wieloznaczności, ponieważ we wszystkich przedstawionych przykładach jest coś wspólnego, co je łączy. Tym czymś jest relacja do przedmiotu naśladowania, najczęściej rzeczywistego, (choć jedna sztuka może też (naśladować drugą), różne są natomiast same przedmioty jak i sposób ich naśladowania.” (Jaroszyński 1996, pg. 14)

two types of *mimesis* essential to the theatrical act; *mimesis* as imitation (e.g. theatre scenery that recreates a real setting) and *mimesis* as imagination (e.g. actors pretending to be different characters). (Stern 2014, pg. 23)

The scenery on set can be likened to a painting which Socrates and Glaucon discuss is “two removes from nature” (Stern 2014, pg. 24) i.e. “two removes” from the ideal world of the forms. For Plato a Form or Idea (*eidos*) is that which gives something its essence, its being “the permanent reality which makes a thing be what it is”. This means that while a physical thing is finite, can pass away and disintegrate i.e. “a dog” - there is an immaterial, intelligible and separate reality from which the “Idea of dog (dogness)” comes. (New World Encyclopaedia contributors 2024, n.p) The Idea or the Form exists forever and is not subject to change and the dog is a mere reflection (an imitation) of the ideal/perfect version. The painting or scenery is therefore an imitation of an imitation i.e. “two removes from nature”.

The example of a couch is used in the *Republic* to discuss art's relation to the ideal world. The ideal world, i.e. the real world for Plato, houses the ideal form of a chair. The carpenter creates by imitating this form and the couch is now in the imperfect and temporal world and is in itself temporal. (Stern 2014, pg. 24) In Plato's metaphysical system therefore, art has a danger of leading man away from the true form instead of leading man towards it (which is the opposite of what he prizes as the highest form of 'knowing' i.e. philosophical contemplation) because the painter paints the couch which is already imperfect and finite. The painter also does not need to know the intricacies... the actual reality of how to make a couch as he is merely painting the 2D image of it. This means that there is a lack in comprehending and capturing the thing as it truly is. This, Plato worries, may cause a domino effect on the audience who then takes the perspective of the painter/poet/director/actors as authoritative over reality - binding both imitator and observer of imitation in a lie, “People tend to take the false or deficient poetic imitations for the real thing or, perhaps, they put too much faith in or are not sufficiently skeptical about the imitations.” (Stern 2014, pg. 25)

When it comes to *mimesis* in the second sense i.e. that which involves the world of the imagination, Plato warns against this false world that he says the actor and audience willingly partake in. A world where the actors pretend and the audience participates in this pretense and a world which is again “two removes from nature”. This he believes can result in disillusionment i.e. the “...naïve audience members may go on to use characters from plays as role-models, falsely taking them to be the real thing (or sufficiently like the real thing).” (Stern 2014, pg. 25) Plato believes theatre practitioners aim at “verisimilitude” which is that which tries to be

“truth-like”. (Stern 2014, pg. 29) This leads Plato to criticize *mimesis* found in the theatrical art because (as we have discussed) the copy can never be as good as the original.

Plato would also prefer that the guardians of the city i.e. the philosopher-king imitated virtues and not vices and therefore he does not see any guardian taking part in a theatrical act where there is an embodiment of characters that exhibit bad behaviours. This is because Plato believes that imitation of vices even in a theatrical sense (because it causes the actor to repeatedly perform ‘bad behaviours’) can lead to imitation of them in real life,

If they (*the guardians*) do imitate anything, then from their earliest childhood they should choose appropriate models to imitate—people who are brave, self-disciplined, godfearing, free, that sort of thing. They should neither do, nor be good at imitating, what is illiberal, nor any other kind of shameful behaviour, in case enjoyment of the imitation gives rise to enjoyment of the reality. Have you never noticed how imitation, if long continued from an early age, becomes part of a person’s nature, turns into habits of body, speech and mind? (Plato *The Republic* Book 3: 393d—395b) (Griffith 2000, pg. 132)

Let us now turn to Aristotle’s views on *mimesis*, views that are different as they are obviously based on his own understanding of reality i.e. his own metaphysical system. Aristotle’s well known definition of *tragedy* in the *Poetics* (an exploration of the essential aspects of the dramatic art) is as follows, “**Tragedy** is an *imitation* of an *action* that is *admirable*, complete and possesses magnitude; in language made pleasurable, each of its species separated in different parts; performed *by actors*, not through narration; *effecting* through *pity* and *fear* the *catharsis* of such emotions.” (Aristotle *Poetics* Book VI) (Stern 2014, pg. 32) (*Emphasis added*). We can see in this definition that while Aristotle is in agreement with Plato over *mimesis* being fundamental to the theatrical art as he also recognises a distinction between what narrators and dramatists do, he has (as we have mentioned) a more positive and slightly different understanding of the term.

As Richard Janko posits, while Plato warns against the deceptive nature of art, Aristotle sees how art can bring one closer to the truth of reality. (Janko 1987, pg. xv) While this rests on Aristotle’s theory of *hylomorphism* (which we will elaborate on in the next section) and his rejection of Plato’s ideal world of the forms, Janko believes that Aristotle is able to claim a positive aspect to the fact that art or tragedy cannot imitate every detail as, precisely through this lack of detail, there is not a distancing from but “an increased clarity of the basic form” (Janko 1987, pg. xv). For Janko this is why Aristotle can state that poetry is more similar to philosophy than history i.e. Aristotle says that “poetry is a more philosophical and more serious thing than history, since poetry speaks more of things that are universal, and history of things that are particular.” (Sachs 2006, pg. 31) This is, according to Janko, due to the fact that “history

represents real actions and events (“particulars”), i.e. what actual historical characters said or did, whereas poetry tends to represent generalised ones (“universals”), i.e. what a certain kind of person would say or do in a certain kind of situation.” (Janko 1987, pg. xv)

We can also add here that the universal character of tragedies which occur due to being based on universal themes - universal themes common to all humans, regardless of any framework (i.e. time, space, culture, religion, ethnicity) - is precisely what attracts and from which the audience benefits. The fact that a South African from the 21st century can watch a play from ancient Greece e.g. *Antigone*, written over 1500 years ago, and still identify with and gain something from its central themes is testament to what the tragedian or playwright can actually do. He can provide an experience where man (an audience member) can enter personally and communally (with other audience members) into the lives of individual characters who represent themes, values and struggles that are common to all men. The question is, does this mean a tragedian should be a philosopher first to ensure that the correct universals are recognized? We must also note that the power tragedy possesses comes from both the display of the universal but via particular concrete individuals i.e. via the characters that are embodied by the actor. As Sachs notes, we are only moved emotionally because of the very fact that these characters are to us watching, like real people “genuine individuals” i.e. it is through “their particularity that they make their mark on us” (Sachs, n.p).

Although we have to admit that in many instances theatre has in fact caused all the things Plato feared i.e. it has drawn some people into a false image of reality and led them to their moral degradation, Aristotle makes a good case for the prudent use of *tragedy*. While Aristotle does not seem to equate theatre with philosophy or education, as Janko writes, “Aristotle responds to Plato’s charges against poetry by arguing that poetry can be of philosophical value without being philosophy, and of educational value without being education” (Janko 1987, pg. xiv); Aristotle’s understanding of tragedy does seem to see theatre as a key part of a process that can help introduce man to the truth of reality and direct man to his proper end, his ultimate good. As Stern notes, “Whereas Plato argued that playwrights and actors should be banished from the ideal city for their suspect imitations of reality, Aristotle argued that theatre, particularly tragedy, was vital for stimulating our emotions and helping us to understand ourselves.” (Stern 2014, n.p)

From the onset Aristotle states that imitation or *mimesis* cannot be demonized as in the case of Plato because it seems to be a totally natural human action as well as a way for man to gain knowledge and therefore actualise his potency (which we will expand on in the next section), “For imitating is co-natural with human beings from childhood, and in this they differ from the

other animals because they are the most imitative and produce their first acts of understanding by means of imitation; also all human beings take delight in imitations.” (Sachs 2006, pg. 22) Joe Sachs in his commentary on the *Poetics* notes that the imitation Aristotle refers to, that is specific to *tragedy*, is not the mere mimicking of characteristic sounds or movements, it is far deeper than that (Sachs, n.p). As we observed earlier; *tragedy* is the imitation of action. This is not just any action however but (as Sachs posits) it is specifically the action to which Aristotle refers and expounds on in the *Nicomachean Ethics* i.e. Praxis, “When Aristotle says that a tragedy sets before us an action that is *serious* and *complete* (1449b 24-25), he points us to the conditions of responsible human action that he discusses in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in Chapters 2-5 of Book III.” (Sachs 2006, pg. 1)(*Emphasis added*) Only that which engages the will (voluntary) and orders man towards some good end is seen as praxis. Praxis is also not found amongst “animals and young children” as it is specific to mature humans who have the ability to decide. (Sachs, n.p)

While mimicry of ordinary human actions (like that imitated by a mime) is not simple at all and in fact requires a lot of skill from the mimic, Sachs notes that for Aristotle it is the job of the dramatist to identify and imitate “things more remote from the eye and ear than familiar people.” (Sachs, n.p) Sachs posits that Aristotle believes that it is the job of the poet to identify and imitate which actions are important and or “worth paying attention to”. (Sachs, n.p) The dramatist is called (like Shakespeare does) to imitate actions that require choice and decision, that “imitate repentance and forgiveness, true instances of action in Aristotle’s sense of the word...” (Sachs, n.p) The poet/dramatist/tragedian in fact must be alert to the actions that truly reveal the nature of the human person, “This difference between what merely happens and what forms human experience is not only Aristotle’s reason for striving to understand tragedy, it is at the heart of his understanding of tragedy.” (Sachs 2006, pg. 1)

Theatre which centers around the human person and his or her action can (especially in the light of Wojtyła’s philosophy which we will explore in the next chapter) therefore be understood as a ‘microcosm’ of man. One could therefore posit that Theatre and philosophical anthropology, while obviously not identical seem to be inextricably linked. Philosophical anthropology is defined by *The Polish Society of St Thomas Aquinas* as a philosophy that has man as its object and which strives to uncover (through right reason) who he is and what he is made for as well as identify what actions are specific to his nature i.e. it is “an explanatory interpretation of the human being, man, and his essentially human action.” (PTTA, n.p) It must be kept in mind that as Piotr Mazur (who quotes Kamiński) writes, philosophical anthropology is dependent on

metaphysics as it needs it to properly explain the “human phenomena” it ascertains is essential to man, “Philosophical anthropology explains human phenomena, their ontic structure and, consequently, their existential position among other beings. Metaphysical claims about the ontic composition of act and potency, properties of beings, and the hierarchy of beings are needed for this [explanation].” (Kamiński 1989, 261) (Mazur 2023, pg. 275) Mazur reminds his readers however that philosophical anthropology forms the foundation of and therefore comes prior to the fields of “psychology, ethics, aesthetics and the philosophy of culture.” (Mazur 2023, pg. 275) The theatrical stage could therefore theoretically act as a ‘philosophical’ or ‘pre-philosophical’ microscope if you will. A spotlight highlighting the connection Anaximenes and later Aristotle observed “between the inner man and his psyche and ‘all the rest’, i.e. the cosmic god.” (Krapiec 1983, pg. 4)

A caveat therefore is necessary here; if the *materialist* or *subjectivist* understanding of man (two concepts we will deal with in the latter part of the paper) is adopted, theatre becomes merely a collection of observations of human behavior and the deeper understanding of human action is not explored. A reminder that Aristotle’s ideas on the theatre are connected to his ethics, and his ethics are connected to his metaphysics. If one adopts the aforementioned ideologies one reduces action and therefore plot - to random choices or cultural constructs where *tragedy* merely becomes a vehicle to expose these constructs and question them. The *theatrical art* becomes a vehicle for politics. The theatre will still be a mirror to man but only a superficial one. We will see the actions man takes and their psychological motivations but will struggle to see as clearly their spiritual or full interior aspect. Saying this, man's emotional life, external actions that include his subjective ‘I’ and his psychological aspect can also not be ignored as the full picture of man will also not be reflected.

To not portray the spiritual aspect of man and his cohesion of body and soul, to not portray the fullness of his inner life that is bound by his objective aspect and reality as a whole, to not show his whole person – this has implications for the way actors portray a character and the script they choose to perform in. When a materialistic vision of man is adopted by the author/director/actor a whole dimension of the character that is being portrayed is eliminated and therefore he/she is rendered incomplete – one could say that the rendition is actually anti-human. When a purely subjectivist vision of man is adopted, the inner life actually implodes in on itself as its uniqueness has no basis to anchor itself (a fact we will explore in more depth).

The actor, however, does not perform a metaphysical operation and sever his soul from his person, neither does the author or the audience, even if they ignore the spiritual aspect. They do,

however, cast this dimension in a shadow thereby eliminating the very aspect that makes them able to partake in this artistic endeavor in the first place. Animals do not perform theatre to grasp a deeper understanding of themselves and their place in this world. Theatre is unique to man just as philosophy, religion and art. Krapiec notes this distinctive aspect of man to create culture as he, "is both a discoverer and user of many fine arts, as well as practical ones... Of course, animals also build 'homes' for themselves...but their activity is instinctive and always the same, while man's activity is the result of reflection and creative invention." (Krapiec 1983, pg. 16) Reducing the aspect that allows this very art form to exist i.e. personhood makes no sense: it is self-sabotage and or subterfuge.

Besides the subjective aspect, current theatrical productions and entertainment in general seem to play mainly to one aspect of man, his sensuous and affective life. They try to release or incite and increase the emotions of their audience. Even though this is an aspect of theatre and Aristotle, in his definition of tragedy acknowledges the role of emotions in bringing about *catharsis* (which we will elaborate on in a moment); Sachs explains that these emotions are incited for a deeper cause than hedonistic pleasure.

3. Catharsis

Here we reach one of the most historically contested terms used by Aristotle i.e. *catharsis*. Due to the fact that Aristotle's explanation of *catharsis* seems to be lost to history, both Janko and Sachs note that there are many interpretations of this term. The first one being the most popular definition attributed to Jacob Bernays i.e. where *catharsis* is seen as a form of healing, an emotional release as it were. (Sachs 2006, pg. 11) This release of "oppressive" emotions was understood by Sigmund Freud to mean a release of that which we are not able to indulge i.e. that which is "repressed". (Sachs 2006, pg. 11) Another definition sees *catharsis* as educational, as enacting a process of refinement, "as a cultivation and elevation of sensibility". (Sachs 2006, pg. 11) John Milton and subsequently G. E. Lessing saw *catharsis* as a moral instrument. They believed *catharsis* to be a "purgation" or "purification", a tempering of negative emotions. *Catharsis* enabled man to not overindulge these emotions and therefore made him more capable of transforming his "passions into virtues". (Sachs 2006, pg. 11)

Deeper than the idea of releasing emotions, refinement of taste and purification of passions is the idea that has religious undertones, in that *catharsis* is seen as a cleansing of some kind of sinfulness or ungodliness, "(katharsis) is a ritual purification from some polluting impiety." (Sachs 2006, pg. 11) Sachs notes that the one other place where Aristotle mentions *catharsis* is

“in a reference to the purification of a religious statue in a play of Euripides (1455b 15).” (Sachs 2006, pg. 11) There are “twentieth-century scholars (H. Otte, G. Else)” who think that *catharsis* does not occur in the audience members but in the drama itself where the hero sins and then in some way is “purified of moral guilt.” (Sachs 2006, pg. 11) Another modern approach to *catharsis* (Leon Golden) seems to evade the link to emotions and focuses solely on *catharsis* as a tool of the intellect which enables “clarification”. (Sachs 2006, pg. 10)

Sachs does not believe these definitions completely grasp the meaning Aristotle was trying to convey. He believes that the key to understanding the *catharsis* posed by Aristotle is the word that replaces it i.e. wonder, “The word *catharsis* drops out of the *Poetics* because the word wonder, *to rhaumaston*, replaces it, first in chapter 9, where Aristotle argues that pity and fear arise most of all where wonder does, and finally in chapters 24 and 25, where he singles out wonder as the aim of the poetic art itself, into which the aim of tragedy in particular merges.” (Sachs 2006, pg. 15)

One of the aims of this dissertation is to bring to the fore the question of what the underlying structures of theatre are, its definition and what theatre should aim to be. A philosophy of the theatre should try to establish the foundational aspects of the object of study and its ends, so that those who engage in theatre (in whatever pedagogical method they choose to employ) can stay true to its intrinsic structures and thereby help bring about its fullest and most perfect realization. An important topic to address therefore is the philosophical problem of beauty. The problem may not seem at first glance as connected to theatre as with the fine arts or music for example, in fact we can question how often the word beautiful is used in common speech to describe a successful production? Yet beauty or something that can be associated with it hovers underneath the surface of a play. Something occurs in the interiority of the spectator (obviously depending on the script chosen and whether the piece of drama is performed successfully) that elevates and satisfies the human spirit.

As we have said before, Aristotle proposed that an essential aspect of theatre is that it brings about a *catharsis* which can be seen as a precursor to the experience of wonder. Again, as Sachs writes, “The word *catharsis* drops out of the *Poetics*” due to the fact that Aristotle then substitutes it with the word “wonder”. (Sachs 2006, pg. 15) Aristotle does this because he sees ‘wonder’ as the end to which theatre is ordered, “he singles out wonder as the aim of the poetic art itself, into which the aim of tragedy in particular merges.” (Sachs 2006, pg. 15) Sachs believes that for Aristotle *catharsis* has therefore a purgative or purifying function in the sense

that it makes way for the spectator to experience wonder, "The catharsis, the washing away, is more aptly described as an *ekplexis* (astonishment), a knocking away and the state in which we are left is wonder." (Sachs 2006, pg. 15)

Building on what Sachs has observed we could add that this state of astonishment is however not some state of shock or experience of a cognitive void but as Joseph Piper writes, wonder is the desire for truth, "(it) is to be on the way, in *via*; it certainly means to be struck dumb, momentarily, but equally it means that one is searching for the truth." (Piper 2009, pg. 116 & 117) Wonder as we know is the starting point for philosophy, it is the thirst for truth as Aquinas says i.e. it is "the longing for knowledge, an active desire for knowledge." (Piper 2009, pg. 116 & 117)

We can now understand why Socrates, in his infamous quote from the *Theaetetus* by Plato, links philosophy with wonder, "SOCRATES: I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight into your nature when he said that you were a philosopher, for wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder..." (Plato 2008, 155 c-d) Piper explains the link between philosophy and wonder even further when he says that philosophy has the task of looking at the mundane "ordinary things of everyday life" for the extraordinary i.e. the "deeper aspects of reality". (Piper 2009, pg. 110) The job of the philosopher is to question the sometimes not thought through, commonly believed, "currently accepted meaning attached to them" and so too question the importance or "value" they possess. (Piper 2009, pg. 110) This is not to be a menace to society or a way to lead society into some kind of *scepticism* but because what is taken for granted is often hiding the very thing that will make us not take it for granted i.e. the surprising truth or "the unusual". (Piper 2009, pg. 110) The "unusual" or surprising truth sparks in man the interior response of wonderment or the act of "marveling". (Piper 2009, pg. 110)

After viewing a *tragedy*, when having undergone two extreme emotions of fear and pity, Sachs says the spectator has a sense that he has been brought through to "the other side". (Sach, n.p) Sachs believes that Aristotle chooses these two passions specifically because they are able to expose the essence of humanness the best, "I suggest that Aristotle is right in saying that the powers which first of all bring this human image to sight for us are pity and fear." (Sachs, n.p) Through the use of theatre it seems the audience is being called to become philosophers themselves or at least start their philosophical journey. It seems that through the theatrical act (*tragedy* in particular) man is put under a microscope, and the audience is forced to pause and really look into the "ordinary things of everyday life" for the "deeper aspects of reality". (Piper 2009, pg. 110)

Sachs does not deny that the mechanism of *catharsis* can cause psycho-somatic reactions to occur in the audience members and therefore it can mean a 'purgation' in the sense of a feeling of an emotional release. (Sachs, n.p) He believes however that this can be both good and bad for the audience members in the sense that one is healing (e.g. you are flushing out the feeling of fear from your system) and the other causes him to become addicted to the thrill the fear provides. (Sachs, n.p) *Catharsis* can even have a purifying function in the sense that man's emotional life is cleansed of fear and pity in their negative meanings. (Sachs, n.p) Sachs believes however that Aristotle and so too the tragedian has a higher goal with its use, "Sophocles does make me fear and pity human knowledge when I watch the *Oedipus Tyrannus*, but this is not a refinement of those feelings but a discovery that they belong to a surprising object. Sophocles is not training my feelings but using them to show me something worthy of wonder." (Sachs, n.p) Through tragedy we see the 'unusual' and 'marvel' at the *wonder* that is man - the start of any good philosophical anthropology.

Sachs goes further and says that the *wonder* produced by *tragedy* echoes the feeling experienced after an encounter with beauty, "The experience of wonder is the disclosure of a sight...thought or image that...grabs and holds us by a power borrowed from nothing apart from itself. The two things that Plotinus says characterize beauty, that the soul recognizes it at first glance and spontaneously gives welcome to it, equally describe the experience of wonder." (Sachs, n.p) Sachs however believes that Aristotle does not claim that the end of tragedy is to create morally good people or educate man in morality but rather to get rid of "our habitual assumptions and opinions... our moralism and sentimentality" (Sachs 2006, pg. 16). He points to Aristotle's words that the tragic hero and his downfall is due to a mixture of (the highly contested term) *hamartia* i.e "missing the mark" i.e. due to a poor decision as well as a bad occurrence that is not a result of his decision making, "It is therefore necessary for the story ... (*to change*) not into good fortune from bad but the opposite way, from good fortune to bad, not through badness of character but on account of a great missing of the mark, either by the sort of person described or by someone better than that rather than worse." (Aristotle The Poetics) (Sachs 2006, pg. 37)

We could still see tragedy (in my opinion and also dependent on the underlying epistemology, metaphysics, anthropology and ethics adopted by the tragedian) as the starting point of philosophical inquiry and therefore as part of the process of coming to 'know oneself' and that which would activate one's potentialities and therefore as part of the process of leading a fulfilled and virtuous life. Tragedy also does not begin and end with Aristotle and we should

perhaps question the degree of influence that Christianity has had on people like Shakespeare (although there has long been an attempt to secularise him) who seems to have been able to take tragedy even further and hold his heroes more responsible but in a “non-moralising” way.

In the tragedy of *Macbeth*, Shakespeare shows the impact of his hero's decisions (especially those which violate his conscience and natural law) on the hero's own person. Shakespeare shows both the internal conflict that arises when making moral decisions as well as the consequences that follow. The consequences that result if something morally neutral like ambition is not rightly ordered, tempered or kept in check i.e. he shows that man can sink into despair and guilt ridden insanity. The beauty or wonder Sachs believes Aristotle is referring to could therefore be seen as occurring as a result of or something equal to the beauty and wonder that occurs when marveling at the truth of the human person and what makes him truly good - truly fulfilled - and what does not. As Sachs writes, “Tragedy is about central and indispensable human attributes, disclosed to us by the pity that draws us towards them and the fear that makes us recoil from what threatens them.” (Sachs, n.p) We could add that we are drawn to the universal human qualities through a recognition of them in ourselves through the emotion of pity and we recoil in fear at the thought that those qualities or in fact virtues may be replaced with vice and therefore that which causes the person or hero to become less than what he is called to be - he becomes a *tragedy* himself.

4. Beauty in the aspect of 'Being, Morality and Art'

If we are to understand this point in a deeper way it would then seem pertinent to delve into the age-old question: What is Beauty? In current philosophy and so too contemporary society i.e. in this era of *relativism* and *subjectivism*, it is very difficult to answer this question. In my article *Modernism, Mysticism and the Pursuit of Freedom* I attempted to explain the origin of this phenomenon, “When Oscar Wilde professed the doctrine “Art for Art's sake” in his novel *The Picture of Dorian Grey* (Buzwell, 2014) it would seem that art had finally been liberated. No more would she be hampered by the suffocating dogma of tradition, no more would she be held back by the stagnant past, no more would unrealistic moral ideals restrict her right to self-expression...” (Szczecina 2021, pg. 172 & 173) Even though *Modernism* is a difficult term to define, it seems that one of the main causes of this movement was the artist's insatiable thirst for freedom. (Szczecina 2021, pg. 172 & 173) As a result of this inordinate emphasis on freedom, it became the primary value usurping all others, “Not only did the Modernists seek freedom from “the rules of academic art” but also the restrictive “demands of the public.” The

rallying cry “Art for Art’s Sake”, Witcombe further states, was for the artist to finally be relinquished from “the tyranny of meaning and purpose”. (Witcombe, 2000) (Szczecina 2021, pg. 172 & 173) The desire for freedom and the overemphasis of the subjectivity of the artist meant that art and so too beauty had become or had to be severed from its metaphysical roots.

In this section we will not be debating whether beauty is objective or not. Rather we will attempt to ascertain Wojtyła’s view on beauty as this will be helpful in trying to develop a *Philosophy of the Theatre* based on his philosophical works. We have two main sources for this endeavor; one being the infamous *Letter to Artists* he delivered as Pope in 1999 and an earlier text I have already mentioned; his retreat *Gospel and Art. Retreat for artists*, given in Kraków in 1962. While he does refer to Plato, we are very aware of his Aristotelian-Thomistic background and his use of phenomenology as we attempt to discover his understanding of beauty.

On the first day of the retreat Bishop Wojtyła grapples with the question we too are trying to uncover. In both the sources we are using he is primarily speaking in his capacity as a theologian, but as we have dealt with before in the introduction, Wojtyła is a “Pilgrim of the Absolute” and therefore we clearly see his parallel but separate use of philosophy, likewise in the opening section of the retreat i.e. *God is Beauty*. It is important to note that in both this retreat and his *Letter to Artists* we see that the primary concern for Wojtyła is the relationship of beauty with being and the relationship of beauty with morality. Perhaps Wojtyła feels this is of primary concern because the modern era has brought with it (as we have referred to earlier) a distancing from an objective understanding of beauty... As Jaroszyński writes (in this day and age) beauty is mainly related to the sphere of aesthetics “... with art, with sensory knowledge, and with emotions...” whereas in the time of ancient Greece beauty was primarily related to “reality (the cosmos) and morality (καλοκάγαθία)” (Jaroszyński 2018, pg. 579).

From the onset Wojtyła acknowledges beauty’s relationship with being - this is akin to the earliest philosophers who as Jaroszyński writes were (although varied) mainly interested in this as well, “The first theories of beauty were not univocal but were intended to consider the analogical dimension of beauty, and even the transcendental dimension of beauty.” (Jaroszyński 2018 pg. 579) - and that while scripture does not explicitly state that “God is Beauty” Wojtyła suggests that we can discover this fact by analogy. This requires first establishing that God is the Absolute Good. In this case Wojtyła takes the understanding of God given by revelation and uses philosophy to draw further conclusions. He refers to the scriptural passages i.e. (Mark 10:18; Luke 18:19) where Christ is discussing the idea of the “good” with a “young man”. (Wojtyła

2021, Lesson I section, para. 3) The young man has called Christ a “Good Teacher” and Wojtyła notes that Christ dismisses the man’s thoughtless use of the term, he “pushes that adjective away immediately.” (Wojtyła 2021, Lesson I section, para. 3) It is here that Christ draws the man into a deeper understanding of the word when He asks (in what can be described as a Socratic fashion), “Who is good? Surely, no one is good but God alone!” (Wojtyła 2021, Lesson I section, para. 3)

Wojtyła explains that Christ is not denying that there is a mark of goodness in all created things, “every entity, every creature is good in some way, that every creature is some kind of good” but he wants to make the man and so too us aware of the fact that this goodness has a source, “Good is—in the complete, absolute meaning of the word—exclusive to God.” (Wojtyła 2021, Lesson I section, para. 3) Wojtyła’s metaphysical realism is evident here. Even though the method of metaphysical realist philosophy is a bottom-up approach; where you find the most basic properties of beings and their first and ultimate causes through metaphysical abstraction and separation (which we will elaborate on in a moment) and thereby draw conclusions about the Absolute, whereas theology has a top-down approach; where God is revealed to man and therefore his revealed nature is applied then to explain for example the nature of man who is made in His image and likeness, nevertheless Wojtyła uses the conclusions and method of philosophy to understand the topic which scripture has not expanded on i.e. in this case beauty and its relation to God.

While it is not possible to go into a full explanation of the metaphysical realistic system, due to the limited nature of this thesis, it does seem necessary (to understand what Wojtyła is saying in this retreat and so too in his letter) to explain a few concepts first. In Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics the object of study is not “ideas”, “meanings of concepts” or the “data of consciousness” but concretely existing things. (Maryniarczyk 2015, pg. 14) Realist metaphysicians study “the world of persons and things” i.e. concrete beings - beings given in experience - they study ‘being’ itself in fact. The study of ‘being *qua* being’ is not for its own sake, but to better comprehend reality and it therefore forms the foundation “for cultivating philosophy.” (Maryniarczyk 2015, pg. 31)

Without going into the long and complex history of the search for the foundational structure of reality and therefore *being* itself and how under Plato matter was seen as separate from form and therefore looked down upon, we will rather begin with Aristotle’s theory of *hylomorphism* which Aquinas adopted and further developed. In this theory (in the metaphysical sense) all beings are

composed of *matter (hyle)* which is understood as housing the ability to become i.e. its “potentiality” and *form (morphē)* which is understood as that which organises and activates matter into becoming. (Maryniarczyk 2018, pg. 124, 125 & 139) Form is the “first act of prime matter” (Maryniarczyk 2018, pg. 133) and therefore the “internal principle of existence and action” in the case of organic things (Maryniarczyk 2018, pg. 134). In the case of inorganic things or products of human creativity the form is rather an external principle i.e. it is “accidental” as matter is “secondary” and form rather refers to the shape of the thing. (Maryniarczyk 2018, pg. 134)

Being in this theory is also understood as having the underlying structures of *substance* and *accidents*. While there are numerous ways the term substance can be ‘used’ in realistic metaphysics i.e. as referring to both matter and form, an individual concrete thing, and as interchangeable with being, we mean to highlight here the fact that a substance (*ousia*) can also refer to what is essential, the ‘what’ something is, “a substance is that which cannot not be in a being, that due to which a being is what it is, and what we apprehend in cognition as the essence of a thing and express in a definition.” (Maryniarczyk 2018, pg. 151 & 152) Accidents are non-essential, they do not exist on their own i.e. they refer to that “which belongs to something” or “which has its subject in something” and they also refer to the properties of the subject e.g. quantity, quality, relation etc. (Maryniarczyk 2018, pg. 154) The final understanding of being was introduced by Aquinas i.e. being as *essence* and *existence*.

Aquinas’ discovery created a big shift in the previous understanding of the most fundamental structures of being. As Father Maryniarczyk explains Aquinas did not accept the previously held beliefs that form or matter or both were the “the source of the existence” of all truly existing beings. Due to inspiration from revelation and his subsequent philosophical thesis of *creatio ex nihilo* (creation out of nothing), the discovery of the cognitive process of *metaphysical separation* as well as the reasoning we will express - Aquinas believed rather that the Absolute or “Ipsum Esse (the pure act of existence)” was this source. (Maryniarczyk 2018, 198 & 218)

For Aquinas the Absolute being is the one who is the highest of all values and or perfections, “All created perfections are in God. Hence, He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He lacks not... any excellence which may be found in any genus.” (ST I, q. 4 a. 2) This is due to the fact that the Absolute is self-subsisting, uncaused and is therefore likewise the first cause of all created things. Aquinas states that all beings like when “iron becomes ignited by fire” get their being from, are dependent, participate in God’s being “who possesses being most perfectly” for

their existence. He quotes Aristotle who states that “whatever is greatest in being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every truth; just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all heat.” (ST I, q. 44 a. 1)

The Absolute is “pure act” meaning that there is no potentiality in him. He is the fullest realization of himself whereas in created things there is a difference between potentiality and actuality. An acorn has the potential to be an oak tree, a lion cub has the potential to be a fully mature lion and the person has the potential to become an adult as well as a morally good person - but their potential needs to be actualised for them to become their fullest realization i.e. for them to reach the end to which they have internally been ordered to become, “*potentia* means an aptitude to change, to act or to be acted upon, to give or to receive some new determination. *Actus* means the fulfillment of such a capacity.” (Dubray 1907, n.p)

As God is *pure act* and therefore has no potentiality and matter is that which “is in potentiality”, God is not composed of any matter. (ST I, q. 3 a. 2) The Absolute is therefore his essence, “God is the same as His essence or nature”. This denotes that he subsists in himself, “Since God then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.” (ST I, q. 3 a. 3) In fact the Absolute is not only essence but existence itself i.e. ‘*Ipsum Esse Subsistens*’. In ‘created things’ their essence (what something is) cannot equal their existence (by which something is/that it is). That would mean that they are the cause of their own existence which is absurd, “Now it is impossible for a thing’s existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. However, because his being is uncaused, and he is “the first efficient cause” God’s essence must equal his existence.” (ST I, q. 3 a. 4)

Father Maryniarczyk’s explanation of Aquinas’s understanding of the Absolute is that, “The existence of each composite being is mediated in the existence of the Absolute (it participates in the existence of the Absolute), who as *Ipsum Esse*, is the act, cause, and form of everything that is.” (Maryniarczyk 2018, pg. 217) This is derived from the fact that, as we have said, only the Absolute is “necessary” and all created beings (contingent beings) are “not necessary”. (Maryniarczyk 2018, pg. 191 & 232) The relationship between contingent beings (created things that are not their own first cause and therefore have to participate in the Absolute to have their being) and the Absolute are also so intertwined that contingent beings serve as signs of the Absolute.

Man therefore (like all beings) can be defined using these aforementioned structures. More specifically he is a composite, he is made up of body and soul (Maryniarczyk 2015, pg. 113) where in his case the soul contains not only the “sensitive faculties” both external e.g. the five senses and internal e.g. instinct but most importantly the unique powers of “reason and the will”. (Maryniarczyk 2015, pg. 114) This means that the most defining feature of man is that which is immaterial. The way the intellect functions for Aristotle is that both the senses and reason are involved. Through the cognitive process of *metaphysical abstraction*, the essence of a really existing object comes to be known. Once one comes into contact with the concrete being through the senses, the object is in a sense ‘dematerialised’ and the form is ‘imprinted’ on the intellect and therefore a concept is formed. The essence here is understood as “simple, general and unchanging”. (Maryniarczyk 2015, pg. 129)

Metaphysical separation is a development by Aquinas and leads to the relationship and distinguishing of essence from existence. This is due to an act of “existential judgment” which recognises **that** a thing **is**. Metaphysical separation also identifies being i.e what becomes “the object of metaphysics... ‘something that exists’ i.e. a definite content determined by existence.” (Maryniarczyk 2015, pg. 138) While abstraction may identify a person by their ability to reason i.e he/she is understood under a “general aspect”, the fact the man can ascertain a person’s “concreteness” and “individuality” is not explained by this cognitive process; *metaphysical separation* on the other hand does. (Maryniarczyk 2015, pg. 135)

According to the realistic metaphysical system all beings that truly exist in the world have transcendental properties. As Jaroszyński writes, “Metaphysics as it was classically understood investigates being as being and the properties of being that are called the transcendentals. The transcendentals, aside from being, are as follows: thing, one, separateness, truth, good” (Jaroszyński 2018, pg. 584) and we can add beauty here as well. Transcendental properties are called transcendental because every truly existing being has these properties but they do not exhaust them (many things can be called beautiful but that does not mean that the property of beauty is somehow reduced); as Maryniarczyk says in his article *On the Transcendental Properties Of Real Beings*, “These properties were called transcendental properties (the transcendentals) on account of their universality, since they belong to everything that really exists.” (Maryniarczyk 2016, pg. 431 & 432) It is important to note that while all these properties are interchangeable with being i.e. *convertuntur cum ente*, according to Aquinas they are not synonyms. They rather add to being in a conceptual sense. On his *Commentary on Aristotle’s metaphysics* Aquinas states that, “Now the terms ‘one’ and ‘being’ signify one nature

according to different concepts, and therefore they are like the terms principle and cause, and not like the terms tunic and garment, which are wholly synonymous.” (Part IV, lesson 2, no. 549)

When Wojtyła in the retreat *The Gospel and Art* notes that, “Everything found in the concept of “good” is fulfilled in God alone” (Wojtyła 2021, Lesson I section, para. 3) he is referring to the fact that, and as we have illustrated above, contingent beings can lose their existence (we observe in everyday life that things change and come into and out of being) they therefore cannot be their own cause and furthermore their goodness cannot be absolute. Instead, this goodness (existing as a transcendental property in truly existing things) is a sign pointing to the type of being that cannot be contingent, cannot pass into and out of being and does not change – the being that is necessary in order for contingent beings to exist.

Although beauty is debated as being a separate transcendental, in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition there is some consensus that like goodness and truth, beauty is a property of being. As Jaroszyński writes, “Most authors...hold that beauty is a separate transcendental property of being, although it is a synthesis of truth and the good (...Étienne Gilson, Mieczysław A. Krąpiec), or of being, truth, and the good (Gerald B. Phelan), or even a synthesis of all the transcendentals (Jacques Maritain)”. (Jaroszyński 2018, pg. 584) Due to the interchangeable nature of the transcendental properties, we can ascertain that if God is Absolute Goodness, then God must be Absolute Beauty and so too Absolute Truth etc., “Everything found in the concept of beauty is found in God.” (Wojtyła 2021, Lesson I section, para. 3)

In Wojtyła’s words we also find an allusion to the thought of St Augustine who, like Wojtyła, believed that God **is** Beauty. This we can deduce from Augustine’s confession referencing his adult conversion where he actually calls God by this transcendental property, “Late have I loved you, O Beauty ever ancient, ever new, late have I loved you!” Wojtyła further states that “created things—no matter whether they be works of nature or works of a human being, works of art—possess only a sort of glimmer, a reflection, one might say a certain fragment of beauty.” (Wojtyła 2021, Lesson I section, para. 3) Augustine also believed that everything in the created order bears a mark “a trace (*vestigium*) of their Triune Creator and thus of His beauty”. (John Saward 1997, pg. 75) This mark however is but a glimmer, a spark of the incandescence of Beauty that is the Triune God. Therefore, things are beautiful because God is beautiful first and they are not beautiful in comparison to Him. (John Saward 1997, pg. 75)

Wojtyła takes those attending the retreat even deeper into their understanding of beauty. He does this by describing the *lived experience* of beauty, “What is beauty? It is difficult to answer that question; we tend to judge beauty by the impact it has. Everything that is beautiful draws us to itself. It delights us; it is attractive to us in a special way.” (Wojtyła 2021, Lesson I section, para. 4) Wojtyła could be describing here a simultaneous inner and upward movement that beauty generates. The fact that it touches on the deepest aspect of ourselves – our being – deep calls to deep – being calls to being – beauty calls to beauty - and therefore attracts and “draws us to itself”. It also simultaneously draws us out of ourselves, and it raises us up to the Absolute beauty in which it finds its source, therefore it “delights us”. (Wojtyła 2021, Lesson I section, para. 4)

When Wojtyła states that beauty is, “attractive to our knowing” (Wojtyła 2021, Lesson I section, para. 4) he is on the one hand referring to Thomas Aquinas’ objective definition of beauty. As Jaroszyński describes, “Thomas Aquinas presented this idea saying: “beautiful things are those which please when seen” and of which “the beautiful is something pleasant to apprehend.” (Jaroszyński 2018, pg. 583) This is because, for Aquinas, beauty corresponds with the power of reason. In the *Summa* he clarifies that while both beauty and goodness are interchangeable because they are both founded on the form of a thing - which as we have explained earlier and as Jaroszyński confirms is, “... an internal principle of being or that (*which*) organizes matter or human action” (Jaroszyński 2018, pg. 582) - the difference lies in the fact that goodness has a more direct relationship with the appetite because it is the object of the will and beauty has a more direct relationship with the intellect,

Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and consequently, goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness being what all things desire); and therefore, it has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful things are those which please when seen. (ST I, q. 5 a. 4)

This means that for Aquinas beauty needs to fulfill three criteria (perfection, proportion, and brilliance) to correspond to that which would please, captivate and correspond with reason, “Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in what is after their own kind—because even sense is a sort of reason...” (ST I, q. 5 a. 4)

Etienne Gilson elaborates on how beauty is a sort of understanding. He refers to our experience of beauty; specifically beauty which engages the senses which usually present objects for the faculty of reason i.e. sight and hearing. He explains that when we go through the experience of

beauty we are left with the feeling of contentment or a type of fulfillment, “The perception of colors or sounds and harmonies is accompanied by the feeling that the perception itself is its own end. The beautiful is something, the very seeing and hearing of which is the totally sufficient reason for seeing and hearing it.” (Gilson 2002, pg. 311) Gilson then explains the adage “Beauty is the splendor of truth” because the truth which beauty presents fills the perceiver immediately and does not leave him wanting, “In its full sense... it means that certain truths present themselves in so bare a form...that they offer the mind the rare joy of a pure apprehension of truth... their perception becomes an end in itself and leaves no more to be desired.” (Gilson 2002, pg. 312)

Whilst recognizing beauty's relationship with the intellect, it seems that for Wojtyła the experience of beauty is not divorced from the other aspects of man i.e. his entire inner life (which we will explore in the next chapter), “But this is an exceptional type of cognitive experience. It's not an abstract experience that is purely intellectual. There is a certain unique sensitivity to beauty in the human soul; a kind of musical string that vibrates when a person meets up with beauty.” (Wojtyła 2021, Lesson I section, para. 4 & 5) *Lived experience* in Wojtyła's philosophy is an experience of the person. It involves his faculty of reason but also includes his emotional life, spiritual life as well as his subjectivity. We will explore this deeper in the chapter *I act, therefore I am* where we go into Wojtyła's concept of man, but it is important to note here that for Wojtyła, beauty affects more than man's intellect, affects him in totality of what Wojtyła understands as his interiority.

Wojtyła is careful to note in his retreat for artists that beauty must not be relegated to the realm of ideas like Plato did with his world of forms. As we have said, Plato believed that man both partakes in the physical world as well as an immaterial world which is the most complete, most real. The physical world is merely signs and shadows, a poor copy of it. The world of forms houses the ideals i.e. beauty, truth and goodness. They are not reachable through sense experience but only through the power of reason. This is why Wojtyła (as a follower of the Aristotelian-Thomistic system and therefore the theory that form is inherent in the material reality of beings) therefore emphasizes that, “Beauty is found in the whole of creation. I wish to emphasize this one more time. It is found in nature and found in art, in the works of human beings.” (Wojtyła 2021, Lesson I section, para. 7)

In the beginning of his *Letter to Artists* as well as his retreat Wojtyła uses the Greek word *kalokagathía* (καλοκάγαθία) to describe beauty. This word is not primarily associated with

artistic beauty however but with moral goodness. Wojtyła suggests that beauty is the revelation of the good and causes man to become attracted to the good. He shows how beauty has a “direct relationship” with good and that it is able to “reveal(s) goodness to the human being in a special way”. (Wojtyła 2021, Lesson I section, para. 6) It is significant I believe that he is speaking about this to artists who (one would not be blamed for thinking) are more interested in *aesthetic beauty*. Wojtyła as Pope John Paul II seems to start the letter with the way he wants to finish it; by guiding artists back to beauty and its relationship with being and morality, “The link between the good and beautiful stirs fruitful reflection. In a certain sense, beauty is the visible form of the good, just as the good is the metaphysical condition of beauty. This was well understood by the Greeks who, by fusing the two concepts, coined a term which embraces both: kalokagathía, or beauty-goodness.” (LA 1999, #3)

Jacques Maritain in his book *The Responsibility of the Artist* deals with the controversial issue of art and morality. Karol Wojtyła as a philosopher and also as Pope deals with the problem in his own way particularly in *Love and Responsibility* and his *Letter to Artists* and inadvertently in *Person and Act*. I would like however to first refer to Maritain’s work (which relies on St Thomas Aquinas) as it better frames and fleshes out the issues underlying this division. Maritain begins the series of lectures he gave at Princeton University in 1951 by questioning whether what one writes needs to be subject to some moral principles. He quotes Andre Gide, the French writer and open pederast who felt morality infringed on the freedom of the artist and his ability to contemplate without any restrictions; “André Gide said after Ernest Renan, “One must be certain that what one writes will be of no consequence.”... “The artist is expected to appear after dinner. His function is not to provide food, but intoxication...” The interlocutor -- “But what is morality, according to you? Gide -- ‘A branch of Aesthetics’.” (Maritain 1960, n.p)

As we can see, the trend of modernity was to deconstruct. Modern artists particularly tried and continue to try to normalize the disordered immoral actions they feel should be natural and therefore acceptable through the vehicle of their art. They ironically try to give their and others immoral actions a moral status. In a way by pushing art away from morality, they and as the above quote shows, try to replace morality with art which is now a mouthpiece for immorality and an outlet for all their disordered desires. Instead of being of service to some higher universal like beauty or truth, art serves pleasure and the ego.

Maritain, the French Catholic philosopher who is associated with the revival of Thomism in the 20th century, surprisingly does not disagree that there should be a divide between morality and

art. He writes that this is based on sound Aristotelian-Thomistic teaching. According to Thomas Aquinas, art and morality have two different ends, two different objects as their good. Art has an aesthetic end and “is concerned with the good of the work” while morality is concerned with man’s moral becoming i.e. “with the good of man.” (Maritain 1960, n.p)

In realistic metaphysics art is considered a virtue but a virtue of the practical intellect. Waldron writes that virtues are divided into three different types: intellectual, moral, and theological and are broadly defined as the “excellence or perfection of a thing”. (Waldron 1912, n.p) In the narrow sense they denote the existence of habits in the rational soul that inclines the subject to perform acts in accordance with man’s “rational nature”. (Waldron 1912, n.p) Intellectual virtues denote the existence of a habit that predisposes the intellect to perform good acts corresponding to their object i.e. the truth (Waldron 1912, n.p) A virtue of the practical intellect is that which (unlike the speculative intellect e.g. “wisdom, science, understanding”) does not predispose the intellect to only contemplate truth but predisposes the intellect to rather contemplate it with respect “to action”. (Waldron 1912, n.p) There are two virtues of the practical intellect: Art and Prudence (Waldron 1912, n.p) Waldron states that Art (*techne*) indicates the correct method that one should adopt in the production/creation of things “(*recta ratio factibilium*)”. (Waldron 1912, n.p) Prudence however indicates the correct way to behave “the right method of conduct (*recta ratio agibilium*)”. (Waldron 1912, n.p) Moral virtues (e.g. justice, fortitude and temperance) however denote the existence of a habit that predisposes the power of volition i.e. the will and the sensuous appetite to submit itself or “to act in accordance with right reason.” (Waldron 1912, n.p)

A good artist will develop his artistic talent by spending hours of time and effort in mastering the skills of his craft, developing habits to achieve the ability to depict (through music, paint, the written word etc.) the truest representation of his artistic idea or physical reality as such. We will touch on the discussion of *what art should imitate* in a moment. For now we assume that if the artist is a realist he will try to stay as close to the image of reality he intends to represent. A morally good person will habitually (in conformity with reason and out of his own freedom) aim his will at a good - choose to conduct acts in the moral sphere - that will turn him into a morally good individual. (Maritain 1960, n.p)

Maritain then distinguishes between an ontological good and a moral good. In terms of the ontological good (which we have already covered), “Everything which exists is good to the extent to which it *is*, it possesses being. For the Good, or the Desirable, is the fullness of being.” (Maritain 1960, n.p) A moral good however is that which is specific to man as only man

possesses a moral dimension; only man has the powers of reason and the will and therefore only man has the ability to 'co-create' himself i.e. render himself good or bad according to his actions as an agent of those actions (a topic that will be more fully developed in the third part of the thesis). The moral good is specifically an object for the will and is by which a man becomes good. As Maritain states, man becomes good through his moral action, "the goodness of his deeds as expressing his will; it is the action which achieves his being and emanates from him as a man... as a person master of himself and capable of working out his own destiny, or as a free agent." (Maritain 1960, n.p) Due to the fact that the ends of morality and art are different we can therefore and do get a lot of artists (this century not being exempt) who produce magnificent works due to their skill and effort but whose moral lives are disordered. As Maritain writes "Oscar Wilde was a good Thomist when he wrote: "The fact of a man being a poisoner is nothing against his prose." (Maritain 1960, n.p) It therefore seems that morality and art are impossible to reconcile.

Wojtyła as Pope harkens to this Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding in his *Letter to Artists* where he discusses the intersection of morality and art. Initially he speaks about the fact that morality and art seem to have similarities and that although artists are 'creators' in a specific sense all of humanity are called to be 'co-creators' in the broader sense. In procreation this is obvious but he means here the moral life in particular, "Not all are called to be artists in the specific sense of the term. Yet, as Genesis has it, all men and women are entrusted with the task of crafting their own life: in a certain sense, they are to make of it a work of art, a masterpiece." (LA 1999, #2) This statement seems to fit in with his phenomenology and his pre-ethical teaching in the *Person and Act*. If we are both a subject and object for ourselves this means we are somewhat 'co-creators' of ourselves, artists of our own lives in fact (a topic we will develop further in this thesis). Like man when he creates his moral life (he is given his ontological being by God), the artist also does not create *ex-nihilo* and is a craftsman "twórca" rather than the Creator "Stwórca" who also works with what God has given. (LA 1999, #1) We are called to make our moral life a work of art, something good, true and beautiful, something fulfilling. While Wojtyła notes the connection he also notes as Maritain does, the difference in the object of morality and art,

The distinction is clear. It is one thing for human beings to be the authors of their own acts, with responsibility for their moral value; it is another to be an artist, able, that is, to respond to the demands of art and faithfully to accept art's specific dictates. This is what makes the artist capable of producing objects, but it says nothing as yet of his moral character. (LA 1999, #2)

Wojtyła then discusses how beauty is the vocation of the artist, “The artist has a special relationship to beauty. In a very true sense, it can be said that beauty is the vocation bestowed on him by the Creator in the gift of ‘artistic talent’.” (LA 1999, #3) Maritain has a similar view when he states that the artist solely in his capacity as an artist (although he will go on to investigate what this statement means) seems to not be bound to make his life morally good or beautiful through the works he produces but is however bound to the duty to make his artwork beautiful, “I have just insisted that Art taken in itself tends to the good of the work, not to the good of man, and that its transcendent end is Beauty...” (Maritain 1960, n.p)

It would seem that a clearer delineation between moral beauty and artistic beauty is needed here. Maritain also describes the notion of *kalokagathia* and the fact that the Greeks used it primarily to describe the “moral good”. (Maritain 1960, n.p) In their understanding, when man performs a morally virtuous act, it can be called beautiful, “Virtue is spiritually beautiful”. (Maritain 1960, n.p) Unlike an artistic work which clearly is a product of artistic action, this type of beauty “does not relate to a work to be made” but rather relates to the result of man using his freedom of the will and submitting it to ‘right reason’. (Maritain 1960, n.p) Moral beauty does not result in an instrumentalisation of the good because this good, “is good in itself -- what the ancients called *bonum honestum*, good as right, the quality of an act, good for the sake of good.” (Maritain 1960, n.p)

Building on the traditional Thomistic conception (which we will discuss further in a moment) artistic beauty according to Maritain is more of a result of the fact that art imitates *the way* nature has been created. For Aquinas the “art that imitates nature” was primarily about the work of the artisan or craftsman i.e. “military art, the art of the master builder, the art of medicine.” (McInerny 1990, n.p)⁷ One of the reasons is because in these instances the artifact cannot be separated from nature, it needs nature to exist. Another reason is that artifacts, through the use of human reason, can in some ways restore or complete nature which seems to be a unique task given to man, “Imitation in one sense means: consciously bringing nature to its goal, aiding nature to fulfill itself...Nature does not equip the human species with protection against the elements and against enemies... That is why art is natural to us. We must fashion what other species are provided.” (McInerny 1990, n.p)

Turning directly to Thomas we see that he believes that the artist, who uses his intellect and what nature already provides in order to create the aesthetic object, imitates ‘the way’ nature has been created. There is obviously a marked difference in the fact that nature has been created *ex nihilo*

⁷ Art being a virtue of the ‘practical intellect’ will be explored more thoroughly in the next section.

i.e. out of nothing. This topic and its implications i.e. the fact that artists cannot create substantially but merely rearrange accidents and therefore the term 'co-creator' is rather a poetic than a metaphysical one, is dealt with thoroughly by Piotr Jaroszyński in the aforementioned book. For Thomas the artist imitates the Divine Creator because his intellect (which he uses primarily to create an artistic work with) and its way of functioning is a reflection of the intellect that formed creation.

The reason art imitates nature is that knowledge is the principle of artistic activity. But all our knowledge is received through the senses from sensible and natural things. Hence our procedure in artificial things is similar to that in natural things. Natural things are imitable by art because the whole of nature is ordered to its end by an intellectual principle, and so the work of nature seems to be a work of intelligence since it proceeds in a determinate way to definite ends -- and that is imitated in artistic activity. (Physics (II, I,4,n.171). (McInerny 1990, n.p)

The artist therefore does and should (if he wants to create at the highest level) be very aware of how nature and reality (reality in its fullness) is constructed and to what end it is ordered,

If then one teaching an art produces a work of art, the apprentice desiring to acquire the art should take note so that he can act in a similar way. So it is that the human intellect, which depends on the divine intellect for its intelligible light, must be informed concerning the things it makes looking at things that are naturally produced, so that it may work in like manner." (In the preface to Aquinas' Commentary on the *Politics* of Aristotle) (McInerny 1990, n.p)

If a skilled artist realistically depicts something that is unattractive, according to Aquinas, the artwork may still be deemed beautiful. Due to the artist fulfilling his responsibility in this case to the depiction of reality; the perfection that comes from the accurate depiction gives birth to beauty as well, due to the fact that it satisfies us, "Then a phenomenon appears of which Thomas Aquinas spoke: we call an image beautiful when it perfectly represents a thing, although the thing is ugly in itself. Perfect representation includes artistic skill, which makes pleasing to us that which in relation to reality may have shortcomings and may arouse negative emotions..." (Jaroszyński 2018, pg. 590 & 591)

The discussion of whether purely aesthetic art e.g. theatre, dance, music, painting etc is obligated to imitate physical reality, ideas or what is held in the imagination - is a complex discussion; especially with regards to the relation of the imagination with 'experience' and 'right reason'. This has long been debated even amongst Neo-Thomists like Maritain, as well as (as we will see) the Polish theatre theorists that helped form Wojtyła. Maritain states that art is in fact a result of 'creative intuition' and artists therefore have a primary responsibility to the idea they have in mind i.e. the vision/inspiration they have been given. The artist has been given a primary

responsibility of making visible the invisible, the “bit of heaven which he obscurely shelters in his mind -- namely creative or poetic intuition.” (Maritain 1960, n.p) Additionally how the artist contributes personally i.e. how his subjective life is captured in his work is also a matter for discussion.

While Wojtyła’s writings (I believe) contribute to this debate, this topic however, is not the focus of this paper but it is definitely a domain of inquiry that would enrich it. I would like to note however, that (as we see in JPII's *Letter to Artists*) there seems to be a belief by John Paul II that artistic or creative intuition/inspiration is obtained or comes from, not through a detachment from or a bypassing of the physical reality but by going through it almost, by going deeply within it and in a sense beyond it to the immaterial world (the other portion of reality), in order to grasp reality in its completeness, “Every genuine artistic intuition goes beyond what the senses perceive and, reaching beneath reality’s surface, strives to interpret its hidden mystery. The intuition itself springs from the depths of the human soul, where the desire to give meaning to one’s own life is joined by the fleeting vision of beauty and of the mysterious unity of things.” (LA 1999, #6) Wojtyła relates this moment of inspiration to what is experienced by people of faith when they have a glimpse of the truth, goodness and beauty of God. While he acknowledges the power art possesses as a means of entering or creating an entry point into “the inmost reality of man and of the world” (LA 1999, #6) and while he reminds artists that inspiration can seem to come from everywhere, what can be called a true or “genuine inspiration” is one that is always from the Holy Spirit whether it is acknowledged or not,

Every genuine inspiration...contains some tremor of that “breath” with which the Creator Spirit suffused the work of creation from the very beginning. Overseeing the mysterious laws governing the universe, the divine breath of the Creator Spirit reaches out to human genius and stirs its creative power. He touches it with a kind of inner illumination which brings together the sense of the good and the beautiful, and he awakens energies of mind and heart which enable it to conceive an idea and give it form in a work of art. (LA 1999, #15)

Going back to the question of what to do then with the division between morality and art and the question of whether an artist is morally culpable or has any responsibility when it comes to the types of artworks he creates; Maritain argues that, as the artist is a person before he is an artist, morality and art are reconciled in him, “the realm of Art and the realm of Morality are two autonomous worlds, but within the unity of the human subject.” (Maritain 1960, n.p) Because the artist is first a man then an artist, for Maritain, the art he makes is subordinate to the man he makes of himself.

Wojtyła says that while we must acknowledge the difference in the type of action motivated by moral goodness and beauty as well as the action motivated by artistic goodness and beauty we must however also acknowledge their connection. With each piece of art the artist reveals an aspect of his inner life, "In producing a work, artists express themselves to the point where their work becomes a unique disclosure of their own being, of what they are and of how they are what they are." (LA 1999, #2) Wojtyła then develops this point further in saying that art is not only an end product, that has an intrinsic relationship to beauty but it does something similar to human action (a topic we will elaborate on in the latter part of this thesis where we discuss *Person and Act*); it discloses the inner life of the artist, his 'I', "In shaping a masterpiece, the artist not only summons his work into being, but also in some way reveals his own personality by means of it. For him art offers both a new dimension and an exceptional mode of expression for his spiritual growth. Through his works, the artist speaks to others and communicates with them." (LA 1999, #2) The idea that art is linked to spiritual growth - is a thought which also has a direct connection to the founding fathers of the Polish 'Sacred' Theatre. i.e. Mickiewicz and Wyspiański) which we will expand on in the fourth part of this thesis. Artists have not only left us a bunch of artifacts over the ages but mirrors into their inner selves, "The history of art, therefore, is not only a story of works produced but also a story of men and women. Works of art speak of their authors; they enable us to know their inner life, and they reveal the original contribution which artists offer to the history of culture." (LA 1999, # 2)

Something to keep in mind, as this section precedes the chapter on discussing *Person and Act*; where it is revealed what a human act is according to Wojtyła; is that action in the realm of morality and action in the realm of art seem to be somewhat linked. They are linked because creative action, like what is seen as truly human action by Wojtyła (as we will discover), reveals man's interior life, his 'I'. The 'I' that is determined by the actions (either morally good or bad) that the person has decided to perform and thereby create himself by, "It is in living and acting that man establishes his relationship with being, with the truth and with the good." (LA 1999, #3) While creative action in the sphere of art may not be equivalent to human action in the sphere of morality; the action in the sphere of morality that the artist takes up (and as we will discuss in detail), that forms him into a good or bad person, an action that Wojtyła in his philosophical works says reveals his subjectivity, his uniqueness, his unrepeatability, his transcendence, his self-possession, his self-governance, his freedom... is reflected in the creative action in the sphere of art. Art (like a mirror) reveals the result of the morally good or bad actions the artist has chosen to perform throughout his life. Who the artist is, i.e. more good

or less good, more evil or less evil, (Wojtyła suggests) will be revealed in the subject matter he chooses and the way he chooses to portray it.

What does this all mean for the theatre? I think that analyzing the concrete example of pornography in the case of theatre will help us in getting to a closer answer. Whilst pornography is mainly transmitted to its audience via a screen, pornographic scenes have been included or have dominated some theatrical productions. The question is, what does it matter if as an actor or an audience member one chooses to partake in or watch a pornographic scene. Is the actor making a moral choice at the same time as making an artistic one? Is there such a thing as a moral artistic choice? Does performing, partaking in and or watching a creative action in the sphere of art cement or take away man's moral goodness?

Firstly, what is pornography? A variation of definitions exists because if beauty and art cannot be defined in the 21st century then it makes it all the more difficult to define pornography. John Jenkins offers this definition, "Pornography, representation of sexual behavior in books, pictures, statues, films, and other media that is intended to cause sexual excitement. The distinction between pornography (illicit and condemned material) and erotica (which is broadly tolerated) is largely subjective and reflects changing community standards." (Jenkins 2024, n.p) The debate between erotica and pornography, while important, cannot be discussed within the limits of this dissertation. We will concentrate therefore on a broad definition of pornography: that is art (specifically theatre in our case) that aims to and causes the sexual arousal of those watching. While the intention of those putting on the production obviously needs to be taken into account nevertheless, we return to the argument of action in the sphere of morality and creative action in the sphere of art.

As an audience member one could argue that it may not be happening directly to me. Likewise, as actors partaking in the pornographic act, one could say it is happening to the characters they are playing or it is not real and there are measures being taken to prevent it realistically occurring (in the case of mainstream theatre productions). From the amount of money which the porn industry makes per year and the number of those addicted to porn we can see however that the margin of reality and art and what can be classified as action in the sphere of art versus creative action in the sphere of morality seems to be a very fine line.

The participation of both the actors and the audience seems to be the issue that is up for discussion here. In the theatre one could argue people cannot really use the act of pornography as in the privacy of their own home and it is also valid to argue if a caress, hand holding or a simple kiss causes arousal should it be classified as pornographic. Sometimes the audience is

also not aware of what the director is going to do prior to watching and sometimes the porn is brief, it lasts only a moment, and it is over. I remember I was once invited to watch a play based on a classical Polish drama where the audience was invited to sit on stage. There was no barrier between actor and audience. Suddenly the actress lifted her dress to reveal herself completely naked within a half a meter of myself. I obviously did not know what would happen because this was the choice of the actor and director, but I could have responded by leaving the play at that moment. I was stuck however as I would have to interrupt the action of the play by literally invading their world as they had mine. You could see the thought of the director in trying to minimize the space and intensify the closeness of the actor and audience with no regard for the audience's subjectivity and will.

The problem of pornography in the theatre can perhaps be solved by Wojtyła's undertaking of the problem of pornography in art in *Love and Responsibility*. While brief it is powerful. Art which is "man's entire production (wytwórczość), and in particular the artistic one, e.g. literary or sculptural" has for Wojtyła a dual purpose. (LR 2013, pg. 150 & 151) On the one hand it has a subjective function as it reveals the inner life of the artist, "his own thoughts, affections, and attitudes" and on the other hand it also has an objective function of serving truth by trying to "grasp and convey in a beautiful way some fragment of reality." (LR 2013, pg. 150 & 151) He alludes to the idea of beauty he presents at the start of his *Letter to Artists* when he says that "artistic beauty is the most characteristic property of a work of art." (LR 2013, pg. 150 & 151) We see in these two lines that art for Wojtyła must be a servant of the truth of reality and beauty must be the most defining feature i.e. what makes it recognisable as a work of art.

He then moves on to dealing with two of the most common themes artists try to portray; "love of a woman and a man" and of course "the human body". (LR 2013, pg. 150 & 151) Wojtyła has no problem with and even says that art has "a right and obligation" (especially in the vein of realism) to both "reproduce" the male and female form as well as "reproduce" the love that takes place between opposite sexes. (LR 2013, pg. 150 & 151) If we are concerned that art serves the truth in order to convey a fragment of reality in a beautiful way then we cannot, as Wojtyła says, exclude what genuinely makes-up the reality artists are trying to portray. (LR 2013, pg. 150 & 151) Neither the human body which is, "an authentic part of the truth about man" nor the "sensory-sexual moment" which "is an authentic part of the truth about human love" can be excluded. (LR 2013, pg. 150 & 151)

Saying this, Wojtyła warns that these aspects of the human person cannot dominate and overshadow the rest of the truth about man. (LR 2013, pg. 150 & 151) He then hones in on the

particular case of pornography where there is the very obvious “tendency to emphasize in a work of art the moment of *sexus*...” (LR 2013, pg. 150 & 151) Those who create pornography do this, not by mistake or as a once-off, briefly obscuring the whole truth of the person, but they repetitively and intentionally promote a reductive understanding of man to those who either take part in their works as actors or observe their work as spectators, “This tendency aims at evoking in the recipient of this work, a reader or a viewer, a conviction that the sexual value is the only essential value of the person, and that love is nothing else but experiencing (*przeżywać*) or co-experiencing (*współprzeżywać*) this value.” (LR 2013, pg. 150 & 151) The failure of pornography lies not even in the fact that the art goes against an ethical system by doing this (as we said Art and Morality have two different goods as their object), but it goes against reality, the reality of the person. What this reality is will be one of the objectives of this thesis to elaborate on. According to Wojtyła those who produce pornography are actually poor artists as they do not adhere to the truth of the reality that they wish to represent. They miss out on or purposefully distort the truth of man and the truth of love. If an artwork wants to grasp the reality of love and show the beauty of the human body it should, “bring out this truth regardless of the extent to which it happens to touch the sphere of *sexus*, and if it contains a tendency to distort this truth, it deforms the image of reality.” (LR 2013, pg. 150 & 151)

As we said before however, “pornography is not merely a mistake or an error—it is a tendency” this means that pornography can and does not only distort the image of the human person, but it dresses it up and presents it as something ‘beautiful’. (LR 2013, pg. 150 & 151) It is therefore more easily received by and embedded in man's consciousness. The beauty (although based only on a half-truth and therefore is a limited beauty) makes it seem like a good for the will to seek out and obtain, “Once the deformed image becomes equipped with the prerogatives of artistic beauty, a greater possibility exists that it will be accepted and engrafted in the consciousness and the will of the recipients. For concerning this point the human will very often displays a great susceptibility to accepting a deformed image of reality.” (LR 2013, pg. 150 & 151)

To conclude, according to what Wojtyła has said, pornography does not lead the audience into *wonder* (the end of theatre according to Aristotle) as it distorts the truth. It does not display the virtues that we identify with and the vices that threaten the dignity of man and ergo make us recoil in horror. This is because pornography portrays the sexual element of man as the full truth of who he is and therefore the unlimited indulgence of sexual sin as a good. While the actor and audience may experience a temporary physical satisfaction or a *catharsis* of basal emotions when they take part in or watch an act of pornography taking place, this cannot be equated with the satisfaction felt after an experience of beauty. This is because, as the aim of *tragedy* implies,

the image of the human person is not truthfully portrayed.⁸ But what is the true image of the human person? What is human action (the action that defines theatre for Aristotle) and what implications will the truth of the person and his action have on the understanding of the underlying structures of theatre? What can Wojtyła's philosophical works contribute to a fuller understanding of theatre?

A brief note on the 'service of artists' before we continue. In his *Letter to Artists* Wojtyła does not just say that artists have a calling to serve beauty but society at large i.e. artists should advance their skills "... in order to put it at the service of their neighbor and of humanity as a whole." (LA 1999, #3) He believes that artists help bring about and actually help society reach the 'common good' which includes but is not merely reduced to "...the cultural heritage of each nation and of all humanity..." (LA 1999, #4) The question is, what is the "common good" Wojtyła is referring to? He alludes to it briefly in this letter when he says that artistic talent should not be at the service of superficial fame and glory but there seems to be or should be an "ethic, even a 'spirituality' of artistic service" which allows for the "renewal" of man. (LA 1999, #4) This is another connection to his theatrical formation, which we will deal with in chapter four. He then quotes the beloved Polish poet Cyprian Norwid⁹ who said, "beauty is to enthuse us for work, and work is to raise us up". (LA 1999, #4) Please note that the word "resurrect" seems to be a better translation from the original Polish, "(...) Bo piękno na to jest, by zachwycalo Do pracy — praca, by się zmartwychwstało." Another objective of this thesis is to work out what Wojtyła says about the 'common good' and how it can contribute to understanding the role of artists and theatre practitioners in society and therefore help arrive at a deeper understanding of the philosophy of theatre. An objective we will try to unravel in the following chapter.

⁸ I would like to add that the pornographer may not be making a moral decision when he shows a half-truth about the human person but his artistic choice may be affected by greed. He may be weaponizing the pleasure and addiction that comes by using this reductive image to make people addicted to his work and therefore improve his financial status. In this case, you could see how his moral choices impact his artistic choice.

⁹ It must be noted how much of an impact the Polish poet Kamil Cyprian Norwid had on Wojtyła's thoughts about man, beauty and work. Although I do not have the capacity to cover this topic, it would greatly enrich this thesis to analyse and draw comparisons from Norwid's poetry e.g. his infamous *Promethidion* and Wojtyła's *Letter to Artists*.

Chapter 3: The Philosophy of Karol Wojtyła

1. 'Two different starting points' - Wojtyła - a synthesiser?

As said at the start, to truly discern if there is an 'original philosophy of the theatre' amongst Wojtyła's plethora of works we first need to understand his focus - his main philosophical focus. As Peter Simpson writes in his book *On Karol Wojtyła*; that while philosophers of the past such as Aristotle and Aquinas focused mainly on the topic of "being" and modern philosophers such as Descartes and Kant tended to focus more on "consciousness" or "knowledge", Wojtyła's philosophical interest was quite obviously "man" (i.e. philosophical anthropology and ethics) (Simpson 2014, pg. 6). We observe that throughout his poetry, his dramatic works, his philosophical works and even his encyclicals... we observe that throughout his life no matter what role he occupied (writer, actor, philosopher, theologian) Wojtyła was in fact conducting a "long meditation on man." (Simpson 2014, pg. 6)

It is interesting to note that Wojtyła started to develop his philosophical thought when Poland was facing two existentially threatening ideologies i.e. Nazism and Communism, which both sought to redefine man. Simpson comments that the damage caused by both these ideologies seemed to force Wojtyła into confronting the question "who is man?" by the means of philosophical reasoning, in order to provide an answer that would be more satisfactory than these reductive doctrines. (Simpson 2014, pg. 7) Simpson quotes Wojtyła from his paper *The Person; Subject and Community* written in 1976,

The present age... is a time of great controversy about the human being, controversy about the very meaning of human existence, and thus about the nature and significance of the human being... After nearly twenty years of ideological debate in Poland, it has become clear that at the center of this debate is not cosmology or philosophy of nature but philosophical anthropology and ethics, the great and fundamental controversy about the human being. ('The Person: Subject and Community,' PC: 220) (Simpson 2014, pg. 7)

In a talk *My friendship with a Saint* hosted by the *Hildebrand Legacy Project* in 2013, Rocco Buttiglione (philosopher and author of *Karol Wojtyła: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*) recalled the first time he saw Pope John Paul II. He was in a crowd and the Holy Father was passing by and shaking hands with those present. In that short time, Buttiglione recalls, he felt as if the Supreme Pontiff - merely through his gaze - was saying that, "he was ready to give his life for you if need be and (that) he had a real passionate interest in you. He had faith in your interior life, in what you were made to be. A confidence that you were made for a fruitful life, no, more - for eternal life." (Buttiglione 2013, timecode 14:55) Intertwined in John Paul II's gaze was Christ's call to love as well as his deeply held personalistic belief in the

inherent dignity i.e. the 'uniqueness', 'unrepeatability' and 'irreducibility' of every human person. As we have said, central to Wojtyła's work lies the question of man - his essence and what he is called to become. John Crosby in his book *The Personalism of John Paul II* calls Wojtyła a "prophet of personal dignity" - a prophet who has made more people aware of this *facet* of the human person than any other leader on the world's stage. (Crosby 2019, pg. 1) Crosby defines personalism as a philosophy (a phenomenon of the 20th century) based on this relatively new awareness, this new "self-understanding of human beings" i.e. of *everyman's* inherent, unrepeatable and irreducible worth - their inviolable dignity, "We know that the birth right of a person belongs not to a select few but to every human being." (Crosby 2019, pg. 85)

As I wrote in *Modernism, Mysticism and the Pursuit of Freedom*; with his "personalist passion" Wojtyła has not given into the modern tendency of *subjectivism* which actually eliminates the individual by exalting him, "to such a degree that it actually subsumes objective reality by altering it in whatever way the individual sees fit." (Szczecina 2021, pg. 184) If there is no objective reality or no way of knowing there is, if reality is only our perception... then there is in fact no basis to make any 'factual' claims at all, never mind distinguish or identify anything as a 'subject' or anything as 'unique'. *Subjectivism* not only devours objective reality but with it the subject itself. Wojtyła has also not given into the *dictatorship of relativism* Pope Benedict XVI indicated was ruling at the end of the 20th and start of the 21st century; where truth is solely dependent on the person's perception of it.

Wojtyła's philosophical ingenuity lies in the fact that he has made great strides in trying to keep the subjective and objective aspects of man in harmony. He has exerted great effort and care in trying to find "a way to not only raise the subjective aspect of man to greater heights than those who purport the *philosophy of consciousness* but simultaneously... to root man firmly in objective reality by bringing him out of the confines of his mind through the experience of action." (Szczecina 2021, pg. 184) By focusing on the *lived experience* of human action, the now canonized Pope has tried to prove "that the only illusion man is currently experiencing is the division between the *philosophy of consciousness* and the *philosophy of being*." (Szczecina 2021, pg. 184)

While the 'turn to the subject' in modern philosophy (a phenomenon of the 17th century) (Crosby 2019, pg. 23) elevated man - giving him almost a license to do what he wanted in the name of progress and science - it subsequently produced a culture that ironically did not value the person at all. A culture that reduced man to little more than an animal. Man's life became expendable as was witnessed by Wojtyła in WWII and the subsequent communist occupation of his Polish

homeland. When Wojtyła was Archbishop of Kraków (as Crosby notes) he wrote a letter to Henri de Lubac (famed Catholic theologian) on this very topic, "The evil of our times consists in the first place in a kind of degradation, indeed in a pulverization, of the fundamental uniqueness of each human person." (Crosby 2019, pg. 9) At the time of the letter Wojtyła was writing his antidote (*The Person and Act*) where he would be extrapolating on the "metaphysical sense and mystery of the person." (Crosby 2019, pg. 9)

The key factor for Wojtyła is that man has forgotten his natural greatness. This greatness does not come from him being at the top of the food chain or his ability to dominate creation but lies in the fact that man (unlike the other living beings) has a deep and rich inner life. A greatness that once acknowledged will be seen to be bound by an even greater responsibility - a responsibility in the service of love, "Man must reconcile himself to his natural greatness... he cannot forget that he is a person. Instinct alone will not solve anything in him, for everything appeals to his 'interiority', to reason and responsibility. What appeals to him in a particular way is this love that stands at the cradle of the coming to be of humankind." (LR 2013, pg. 183)

The function of Wojtyła's philosophy could be likened to the symbolism of the statue of Christ carrying the cross, found underneath the immense rubble (a product of the Nazi bombing) in front of *The Holy Cross Church on Nowy Świat* (New World) street in Warsaw. The statue was found miraculously intact, and Christ was pointing upwards as if to say that the Polish nation would rise again. So too with Wojtyła's philosophy... It is as though he is saying (as Buttiglione already noted); yes man you are great, but you do not know how great you really are. He uncovers man laden by the debris of power struggle and revolution and whispers: 'you were made for more'.

For Wojtyła man has both reduced himself and others to a *materialistic* rather than a *personalistic* vision. Man, for Wojtyła, is not a conglomeration of atoms that respond merely to neural chemical reactions, but man has an inner life which, while it functions in relationship with the material world and is grafted on it, has priority over these biochemical processes. When talking about the role of the senses in his early series of lectures contained in the publication *Considerations on the Essence of Man* Wojtyła alludes to this sentiment,

Whereas in animals those sensory powers, skills and habits exhaust the whole and complete richness of their experiences, in man, although they constitute a huge contribution to his experience, they do not completely exhaust the resources of his life force but are only material from which human acts and experiences are formed on the basis of an even deeper element, an even higher life principle. (Wojtyła 2016, pg. 57 and 58)

As I wrote further in my paper, the negative impact of modern philosophy arose from the fact that, "By reducing consciousness to a purely cognitive function, philosophers (which Wojtyła says in his essay *The Person: Subject and Community*) absolutized it, "After Descartes, on the other hand, the aspect of consciousness eventually assumed a kind of absolutization, which in the contemporary era entered phenomenology by way of Husserl." (Wojtyła, 1994). (Szczecina 2021, #footnote pg. 184) Unfortunately "an extreme skepticism" was introduced into the culture and man's mind "where man cannot trust anything, his knowledge of the world and himself can only be interpreted through the subjective lens. He is the one who cognises therefore there is no difference for him between reality and what he perceives it to be." (Szczecina 2021, #footnote pg. 184)

The answer to rectifying this division, Wojtyła discovers is, "...not through an elimination of the self but through an expanding of the limited vision secular culture has adopted." (Szczecina 2021, pg. 184) He at the same time feels that the traditional *philosophy of being* has missed capturing the full truth of man as well. It is not that Wojtyła wants to disregard the *philosophy of being* or the *philosophy of consciousness* altogether but he wishes to lead philosophy in a different direction and so too mend the rift that occurred with the dawn of René Descartes and his 'turn to the subject' in his infamous *cogito* i.e. I doubt/I think therefore I am, "For there is in this history a divide or fissure that appears at the beginning of what we nowadays call the modern period (the period beginning with Descartes)." (Simpson 2014, pg. 7) One of the main issues that Wojtyła has had to deal with is the fact that both these philosophies have two different starting points.

In realistic metaphysics the method demands seeing man from an objective standpoint, seeing him in comparison with the rest of creation, "as part of the cosmological whole". (Simpson 2014, pg. 8) The *philosophy of consciousness* however tries to understand man and the world through the lens of man's own subjectivity. It must be noted that Descartes never intended to lead to *subjectivism* and consequently *scepticism* with his method, as he too was in the pursuit of finding a firm foundation for objective knowledge. He felt however that the answer lay in the subject i.e. the thinking man. His premise was that even if one doubted absolutely everything, one would have to at least acknowledge that there is a 'thinking thing' that truly exists and precedes this doubt and therefore the 'thinking thing' had to be the foundation of knowledge. Regardless of his intentions, Descartes started a revolution that in effect trapped man within his own mind, with no ability of confirming anything as true outside of it i.e. there was "a turn of philosophy inward to the self and the self's own subjective awareness of its cognitive acts, and to the presence of objects of knowledge within consciousness." (Simpson 2014, pg. 8)

Wojtyła notes in *Subjectivity and the "Irreducible" in man* that in the *philosophy of being* or the objective and cosmological understanding of man; Aristotle's notion that "*homo est animal rationale*" (man is a rational animal) (PA 2021, pg. 537) arose from the necessitated reduction of man to a part of the cosmos (i.e. he is a being among beings, living being among other living beings, an animal among other animals) in order to then grasp his difference/uniqueness i.e. his rationality. In this understanding, each human being is seen as a separate, individual and particular instantiation of the human species (the genus animal and specific difference of rationality). We can see that in this definition man's subjectivity is somewhat grasped precisely because his distinctiveness is: he is a composite of both body and soul and has the distinct powers of reason and the will and therefore is a "subject of being and action". (PA 2021, pg. 539) Wojtyła refers to the 6th century philosopher Boethius who took Aristotle's notion even further by introducing the theological term of the 'person' to it i.e. "a person is an individual substance of a rational nature" (*naturae rationabilis individua substantia*). (PA 2021, pg. 539) Wojtyła states that the definition by Boethius is primary and provides a basis or a "metaphysical terrain" where "the personal subjectivity" of the person is actualised. (PA 2021, pg. 539)

While the realistic metaphysical definition of man might show the distinguishing features of man from the rest of the cosmos and even the use of the words 'individual' may show man's separateness and uniqueness even more, this is somehow not enough for Wojtyła. He wants to get to (albeit in a supplemental way i.e. he wants to build on and not replace realistic metaphysics as he himself accepts the realistic metaphysical framework) what he says the term person truly signifies i.e. man's 'I' and what is revealed about this 'I' in experience, "a man cannot be wholly contained within the concept 'individual member of the species' but there is something more to him, a particular richness and perfection in the manner of his being..." (LR 2013, pg. 22) As we alluded to earlier, for Wojtyła, man is most distinguished by his inner life, "the person as a subject differs from even the most perfect animals by his interiority and a specific life, which is concentrated in it, i.e., an interior life." (LR 2013, pg. 22) We will expand on this issue even more further along in the text.

In the *philosophy of consciousness* however, this reduction (by virtue of its method) does not occur. The 'I' of the human person is the jumping off point and indeed fulcrum for this philosophy and therefore cannot be sidelined or ignored, "For Descartes, by contrast, man is essentially the "I think" of conscious cognitive states and precisely not so reducible." (Simpson 2014, pg. 8) What Wojtyła values, Simpson observes, is the fact that Descartes gives philosophy an opportunity to focus on man's subjectivity and therefore helps aid in the unmasking of his interior life, "What Descartes thus discovered, or perhaps recovered, and what gave modern

philosophy its special impetus, was the subjectivity, the interiority, of the human person.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 8)

The ‘discovery’ or ‘recovery’ of man’s subjectivity and interior life actually occurred just before Descartes (1596-1650) however, with St John of the Cross (1542-1591) who was a Carmelite friar and mystic. His ideas form the basis of Wojtyła’s first doctoral thesis which he presented to the Angelicum: *The Doctrine of Faith According to St John of the Cross*. In my paper I quote Rocco Buttiglione who remarks on the fact that Wojtyła tried to synthesize the different ideas of faith according to St Thomas Aquinas and St John of the Cross. He writes that while the famed metaphysician believed that the intellect held a primary place in the act of faith i.e. “faith is a virtue of the intellect which does not involve the will”, for the carmelite mystic the will held a very important place in the act of faith i.e. “the faith which establishes a *“proporción de semejanza”* (proportion of similarity) between God and the human being is an obscure faith in which the intellect knows that, in the ‘night of faith’ it has to give up attempting to know.” (Buttiglione 1997, pg. 54) (Szczecina 2021, pg. 182)

Wojtyła does not regard these two visions as mutually exclusive - faith is a result of ‘both and’ (and here we see a link to the method he adopts in his later philosophy). He tries to solve this problem in the sense that he does not reduce man to his faculties of reason and the will but he highlights that there is a person in which there is a unity of these faculties (as well as passions and virtues) and therefore in the instance of faith both the intellect and the will play a part, “Wojtyła observes quite rightly that unitive faith, a faith enriched by the gift of the Spirit, and in particular by a gift of the intellect, and by being an organic part of the intentional tendency of the *person* toward God, involves all his faculties and virtues.” (*emphasis added*) (Buttiglione 1997, pg. 54) (Szczecina 2021, pg. 182)

One cannot underestimate the impact, “St John of the Cross (the great Spanish mystic and a doctor of the church) had on the thought of Wojtyła’s philosophical development – a development that did not end with his doctoral thesis”. (Szczecina 2021, pg. 182) On the celebration of the “fourth centenary” of the doctor of the church’s death the Holy Father actually, “...refers to St John of the Cross as a ‘master in the faith’ and remarks that “I myself have been especially attracted by the experience and teachings of the Saint of Fontiveros. From the first years of my priestly formation, I found in him a sure guide in the ways of faith.” (Pope JP II 1990, pt. 2) (Szczecina 2021, pg. 182)

The Spanish mystic did not only impact the Holy Father’s spiritual life and theology but as Rocco Buttiglione highlights, his philosophy as well. This is due to the fact that Wojtyła noticed

in the writings of this 16th century mystic an emphasis on subjectivity or “the interior life” that would come to preoccupy the modernist philosophers. This emphasis caused the carmelite to create a “phenomenology of mystical experience” with his writings. (Buttiglione 1997, pg. 53)(Szczecina 2021, pg. 182) This intuition is noted by Wojtyła and inspires his own philosophical method.

Buttiglione writes that through St John of the Cross’ “phenomenology of mystical experience” (Buttiglione 1997, pg. 53) man is initially taken on a journey to his “irreducible core” i.e. he is led to the reality or truth of his subjective ‘I’. In the mystical experience of faith, man can be said to most fully experience being a person as it is here that he realizes his deepest call which is to then go beyond his subjective ‘I’ to the one who formed it i.e there is a “necessity of transcending this core toward that truth who is God himself”. (Buttiglione 1997, pg. 55 & 56) (Szczecina 2021, pg. 183) This is a response to God who first initiates and actually makes man’s I “experienceable” and who after the act of faith draws man to the divine level which allows him to experience himself most fully; as the divine element forms a vital if not primary part of who he is. (Buttiglione 1997, p. 55 & 56) (Szczecina 2021, pg. 183)

Wojtyła then takes this inspiration to try combat the division in modern society between the material and the immaterial, body and soul, the subjective and objective aspects of man’s being and so too encourage and explain to modern man, “the great Christian affirmation of the meeting of the finite and the infinite in Christ”. (Buttiglione 1997, pg. 56) An affirmation which modern philosophers (e.g. Karl Marx) claim comes about through force i.e. “nature, history, and humanity” and not as a gift from God i.e. “through grace.” (Buttiglione 1997, pg. 56) (Szczecina 2021, pg. 183) To return to a true mysticism (Christ centred) would in fact mean a return to a true understanding of the person. The task was for Wojtyła, and perhaps is the real reason behind his developing a philosophical anthropology, to help modern man see his need not for a secularised understanding of the infinite but Christ himself. (Szczecina 2021, pg. 183)

What precisely is the interior life for Wojtyła and therefore what is it that constitutes the “irreducible core” of the human person? John Crosby succinctly elaborates on the phenomenon (according to Wojtyła) where man actually becomes aware of his own ‘I’ where he becomes aware that he is more than an object, “we *first experience ourselves* in the more intimate way of being present to ourselves, that is, we first experience ourselves not from without but *from within*, not as object but as *subject*” (Crosby 2019, pg. 18)(*Emphasis added*). Wojtyła sees subjectivity as synonymous with the “irreducible core” or the immaterial life of the human being, “For *l’irréductible* also signifies all that is invisible in man, all that is completely interior,

and by which every man is in a sense an *eyewitness of himself*, his humanity, and his person.” (PA 2021, pg. 542) (*Emphasis added*) The term subjectivity goes beyond the cosmological definition of man as it highlights man’s irreducibility, “Subjectivity... (*is*) a term bringing forth the fact that in his proper essence man cannot be reduced and completely explained by the most proximate genus and the specific difference.” (PA 2021, pg. 539)

In order to catch onto this essence, Wojtyła insists that the “aspect of *consciousness*” must be brought into the study of the human person. (PA 2021, pg. 541) Man’s interiority, his inner life is made apparent through the mirroring and reflexive functions of consciousness (functions we will elaborate on later). Wojtyła calls here not for a breaking away from metaphysical reduction but a pausing, a “dwelling on l'irréductible” (PA 2021, pg. 541) – it is here that man will discover that he is not just a “‘in particular’ this man - an individual of a species but... he is a person: a subject...” which Wojtyła believes is a more accurate and total vision of man. (PA 2021, pg. 542)

Whilst this new starting point for philosophy i.e. consciousness is held by those who espouse realistic metaphysics as a methodological error; Wojtyła wants to hold onto the benefits of the new starting point, “Wojtyła regards this turn towards the person, and to the subjectivity and inwardness of the person, as a fundamentally positive and necessary development that must be embraced and pursued.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 8) Wojtyła fully admits that there are problems with the *philosophy of consciousness* but he has faith that the two philosophical systems can be merged, “He regards it moreover as fundamentally compatible with, and supplementary to, the older and more objective approach of the philosophy of being.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 8)

Using the subject as a starting point, as we have noted, is still philosophically risky. Whilst the *philosophy of being* might miss the ‘irreducible’ element of man i.e. his subjectivity/interiority the *philosophy of consciousness* threatens to implode and has in fact toppled its own philosophical system into that of *scepticism* and *relativism*. As we have noted, the biggest problem of beginning with the subject’s own consciousness as that which defines reality means just that, it becomes the sole definer of reality¹⁰, “The chief danger is that of subjectivism, of hypostatizing consciousness and making it into a subject all by itself without grounding it in anything further... it leads to the positing of an absolute consciousness that freely creates its own world for itself...” (Simpson 2014, pg. 9) Wojtyła, however, is not afraid. He sees the benefits of the *philosophy of consciousness* and looks for a way to ground it in the *philosophy of being*. The question is how can this be done, when both have clearly opposing starting points?

¹⁰ We know that various philosophers try to deal with this in their own ways. An example is Kant who posits the necessity of an external world although we have no access to it directly (we will expand on this later in the text).

Wojtyła seems to find a solution in *phenomenology* (whether he achieved a 'synthesis' of phenomenology and metaphysics will be discussed in a moment). This philosophy/method/attitude has become more and more difficult to define over time, as it has been instrumentalised by different philosophers in different ways. Two main questions therefore would be: What is *phenomenology* and what type of *phenomenology* is Wojtyła interested in? Going to the founder of *phenomenology* himself, Edmund Husserl, in order to answer these questions would be the obvious starting point. Husserl's legacy goes beyond the confines of this dissertation, and we know that Wojtyła would draw more from Husserl's student Max Scheler: but it is important to note Husserl's impact nonetheless.

Simpson points to Husserl's major contribution to philosophy; the fact that he was actually able to go quite a long way to avoid the "absolutizing of consciousness" from inside the very system which caused this to occur in the first place i.e. the "philosophy of consciousness". (Simpson 2014, pg. 9) Instead of separating consciousness from *lived experience* (a term which we will expand on) Husserl wanted to see consciousness in its fullness, he wanted to perceive it in its "totality" and not just single out a few characteristics of it whilst avoiding others. (Simpson 2014, pg. 9) Husserl wants to go back to the true experience of consciousness... he wants to go "back to the things themselves" or "back to the object" as Simpson notes. (Simpson 2014, pg. 9)

In this practice, Husserl discovers that there is not a division but a relationship between the objects of consciousness and the act of consciousness itself; a relationship that is intentional. The *philosophy of consciousness* says one does not have direct knowledge of a really existing external world - only that which appears in our mind - we only have direct contact with our ideas (phenomena). Whether that means that our minds are specially structured to imprint or organize the data we receive and form them in certain ways as found in Kant's *rationalism* is another matter. Simpson stresses the fact that for Husserl the "objects of consciousness" (that which consciousness tends towards to get its content) are not synonymous with but lie beyond/apart from consciousness, "...the objects of consciousness are transcendent to consciousness, and that they are so because (cognitive) acts of consciousness are intentional." (Simpson 2014, pg. 9 & 10) Briefly 'intentionality' means that cognitive acts of consciousness have a directional quality i.e. they go out, "they display a directedness from the subject toward an object. They are not focused on themselves but on some object beyond themselves." (Simpson 2014, pg. 9 & 10)

Simpson further clarifies that while Husserl's discovery is on the way to saving the *philosophy of consciousness* from causing the philosophical error of *subjectivism*, this idea cannot be called "realistic" or "objective" as yet. This is due to the fact that we do not know if these objects of

consciousness have any true existence apart from our awareness of them. Still, it is at least setting us on a path towards that conclusion, as “Objects known in consciousness but transcendent to the act of being known are certainly the sorts of thing (unlike Descartes’ Ideas) that could really exist independently of their being known.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 10) Historically we know that Husserl flitted back and forth between *realism* and *idealism* but some of his students who were very inspired by his insight that potentially reconnected consciousness with really existing things opted for the first option e.g. Edith Stein and Max Scheler. Wojtyła also adopted the method of *realistic phenomenology*. (Simpson 2014, pg. 10)

It must be noted that Spiegelberg has doubts about whether Scheler (although he opposed idealism) can be called a *phenomenological realist* - a term he says does not appear in any of his writings. (Spiegelberg 1994, pg. 282) He reminds his readers that in 1920 Scheler even declared he was trying to formulate a new “realistic epistemology” which would stand in contrast to all forms of realism i.e. “the old scholastic realism, the so-called critical realism and the intuitive realism.” (Spiegelberg 1994, pg. 282) He never managed to achieve this endeavor however before he passed away in 1928. Regardless, Spiegelberg notes, that Scheler believed that the task of phenomenological discussion/the phenomenological attitude or approach was a viable means of ensuring cognitive certainty i.e. in experience man immediately comes into contact with the “givenness” of “reality” and in this experience, there is an immediate differentiation or distinction recognized/felt between “the real” and the “knower”. (Spiegelberg 1994, pg. 281 & 282) It must also be noted that Scheler debated what type of knowledge *phenomenology* could extract throughout his philosophical career which casts doubt on him being a realist, at least in the traditional sense. He believed that the “givenness of reality” or “thatness (Dasein)” i.e. somethings’ existence was “felt” as “resistance” versus the reality grasped in “perception” i.e. when one cognises the “what (Sosein)” i.e. essence of things. (Spiegelberg 1994, pg. 281 & 282) Regardless, Scheler believed that we could attain, or at least partially, (through intuition) the whatness/Sosein i.e. “the essence of the being of the objects”. (Davis and Steinbock 2024, n.p) A phenomenological discussion was therefore made to help lead the person reading or listening to be able to access the essence i.e. “intuit what according to its very essence is accessible only to intuition”. (Spiegelberg 1994, pg. 280) As Davis and Steinbock propose, as opposed to other modern philosophers e.g. idealists and sceptics, Scheler had a belief in or a type of “trust in the world and in experience”. (Davis and Steinbock 2024, n.p)

However, what does it mean to be a *realistic phenomenologist* in the Wojtyła sense? How does Wojtyła jump from Husserl’s transcendental objects to truly existing ones? Simpson says that for Wojtyła man is said to receive what he is ‘given’ in consciousness i.e. there is no “absolute and

free-standing consciousness” that creates but rather “in consciousness, or conscious experience” there is a ‘receiving’ of, a disclosure of the truly existing “objective reality”. (Simpson 2014, pg. 10) Simply put, in realistic phenomenology (or at least in Wojtyła’s version) consciousness is not the equivalent of the intellect and both the external world and the person as a subject are objective realities that are unveiled as such in the very act of conscious *lived experience*.

As we have said, the reason why Wojtyła turns to *phenomenology* is that he wants to get at the “irreducible” aspect of man and therefore he needs to have a method that enables him to get at man’s innerness, he needs “to get at this subject from within, to grasp it in its interiority as a conscious self.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 10) He however also wants to try to grasp man’s elusive ‘I’ without compromising his actuality, “But that this self is first a real being in the world, in direct contact with other beings in the world, is never matter for doubt.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 10) In true *lived experience*, if one is radically honest, one discovers/comes into direct contact with both the objective and subjective realities of oneself. As Simpson states Wojtyła believes that “the objective reality of the self as a personal subject is an immediate given of that subject’s own experience.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 10)

The key for Wojtyła, in order to discover the fact that the subject experiencing its own consciousness and its objects of consciousness has a reality apart from consciousness, requires analysing “conscious experience” in her totality and without any prejudices or bias. (Simpson 2014, pg. 10) To those who would like to oppose this claim by saying that experience is too relativistic or too dependent on the subjectivity of the person experiencing the experience?... Simpson writes that Wojtyła suggests turning back to “basic honesty”. (Simpson 2014, pg. 11) Simpson also notes that for Wojtyła (as with Aristotle) experience is one of the most basic concepts there is, as it can only be explained by referring back to experience, “What experience is like and what it is experience of are themselves matters of experience, not of proof from some supposedly more basic premises more basic than experience.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 11) Therefore for Wojtyła the truth of experience forms one of the most basic foundations of knowledge.

Professor Duma in his paper *Personalism in the Lublin School of Philosophy* explains the four main underpinnings of Wojtyła’s *personalism* in his opus *Person and Act*. The first underpinning is *realistic metaphysics* which (as we have said) understands reality to be outside, independent of and not created by the mental life of man. In this system man is also deemed to be special... distinct from all other beings. (Duma 2016, pg. 371-372) The second underpinning is the fact that Wojtyła starts his philosophising from the cognitive position of *realism* and not *scepticism* meaning that he believes man can apprehend, convey and prove

“objective truth” through reason or “rational procedures” based on experience (e.g. abstraction and separation).

The third underpinning is a “substantialist concept of person” (Duma 2016, pg. 371-372) i.e. the understanding of man as a *suppositum* (which Wojtyła does not think captures man completely but which he uses as a foundation - this will be further expanded on). This is a term from scholastic terminology and refers to an instantiated individual of a particular species. As Simpson writes, a *suppositum* “is a self-subsistent reality existing as such in its own right”. (Simpson 2014, pg. 11) Being a ‘self-subsistent’ reality comes from the fact that, as forms/essences do not exist in the *Aristotelian-Thomistic* system as separate from matter, “Fido the dog and Felix the cat” embody the substances “dog-nature and cat-nature” individually and concretely. (Simpson 2014, pg. 11) On a deeper level it means that the individuals i.e. beings which are “undivided” in themselves “but separated from other beings” (Maher 1910, n.p) and should be termed (according to Aquinas) “hypostases or first substances” - rely on their substances and not their accidents to determine their “individuality” e.g. Jack is a particular instantiation of human nature (substance) regardless of the colour of his hair (accident). Aquinas goes on to say that in “rational substances” - i.e. those whose action can result from their own free choice i.e. in persons “individual substances of a rational nature” - are the terms “particular and the individual” made more manifest, as actions do not belong to abstract universals but “singulars.” (ST I, q. 29 a. 1) Wojtyła therefore believes man to have a “permanent identity and ontic continuity”. (Duma 2016, pg. 371-372)

The final underpinning is the belief that man has a universal “objective human nature” which is distinct (from other beings) and which manifests unique characteristics i.e. “rationality, freedom, emotionality, subjectiveness, sexuality, social character, morality, creativity, and spirituality” that affect and determine man’s distinctive type of action. This universal nature also provides the basis for individual human action. (Duma 2016, pg. 371-372)

So, what is so special about *lived experience*, especially as it is understood in the phenomenological tradition i.e. as “the immediate givens of the subject’s own experience taken in all their unbiased fullness.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 12) As Simpson writes, it is as if Wojtyła believes that ‘lived experience’ is a metaphysical category that has been missed in traditional metaphysics due to Aristotle’s primary concern of locating “the human being in the external world as a thing alongside other things.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 12) It must be noted that while in the *Person and Act* Wojtyła does not want to focus on other substances but specifically man and

in his totality; he wants to focus on the “human suppositum not on supposita” in general, he never forgets that the human suppositum are also objects i.e. “real existents in the concrete, material world.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 12)

As said previously he wants to catch what cannot be reduced in man and he feels the cosmological account passes over the mystery of man i.e. that “which makes each man” truly distinct. (Simpson 2014, pg. 12) Wojtyła wants to get at why it is that a person (unlike other beings) cannot be replaced. If your plant dies you can always buy another one, even though it too is obviously a different plant. In the case of the passing of beloved pets the irreplaceability is more pronounced but in the case of the human person irreplaceability is the most pronounced. A person can never replace another person. Even in the case of identical twins, one can never be replaced by the other twin if something were to happen to him/her. Wojtyła believes there is something different about man that needs a longer look. He is not just an individual differentiated being, but he is a person, a someone, an ‘I’, “He is a personal subject, a conscious self, the self that has been massively thematized by modern philosophy but relatively ignored by the traditional philosophy of being.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 13)

We can ask if Wojtyła is not simply experiencing a metaphysical problem that should be sorted out within the metaphysical system and not with the introduction of *phenomenology*? Simpson notes that Wojtyła is not proposing that *lived experience* should be a new ‘ontological’ category, but he admits that one could see why, if it is concerned with being, “it must be part of ontology”. (Simpson 2014, pg. 13) Simpson believes that Wojtyła, in focusing on *lived experience* does not create a new metaphysical category but merely opens up a new “dimension” contained in the already established ones. (Simpson 2014, pg. 13) This dimension is exposed when one focuses, truly focuses, on the question of; How do I personally experience myself as a self? How do I experience myself within myself? In other words, “what it is to be a self-conscious suppositum when that suppositum is viewed from the suppositum’s own inner experience of self.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 13)

As mentioned in the section, *The Philosophical Problem of Beauty*: a substance is essential, it is the ‘what’ something is and accidents are non-essential and therefore do not exist on their own. Traditionally the “human suppositum” was seen as a “substance” and its “lived experience” i.e. its “powers and acts and self-awareness” were seen as accidents (Simpson 2014, pg. 13). This is because properties do not “define or constitute” what something is, rather they unveil i.e. “express or reveal” it. (Simpson 2014, pg. 13) It is precisely this moment of disclosure of the *human suppositum* that Wojtyła wants to focus on so that he can focus on this disclosure of

being from within, as “the human suppositum, in its lived reality, is precisely a ‘within’.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 13)

In *Person and Act* Wojtyła wants to go in a sense in the opposite direction of the old adage *operari sequitur esse* (action follows being) in order to explore/investigate being through the act. This is due to the fact that the act i.e. the *actus humanus* cannot tell us anything new about the interiority of the person as it already assumes/implies a person is doing the acting. Wojtyła therefore wants to hyper focus on the most human act i.e. the conscious act in the realm of morality to see what it reveals about the internal structures of the person. *The Person and Act* is therefore not a study of ethics i.e. “The science that aims at a thorough knowledge of the problems of moral good and evil...” (PA 2021, pg. 41) which necessitates an understanding of who and what a person is, but it is a pre-ethical study, “Although it bears the title *Person and Act*, the study nevertheless will not be of the act that presupposes the person... this study will concern the act that reveals the person; it will be a study of the person through the act.” (PA 2021, pg. 103) Wojtyła believes that when traditional philosophers analyzed the “actus humanus” they saw it more in the sense of the “persona in actu” (person in action) vs the “actus personae” (the acts of the person). They focused on the definition of the person but not on how the acts reveal the person, “the way in which he himself performs it and, at the same time, fulfills himself in and through it.” (PA 2021, pg. 213 & 214)

As we noted briefly before, the acts of a person have a different effect to the acts of other living beings. (Simpson 2014, pg. 13) The activity of living beings like plants or animals, whilst they actualise their inherent potentialities i.e. “nutrition, growth, reproduction, resting, moving”, have only an outward directedness, “the activity ... proceeds outward from the thing into its immediate environment or into other material parts of itself.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 13) With the *human suppositum* there is a dual effect, the act (which will be defined in more detail later on) does not just go outwards but in a sense boomerangs inwards due to the dual function of consciousness: man therefore *experiences* himself as both a subject and object of action, “They (*the acts*) become mirrored and reflected in the subject’s own consciousness. The subject does not just act or get acted upon; it experiences itself acting and being acted upon and does so immediately.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 13)(*Emphasis added*)

This is a key moment for Wojtyła; the moment the human suppositum experiences “self-possession” and therefore the moment when “the subject” is actually revealed and established as a “self”. (Simpson 2014, pg. 13) Moving from the idea that the person is an “individual substance of a rational nature” to also being a “self-possessing self” is imperative for

Wojtyła as we will see throughout this chapter, as it is another way, and a profound way at that, that man is distinguishable from the rest of creation, “For the very idea of a self betokens self-awareness, or betokens self-reflexivity. Man is a self in this sense while plants and minerals and animals are not...” (Simpson 2014, pg. 13)

As we have said, Wojtyła believes the *self* is revealed as well as formed in *lived experience* (as to how it is formed, we will elaborate on later) (Simpson 2014, pg. 14) It seems as if Wojtyła is saying, as Simpson posits, that the self is not a “substance” or an “accident” but in a sense it is an amalgamate of the “two fused together, as it were, in the single experience of self-possession” as the self is *only* revealed through this *unity* of substance and accident which occurs in *lived experience*. (Simpson 2014, pg. 14) It is of course not a “real unity” which uproots “consciousness” from the truly existing “suppositum” like in modern philosophy which leads to the error of *subjectivism* but (Simpson 2014, pg. 14) Wojtyła believes that one cannot gloss over the fact that the self only appears fully (as a subject and an object) in *lived experience* - which as we have said for him is objective “Objectivity belongs to the essence of experience, and so the human being, who is that subject, is also given in experience in an objective way.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 14) For Wojtyła, “the self that possesses” itself “and the self that is possessed” are one in the same and therefore when one becomes conscious of oneself it is not just an idea of self that one possesses but one’s entire being - body and soul. (Simpson 2014, pg. 14)

While the cosmological account seems to better maintain the continuity of the dignity of persons as, even when man is asleep or has lost consciousness, he is still a *suppositum* even though he does not *experience* himself as such; Wojtyła however still believes that consciousness is fundamental to raising man up to his full height, “Consciousness is what makes the human suppositum a human self.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 15) Simpson brings to our attention the connection Wojtyła makes between “self” and “suppositum” in his paper *The Person: Subject and Community* (PC: 231-32) (Simpson 2014, pg. 15 & 16). The ‘self’ for Wojtyła *is* the really existing *suppositum* that is made present to us via “consciousness” in the concretely *human act* when we experience ourselves as ‘self-possessing’ and ‘self-governing’ which are terms that are in effect interchangeable with the term ‘self’. Simply put, this “lived experience of our personal subjectivity” is the most complete actuation of all the potentialities found in one’s “metaphysical subjectivity”. (PC: 231-32)(Simpson 2014, pg. 15 & 16)

In the *philosophy of consciousness* “the self” is also not a rich enough description of man for Wojtyła, as it is reduced to and synonymous with “cognitive consciousness”. (Simpson 2014, pg. 16) Descartes already saw man’s ‘I’ in “cognitive terms” in his *cogito* which we explored earlier;

it is no wonder then that a focus on subjectivity primarily seen in terms of cognition led to *subjectivism*. (Simpson 2014, pg. 16) Husserl wanted to bring back a sense of certitude to cognition and hence his use of *phenomenology* to show that consciousness is not merely an awareness but an awareness *of* something. As we have said, that something is beyond consciousness i.e its intended object. (Simpson 2014, pg. 16 & 17) The thing is, man is still being portrayed by Husserl only in terms of cognition. It is only with Max Scheler that we move to a more encompassing understanding of man – one that includes the fact that he has emotions and is “a being that feels and loves and values.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 17) Along with the subjectivising of cognition went the subjectivising of values and only in Scheler (who as we have said before influenced Wojtyła to a certain degree) do we have an attempt to return to an objectivity of values i.e. a “recovery of a certain objective realism in the sphere of values from within the modern philosophy of consciousness”. (Simpson 2014, pg. 17)

Already faced with the “overthrow of values” prior to WWI Scheler, diagnosed a culture in crisis. A culture that had replaced Christian values with values derived from, as Spiegelberg writes, the “bourgeoisie capitalistic age” which had left the world disenchanting and less human by glorifying “rational calculation and mere utility”. (Spiegelberg 1994, pg. 271) Scheler desired a return to these Christian values but believed that the hands of time could not be wrenched back. As Spiegelberg states, Scheler did not want to return to “medievalism”, rather he wanted to help bring about an internal reformation that would begin with the human person as well as “his sense of values”. (Spiegelberg 1994, pg. 271) Is it any wonder then that Wojtyła in his habilitation asked the question of whether a Christian ethic could be built on the system of Max Scheler? Scheler seemed to present Wojtyła with a way to engage with modern secular culture. Instead of undermining man’s modern subjective reality, Wojtyła might be able to theoretically engage with that reality and bring man back to universal values, as well as deepen the understanding of the person. Scheler like Wojtyła was after all preoccupied with the question of man, “Since the first awakening of my philosophical consciousness the questions: ‘What is Man? And what is his place in the universe of being?’ have occupied me more deeply and more centrally than any other philosophical questions.” (Spiegelberg 1994, pg. 273) However, as we have said, Wojtyła did not think Scheler’s philosophical system provided enough stability to base a Christian ethic on.

At the start of his philosophical journey Scheler saw philosophy as a type of “loving act of participation by the core of the human being in the essence of all things” (GW V, 68). (Davis & Steinbock 2024, n.p) Knowledge was not construction for Scheler but rather a receiving of what is given, it was “a relation between beings, a relation wherein a being ‘participates’ in what

another being is in itself (GW VIII, 203).” (Davis & Steinbock 2024, n.p) It is no wonder then that *phenomenology* attracted him. In this philosophy (which he saw as an attitude rather than a method) one could “grasp what is given” (without any pre-existent bias) the truth given purely in immediate experience, “(*phenomenology*) ... made it a duty, to intuit plainly and simply, prior to constructive systematizing and to genetic considerations.” (Spiegelberg 1994, pg. 274 & 275) As we said earlier, his attitude was one of trust “in the world and in experience” i.e. a trust that one could, at least to some degree intuitively grasp the “essence of the being of the objects”. (Davis & Steinbock 2024, n.p)

Even though, according to Husserl there are three stages of the phenomenological method: historical reduction, eidetic reduction and transcendental reduction; according to Spiegelberg, Scheler used two types of *phenomenology* that are not mutually exclusive but rather flow into each other. He used descriptive *phenomenology* which is “reconstructive” i.e one reaches the “intuitive” foundation by working backwards from “metaphysical or religious systems” and a *phenomenology* of essences. The descriptive method is meant to prepare the way as it were and give the ability of a “direct and unbiased approach to the essences.” (Spiegelberg 1994, pg. 284) Like in Husserl’s famous *epoché* and eidetic reduction, Scheler “brackets” but does not eliminate the question of objective external reality with his *phenomenology of essences*, in order to ascertain the intrinsic or essential traits of “whatever is intuitively given in experience.” (Spiegelberg 1994, pg. 284)

Scheler it must be noted (according to Casas) held to the belief that phenomenological experience is not restricted to “cognitive experience” but encompasses emotional i.e “volitional and sentimental experience” as well. (Casas 2019, pg. 570) Emotional experiences are very important for Scheler, even more important, says Casas, than, “cognitive experiences of a theoretical nature”. (Casas 2019, pg. 575) Although he notes that Scheler differentiated between “emotivism” and “intentional feelings” which occur as a response to values (I will expand on this concept further on). (Casas 2019, pg. 575)

According to Scheler, feelings have been a long-neglected aspect in philosophy; held as inferior to the will and reason. He however saw (as Spiegelberg clarifies) “an objective character” to feelings and their ability to perceive things the mind cannot. (Spiegelberg 1994, pg. 293) In agreement with Pascal, Scheler held the view “that our emotions are characterized by an *a priori* content and are subject to *a priori* laws” i.e. there is “logic of the heart.” (Dan Zahavi 2010, pg. 177) Scheler believed that feelings have the ability to reveal objective values which are essential to ethics. According to Spiegelberg, Scheler distinguished between objects of desire or goods

and values. Values are 'objective' as they are defined as "the good making characteristics in a goal or good which by no means coincide with it". (Spiegelberg 1994, pg. 289) While objects of desire are "empirical, variable and subjective" (Spiegelberg 1994, pg. 289)

Scheler (opposing Kant's ethical system i.e his categorical imperative¹¹) uses the phenomenological method to reveal the objective reality of "moral values of goods that are not the goods of self-interested pleasure." (Simpson 2014, pg. 17) Kant's ethics is not founded on values but rather obligation, "... on the categorical imperative which stresses duty, or obedience to a free-standing 'ought' or norm". (Simpson 2014, pg. 17) We will not explore the difference between Scheler and Kant in this thesis but simply mention that as Simpson notes, Wojtyła in the end saw pros and cons in each ethical system.

While inspired by Scheler's use of *phenomenology* to arrive at objective values, Wojtyła could obviously not agree with his belief that the intellect is not one of the main reasons why values come to be identified by man, "for he (*Wojtyła*) accepts the traditional ancient and medieval claim that reason grasps the good of things and not just their factual being". (Simpson 2014, pg. 18) For Wojtyła, Scheler (in his phenomenological reduction), also completely misses *conscious efficacy* and man's "vertical transcendence" (which we will elaborate on later) and therefore the fact that, "Ethical experience is above all the experience that I am a cause of my own acts and, indeed, of the fact that they are good or bad acts." (Simpson 2014, pg. 18)

Simpson says that Wojtyła found he could maybe even work with Kant's imperative more than Scheler's notion because it created an ethical impetus, "duty and the categorical imperative are, as such, a sort of summons to action." (Simpson 2014, pg. 18) This imperative however is imposed and not discovered in experience, "They belong rather to what is never given in experience, namely to the *noumenal* (that is, non-phenomenal and non-experiential) sphere of freedom and pure practical reason." (Simpson 2014, pg. 18) Ironically, Simpson says, Kant also relied on feelings in the end to establish his ethical system, the feeling that accompanies duty i.e. the "awe or respect generated in us by the categorical command of duty." (Simpson 2014, pg. 18)

We see then that Wojtyła's main issue with modern philosophy is (as we have already alluded to) the fact that man is equated with consciousness and not seen in his fullness as revealed in *lived experience*. That he is a subject of being and action as well, "Wojtyła attributes the failure of Kant and Scheler in this regard to the fact that they both divorce human consciousness from the

¹¹ As Tim Jankowiak states, the categorical imperative is "a universal ethical principle stating that one should always respect the humanity of others, and that one should only act in accordance with rules that could hold for everyone..." (Jankowiak, n.p)

objective human being, that they do not see that the complete human being is a being, *an active and causing being*, and not just a consciousness.” (Simpson 2014, pg. 19) (*Emphasis added*)

What does it mean that man is a subject of being and action? What does it mean that man can “choose to act”? Essentially, what does it mean that the will is free? According to Wojtyła, the will is free because this is precisely one of the elements (besides being end-directed and motivated) that fundamentally defines and differentiates it from the other strengths and powers. The will exists precisely because it is free. Even though, from the very beginning, there have been attempts to reduce the will to thinking or cognition and there are ongoing philosophical attempts to qualify the will as a response of sensory functions or an extension of the emotions (which enslaves the will or reduces it to other processes) - Wojtyła holds to the Aristotelian definition that believes the will to be a completely separate and distinct power,

As regards that complex of volitional experiences lived by man alone, the fact of the freedom of the will as if explodes the typical organization of material beings from the inside, producing such experiences in man that cannot in any degree be reduced to even the most organized power of animated matter as its proper and first cause. (Wojtyła 2016, pg. 111 & 112)

At any moment man is able to decide whether he will or will not do something. This underlies his uniqueness and infuses him with his ‘I’, “(Man) alone decides about the direction of his acts. He alone chooses. And, among all the acts of man, those are strictly human acts which contribute to the fruit of a free decision.” (Wojtyła 2016, pg. 107) The existence of the will shows that man is raised above the natural order and helps him transcend (a transcendence we will elaborate on later in the chapter). The will in fact is one of the indicators of the human soul and is what separates man from the rest of creation, “Freedom of the will constitutes the real attribute of its nature (man), the one that differentiates it from all the known concrete beings of the material world.” (Wojtyła 2016, pg. 107)

An indicator of this “freedom of choice” is the fact that man’s actions cannot be interpreted in the same way as for example a mathematical equation is i.e. he is guaranteed to behave in some way if there is a certain input. We know by experience that man’s reactions to different situations are various and cannot be “determined”. (Wojtyła 2016, pg. 107 & 108) It therefore seems that man is not bound by animal urges or “inborn or acquired tendencies”. (Wojtyła 2016, pg. 107) Whether something is recognised as a “free act of choosing” or “engaging the will” is precisely known through the discussion of motives before a choice is made. The will’s existence is apparent by the mere fact that man can weigh up certain pros and cons and can actually choose things that are not seemingly easy i.e. giving his food to the poor rather than satisfying his immediate hunger, “We know, after all, that the human will chooses on numerous occasions that

which is contrary to feelings, pleasure, and the actual inclinations of nature.” (Wojtyła 2016, pg. 109)

Although cognition has to take place prior to the will's activity (which I will elaborate on in a moment) the will has to be unbound (free) from anything else in order for man to truly make a choice. As I said at the start; freedom underlies the will's nature... It has freedom from feelings, situations, bodily sensation but in the same breath it has a freedom for something i.e. freedom for the “good”. The will is always oriented towards obtaining a value, it is “end-oriented”, and that end is the “good”, “The will is therefore free by nature... It bears no prior determination within itself, apart from the one need of striving for happiness, for absolute good.” (Wojtyła 2016, pg. 105)

As Wojtyła reminds us, the will is always engaged when a value is to be obtained. Cognition is part of this process. It makes known to the will what is of value; it makes known what is a ‘good’. There is therefore a close relationship with reason and the will in their bid to arrive at the end desire of man... happiness...*eudaimonia*. Reason enlightens the will, and the will is the vehicle to the good. This is a more complicated process when determining what value to choose amongst other values, a process we will also get to in the latter part of the chapter.

Lastly, the fact that the freedom of the will is oriented towards the obtaining of the good imbues the will with a responsibility to reach for the good at all times. It is a constant drive within man and somewhat relentless even if the man's character or external forces somehow infringe on this freedom, “Man experiences (the freedom of the will) endlessly; he feels himself constantly driven internally to make decisions to choose. He is incapable of avoiding the yoke of that above all internal responsibility that hangs over him.” (Wojtyła 2016, pg. 111)

We can see that freedom, in the case of the will and according to Wojtyła, is not from something but rather for a concrete object, a value, a good and as we will see later on - is for the good of the person. To say the will is free is to state the essence of the will itself; it exists because it is free. Freedom is in relation to other determining factors and not necessarily in the ability to choose the opposite of good. I am free because my will can go above and beyond my emotions and bodily sensations. The thing is... even the will needs an object to which it is oriented. Because it desires a value, the good, happiness... it is by default natural that the freedom of the will would be used to achieve the deepest desire of the human person. Therefore, freedom of the will is not to say that our decision making has been let loose to wander around like an untamed lion but instead it has the freedom to choose what man was made for and where he will encounter his greatest good and satisfaction.

The idea of Wojtyła as a synthesizer and more specifically whether his epistemological approach is in fact a valid approach, has always been and continues to be a subject of much debate and discussion. Grzegorz Hołub notes the immediate criticism Wojtyła received after the publication of *Person and Act*. Jerzy Kalinowski tried to refute Wojtyła's central tenet that the 'act reveals the person' by stating that underlying, or hovering in the "background" is the assumption of the "Boethian definition of the person" which first requires the methodological and cognitive approach of realistic metaphysics to be arrived at. (Hołub 2023, pg. 388) Kalinowski believed therefore that all Wojtyła was doing with the *Person and Act* was confronting "metaphysical presuppositions" with experience. (Hołub 2023, pg. 389) Due to the fact that Wojtyła claimed that "every experience is also some sort of understanding" he came under the criticism of Stanisław Kamiński whose field of specialisation was philosophical methodology. (Hołub 2023, pg. 391) There also were/continues to be questions about whether his form of phenomenology can be called phenomenology at all as he, as Hołub notes, Wojtyła does not use the famous epoche to bracket existence, he does not believe consciousness has an intentional tendency (Hołub 2023, pg. 387) and he uses Aristotelian *induction* to "modify" the phenomenological method (Hołub 2025, pg. 57). While Wojtyła answered many of these questions¹², and many have made arguments to support the validity of Wojtyła's approach, I am noting them to try to show the extent of the debate. A debate (while very important) that cannot be entered into due to the limited nature of this thesis.

On the question of whether Wojtyła was a Thomist, a phenomenologist or both: there are people like Peter Simpson who believe Wojtyła to be a synthesizer i.e. he states that Wojtyła is a "scholastic realist and a phenomenologist at the same time" due to the fact that there "is a real symbiosis or cross fertilization of the two traditions in his thought." (Simpson 2014, pg. 11) Piotr Jaroszyński writes however that the answer to this question can be and has (in some cases) been affected by the philosophical preferences of the persons interpreting Wojtyła and therefore the answer given has sometimes come from ideological motivations. (Jaroszyński 2021, pg. 137 & 138) Saying this, Jaroszyński shows that while Wojtyła used knowledge gained by the philosophy of consciousness, he gave priority to the philosophy of being. For Jaroszyński this means that Wojtyła, as a result, would have had to have given priority to

¹² Wojtyła answered these criticisms by stating he recognized the fact that he would come to the description of experience with metaphysical assumptions but he in fact suspended them while "describing a given phenomenon". He also stated that he did not equate "experience" with "comprehension" but emphasised that it underlies it, it is in fact its "foundation and life-giving force". (Hołub 2023, pg. 390 & 391) Hołub argues that Wojtyła is also not the only phenomenologist who abandoned the epoche and his method seems to fit into a broader definition of phenomenology proposed by Robert Sokolowski, "phenomenology is the study of human experience and of the ways things present themselves to us in and through such experience." (Hołub 2023, pg. 392)

realistic metaphysics over phenomenology. (Jaroszyński 2021, pg. 145) Professor Pasterczyk writes that Wojtyła, and so too Edith Stein, never managed to and actually rejected the idea that phenomenology and metaphysics could be synthesised. Pasterczyk quotes from Wojtyła's dissertation on Scheler where the late Pope declares his "verdict" himself,

Research [on Max Scheler's ethical system] convinces us that a Christian thinker, and especially a theologian, using phenomenological experience in his research, cannot be a phenomenologist. Consistent phenomenology will present him the ethical values that appear in personal experience "when they are able to act," whereas the task of an ethical theologian will always be to examine the ethical value of a human action itself in the light of objective principles. (Wojtyła 1959)(Pasterczyk 2020, pg. 595)

The question of whether or not Wojtyła believed, wanted to or achieved a synthesis really comes into play however when one analyses the *Person and Act* (which was published ten years after his thesis on Scheler). This work seems to imply that Wojtyła had drawn from both Scheler and Aquinas equally. In the introduction, as Pasterczyk reminds us, Wojtyła even states "on the one hand, he owes everything to the systems of metaphysics, anthropology, and Aristotelian-Thomistic ethics, and on the other hand to phenomenology, above all in Scheler's interpretation and through Scheler's critique also to Kant." (Pasterczyk 2020, pg. 596) Pasterczyk cites George McLean who, similar to Jaroszyński, explains that in Wojtyła's writings there is an "enrichment" of the *philosophy of being* with the *philosophy of consciousness*. This leads Pasterczyk to agree with the idea that in Wojtyła's work there is not a "synthesis" but rather a "co-existence" of the two philosophies, "The term "enrichment" suggests the co-existence of two different philosophical approaches (two exclusive notions of humanity) in Wojtyła's thinking, without their synthesis according to new terms or theories." (Pasterczyk 2020, pg. 596)

As we see the debate is wide and varied, although there does seem to be a consensus amongst certain thinkers as we have shown. Whether or not there is a synthesis or even a "co-existence", as I said before, seems to come down to the more specific question of the validity of Wojtyła's epistemological approach as well as, as Hołub notes (in the vein of Giovanni Reale who believed that historically there has not been one but three dominant strands of metaphysics i.e. "of the One, of Being and of the Person") the fact that due to his elevation to the Papacy, Wojtyła never had time to "work out a complete project of the metaphysics of the person." (Hołub 2023, pg. 396) Hołub believes this (which includes an in-depth study of Wojtyła's epistemological proposal in *Person and Act*) is the responsibility of his followers to work out. (Hołub 2023, pg. 396) While I lean towards the opinion that Wojtyła does not 'synthesise' but uses phenomenology as a tool and then grounds the

knowledge gained via this method in the knowledge provided by Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics; I recognise that (as I have illustrated) the implications of this statement needs much greater discussion and study which (as I have said before) lie outside the limits of this paper.

2. 'I act therefore I am' - Person and Act

Let us then turn directly to Wojtyła's philosophical masterpiece to get a deeper understanding of what we have been introduced to. We look at his study of the *Person and Act*, precisely because (as we have explained in the previous chapter) theatre is based on these two very things i.e. man and his action. In order to ascertain what a philosophy of the theatre is according to Wojtyła, we therefore need to grasp what he understands by these two terms. Not only do we look at man in his individual capacity but his relational capacity as well, as not only does (as we shall see) this fully express man as a person but because theatre is based on this very capacity (again as we shall expand on) as well. As we said in the methodology, ultimately we need to understand Wojtyła's philosophical basis for seeing man as 'gift' i.e. how he understands being able to honour man's subjectivity in light of his relational aspect - in order to fully comprehend what a philosophy of the theatre would look like for him. The title of the section therefore has two meanings, it is a play on words and in a sense 'corrects' the *cogito* of Descartes in light of Wojtyła's philosophy i.e. what can be called a truly human action *reveals* who the person is most fully i.e. My act, the fact that I can act (perform a conscious act in the realm of morality - make myself good or bad according to what I freely decide) reveals that I am - I am a self-possessing, self-governing, self-determining, self-transcending self i.e. I am both a subject and object for myself. The second meaning is linked to theatre; as while the 'coming to be' of a character is based on the *imitation* of action by an actor, his *true coming to be* and what gives theatre its inherent value, is the imitation of an act that would reveal his persona/character the most i.e. a truly human act i.e. a conscious act in the realm of morality.

As said before, Wojtyła believes that *lived experience* is a neglected category or "dimension" within existing categories that needs to be explored. As only through experience, even though it can be fragmented like we have said due to sleep and loss of consciousness, does man realize or come into contact with his own personhood, "When speaking of the experience of man... we mean above all the fact that man encounters... establishes cognitive contact with himself." (PA 2021, pg. 95) Wojtyła however recognises the complexity of what is termed *man's experience* i.e. there are a lot of 'experiences' he goes through both in his inner world and his outer reality.

Wojtyła believes that this complexity has caused the division between the *philosophy of consciousness* and the *philosophy of being*.

As we have already discussed, while the *Person and Act* is not a study of *epistemology* (the area of philosophy that deals with the questions pertaining to knowledge i.e. if we can know anything and how we know what we know) Wojtyła recognises that his method of cognition must be in harmony with the subject he is studying. So how does one “stabilize” the subject? How does one find the underlying unity in this plurality of facts given in experience as well their “complexity”? A complexity that arises from the fact that these facts are both given externally “in all other people outside of me” and internally “on the basis of my own ‘I’” (PA 2021, pg. 107). Is one doomed to either deny all the “understanding” experience brings or is one doomed to see man merely as a disunified stream of mental acts. As we have seen in the previous chapters, the role ascribed to the agent intellect in the system of realistic metaphysics, is to in a sense ‘dematerialise’ the individuated matter and abstract the form which then imprints itself on the possible intellect. In metaphysical abstraction one goes from the particular to the general. Wojtyła however does not want to go to the general (as we said he wants to pause on the particular) as man’s personhood is based primarily on what is irreducible in him.

Wojtyła attributes the possibility of finding the underlying “sameness” in man as well as not closing him off to all the richness and diversity of experience, to the cognitive process of *induction*. Wojtyła makes it clear that this is not the *induction* proposed by the “modern positivists” but is rather closer to the idea of *induction* proposed by Aristotle which Wojtyła believes is, “...not any form of demonstration or reasoning at all. It is a mental grasp of semantic unity in phenomenal plurality and complexity.” (PA 2021, pg. 107) Whether or not Aristotelian induction or *epagoge* is a valid cognitive approach and whether Wojtyła’s understanding and use of the term is correct, all lie outside the scope of this paper. As I have mentioned before, Grzegorz Hołub has written interesting articles recently on this matter. For Wojtyła the very words, the very notion “person through the act” exemplifies this semantic unity. It exemplifies how a “sameness” can be and is grasped (from the plurality of facts found in the experience of man. (PA 2021, pg. 107 & 108) This “sameness” however, Wojtyła states, does not stop the mind from being in constant contact with the richness of facts found in “experience”. (PA 2021, pg. 108)

From establishing this “sameness” Wojtyła claims one must move to the process of *reduction* which, although it sounds like it is a process of simplification, is actually a process of explanation, clarification, or interpretation and comes from the root word “*reducere*” which

means “to lead back” i.e. “to lead back to proper reasons or foundations...” (PA 2021, pg. 110) Wojtyła believes that by this process one is not only able to stay with the particular “the object that is given to us in experience” but the way in which it is presented. (PA 2021, pg. 110) However, is what Wojtyła calls ‘*explanation*’ not just a more in-depth retelling or redescription of experience? Wojtyła differentiates the two by noting that in *explanation* you try to match the “intellectual image” with the really existing “object” i.e. “The aim of explanation, or interpretation, is that the intellectual image of the object is adequate, that it ‘lives up to’ the object...” (PA 2021, pg. 111)

Wojtyła makes it known at the start of *Person and Act* that the term he uses in the title of his study i.e. *act* must be understood as “man’s conscious action” (PA 2021, pg. 121). He also makes it known that while his study and his use of the term *act* is not in conflict with, in fact it “presupposes” the understanding of *actus humanus* and *actus voluntarius* provided by Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics - he prefers to use the term independently. (PA 2021, pg. 121) As we have already mentioned; Wojtyła wants to go, in a sense, in the opposite direction of *operari sequitur esse* (action follows being) as he does not want to ‘presuppose’ the person but wants his study of the *act* to reveal the person from which this act stems and all his inherent structures. This Wojtyła hopes will show that the *act* is not just *actus humanus* but an *actus personae*. (PA 2021, pg. 123)

However the word *act*, for Wojtyła (as we have noted) houses these realistic metaphysical concepts and “all that is hidden” in them (PA 2021, pg. 124) and it would thus be pertinent to understand them in more detail. *Actus humanus* (according to the *Polish Society of Thomas Aquinas*) is an act defined as specific to man, who (due to the rational and volitional powers) is able to make a free choice i.e. it is “a human action, an act of decision, whose source is in rational knowledge and free will... Human action originates in man as a rational and free being. The human act differs from an “act of man”, in which something happens independently of man’s will.” (PTTA, n.p) *Actus humanus* for Wojtyła indicates that man is both the “subject” and “source” from which this type of action proceeds. (PA 2021, pg. 122) *Actus voluntarius* more precisely indicates that human action comes about due to the power of the will “the power that is the dynamic basis of conscious action” and indicates that, through the use of the word “*dobrowolny*” [voluntary]”, the fact that the human act is never imposed i.e. it stems from the person freely and without coercion. (PA 2021, pg. 122) Wojtyła additionally says that because every act that involves the will is “conscious”, the words *act* or *conscious action* are seen to be in correlation with *actus voluntarius*. (PA 2021, pg. 124) He writes that in the term *act* or *conscious action* there is housed both the metaphysical meaning “ontological contents” of “*actus*

humanus” as well as the psychological meaning “psychological contents” of *actus voluntarius* and “the Polish “conscious” (świadome)”. (PA 2021, pg. 124)

Wojtyła is specifically interested in the *human act* that reveals the interior life of man the most i.e. a conscious act in the field of morality i.e. a conscious act that has a moral value, “Man as such, as a person in his proper essence, actualizes and expresses himself in morality - that which is most proper, most essential to him.” (PA 2021, pg. 4) Morality, Wojtyła notes, is the “property of human acts” and therefore reveals, expresses or unveils his essence. (PA 2021, pg. 104) This action reveals the interior drama of human existence, the drama not just between the moral values of good and evil but between becoming good or evil. While man is given his ontological *suppositum* which is the grounding for the emergence of the self, he is able to mold his own ‘I’ on the moral plane. As we have said before, in his *Letter to Artists* the Pope writes that, “Not all are called to be artists in the specific sense of the term. Yet, as Genesis has it, all men and women are entrusted with the task of crafting their own life: in a certain sense, they are to make of it a work of art, a masterpiece.” (LA 1999, #2) Man is his own artwork as it were. He has been given the canvas and the paint i.e. his ontological being, but his ‘co-creative’ ability implies that he has to mold himself into a good or a bad work of art. Why is this the key to understanding man? The very fact that he can mold himself or as Wojtyła says “determine himself” is the reason why he is deemed a person. It is what sets him apart from all of the created order. Not only is he an object in the world, an object of values but he is an object for himself to form.

For Wojtyła, man is therefore revealed not only as a ‘something’ but a ‘somebody’. He is both object and subject for himself and only the *conscious act* in the field of morality reveals this unseen mystery. It seems that, like he attributes to art, the *conscious act* for Wojtyła, makes the invisible world visible; the invisible world of the interiority of the human person, the ‘I’,

In the field of experience, man appears as a particular suppositum and at the same time as a concrete ‘I’, every time unique and unrepeatable. This is the experience of man in the twofold sense, for he who experiences is man and he whom the subject of experience experiences is man as well - man as both a subject and an object. His subjectivity belongs to the essence of experience, for experience is always an experience of ‘something’ or ‘somebody’ (as is the case in the experience of man). (PA 2021, pg. 470)

But how does the *conscious act* in the field of morality reveal man’s personhood? This is a ‘revealing’ that has many different layers; layers that Wojtyła pulls back one by one in the *Person and Act*. We will attempt to summarize each of them subsequently. Before we do this it is imperative to remember that for Wojtyła experience must not be only associated with the subjectivity of the person but his really existing reality, “The tendency to retreat toward the ‘pure

subjectivity' of experience is characteristic of the philosophy of consciousness... Yet what belongs to the essence of experience is its objectivity, and hence the man-subject is given in experience also in an objective way." (PA 2021, pg. 470) Experience for Wojtyła forms the basis of both forms of philosophy (*philosophy of consciousness and philosophy of being*) as without experience there can be no cognition. He also writes against the "phenomenalistic position" that the 'I' is just a stream of moments of impressions and argues for its ontic continuity (as Professor Duma elaborated on), "The object of experience is not only a 'moment', but also man, who emerges from all moments and at the same time inheres in each of them..." (PA 2021, pg. 96)

Another reason why Wojtyła stresses the *conscious act* in the field of morality to reveal the personal 'I' is because consciousness is not part of the external world of man but precisely within and the access to this interior is this moment of *conscious action* and therefore consciousness can be seen as a real aspect of man, "(T)his will be a specific anthropology. Its specificity results from the fact that the experience of morality introduces us into the world of the man-person not only as a being but also as a consciousness." (PA 2021, pg. 4)

The reason for Wojtyła's study is then - even though the traditional *actus humanus* or *actus voluntarius* implies that there is such a thing as consciousness i.e it was "contained (hidden, as it were) in 'rationality' (referring to the definition *homo est animal rationale or persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia*) and... contained in the will (understood as *appetitus rationalis*) and expressed in *voluntarium*." (PA 2021, pg. 127) - the Aristotelian-Thomistic system does not elaborate on the aspect of consciousness specifically, "Our task in this study... is the 'explication' of aspects of consciousness, the exposition of consciousness as the essential and constitutive aspect of the entire dynamic structure that is the person and act." (PA 2021, pg. 127) Wojtyła uses the word aspect because he wants to avoid the "absolutization of consciousness" (making it equal or interchangeable with cognition or the subjective self - the 'I') which would override the object of investigation i.e. *The Person and Act*, "An aspect can neither replace the whole nor displace it from our field of vision. If that took place, we would deal with the absolutization of an aspect, which is always an error in the cognition of a complex reality. The person and act is such a complex reality." (PA 2021, pg. 124)

The Aristotelian-Thomistic system also does not delineate between "conscious action" and "consciousness of action" and therefore misses a true study of consciousness itself, "The expression 'conscious action' directs us to the aspect of consciousness in the act, without, however, distinguishing this aspect. We should make the distinction between 'conscious action'

and the 'consciousness of action' then the aspect of consciousness will be revealed in a sense for its own sake." (PA 2021, pg. 125) Wojtyła wants to distinguish these two experiences because he wants to get at consciousness as a *noun* and not just as an attribute or adjective of action. Then he will be able to properly analyze its structure, "Thanks to this distinction, we gain in a sense a direct access to consciousness, which we can examine while, of course, constantly taking into consideration the function that consciousness fulfills in action and in the person's entire existence." (PA 2021, pg. 125) This is in full harmony with *lived experience* which is where man encounters consciousness in both its descriptive and *nounal* sense, "Man not only acts consciously but also has the consciousness that he acts and, moreover, that he acts consciously." (PA 2021, pg. 125) Saying that he wants to get at consciousness in the 'nounal' sense does not mean he wants to make consciousness an independent or separate subject. He wants to keep it in its place, "However, we still regard consciousness not as a separated reality but only as the *subjective content* of the existence and action that are conscious, that is, the existence and action proper to man." (PA 2021, pg. 130)(*Emphasis added*)

Consciousness for Wojtyła (as we have said) has two functions: a mirroring and reflexive function. While it has in a sense a type of cognitive function it definitely does not replace cognition i.e. both knowledge and self-knowledge. While both consciousness and the intellect have the same "object", consciousness merely reflects what the intellect has grasped, "...consciousness is limited to mirroring what was already cognized... In a sense, it is an understanding of what has already been understood." (PA 2021, pg. 129) Wojtyła further elaborates on the dependency of consciousness on cognition, not only because that is what is unveiled in experience but to also show that the traditional definition of the person being attributed to the ability to reason is also part of the underpinning of his personalistic definition of man which will entail an explication of consciousness. Wojtyła really wants to separate himself from falling into the "absolutization of consciousness" i.e. making consciousness interchangeable with the self and with cognition which leads to *subjectivism* instead of revealing the subjectivity of the person,

Consciousness is ... conditioned... by the entire cognitive potentiality that we grasp together with the whole philosophical tradition as the fundamental property of the man-person... Thanks to the ability... we discover the meaning of particular things... All this is alien to consciousness inasmuch as the whole process of active understanding occurs neither by it nor thanks to it. (PA 2021, pg. 132)

Wojtyła also wants to expose and pay more attention to a type of knowledge that needs to be differentiated he says (semantically at least), "from all forms and kinds of knowledge acquired and possessed by man, and what indirectly shapes his consciousness with respect to content..."

(PA 2021, pg. 133) A knowledge that can be mistaken for being a product of consciousness itself but actually works in tandem with consciousness and provides it with most of its content. This knowledge is *self-knowledge* which has as its object the 'self', "As the name itself indicates, it is about understanding oneself; it is a kind of cognitive permeation of the object that I am for myself..." (PA 2021, pg. 133) Self-knowledge gives the personal 'I' its stability i.e. its objectivity, and consciousness (which in a sense reveals man's subjectivity to himself) has no ability to distort or replace this,

Thanks to self-knowledge, the acting subject's own 'I' is cognitively grasped as an object. As a result, both the person and the act connected with him have an objective meaning in consciousness. Consciousness related mirroring, which not only is something subjective but also constitutes the basis for subjectivization... removes neither the objective meaning of one's own 'I' nor that of its acts, for it constantly draws this meaning from self-knowledge. (PA 2021, pg. 134)

The relationship between self-knowledge and consciousness are so vital because they form and create the basis for the interior life of the person i.e. together they "...should be considered the basic factor of the equilibrium of the person's interior life..." (PA 2021, pg. 134) It must also be understood that consciousness does not just work in tandem with self-knowledge but also (like the 'I' and its acts) becomes its object and therefore we can explain the fact that when a person "possesses the consciousness" of his action there is also a parallel engagement of the intellect, "he at the same time 'knows that he acts' and 'knows that he acts consciously'." (PA 2021, pg. 134)

Self-knowledge must be further differentiated not just from consciousness but from knowledge itself, "It is the knowledge that meets everything in whatever way connected with or referring to the 'I'... namely, the objectivized 'I'." (PA 2021, pg. 137) Wojtyła explains that this is why we have a difference between knowledge of one's own moral life and morality in general. (PA 2021, pg. 137) This however does not mean the 'I' and self-knowledge are cut off from knowledge in general but they work and are in harmony with it as well. This is due to the fact that the 'self' is a truly existing reality and is also involved in external happenings and events, "For self-knowledge, concentrated on its own 'I' as its proper object, enters with the 'I' all the areas into which this 'I' expands. Self-knowledge, however, does not objectivize any of these areas for their own sake but only in connection with and because of the 'I'." (PA 2021, pg. 137)

Wojtyła admits the term self-knowledge might be difficult to accept as 'knowledge' in the realistic metaphysical sense which is about finding the form i.e the general and universal in the particular. The object of self-knowledge is not a generalization however but the particular and concrete 'I'. The process of self-knowledge is therefore "...an objectivizing permeation of one's

own 'I' in the fact of its entire concreteness and, at the same time, its entire particularity, which escapes any generalizations." (PA 2021, pg. 138) Self-knowledge, Wojtyła writes however, is not satisfied with all the particulars it gains about the personal 'I' but in order to establish a complete and cohesive picture of the 'I' it "constantly strives for generalizations...all views or assessments of oneself, proper only to self-knowledge and created by it." (PA 2021, pg. 138) This attempt at reaching an "integral vision of one's own 'I'" (PA 2021, pg. 138) gets "mirrored in consciousness" and as a result one gets a deeper understanding of one's own self. (PA 2021, pg. 138) Self-knowledge has a different process to the knowledge of man in general. It goes directly from "self-experience to self-understanding" and does not make "generalizations about man as such". (PA 2021, pg. 138)

Even though the 'I' is a unity there exists, however, in our intellect and from the evidence provided by experience, a division "a discrete... distinctly drawn boundary (*that*) runs between the knowledge of man in general and self-knowledge..." (PA 2021, pg. 138) While self-knowledge uses "knowledge about man in general" (PA 2021, pg. 139) to get a deeper understanding of its own object i.e. the self; there is however no *vice versa* - it does not work the other way round. It does not apply the knowledge of itself to "understand man in general". (PA, 2021, pg. 139) That is the realm of the knowledge of man. Wojtyła therefore reaffirms the traditional belief that "*individuum est ineffabile*" i.e. the person is incommunicable - which we will elaborate on a bit later.

So what does consciousness mirror? And what does mirroring entail? Consciousness mirrors everything the subjective 'I' is involved in; that which both occurs in him and is done to him in his inner and outer world, as well as all that which is implied in *actus humanus* and *actus voluntarius*, "that which 'happens' in man, and... the fact that man 'acts' and what it is he does... everything with which man comes into objective contact by means of any (including cognitive) action... In some sense, the entire man and the entire world accessible to this concrete man (i.e. to the man I myself am) are 'in consciousness'." (PA 2021, pg. 128) For Wojtyła, mirroring - which enables consciousness to hold before man all that was cognised - can take place because consciousness has the capacity to 'transilluminate' i.e. it " 'maintain(s) the light' needed for objects and their cognitive meanings to be mirrored in consciousness." (PA 2021, pg. 130) The light of illumination from cognition is almost kept/retained/held onto in order to illuminate consciousness, "For what is proper to consciousness is the same intellectual light to which man owes his traditional definition as *animal rationale* and the human soul its description as *anima rationalis*." (PA 2021, pg. 130)

As we have said before, Wojtyła believes that consciousness also mirrors the content obtained by self-knowledge. Wojtyła continually stresses that consciousness is not however equal or should not be equated with the 'I' (a *suppositum*) as well as not be equated with cognition, "It must be added that the sum or resultant of acts of consciousness determines the actual state of consciousness. However, the subject of this state is not consciousness but man... Consciousness itself does not exist as a 'substantial' subject of acts of consciousness; it exists neither as a separate *suppositum* nor as a power." (PA 2021, pg. 131) Unlike cognition and unlike Husserl, for Wojtyła, consciousness does not have an intentional tendency. It does not go out towards an object. Instead the content of knowledge and especially self-knowledge already obtained by the intellect is mirrored via it, back to the subject and then "interiorised", "Man not only cognitively enters the world of objects and even finds himself in that world as one of these objects but also possesses all of this world in the mirroring of consciousness, by which he lives most interiorly and personally..." (PA 2021, pg. 131)

The second function of consciousness goes one step further than the 'interiorisation' of the contents of *knowledge* and *self-knowledge*. *Reflexivity* is when, due to the mirroring function of consciousness which holds the actions of man before him as it were, man experiences an awareness - an awareness of his own subjectivity and he experiences the actions he performs as "mine". These actions are not repeated in consciousness but subjectivised. Through consciousness we, "not only... view our acts interiorly (introspection), including their dynamic dependence on one's own 'I', but also... experience these acts as acts and as our own." (PA 2021, pg. 141) Consciousness does this by 'subjectivising' the 'objective' i.e. there is an orienting of actions to the self, "A special turning toward the subject takes place... to which we owe... the particular manifestation of the subjectivity of the experiencing 'I'." (PA 2021, pg. 142) *Reflexivity* has to do with actually experiencing yourself, your entire *suppositum* - as a really existing reality, as an 'I', "In the mirroring (thanks to self-knowledge), this man, who is a subject and his own 'I', is still present as an object. The reflexive turning of consciousness causes this object, precisely because it is ontologically a subject, to experience himself as a subject while experiencing his own 'I'." (PA 2021, pg. 143) Wojtyła then distinguishes between having an awareness of yourself as a truly existing subject (which involves conscious mirroring) and having an awareness of yourself as the author of your own acts (which involves the reflexivity of consciousness). (PA 2021, pg. 143)

Wojtyła believes we can state (because consciousness gives man the experience of experiencing himself and his acts as his own) that consciousness helps 'constitute' the 'self' in a sense. This means that consciousness actually is a fundamental part of the person, "(it is an) essential

dimension or real moment of the being that 'I' am, since it constitutes the being's subjectivity in an experiential sense." (PA 2021, pg. 145) It is an aspect, it does not replace the 'I' - it rather *reveals* the 'I'. It *reveals* the 'I' to the 'I' - to the person within the person's interiority, "consciousness united with the existence and action of the concrete man-person neither absorbs nor obscures this being... but rather unveils it 'inwardly', thereby unveiling it in its specific distinctness and unrepeatable concreteness." (PA 2021, pg. 146) Wojtyła writes that without consciousness there is no such thing as the *lived experience* of man for, consciousness takes experience and makes it 'lived' by the 'I', "...our lived-experiences are formed thanks to consciousness... without consciousness there is no human lived-experience - though there exist various manifestations of life or various actualizations of man's potentiality..." (PA 2021, pg. 147)

While we can arrive at a spiritual element in man through metaphysical abstraction i.e. we can arrive at the metaphysical concepts of the immaterial soul and its powers, consciousness gives us an experiential entryway into man's spiritual life which inadvertently helps deepen our understanding of it. (PA 2021, pg. 147) Because consciousness subjectivises man's being and his acts, Wojtyła writes that consciousness exposes and manifests his spirituality, which is obviously still "rooted" in his being in the realistic metaphysical sense. (PA 2021, pg. 147)

Wojtyła distinguishes the fact that man both experiences an awareness of himself as the author of his acts and he also experiences an awareness of acts occurring within him that are not a product of his agency. (PA 2021, pg. 147 & 148) An experience of actions where he is an agent versus that which Wojtyła terms as that which "happens in man" is based on the Aristotelian-Thomistic distinction between *actio* and *passio*. (PA 2021, pg. 147 & 148) According to Aquinas, "An action is a change that is carried out; a passion is a change that is undergone." (Budziszewski 2020, pg. 41) i.e. an action is 'active' - it requires an agent to carry it out and passions are 'passive' as they happen to or within the agent regardless of the agent's will.

Self-knowledge (working with the *mirroring* and *reflexive* functions of consciousness and therefore *lived experience*) helps distinguish between these two acts. Man is aware, through experience, of the complete difference between action which he initiates and action which occurs without his volition. (PA 2021, pg. 147 & 148) The acts that see man as an agent of his acts are the only kinds of acts that can be called moral, where he not only recognises the "moral values of 'good' and 'evil'" but he experiences them as his own, "He experiences them on the basis of a

relation that is both feeling and assessment...man not only is conscious of the 'morality' of his acts, but also experiences it authentically (and at times very deeply)." (PA 2021, pg. 147 & 148)

We can see consciousness acting in its fullness (i.e. both of its functions) when it comes to performing a *conscious act* in the field of morality; the act where man decides between and determines himself as either good or evil. Wojtyła calls this the "'drama' of human interiority" which is the "drama of good and evil" and which takes place "in acts and, through the acts, in the person." (PA 2021, pg. 149) In the mirroring function (which self-knowledge acts in tandem with) the subject/agent becomes aware or "objectively conscious" of "the good or evil" that comes about due to their conscious efficacy. (PA 2021, pg. 149) In the reflexive function we actually experience the goodness or evilness of acts as our own as well as the result of these acts as it pertains to our moral lives i.e. we experience ourselves as having become good or evil. (PA 2021, pg. 149) Due to this "reflexive reduction 'inward' man's act and 'moral good or evil' gets subjectivised and man then experiences "good or evil simply in himself in his own 'I' " and "he experiences himself as the one who is good or evil". (PA 2021, pg. 149)

So far, we have spoken about the interiority of man primarily when it comes to *self-knowledge* and *consciousness*. The problem Wojtyła brings to our attention is that consciousness is not relegated to the sphere of immateriality alone. It has an implicit connection with the body of man who is a body-soul composite as ascertained by the Aristotelian-Thomistic system. In the two functions of consciousness we can observe the body's impact. (PA 2021, pg. 151) Wojtyła writes that man not only possesses an awareness of his physicality but he also "experiences" his physicality i.e. "his own 'bodiliness', just as he does his own sensuality and affectivity." Consciousness cannot evade the impact the body has on it, and (as Wojtyła writes) sensations seem to dictate how much consciousness is conscious of, with regards to the *psycho-somatic* (mental-physical) structure of man. He explains how man only becomes aware of an organ when there is something wrong with it e.g. one knows one has a kidney but only when there is a kidney stone which causes pain does one become aware of it and experience it. The body is therefore primarily an "object of sensations" and secondarily an "object of self-knowledge and consciousness". (PA 2021, pg. 151)

Wojtyła then clarifies the difference between man experiencing the "sensation of his body" versus the "consciousness of it." (PA 2021, pg. 152) Because man is not only a "thinking" being but also a "sensing" being, Wojtyła writes, and as we alluded to earlier, emotions have an impact on what he has defined as a proper *human act*. (PA 2021, pg. 152) He does divide sensations into "qualitatively" higher and lower sensations and says that those that are (in terms of quality)

higher up on the scale - that they pertain to man's spirituality. (PA 2021, pg. 152) Emotions or affections can either "intensify our action" or limit and paralyze that which is fundamental to the *human act* i.e. "voluntarium" (the will) (PA 2021, pg. 152).

When emotions become too strong, overwhelming, intense; when they change rapidly and overall become too dominant, they distort *consciousness* in both functions and as a result flood out or block out the 'I'. It all starts with self-knowledge not being able to make an object out of the emotions, "It does not establish meanings and thereby does not keep emotions in intellectual dependence." (PA 2021, pg. 153 & 154) This obviously makes an impact on the mirroring of consciousness which we could say gets clouded by the emotions, "when sensations in a sense grow beyond actual comprehension by man." (PA 2021, pg. 153 & 154) The emotions or as Wojtyła says "things that happen in man" are still mirrored, but consciousness plays a subservient role, "(it) loses its superior, that is, its objective, relation to them." (PA 2021, pg. 153 & 154)

The emotions can make man not only lose a sense of his own 'I' but prevent him acting in the Wojtyłaan sense. As a result his subjectivity is not disclosed because he cannot make a choice that shows his 'self-determination' based on his 'self-governance' and 'self-possession' therefore allowing him to not just transcend towards the object of good his will desires but 'transcend himself' therefore participating in his own moral 'co-creation' in becoming good or bad (we will elaborate on these terms in more detail). His emotions are so dominant that it puts man *under* his emotions, "with a significant intensification of affections or passions, man...ceases to 'experience' them and only 'lives by' them... (*in an*) 'impersonal' way. For a lived-experience is personal when the lived-experience of the subjectivity of one's own 'I' is also manifested." (PA 2021, pg. 155 & 156)

Wojtyła believes that if emotions are not too strong for the 'I', consciousness will function normally. He does note however that the scale of emotional intensity is individual to each person i.e. some are more sensitive, some can withstand stronger emotions, some are weaker in the face of stronger emotions and or some are able to overcome strong emotions from an inner training. Regardless, he does not demonize the emotions but refers to them in terms of their relationship and the governance by self-knowledge and consciousness, "Up to a certain intensity of sensations, consciousness functions normally with respect to both mirroring and reflexivity. What can be formed then are authentic, affective lived experiences in all their subjective completion..." (PA 2021, pg. 156) Perhaps that is why there is a sense of not feeling like oneself when we experience a torrent of emotion... our 'I' is replaced with how we feel and not who we

are. We are unable to act from our 'I' and therefore less likely to show and grow into our 'I' as well.

Wojtyła asks what is *subjectivity* and how does it differ from *subjectivism*? Firstly, *subjectivity* is only known through *lived experience* and not pure reasoning. As we have said before, some kind of union between *phenomenology* and *metaphysics* is needed to delve into the 'I' of man. *Metaphysics* is a step too far removed from the process that reveals the 'I' i.e. *lived experience*. We need to stay with experience to get to the person but not fall into *subjectivism* which divorces man from reality in general as it is a "mental attitude", thereby it also does not stay with *lived experience* which is the only situation that manifests the 'I',

For in reality man is a subject and experiences himself as a subject... The aspect of consciousness has a fundamental significance for ascertaining the subjectivity of man... Here, understanding grows directly from experience without any intermediary stages, without reasoning... By grasping subjectivity only in the metaphysical way, by stating that man as an objective being is a true subject of existence and action that is, a suppositum - we abstract ourselves to a considerable extent from what is for us a source of visualizations, a source of experience... (PA 2021, pg. 157)

Back to the topic of *agere* and *pati*; Wojtyła writes that although we clearly experience a difference between *conscious action* and *something which happens in man*, there is connection, they both take place within the human person. (PA 2021, pg. 164) Wojtyła also further delineates between two types of passivity; a difference which is captured in the following assertions i.e. "something happens in man" versus "something happens to man". (PA 2021, pg. 164) The latter means something is done to him from his external environment, it does not originate within him, he is not an object for himself but rather he becomes "an object" for an external force or "other subject". An action is exacted upon him and "he merely suffers" the effects. (PA 2021, pg. 164)

Wojtyła writes that the interconnected concepts of *agere* and *pati* imply each other and are inextricably "linked into one mental whole" and therefore cannot be grasped without each other. (PA 2021, pg. 165) Wojtyła defines the concepts that refer to the principle of change apparent in the world as: "*Potency* denotes what in some way already is and at the same time is not; it is in preparedness, in disposition, and even in readiness, but not, however, in reality. *Actus*, which is present in philosophical manuals in the polonized form as 'act' [akt], is the same as the realization of potency, its fulfillment. (PA 2021, pg. 165) As we have already stated in the previous chapter, potency or potentiality becomes 'activated' in a sense, to become fully what it is in *actus* or actuality e.g. a seed has the potential to actually become a rose and a rose is the fulfillment of the potentiality inherent in the seed. Wojtyła writes that no other concept has come

close to explaining the “dynamic essence of change and all changes taking place in any being” except for this concept offered by Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysical language i.e. “*potentia-actus*”. (PA 2021, pg. 166) This is why he uses it as the basis for explaining, in the *Person and Act*, the “dynamism proper to man”. (PA 2021, pg. 166)

He states that, in the first place, this concept is describing not only “two different states of being” but it is simultaneously describing “two different kinds of existence (existentia)”. (PA 2021, pg. 166) This is because, when we move from the state of a seed to the state of a rose, we do not only refer to a ‘change’ in their ‘being’, but a ‘change’ in “the order” of the “existence” of the being; there is clearly a “*fieri*” or “becoming”. (PA 2021, pg. 166) Not an “absolute” “becoming” *ex nihilo* (out of nothing) but a “relative” “becoming”. (PA 2021, pg. 166) This “relative becoming” arises out of and depends on the *potency* in the really existing ontological being i.e. “the *fieri* within a being’s own internal structure.” (PA 2021, pg. 166)

The two types of “existences” are therefore: the state of existence prior to ‘becoming’ which can ‘become’, “that which exists in potency, by the fact that it exists in potency, can exist in actua” and the state of that which has ‘become’ which points to the previous state “that which already exists in actus exists due to the potency in which it earlier existed.” (PA 2021, pg. 166) He therefore calls *potentia-actus* “two moments or two phases” that occur in “concrete existence” and are connected in one “dynamic unity”. We can therefore conclude that “actus” does not only refer to the end product or the “completed state of the being-fulfilled itself” (PA 2021, pg. 166 & 167) but it refers to the state of ‘becoming’ as well i.e. “the very transition from potency to this state”. (PA 2021, pg. 167)

This concept of *potentia-actus* refers to the very different “experiences” which we have already explored of “man acts” as well as “something happens in man” which Wojtyła says both contribute to the fulfillment of his being i.e. “both constitute the concretization of his proper dynamism”. (PA 2021, pg. 167) Just because something that “happens in man” is passive and “man acts” is active does not mean that there is not a dynamic transition taking place from *potency* to *act* in both cases. (PA 2021, pg. 167) The difference between “something that happens in man” and “man acts”, as we have explained, is mainly determined by “the moment of efficacy” for Wojtyła.

“Man acts” occurs when I experience myself as the agent of my acts. With the passive “something that happens in man” my “dynamization” or movement from *potency* to *act* occurs without my contribution i.e. it is “dynamism without efficacy”. The active “man acts” has the dynamization occur due to man’s agency. (PA 2021, pg. 168) In the passive structure man is also

not “conscious of his efficacy” and does not experience it, whereas in the active he is. (PA 2021, pg. 169) Man in the carrying out of *actus* - the active structure - realises, experiences and becomes conscious of the fact, that he is a cause i.e he and he alone does “evoke the coming into existence and the existence of an effect, its *feri* and *esse*”. (PA 2021, pg. 169) This realization comes with the subsequent realization of responsibility: “This connection causes the person, that is, every concrete human ‘I’, to have to consider the act not only as the effect of his efficacy and as his possession but also due to the moral character of the act as the field of his responsibility.” (PA 2021, pg. 169) Although Wojtyła has and will continue to focus on the ‘self-transcendence’ that occurs during “man acts” he does not neglect man’s substantial immanence (a remaining within) “in his own action” which occurs in harmony with it, “when ‘I act’, I am already wholly in my action, in this dynamization of my ‘I’, to which I contributed efficaciously.” (PA 2021, pg. 170)

Wojtyła next raises quite a difficult issue: How are *personhood* and *human nature* integrated? If the action “man acts” is the defining feature of *personhood* and this action can even go against *human nature* to achieve a moral good e.g. go against the natural instinct of *self-preservation* in order to lay down one’s life for another... How can person and nature be unified? Does man have two different causes for his activity? As a matter of fact, in the findings of *phenomenological reduction*, and therefore in the evaluation of man’s experience; *nature* sounds seemingly opposed to *personhood* as it seems to imply an inherent pre-determined tendency which does not explain man’s ability to freely choose to act. It does explain passive action however i.e. the “something that happens in man” or what Wojtyła calls “actuations” e.g. respiration and emotions (PA 2021, pg. 180) which (while they form a part of his subjective life) is not the action that reveals him as a person.

Again, Wojtyła refers to the ‘experience’ of ‘experience’ as a possible solution to unite *nature* and *personhood*. The ‘I’, the personal self which is the *suppositum* revealed in *lived experience* - serves as a grounding for both these acts. Both types of acts occur in the **same *suppositum*** as witnessed by experience and therefore are united by the ‘I’, “Even if ‘nature’ is identified only with the moment of *actuations* as opposed to the moment of acts, which manifests the person in man, then, at any rate, the former moment is not located outside the unity and identity of one’s own ‘I’.” (PA 2021, pg. 183)

Wojtyła does note that, in the case of trying to unite *nature* and *personhood*, *phenomenological reduction* can only go so far in trying to arrive at a solution to this ‘opposition’. (PA 2021, pg. 183) This is especially when one asks about the two different “causes” in man i.e. the seemingly

“personal” cause in *conscious efficacy* and the “non-personal” in the *something that happens in man*. (PA 2021, pg. 183) Still, he believes that experience, while it shows this difference, first and foremost shows the “unity and identity of one’s own I” i.e. it shows that the causes of the two seemingly ‘opposing’ acts cannot lie outside of the one subjective ‘I’ in which they both occur. (PA 2021, pg. 183)

It is here that Wojtyła returns to *metaphysical reduction*, where the integration of *nature* and *personhood* is specifically “aimed at”. (PA 2021, pg. 183) In this system, *nature* is somewhat equated with *essence* and therefore *nature* in the human person denotes man as a whole, each and every man “the entirety of humanity” as well as not just man’s “static” but his “dynamic humanity” (PA 2021, pg. 183 & 184). In this system *nature* is seen as the foundation or “real basis” of man’s total “dynamism” and therefore all his actuations - both passive and active. (PA 2021, pg. 184)

The adage, which we used at the start to begin to explain Wojtyła’s philosophical method: *operari sequitur esse* “action follows being”, is now explained in more detail. Wojtyła uncovers another understanding i.e. that “in order to act, one must first exist”. In this adage *action* and *existence* are not synonymous but are also inextricably linked, as the same ‘I’ underlies them both. (PA 2021, pg. 184) It is not only man that exists ontologically but also in some sense (in the proper order and firstly reliant on man’s existence) the acts man performs. (PA 2021, pg. 184) In this adage “action” comes after, is primarily reliant on man’s “existence” (PA 2021, pg. 184). The metaphysical adage *operari sequitur esse* “action follows being” shows the inherent connection “between action and the acting subject” through the use of the word *sequitur* (follows) - a connection that is “grasped and expressed” by the metaphysical understanding of *nature*. (PA 2021, pg. 184) Therefore *nature* is actually the foundation of the “essential” connection, “between the one who acts and his action.” (PA 2021, pg. 184)

The active and passive activity that occurs in and reveals the person is shown to be, as Wojtyła states, “human” because it arises due to “nature, from humanity.” (PA 2021, pg. 187) This is obvious when one considers that not only is “the person” performing acts “human” but his acts are indeed also “human”. (PA 2021, pg. 187) So when the person acts in the sense of “man acts” we cannot say that even though he transcends himself (which we will elaborate on) it means that the person becomes separate from his nature. It just means that this type of action reveals the essential aspects i.e. “the particular properties of this nature”. (PA 2021, pg. 187) Still, this does not mean that the “difference between person and nature” is somehow dissolved. (PA 2021, pg. 187)

A brief note on *potentiality* and *consciousness*. *Potentiality* (which is implicit in the *suppositum*) as we know is the basis of man's "dynamism" i.e his two types of acts. (PA 2021, pg. 188) Although they both seem to have similar meanings "(The term 'dynamism' is of Greek etymology: *dýnamis* means 'force' or 'power'. The term 'potentiality' is of Latin etymology: *potentia* means 'power' or 'faculty')" (PA 2021, pg. 188) they describe two different stages in action. *Potentiality* is in a sense the "source" and *dynamism* is "the actual dynamisation". (PA 2021, pg. 188) Wojtyła also notes that "man acts" and "something happens in man" seem to arise from different *potentialities/sources/layers of potentiality* which we will expand on in a moment. (PA 2021, pg. 188)

With regards to the action that involves the "psycho-emotive" (mental-emotional) versus the "somatic-vegetative" (physical) what Wojtyła calls "layers" of man and their "potentialities"; Wojtyła notes the difference in the relationship each layer has with *consciousness*. (PA 2021, pg. 191) The fact that only one of them i.e. the "psycho-emotive" (mental-emotional) is mirrored and subjectivised by *consciousness*. As we have said before, although we have a constant awareness of our body, we do not have awareness of every organ, and everything involved in the life-giving processes of the body (e.g. osmosis in cells) occurring at all times to maintain our existence. The "somatic-vegetative" layer only becomes apparent to us through "sensations". (PA 2021, pg. 192) When we feel sick or have any physical affliction, even though its source is the "somatic-vegetative" layer of potentiality, it is actually our "psycho-emotive" layer which makes it apparent to *consciousness*. (PA 2021, pg. 192)

Here Wojtyła turns to the idea of the *subconscious* and writes that the term garnered the meaning attributed to it by psychoanalysts (Freud, Adler, Jung etc) who observed a difference between it and *consciousness* and the content it 'provided' or was 'concerned' with i.e "The subconscious... designates a source of content experienced by man different from the one encompassed by consciousness." (PA 2021, pg. 195) Wojtyła describes the *subconscious* as an "interior space" where specific "content" - especially linked with the psycho-emotive and somatic-vegetative layer - is held back or kept "before the threshold of consciousness". (PA 2021, pg. 196) Wojtyła believes, (because what is in the *subconscious* is waiting in an 'active' sense to be made known in *consciousness*) especially when consciousness is not functioning at its best i.e. "when consciousness is weakened or inhibited, during fatigue or...sleep", that the *subconscious* shows the harmony within the subject as well as its consistent basis of its unifying 'I' i.e. its "interior continuity and coherence" (PA 2021, pg. 197). It also shows how *potentiality* is linked to *consciousness*, especially in acts that occur without much of consciousness' involvement. (PA 2021, pg. 197) Due to the idea of the *subconscious* there is therefore a way to

better way to visualize the movement or “transitions” from something that “happens in man by way of natural, vegetative (or possibly emotive) actuations” and *conscious efficacy* “which man consciously experiences and considers as his act.” (PA 2021, pg. 197)

As we have said before and as Wojtyła emphasizes again, man does not only perform acts or subjectivise them, but they are the realization of the latent potentialities within, “...man - both action, that is, act, and happening in various forms, which was described as ‘actuation’ is at the same time linked with a certain becoming of this subject ‘man’. Becoming is what we grasp with the Latin word *fieri*.” (PA 2021, pg. 199) As existence (*that* something is) is the first “becoming” of esse (*what* something is), Wojtyła says in a sense we can actually equate existence with *fieri*, “For ‘to become’ is the same as to ‘begin to exist.’” (PA 2021, pg. 199) It is not that ‘becoming’ refers to a new creation out of nothing which belongs solely to the first coming into being but rather, “something begins to exist in the already existing subject ‘man’.” (PA 2021, pg. 200)

According to the *realistic metaphysical* system the *ontological* ‘coming to be’ is *substantial* and the ‘coming to be’ in the sense that man matures and develops on the physical as well as moral plane i.e. comes to be himself in a deeper and more true sense is *accidental*, “Man, who at one time substantially came into existence, simultaneously becomes more and more ‘of some sort [jakimś] and even, in a sense, more and more ‘somebody’ [kimś] through everything that he does and everything that happens in him - through both forms of the dynamism proper to him.” (PA 2021, pg. 200) As alluded to before, for Wojtyła however (and as experience shows) there are two types of *fieri* that occur in man. The first one refers to the passive “something that happens in man” which denotes the “somatic-vegetative aspect” and the potentiality in this layer. Man flourishes in the physical sense from birth and then subsequently begins to deteriorate even though man can do certain things to aid it in his physical development and slow down his body’s rate of deterioration to a certain degree. The “psycho-emotive” aspect also develops according to this passive “something happens in man”. As we have said though, it is mirrored in consciousness and therefore man has a greater ability to mold and transform this aspect with “conscious efficacy” (PA 2021, pg. 201).

Wojtyła now explains in detail how “man ‘becomes’ good or evil as man” by virtue of his acts. (PA 2021, pg. 202) As we have said, *conscious efficacy* which sees man as the agent and is therefore active, enables man to become “somebody”. (PA 2021, pg. 202) This type of *fieri* i.e. man becoming “good or evil as man” is therefore reliant on the action that is “proper to the person” (PA 2021, pg. 202). The type of action man chooses, produces actual moral good and

evil (not in an abstract sense) and leads him to therefore *truly* becoming either one of these values “in the moral sense.” - i.e. “To be morally good means to be a good man, to be good as man. To be morally evil means to be an evil man, to be evil as man.” (PA 2021, pg. 202) While the origin of this ‘becoming’ is not the *conscious act* alone but its “relation to the norm of morality” - the ‘becoming’ is reliant on action and through this action the “quality of acts...passes into man”. (PA 2021, pg. 202)

Freedom lies at the heart of this *fieri* - it is revealed as a fundamental structure that enables this type of action to take place and therefore it enables the person in becoming morally good or evil as well, “freedom is the root of man becoming good or evil through acts”. (PA 2021, pg. 203) Wojtyła wants to hone in on what he calls the “moment of freedom” within *man acts*. This is when we experience the moment “I can but do not have to”. (PA 2021, pg. 203) The potentiality or source of this action is the volitional power i.e. the will. (PA 2021, pg. 203) We can only transcend ourselves because of this freedom, a freedom Wojtyła notes is “absent in the causation of nature”. (PA 2021, pg. 204) The will is not only a revelation of freedom but also the revelation of the person, who can only perform “man acts” which is an action different from all the created order solely because he possesses the “property” of the will. (PA 2021, pg. 207)

Self-determination or the fact that one can ‘determine’ oneself is deeply connected to i.e. it underlies the “*fieri* of the person” - his/her becoming in the moral sense. (PA 2021, pg. 207) It describes for Wojtyła, the “relation” described above: the power of volition is unique to man and is a “property of the person” and conversely, as *conscious efficacy* is primarily dependent on the will, the power of volition in *actus* “reveals” the person. Wojtyła writes that *self-determination* is dependent on and therefore also unveils the constituent structures of the person: “self-possession” and “self-governance”. (PA 2021, pg. 208) *Self-possession* refers to the medieval adage *persona est sui iuris* or “self-ownership” which understands the person as completely autonomous i.e. as “someone who possesses himself and who at the same time is possessed only and exclusively by himself.” (PA 2021, pg. 208) *Conscious efficacy* and therefore *self-determination* cannot take place without the “I will” i.e. it is not only due to the fact that a person can freely decide for himself but also due to the fact that he owns himself, “for one can determine only what he really possesses. And only the one who possesses can determine.” (PA 2021, pg. 208)

Self-governance according to Wojtyła is not wholly synonymous with “self-mastery” but is rather more basic/essential, and refers to the fact that man (who is a subject and object for himself) “is the one who governs, who governs himself, and, on the other hand, he himself is the

one whom he governs.” (PA 2021, pg. 208 & 209) *Self-possession* therefore enables the structure of *self-governance* to take place and, as we have said, they both lay the foundation for *self-determination*. (PA 2021, pg. 209) Wojtyła writes that each instance of *self-determination* is also an instance of man governing himself (PA 2021, pg. 209) because when he says, “I will” he utilises “the specific power over himself” which is exclusive to him and him alone i.e. “that no one else can exercise or perform.” (PA 2021, pg. 209) *Self-governance* therefore refers to the other half of the medieval adage i.e. *Persona est alteri incommunicabilis* (The person is incommunicable). (PA 2021, pg. 209) We will expand on this in more detail later/in the following chapter.

Self-determination does not occur in other beings, in other *supposita*, and is not a structure revealed in something that happens in man but (as we have said) it is only revealed through the action specific to man i.e. *conscious action* and therefore it only occurs in persons. That is why *self-determination* unveils the personal structure of man, “But self-determination is proper to the person. It is self-determination in particular that binds and integrates various manifestations of man’s dynamism on the level of the person. It also unceasingly constitutes, determines, and manifests this level. It is through self-determination that man is given in experience (above all in self-experience) as a person.” (PA 2021, pg. 209) For Wojtyła, experience therefore reveals that the will is, in the first place, “a property of the person” and only then it is revealed as a volitional “power.” (PA 2021, pg. 209) *Self-determination* reveals the subject as an object: the person is revealed as an object for himself ((he is i.e. his ‘I’ is “objectivised” - in a sense), an object that can be formed by one’s self, one’s ‘I’. This moment therefore also reveals his subjectivity, “the person as the object (the one who is governed and possessed) is given to the person as the subject (the one who governs and possesses). As we see, objectivity corresponds to the subjectivity of the person, and in a particular way it seems to manifest this subjectivity.” (PA 2021, pg. 210)

Wojtyła wants to make it clear however that the “objectivisation of the subject does not have an intentional character” if intentionality is understood as the one found when the will ‘goes out’ towards a value (a good) as an end, like in the experience “I will” something (PA 2021, pg. 211) *Self-determination* rather “actualises... the ready made objectivity of this ‘I’ contained in the intrapersonal relation of self-governance and self-possession.” (PA 2021, pg. 211) Wojtyła writes that historically the “I will something” (the relation of will to an external object/value) has been concentrated on more than the “I will” as “self-determination”. (PA 2021, pg. 213) *Self-determination* “places one’s own ‘I’” i.e. oneself as a subject, as the object of value. (PA 2021, pg. 214) This is how one’s ‘I’ gets objectivised. (PA 2021, pg. 214) As we have said

before, the function of *consciousness* (both the mirroring and reflexive function) subjectivises or reveals in *lived experience*, to himself, man as a subject. (PA 2021, pg. 214) Therefore Wojtyła concludes, "If the will as self-determination brings objectivization, this is accomplished within and, so to speak, in the bedrock of the simultaneous and actual subjectivization through consciousness. For man experiences every 'I will', every self-determination, as a subjective fact." (PA 2021, pg. 215) Through this man is able to not only "determine himself", "become a somebody" and therefore become "good or evil" but actually experience this *feri* or "becoming" as well. (PA 2021, pg. 215)

As we said before, *consciousness* does not replace cognition i.e. *self-knowledge* or knowledge itself. The will in the case of *self-determination* and its being drawn to objects that it values as a good is ruled not by *consciousness* but *self-knowledge* and *knowledge in general*. (PA 2021, pg. 215) To explain the fact that "only in its objectivising function does cognition lead the will" (PA 2021, pg. 216) Wojtyła turns to the metaphysical understanding of *nihil volitum nisi praecognitum* (nothing is willed unless foreseen). Maurice de Wulf explains this concept which states that, in the order of operations, the power of reason grasps the 'goodness' of a value and presents this to the will which then begins to desire it as a good, "Every appetite presupposes the knowledge of the object desired. The sensible appetite is the tendency of the organism towards a concrete object presented by the senses as a concrete good... The rational appetite, or the will, acts consequently to the presentation of an abstract good." (de Wulf, #301) When *consciousness* reflects the content of cognition to the subjective 'I' and therefore interiorises or subjectivises the knowledge, this does not "lead or govern" but rather "accompanies" the will. (PA 2021, pg. 216) The fact that "man acts" requires that there is an exclusive ruling/leading or "governing function" of the intellect. (PA 2021, pg. 216)

It must be noted once again here that Wojtyła holds the belief that there is an inherent relationship between the inner and outer world of man. Every act reveals his person. Therefore, Wojtyła says that "Every act is an exteriorization of the person, even if it is accomplished in a way that is merely interior and thus merits for it the name *actus internus*." (PA 2021, pg. 216) He further expands that due to consciousness and its subjectivising function, "every act, no matter how exterior in light of that criterion, undergoes interiorization as well." (PA 2021, pg. 217).

As Wojtyła has indicated before "on the level of nature" there is only passive action or what he calls "actuations" which relate to the *something that happens in man*. (PA 2021, pg. 218) Nature is therefore interchangeable or synonymous with the "potentiality that inheres at the origin of actuations themselves". (PA 2021, pg. 218) Wojtyła notes though that nature is not just relegated

to being defined as *actuations* but also alludes to “the direction of their integration”. (PA 2021, pg. 218) The direction of the integration of these *actuations* have an end “a mark of some finality”. (PA 2021, pg. 218) Wojtyła defines instinct, particularly found in the animal world, as the “subjective basis of both the integration and the finality on the level of the dynamism of nature alone.” (PA 2021, pg. 218) Instinct also looks like action because everything that occurs in an animal as passive action is “unified and oriented”. (PA 2021, pg. 219) Action on the “level of nature” is further differentiated by Wojtyła when he notes that it personhood does not seem to be at the root of it i.e. “lacks the particular dependence on one’s own ‘I’ that marks the dynamism of the person.” (PA 2021, pg. 219) The reliance on the self is the foundation for freedom because man does not always have to engage in acts that are bound by a sense of “necessity” like in the case of animals and instinct. (PA 2021, pg. 219) Therefore, conversely, freedom does not manifest itself where there is an action that is not dependent on the ‘I’. (PA 2021, pg. 220) Instinct is dependent on the “potentiality of its own subject” and therefore is a “manifestation and an actualisation of this governance of nature over the individual”. (PA 2021, pg. 220)

Transcendence in Wojtyła’s philosophical thought refers to “crossing a threshold or boundary (transcendere).” (PA 2021, pg. 221) Obviously this can denote the more traditionally understood “crossings” that take place in rational and volitional activity. (PA 2021, pg. 221) This intentional “crossing the boundary of the subject toward an object” is identified by Wojtyła as “horizontal transcendence”. (PA 2021, pg. 221) The second type of transcendence i.e. “vertical transcendence” is what Wojtyła means when he talks of “the transcendence of the person in the act.” (PA 2021, pg. 221) This transcendence is a “property of the dynamism of the person” and is therefore based on “self-determination” and “freedom” (PA 2021, pg. 221) and sees the person transcend themselves/stand above themselves in their conscious efficacy; when they decide to perform an act that is good in the moral sense.

Unlike, in the case of animals, when man experiences an instinct and therefore ways to carry out an “instinctive action” two things seem to take place: there is “a certain increase of its spontaneity and even its intensity, with a simultaneous attenuation of the vividness of self-determination. Self-determination is identified with conscious decision.” (PA 2021, pg. 225) You have a “something happens in man” needing the consent underlying self-determination i.e. the consent of the person. There is a tension, Wojtyła notes, between “the will as the power of self-determination...and...drives, emotivity and potentiality of the body” (PA 2021, pg. 226). Wojtyła writes that a person specifically arises “from this tension” because conscious decision is really needed in these moments. (PA 2021, pg. 226)

Wojtyła wants to explain more clearly the word *appetitus* as it is found in the term *rational appetite*. It denotes, a reaching out, a “striving” which signifies, “to tend toward an end”. (PA 2021, pg. 228) This only seems to refer to “something that happens in man”. Intentionality is however different with regards to the rational power as opposed to the volitional power. As Aquinas delineated, when the intellect reaches out to an object, it abstracts the form and, in a sense, there is an “introduction of an object into the subject”. (PA 2021, pg. 228 & 229) When the will is engaged, it also reaches out to the object but then enters the object and “the subject begins in a sense to exist through volition in the object”. (PA 2021, pg. 228 & 229) Intentionality therefore refers to, both an orienting, a “turning oneself toward an object” and a reaching out “a specific going out toward the object.” (PA 2021, pg. 228 & 229)

Decision underlies two types of volition i.e. one simple “when I simply will something” and the other more complex “when I choose”. (PA 2021, pg. 229.) In fact, Wojtyła writes that at the very core of the “I will” resides *decision*, specifically in the case of “intentional subordination to an object (‘I will something’: x or y) is concerned.” (PA 2021, pg. 229.) Wojtyła is careful to explain that *decision* is not a replication of “the drive for the good” but it is a type of “threshold” which man must pass in order to get to “the good”. When the “drive for the good” increases then the “possibilities that inhere” in man with regards to “drawing the will and thus also the person” also increases i.e. Wojtyła equates “maturity” with man becoming increasingly attracted to “true values”, which, as he noted before, will “absorb” the person in a sense. The “personal character” of this process however, Wojtyła attributes to conscious decision and says it must remain apparent in the “absorption of the good” even if it seems the good has overwhelmed or “engrossed him”. (PA 2021, pg. 230 & 231) Decision does not separate the will from its “objects” but requires that first of all the will is inherently always ready to “go out towards the good”. (PA 2021, pg. 231)

But what about the “influence of motives” on our volitional power? (PA 2021, pg. 231) Simply put Wojtyła uses the “*Latin movere* to move” as underlying the definition of motivation; therefore, he says that “It is to motivation that we owe movement, that is, the movement of the will toward a presented object.” (PA 2021, pg. 232) The will is obviously not just oriented but actually moves towards and “becomes an end”. (PA 2021, pg. 232) Motives do not excite the emotions but “They move...they evoke the fact that man ‘wills something’: x or y”. (PA 2021, pg. 232) Just as there are two types of decisions there are two types of motivations: simple and complex. Simple: “I will something” does not denote choice yet still includes a decision as only “one object is presented to the will... only one value moves the will” (PA 2021, pg. 232 & 233). The Complex denotes choice: It sees multiple values battling for the will’s attention. Decision in

this case is reliant on a “separate process that precedes and conditions this decision”. (PA 2021, pg. 233) This process Wojtyła calls a “discussion of motives”, a weighing up of pro’s and con’s, which also sees a parallel ‘pausing’ of the will (PA 2021, pg. 233). This is where choice steps into the discussion (PA 2021, pg. 233) Wojtyła believes that the will should not be equated with what he explained is “horizontal transcendence” but primarily with “vertical transcendence” because of the fact that in it we see decision most fully. (PA 2021, pg. 234) Freedom is revealed most fully in choice because the object is “determined” solely by “the will” and therefore reveals that “self-determination” is taking place. (PA 2021, pg. 235) This does not mean that freedom is set in opposition to values or in spite of them but freedom exists for values, “For this is not freedom ‘from’ objects, ‘from’ values, but, quite the contrary, freedom ‘to’ them, or even better, freedom ‘for’ them for objects, for values.” (PA 2021, pg. 235)

Wojtyła starts by getting a deeper understanding of *nihil volitum nisi praecognitum* which we have already introduced into the discussion. He returns to the problem both taken on by Aquinas and Kant of how to unite the will with the intellect i.e. the will’s relation to truth. Wojtyła sees and explains how truth actually forms the core or “interior principle” of the will. (PA 2021, pg. 239) Wojtyła asks how the will is able to choose one value over another in the moment of conscious decision. (PA 2021, pg. 239) If we are to avoid materialistic determinism which in some cases says there is no freedom of the will at all and in others says that some objects are made more attractive and therefore their “choosing” is all an illusion, one cannot deny the fact that choosing relies on decision (involving the will) which relies on truth, “To choose means above all to decide about the objects presented to the will in the intentional order on the basis of a certain truth. In no way can we understand choice without reducing the will’s proper dynamism to truth as the principle of volition.” (PA 2021, pg. 240)

As we have discussed already, cognition does not equal volition and therefore the will’s relationship to truth is not the same as the relationship of truth to reason. That is why the will is first dependent on the intellect to ascertain the truth (PA 2021, pg. 240). The will is also “subordinate to truth” which frees it from the objects of volition. The will’s “dependence in truth” is equated with the “dependence of the person” expressed by the fact that man makes a decision and choice during conscious efficacy. “Dependence in truth” also “definitively explain(s)” vertical transcendence because of the freedom which is inherent to self-determination, “The person is independent from the objects of his own action through the moment of truth contained in every authentic decision or choice.” (PA 2021, pg. 241)

It must be noted that if the will desires something that “is not a true good” this is not just due to a fault made by reason but you have here an active rebellion, a choosing of “not a true good” - this Wojtyła calls “moral evil” and says it further unveils the will’s “interior dependence” on truth. (PA 2021, pg. 242) Morality and “the opposition of good and evil” exists because of the will’s dependence on the “truth about the good” in deciding on which objects it should choose. (PA 2021, pg. 242) The “truth about the good” comes forth in the “lived experience of value” where for example we experience the benefits of physical exercise and then “we cognize the good that this object” exercise is. (PA 2021, pg. 244 & 245) The axiological truth is what we have just explained where man has a “cognitive lived experience of value” that “contains the truth about the object precisely as a good”. (PA 2021, pg. 246) In this case it is not the truth of the essence of the object i.e the “ontological truth” but rather its “value” that is ascertained. (PA 2021, pg. 246)

Judgement, which allows man to experience himself as the one who thinks and cognises, has an immediate relationship with “decision or choice”. (PA 2021, pg. 248) Judgement is not only ascertaining a “property” of an object e.g. those shoes are clean or those clouds are wispy, but there is a “grasp of truth about the objects” and therefore “the object is introduced” into the person in the process. (PA 2021, pg. 248) When the person forms a judgement they experience “cognitive transcendence” with regards to the objects of value and the will is therefore able to transcend as well. (PA 2021, pg. 249) “Decision and choice” cannot occur without judgement which grasps the “truth about objects” and therefore their value. (PA 2021, pg. 249)

While it is imperative that man is the agent of his own acts in this conscious efficacy the person must also “fulfill” himself. His determination of himself must not just be a determination in any direction but, “bring to proper fullness the structure that is characteristic of him on account of his personhood, on account of the fact that he is somebody and not merely something.” (PA 2021, pg. 253) With conscious action the person does not just reach out towards objects of value but reaches inwards as well. Through this process morality can mold the interiority of man and “moral values” can remain in him, “Human acts remain in man thanks to moral values, which are the objective reality most closely coherent with the person. Man as a person is somebody, and as somebody he is good or evil.” (PA 2021, pg. 254)

When we say that man can become good in the moral sense, we mean that man “fulfills himself” and when he becomes evil this means that he “fails to fulfill himself”. (PA 2021, pg. 255) This “lack” of fulfillment position arises from the “moral order” and therefore effects the “axiological order” which is “the order of values” and seems in opposition to the order of being or the

“ontological order” which does not make a distinction but says that “every act is ontologically a fulfillment of the person.” (PA 2021, pg. 255) Man is therefore not only contingent in the order of being but there is a contingency in the order of axiology. Because of the fact that freedom is a property of the person he has the ability to choose to become either good or evil, “Man is neither absolutely rooted in good nor certain of his freedom. Precisely in this consists the ethical aspect of the person's contingency and, at the same time, the significance of conscience.” (PA 2021, pg. 256)

As we have discussed, “man’s dependence on one’s own I” is not the only reason for freedom being revealed as a property of the person, but its “dependence on truth”. (PA 2021, pg. 257) This is because freedom is not a freedom from but a freedom for, “For freedom is not realized through the subordination of truth to oneself, but through the subordination of oneself to truth.” (PA 2021, pg. 257) When conscious efficacy takes place, there is a fulfillment of man on the level of the person, due to the fact that “he becomes good or evil”. (PA 2021, pg. 258) This is due to “self-determination” and freedom as its foundation. (PA 2021, pg. 258) In a moment of conscience, we see that truth has to underlie freedom because the role of conscience is “in designating the true good in the act and with this, in creating duty.” (PA 2021, pg. 258) Duty is what Wojtyła calls “the experiential form of dependence on truth, to which the freedom of the person is subject.” (PA 2021, pg. 258) Conscience does not only involve a cognitive type of function by assigning something as good, it also involves the “subjecting” of the actual “act to truth” which can also be understood as the “subjection of self-determination” and therefore “freedom of the will to the true good or the good in truth.” (PA 2021, pg. 258) Wojtyła writes that this subjugation forms a “new reality” i.e. a “normative reality” in the person’s interiority. (PA 2021, pg. 258) A “norm” harbors an inherent sense of obligation i.e. what is revealed by the words ““should” or “ought to””. (PA 2021, pg. 258) When our conscience takes part in assigning something as good there is an immediate inner reaction “an interior compulsion or mandate” that says that conscious efficacy or “man acts” should take place in order to obtain this good. (PA 2021, pg. 265) There is an immediate sense of duty that arises... a duty to fulfill oneself.

3. The Human Person and Participation

While man is a profound mystery for Wojtyła, a whole world in himself in fact, one that cannot be known fully by another i.e. as we have said “the person is *alteri incommunicabilis* — non-transferable, incommunicable” (LR 2013, pg. 23) he is simultaneously not an entire world apart. Due to the fact that he experiences his own inner life he is able to determine that the other

people around him are persons harboring their own inner lives as well. This awareness is not just a nice sentiment, but a task given to him. This brings us to the topic of *participation*. In this study, Wojtyła endeavored to preserve the individuality of the person while emphasizing the key significance of the communal/social aspect of man. With his theory of *participation*, he tries to remedy and, in a sense, reconcile *individualism* and *objective totalism*; so that one does not eliminate the other. While Wojtyła acknowledges the concept of *metaphysical participation* stemming from Plato and gaining new meaning in Thomas Aquinas (a concept we explained in the first chapter); in his study, however, he wants to attribute “a personalistic sense” to this idea. (PA 2021, pg. 514)

Participation or acting “together with others” (PA 2021, pg. 377) for Wojtyła should preserve the individual, develop or concretise his ‘I’ - his full self - even more than if he were completely isolated. It is important to note that when Wojtyła emphasizes man’s *incommunicability* it is in order to retain and in fact is a by-product of his inherent dignity, his right to *self-possession* and *self-determination*, “Thanks to the fact that man—a person—possesses free will, he is also a master of himself, *sui iuris*” (LR 2013, pg. 23) and therefore (as we said before) is completely autonomous “No one else can will in my stead. No one can substitute his act of the will for mine” (LR 2013, pg. 24) as well as “I can not want what he wants me to want—and precisely in this I am *incommunicabilis*. I am and should be self-reliant in my actions.” (LR 2013, pg. 24)

This belief that man has the inherent right to determine his own actions feeds into the way we should view others in the community – as other ‘I’s. This is not just an eloquent statement but is a very vivid image illustrated to help man rally against his tendency to objectify others. We hear echoes of the *personalistic norm* spelled out in *Love and Responsibility* which we will expand on in the following chapter,

As a principle formulated negatively, this norm states that the person is a kind of good that is incompatible with using, which may not be treated as an object of use and, in this sense, as a means to an end. Hand in hand with this goes the positive formulation of the personalistic norm: the person is a kind of good to which only love constitutes the proper and fully-mature relation. (LR 2013, pg. 36)

In the *Person and Act* Wojtyła goes to great lengths to emphasize that true *participation* respects the ‘I’ of the other. In fact, *participation* should not mean an eradication of the individual but an edification of their subjectivity and their ability to determine themselves should not be decreased but increased. At the same time man has a relational aspect which needs to be actualized in order for him to fully thrive, “Concerning action itself, participation as a property of the person determines the fact that by acting ‘together with others’ the person performs the act and fulfills himself in it.” (PA 2021, pg. 386) The “I-Thou” relationship (which we will elaborate on in a

moment) should render man more fully himself and if it does not there are two causes for this, either from the side of the acting person or external factors i.e. “an erroneous organization” resulting from the community he is in. (PA 2021, pg. 389)

A quick note to say that in his essay, *Participation and Alienation*, Wojtyła credits the concept of “alienation” to the philosophy of Karl Marx. Marx’s idea of ‘revolution’ is based on the desire to get rid of alienation which he attributes as having been caused by “the system of private property”, “the state” who enforces and keeps this system going, “the work” and “socio-economic relations shaped by this system” as well as “religion”. (PA 2021, pg. 515) In Marxism, alienation describes everything that causes man to be less of a person, “all that by which man deprives himself or is deprived of what is essentially human, what belongs to humanity or to man.” (PA 2021, pg. 515)

As we have thoroughly discussed the ‘I’, we will now turn to what Wojtyła describes as the “other”. The “other” is understood on the basis of my own ‘I’. (PA 2021, pg. 519) The other is therefore not just another but “an other I”. (PA 2021, pg. 519) I can say this because through *self-consciousness* my own subjectivity is revealed to me. I can therefore transfer (not what actually “constitutes” my ‘I’) but this understanding “to all people”. (PA 2021, pg. 519) This is not just a “general” understanding that “the other” is *ontologically* the same as me, but that he also possesses his own subjectivity and therefore has his own internal structures e.g. of *self-possession, self-governance, self-determination, self-transcendence* etc which we have described already in detail. Because I transfer the understanding of my own “I” onto “an other I” this other I becomes a “second I – a neighbor”. (PA 2021, pg. 520) Wojtyła also describes a “receiving” of the subjectivity of the ‘I’ but believes that the experience of one’s own ‘I’ and his understanding of his own subjectivity is actually “transferred” first. (PA 2021, pg. 520)

Wojtyła explains that *participation* is not just about recognizing the general nature of man because every “I – the other” relation is “concrete”, “unique”, “unrepeatable”. (PA 2021, pg. 520) Each ‘I’ is unique and therefore each combination of ‘I’s will be unique as well. (PA 2021, pg. 520) The ‘I - other’ relation takes place by actually experiencing “the other ‘I’ as a person” i.e. everything that makes him “unique and unrepeatable”. (PA 2021, pg. 521) At the same time, “becoming conscious of the humanity” of the people around us also does not mean that *participation* is taking place. (PA 2021, pg. 522) *Participation* is only ‘activated’ when we see it “as a task” just like in the “commandment to love”. (PA 2021, pg. 522) Wojtyła sees in this commandment the summons to *participation* i.e. a summons “to participate in (the other I’s)

humanity concretized in his person, just like my humanity is concretized in my person". (PA 2021, pg. 522)

Even though the emotions play a role in *participation*, as we will expand on in the next chapter, the will is the decisive factor in carrying out the task of *participation*. (PA 2021, pg. 523) It is not just a choice to *participate* in the personhood of any man but particularly the individual 'I' given to me, "precisely this man... is ...entrusted as a task to me". (PA 2021, pg. 523) What is asked of in *participation* is "I accept his 'I'," that is, I affirm the person, and in this way, I in a sense "choose him in myself, that is, in my 'I' for I do not have another access to the other man as an 'I' except through my own 'I'." (PA 2021, pg. 523)

With regards to the multiple "inter-human relations" Wojtyła attributes the description "I – thou". (PA 2021, pg. 524) If we look at what Wojtyła calls the "negative verification" of *participation* e.g. "hate, aggression or envy" we can start to get to the core of *alienation*. (PA 2021, pg. 525) For Wojtyła, alienation is a lack of participation, "the denial of participation, an attenuation or outright annihilation of the possibility of experiencing the other man as "the other 'I'" and thereby a devastation of the "I–the other". (PA 2021, pg. 525) Alienation is in a strange sense - a lack of choice - or a choice not to choose to... I do not choose to participate, I do not choose to see and experience a specific person as "an other I". I do not choose to acknowledge that he is a *self-possessing* self. (PA 2021, pg. 525)

The "We" Relation: This type of relation refers to a collection of persons. In terms of metaphysical concepts this collection is "accidental" and not "substantial" because it is made up of "relations between people" and therefore is not a substantial being in its own right. (PA 2021, pg. 526) What unites these persons is something called "the common good". (PA 2021, pg. 527) As Wojtyła has already noted every man not only exists and acts among others but also exists and acts "together with others." When the person "exists and acts together with others" his world in a sense expands and he participates in something bigger, "in a whole greater than himself". (PA 2021, pg. 528) This cannot be merely an external participation but has to involve his 'I', it must define or determine himself in a fundamental way. (PA 2021, pg. 528)

Wojtyła says that *participation*, in the personalistic sense, is revealed as "a property of the person" when he "exists and acts together with others". (PA 2021, pg. 528) *Participation* allows man to reach a higher fulfillment of self. When we consider the "we relation" the *common good* cannot subvert the fact that "self-determination" and "self-fulfillment" is the right of each individual. (PA 2021, pg. 528) In the "we relation" the person has to be able to determine

himself and at the same time help achieve the *common good*. *Individualism* and *totalism*, which we will discuss in a moment, both pervert *personalism*. (PA 2021, pg. 528)

Alienation in the second sense, is everything that stops man from being able to determine himself in the "we relation". (PA 2021, pg. 528) This brings Wojtyła to his analysis of *individualism* and *objective totalism* – which both represent for him perversions or inadequate forms of participation, "individualism advances the good of the individual as the principal and fundamental good to which every community and society must be subordinated, whereas objective totalism proposes a quite contrary principle - it fully subordinates the individual and his good to the community and society." (PA 2021, pg. 390)

With either of these distortions, persons are not seen as other I's – unique, unrepeatable and irreducible. In the case of *individualism* others are seen as threats to one's own subjectivity/fulfillment – burdens in fact. This results in man not wanting to participate but rather isolating himself, as man believes nothing is actually *actualised* in him through relationship. Relationship stunts him in fact, "acting together with others as well as existing with them is a necessity to which the individual must submit, a necessity to which no positive property of the individual corresponds; likewise, the acting and existing together with others serve and develop no such property." (PA 2021, pg. 390) A community is therefore created to simply protect the individual from other individuals.

With *objective totalism* or as Wojtyła calls it, "*individualism à rebours*" (reversed individualism) (PA 2021, pg. 391) the opposite is true. The community becomes the highest good and therefore man has to 'get himself out of the way' in order for the *common good* to thrive. The individual and his individual good is, in this instance, the enemy/threat/burden, "What dominates in it is the need for protection against the individual, who is basically considered an enemy of the community and of the common good." (PA 2021, pg. 391) This system states that inherent in the person is the tendency towards *individualism* and man must therefore constantly strive to correct this iniquity, "the 'common good' can be achieved only by limiting the individual." (PA 2021, pg. 391) In *totalism* there is a belief that the tension between man and others can only be resolved by force, where the individual is made to submit to the *common good* i.e. "This good cannot be one that corresponds to the individual, one that he is capable of choosing on the basis of participation, but can only be one that must hinder and limit the individual. Accordingly, the realization of the common good must consist in coercion." (PA 2021, pg. 391)

As I said before, Wojtyła sees *individualism* and *totalism* as perversions of participation because they do not uphold the true understanding of the person and therefore cannot help in the

realization of the fulfillment of the human person. An understanding that sees *participation*, in the personalistic sense, as a property of the person which thereby denotes that the community the person functions in, must correspond to this nature. This makes participation not an external imposition but a response to man's innate structure, "Participation as a property of the person is at the same time a specific *constitutivum* of the community. Thanks to this property, the person and the community in a sense adhere to each other and are not foreign or opposed to each other, which is the case on the basis of the individualistic or anti-individualistic way of thinking about man." (PA 2021, pg. 393)

But what will ensure that the proper understanding of *participation* will be adhered to in a community? Obviously the correct understanding of *participation* and an adequate anthropology of the human person but along with this list Wojtyła adds a proper understanding of the *common good*, "As we see, solving the problem of the community and participation depends not on the very reality of acting or existing 'together with others', but - as was stated - on the common good. Speaking more precisely, it depends on the meaning that we confer on the concept of the common good." (PA 2021, pg. 396) The question that follows then, is what is the *common good* exactly?

Wojtyła unites the *common good* with the *personal good* rather than holding them in direct opposition; I must be free to choose to be a part of a society that aims to uphold a good that both fulfills a society's needs as a whole and at the same time helps me determine myself. Wojtyła points to communities where it is naturally more visible and more possible to attain the relationship between *common* and *individual good* e.g. the family,

Every man expects from these communities of being (which earned the name 'natural societies' on account of the fact that they thoroughly correspond to man's social nature) that in them he will be able to choose what others choose and because they choose that he will be able to choose that as his own good serving the fulfillment of his person. At the same time, however, on the basis of the same capacity for participation, which is the basis for existing and acting together with others, man expects that in communities grounded on the common good his own acts will serve, sustain, and enrich the community." (PA 2021, pg. 399)

If there is a situation where man would have to give-up his "individual good" for the good of society, it would be inadvertently for his greater good as well, as it is in harmony with his make-up, "This sacrifice is not " 'against nature', for it corresponds in every man to the property of participation and, on the basis of this property, opens to him the path toward fulfillment." (PA 2021, pg. 399)

This does not mean that the *common good* will always require total submission and sacrifice on the part of the individuals as though it is established and unchanging, "...the common good can be understood not statically but dynamically. It must fundamentally evoke the attitude of solidarity without closing itself to and severing itself from opposition." (PA 2021, pg. 403) It requires (as Wojtyła develops) constant *dialogue*. A dialogue that will include the possibility of opposition; which he conceives of as not being opposed to but a criteria for true solidarity to take place, "The principle of dialogue is fitting because it does not avoid tensions, conflicts, and struggles, which are present in the lives of different human communities, and because it addresses precisely that which is true and right in them, that which can be a source of good for the people." (PA 2021, pg. 403) Opposition that is not just for the creation of chaos in order to usurp power but opposition that operates for the good of establishing genuine solidarity, "Solidarity denotes a constant readiness to accept and realize the share that falls to each due to the fact that he is a member of a given community. A man who lives in solidarity performs what belongs to him not only on account of his membership in a community but also 'for the good of the whole, that is, for the common good'." (PA 2021, pg. 401)

Dialogue for Wojtyła is not just an opportunity for people to express their opinions (although undoubtedly this is part of the process) but dialogue has a clear direction and purpose. *Dialogue* goes hand in hand with discernment, a collective discernment to ascertain the elusive (not subjective but objective) truth. (PA 2021, pg. 403) Choosing to '*dialogue*' is obviously more complex and requires markedly more effort than simply governing by authoritarian rule - because the good is arrived at together. This does not mean that the truth is relative, rather that the community needs to make sure that there truly is, "the dynamic subordination to truth (see chapter 3), so essential for the transcendence of the person in the act. This subordination is reflected in a right conscience." (PA 2021, pg. 404) For Wojtyła "right conscience" is able to assist man in discernment of whether he has subordinated action to truth and therefore "It is the definitive measure of the authenticity of human attitudes with regard to existing and acting 'together with others' " (PA 2021, pg. 404) which as a result helps man discern the true *common good*. Similarly, the *common good* has to help preserve the ability of the *conscience* to be right and therefore able to discern.

There are two additional distorted attitudes towards participation i.e. *Conformism* and *Non-Involvement*. Wojtyła explicates that *conformism*: "contains above all a certain submission, a specific variation of the *pacti* in which the man - person is only a subject of 'happening' and not an agent of his own attitude and his own commitment in the community." (PA 2021, pg. 405) Instead of being an acting person who takes an active role in his community as well as an active

role in determining himself he just 'goes with the flow'. This lack of true and personal participation obviously impedes the *common good*. Perhaps due to the fact that achieving the *common good* takes effort and demands active participation not just of presence and energy but a wrestling with one's vices, Wojtyła writes that *conformism* usually tends towards an "indifference toward the common good." (PA 2021, pg. 406) There is also an illusion of 'oneness' that conformism creates. A oneness that Wojtyła describes as "'uniformity' rather than unity". (PA 2021, pg. 406) This serves neither the person nor the community.

Non-Involvement, even if it is justified, does not help but also hinders *participation*. It is not like opposition which tries to get to a better understanding of the *common good* but rather paralyzes this process. The person who has taken up the position of *non-involvement*, does not partake in trying to show or discover what has gone wrong in a community and therefore has no idea or desire to fix it and therefore does not fulfill himself or help the members of the community to fulfill themselves, "...participation is a fundamental good of the community. Because 'avoidance' as the attitude justified in a given case, attests to the impossibility of participation, the community does not live correctly. It must be lacking the true common good since 'avoidance' has become the only option for members of this community." (PA 2021, pg. 407)

The solution for Wojtyła is to go even deeper by trying to understand the person and *participation* in light of the notion of 'neighbor'. As a "member of the community" even though there is a sense of unity, you can still choose to not interact with other members, you can still be strangers but as Wojtyła states, the term *neighbor* is brings with it a level of intimacy that being a member does not encapsulate, "The concept 'neighbor', however, indicates something deeper than people's closeness or their being strangers to one another. Therefore, it is much more fundamental than the concept 'member of the community'." (PA 2021, pg. 408) The term 'neighbor' also has a far-reaching universal application that transcends the boundaries of groups and nations,

The concept 'neighbor' is connected with man as such and with the very value of the person regardless of any relation to this or that community or society... it takes into account, humanity itself, which is possessed by every 'other' man just as 'I' myself possess it. Thus, the concept 'neighbor' creates the broadest plane of community, a plane reaching further than any 'otherness', including that which results from membership in various human communities. (PA 2021, pg. 409)

Wojtyła writes that contained in the term is the fact that man is able to engage with the humanness of others, in fact in the humanness of all persons which allows for the proper conception of *participation* to take place, "The ability to participate in the very humanity of

every man constitutes the core of all participation and conditions the personalistic value of all acting and existing 'together with others'." (PA 2021, pg. 411)

It is here that Wojtyła introduces the concept of love with the commandment that houses the notion we have been referring to; the gospel commandment, "to love thy neighbor as thyself". In this commandment the 'I' of the other (any man existing and acting in the world) becomes one's own 'I' merely by adopting the attitude of love, "This system manifests in a particularly consistent way the commandment 'You shall love' by juxtaposing the neighbor to one's own 'I': 'your neighbor as yourself'." (PA 2021, pg. 411) This command emphasizes what truly lies at the basis of *participation*. (PA 2021, pg. 411) Not seeing a member of a community as simultaneously being a neighbor, not holding these two notions in relationship, is what Wojtyła says leads to alienation which, "The philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries understood...as man's estrangement from his humanity, as a deprivation of the particular property that we have called 'personalistic'." (PA 2021, pg. 412) To see the 'other' as another I – another person with an interior life – who has a right to *self-possession* and *self-determination* - who has inherent dignity that needs to be preserved – who needs to be allowed to become fully human – to see the other as a neighbor and not just a member of a community but one who is intimately linked through their humanness is to imply a responsibility, "...the commandment to love defines the proper measure of the tasks and demands that all people - persons and communities must posit for themselves so that all the good of acting and existing 'together with others can be truly real'." (PA 2021, pg. 414) This responsibility ensures the upholding of each person's personalistic value and is a responsibility that goes beyond external law and imposition. We will discuss love, the 'act of love' and responsibility more thoroughly in a moment, when we analyse *The Radiation of Fatherhood*. Before we analyze this text, let us first return to Wojtyła's theatrical roots and discover the heritage he was formed in.

Chapter 4: Wojtyła's original concept of the Theatre

1. The Sacred Stage

The Polish theatre that arose in the 20th century is as Kazimierz Braun (Polish theatre director, writer and professor of humanities) states in his book *A History of Polish Theatre (1939 - 1989): Spheres of Captivity and Freedom* closely linked to its Christian baptism (966) and fight for its national identity. (Braun 1996, pg. 4) After Poland became a Christian nation "the liturgical theatre" arose which saw plays relating to scripture (most notably the Nativity and Passion of Christ) come to life in order to deepen the spirituality of the lay faithful. This phenomenon gained traction, and the medieval era saw the rise of (as with the rest of Europe) the most mature form of this theatre in "mystery and morality plays" (Braun 1996, pg. 4) The Renaissance saw a return to Greek and Roman texts with plays using the form and content of "classical tragedies" as a basis. (Braun 1996, pg. 4) Comedic theatre productions inspired by the movement started in Italy i.e. "*Commedia dell'arte*" but with its own Polish flare became in vogue in the 16th century. (Braun 1996, pg. 4) The embedding of theatre in Polish culture was further deepened during the early 17th century which saw it taught in the schools run by religious orders i.e. the Jesuits and Piarists and by 1765 Warsaw officially had its own "National theatre" and it is here when theatre truly began to flourish. (Braun 1996, pg. 4)

In the 19th century however, due to being divided into three partitions (each ruled separately by the Russian, Prussian and Austrian powers) those involved in theatre or any area of culture for that matter suddenly had a different task. Other than achieving a high level of artistry in their craft, theatre practitioners needed to help preserve and unite Poland through the arts, "On all Polish lands, in the absence of political freedom, culture and art assumed a fundamental significance, as instruments for the preservation of the nation's tradition, identity, and language, as well as its moral and spiritual values." (Braun 1996, pg. 5) Some of the most treasured dramatic works come from this era, especially from those Poles who were living in other countries or exiled during this period of occupation i.e. "Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Słowacki, Zygmunt Krasiński, and Cyprian Norwid." (Braun 1996, pg. 5) Their works were centered around Poland's spiritual and national plight and they wrote to, in a sense, 'free' the Polish people - "They wrote poetic dramas, creating powerful and universal visions, freely discussing Poland's fate and destiny." (Braun 1996, pg. 5) Famously Adam Mickiewicz in his play *Dziady* (Forefathers Eve) would try to summon the Polish nation to find spiritual meaning in their constant persecution and essentially embrace becoming another Christ or 'Christ of

Europe/Christ of Nations'. During this period a connection was therefore cemented between the theatre and the Church because they became the only two safeguards of the Polish language (which Russia had banned except in both these organizations) as well as safeguards of Poland's beloved "traditions" and "values". (Braun 1996, pg. 5)

The start of the 1900's saw the rise of a talent whom Edward Gordon Craig (renowned English theatre practitioner) recognised as a master of his craft i.e. "One of the greatest artists of the European theatre of his time." (Braun 1996, pg. 6) This was because Stanisław Wyspiański (1869-1907) who was a Polish "painter, poet, playwright, director, and designer" was a true innovator and had formed a concept of the "ideal 'artist of the theatre'" (which we will soon describe) even before Craig himself had. (Braun 1996, pg. 6) Wyspiański in his play *The Deliverance* also explicated a "doctrine of liberation" which was his belief in the need for the modernisation of the arts but more importantly his belief in the use of the arts as an instrument for spiritual and social development, "The theatre was to liberate itself from outdated aesthetics and participate in the liberation of the nation from both its moral faults and its political bondage." (Braun 1996, pg. 6) Wyspiański is credited as creating the basis on which the "modern Polish theatre" would be formed - a basis which held three aspects "artistic, moral, and political" as essential. (Braun 1996, pg. 6)

Wyspiański - who Osterwa and Limanowski (co-founders of *The Reduta Theatre* - which we will describe in a moment) were self-proclaimed disciples of - published a small but powerful work entitled *A Study of Hamlet*. So treasured was this text that it was known, as Professor Kosiński author of *Polski Teatr Przemiany (The Polish Theatre of Transformation)* explains, amongst the members of the Reduta, as "an apostolic letter"¹³. (Kosiński 2007, pg. 19) Wyspiański in this little book outlines what he feels is Shakespeare's concept of the theatre but inadvertently outlines his own ideal i.e. it is a theatre endowed with the quest of "proclaiming the truth", it exists and operates "under the care of those laws and those courts that are directed by the hand of God", it is tasked with revealing "the truth of experience" and "the essential meaning of events" and it is founded on the idea that the theatre has "a sacred character/nature"¹⁴. (Darek Kosiński 2007, pg. 21)

¹³ "W programowym tekście, podpisanym wprawdzie przez Eugeniusza Świerczewskiego, ale z pewnością zaakceptowanym przez kierownictwo zespołu, zasadnicze tezy na temat sensu pracy aktora przedstawiano jako wyinterpretowane ze Studium o „Hamlecie”, nazywanego w kręgu Reduty „listem apostolskim” skierowanym do aktorów i im poświęconym.” (Kosiński 2007, pg. 19)

¹⁴ "Będzie to teatr prawdę głoszący, teatr pod opieką tych praw i tych sądów, którymi kieruje Boża ręka. Prawda przeżycia, podjęcie trudu odczytania istotnego sensu zdarzeń, przeistoczenie w istniejącą wiecznie postać, będące etapem na drodze duchowego rozwoju, wreszcie postrzeganie teatru w perspektywie objawienia o charakterze sakralnym." (Darek Kosiński 2007, pg. 21)

Wyspiański believed that the theatre did not just have an aesthetic end but it was a means – a means through which the actor personally encountered truth and therefore the means by which he developed himself spiritually, “Theatre, like every true art, is for Wyspiański a place of a personal discovery of truth.”¹⁵ (Kosiński 2007, pg. 19) For Wyspiański, one could therefore not help but change through partaking in the theatrical act, as the process of creativity in this theatre (specifically through the vehicle of tragedy) was not about mere replication but a process of discovery of the “universal truth about man” i.e. his fate. (Kosiński 2007, pg. 19 & 20)¹⁶ The stage was to showcase this universal truth, through the actor’s embodiment of the character who then “became alive and had their own will... and whose “will was everything...”. (Kosiński 2007, pg. 19 & 20)

Wyspiański believed the poet to not be a “creator” but rather a “discoverer and revealer” of Truth – a Truth that is not a consequence of his thinking but that “pre-exists” him and is that which inspires him to write. (Kosiński 2007, pg. 20) The actor who is a “hero of active cognition” therefore should be regarded as an accompanier of the poet in this search for and proclamation of the Truth (Kosiński 2007, pg. 20). Therefore Kosiński suggests that Wyspiański implies that the bulk of the actor’s work lies not on the stage but beyond it.¹⁷ Wyspiański notes that the art of the actor is ‘sacred’ because it is the search for Truth and exists primarily therefore due to the immaterial realm i.e. it is “...the art of thinking...” (Kosiński 2007, pg. 21)¹⁸

The true origin of the ‘sacred idea of the theatre’ however comes slightly earlier than Wyspiański, in the form of one of Poland’s greatest poets and dramatists - Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855) (Kosiński 2007, pg. 24 & 25) Adam Mickiewicz did not believe that art should imitate nature as this idea was in his view heretical. (Kosiński 2007, pg. 25) He believed that artists who imitated nature were creating, “a sinful substitution of a human creation for a divine

¹⁵ “Teatr, jak każda prawdziwa sztuka, jest dla Wyspiańskiego miejscem osobistego odkrywania prawdy.” (Kosiński 2007, pg. 19)

¹⁶ “wszystkich artystów teatru nie polega na powtarzaniu fikcyjnych historii, ale na czynnym dochodzeniu do prawdy o LOSIE LUDZI: I aktora, i autora obchodziła TRAGEDIA, dramat ich obchodził, los ludzi, LOS LUDZI, i to tych ludzi, o których mówiła tragedia. – Ludzie ci albo rodzili się z legendy i powieści, albo rodzili się z przypomnień tych artystów. Stawali się żywi i mieli swoją wolę. Ich wola była wszystkim. Scena służyła, aby ich pokazać. Do tego jest scena. Teatr jest więc drogą wiodącą do poznania uniwersalnej prawdy o człowieku.” (Kosiński 2007, pg. 19 & 20)

¹⁷ “Poeta nie jest więc twórcą – kreatorem rzeczy wcześniej nieistniejących, lecz odkrywcą i rewelatorem Prawdy istniejącej przed jego DZIEŁEM. W tym trudzie odkrywania i objawiania towarzyszy mu aktor – bohater czynnego poznania, dla którego los postaci jest, być musi, losem własnym, losem człowieczym odpoznanym w spotkaniu z postacią. Można nawet zaryzykować twierdzenie, że już u Wyspiańskiego pojawia się idea, że właściwa twórczość aktora nie ma miejsca na scenie, lecz poza nią...” (Kosiński 2007, pg. 20)

¹⁸ “Sztuka aktorska podniesiona zostaje w ten sposób do rangi działalności sakralnej. Nie jest to już sztuka odtwarzania, sztuka błazeńska, ale sztuka myślenia: sztuka Hamleta i Szekspira.” (Kosiński 2007, pg. 21)

creation” – a divine creation which should rather be contemplated instead.¹⁹ (Kosiński 2007, pg. 25) Mickiewicz favored the idea of “inspired art” which drew its content from “revelation” and could, he believed, “save nations” therefore rendering the artistic act as a sacred activity. (Kosiński 2007, pg. 25)

Due to the increasing popularity of materialism, Mickiewicz believed that people at the time were only open to one form of “religious rite” i.e. the artistic act – an act that still managed to show to a world that had renounced God, the world of the spirit. Mickiewicz writes that art is a “sacred activity” due to the fact that it makes the invisible realm visible - it does not show abstract universals but concrete individual spirits,

Great artists, even those who openly profess materialism, retain a feeling or memory of the fundamental truths of religion. They believe in the sovereign existence of the soul, in its immortality and activity... In their statues and paintings they do not present us with the shapes of some indefinite universal and pantheistic soul, but they try to show us individual spirits, spirits of individuals... (Adam Mickiewicz) (Kosiński 2007, pg. 92)²⁰

It is no wonder then that Mickiewicz viewed the theatrical act as the highest form of art, as it revealed “individual spirits - spirits of individuals” like no other, “What other art is by its nature the evocation and embodiment of spirits in visible and living forms? What other art, if not theatre?!”²¹ (Kosiński 2007, pg. 26) The script that would do full justice to this art form was in Mickiewicz’s opinion, “dramatic poetry” as it is in this form in particular that “poetry passes into action towards the audience”.²² (Kosiński 2007, pg. 26) This movement from the world of thought into being through action reflects the uniqueness of the theatre and gives its inherent worth i.e. it is the artform that primarily enables the word’s embodiment; it closes the gap between “what is written and what is done”²³. (Kosiński 2007, pg. 26) Mickiewicz claims that the effect of this type of theatre can be compared to the effect of spiritual activities

¹⁹ “Podobnie jak idealistyczni estetycy, Mickiewicz odrzucał koncepcję sztuki jako naśladowania natury, argumentując, że jest to grzeszne podstawianie tworu ludzkiego zamiast tworu boskiego, stanowiącego właściwy przedmiot kontemplacji. Sztuce naśladowczej przeciwstawił sztukę natchnioną, której źródłem jest objawienie, tożsame co do natury z tym, które ma według niego moc zbawienia narodów.” (Kosiński 2007, pg. 25)

²⁰ “Wielcy artyści, ci nawet, co jawnie wyznają materializm, zachowują przecież odczucie czy też wspomnienie zasadniczych prawd religii. Wierzą w udzielny byt duszy, w jej nieśmiertelność i działanie... W swych posągach i obrazach nie przedstawiają nam kształtu jakiegś nieokreślonej duszy powszechnej i panteistycznej, ale starają się ukazać nam duchy indywidualne, duchy jednostek.” (Adam Mickiewicz) (Kosiński 2007, pg. 92)

²¹ “Jakaż inna sztuka jest ze swej natury wywoływaniem i ucieleśnianiem duchów w kształtach widomych i żywych? Jakaż, jeśli nie teatr?!” (Kosiński 2007, pg. 26)

²² “Mickiewicz nie tylko, jak wszyscy jemu współcześni, uznawał poezję dramatyczną (w owych szczęśliwych czasach nie oddzielano dramatu napisanego od wystawionego) za „najsilniejszą realizację artystyczną poezji”, ale dowodził, że ma ona szczególną moc, gdyż „w dramacie poezja przechodzi w działanie wobec widzów.” (Kosiński 2007, pg. 26)

²³ “Teatr ze swej natury jest ucieleśnieniem słowa, pozwalając na likwidację dystansu między zapisanym a czynionym. To właśnie powoduje, że ma on dla Mickiewicza „wielką wartość”...” (Kosiński 2007, pg. 26)

as “it is a revealing art par excellence”²⁴ helping the observers of the theatrical act to make contact with the invisible reality. (Kosiński 2007, pg. 26)

The gift given to actors is, according to Mickiewicz, the fact that they can personally experience the realm of the unseen. (Kosiński 2007, pg. 26) This makes them more equipped to become the go-between of spirit and matter... the infinite and the finite i.e. to become, as Kosiński writes (as is in accordance with the idealistic tradition), an “active intermediary between the sphere of spirit and the absolute and the level of matter and temporality.”²⁵ (Kosiński 2007, pg. 26) The embodiment of the word was vital for Mickiewicz – not only because thought is “dead” if it is not embodied in action but because the embodied word had salvific properties i.e. it could be “the source of revelation and salvation for humanity”²⁶. (Kosiński 2007, pg. 27)

The word for Mickiewicz was “the whole man” – “The word is therefore body and spirit fused together by the divine fire that dwells in man.”²⁷ (Kosiński 2007, pg. 27) This fire Mickiewicz likened to the “divine inspiration” which comes upon man when he feels compelled to express himself e.g. in moments of love and or passion for his fatherland. (Kosiński 2007, pg. 27) Mickiewicz says that this “internal fire” which is “ignited” in our deepest parts “consumes” us and from this molten heap, the “essence” or the “word” is retrieved by the spirit. The word which cannot be destroyed is a “revelation” which comes from communion with God and that we have due to our active participation in this communion, “We can only create a word insofar as we kindle the creative fire within ourselves, developing what poets call our secret drive, which is simply the love of God; rising to a state in which we can receive inspiration, that is, commune with God...”²⁸ (Kosiński 2007, pg. 27)

²⁴ “Jest sztuką par excellence rewelatorską...” (Kosiński 2007, pg. 26)

²⁵ “...aktor musi być cielesnym, czynnym pośrednikiem między sferą ducha i absolutu a poziomem materii i doczesności.” (Kosiński 2007, pg. 26)

²⁶ Jej konsekwencją była, głoszona zwłaszcza w trakcie kursu czwartego Literatury słowiańskiej, koncepcja słowa jako najwyższego celu duchowego rozwoju, a zarazem źródła objawienia i zbawienia ludzkości. (Kosiński 2007, pg. 27)

²⁷ “Aby się przekonać o prawdziwości tego wyrażenia, dość nam zastanowić się nad samym sobą w tych rzadkich chwilach, kiedy głęboka, szczerza i czysta miłość, uniesienie patriotyczne, natchnienie boskie pobudzają nas do mówienia. Cóż się wtedy dzieje? Czujemy, jak w głębi naszego jestestwa zapala się jakiś ogień wewnętrzny; ogień ten przenika i pochłania całą naszą organizację, roztopia ją, że tak powiem, a wtedy duch dobywa z naszej tak roztopionej organizacji ekstrakt, esencję i z niej tworzy tę świetlistą i lotną kulę, którą zwiemy słowem; opuszcza nas ona, choć się od nas nie odrywa, znika, a jednak trwa tak długo, jak duch, co ją wydał, to znaczy jest niezniszczalna. Słowo więc to ciało i duch stopione razem ogniem boskim przebywającym w człowieku.” (Adam Mickiewicz) (Kosiński 2007, pg. 27)

²⁸ Możemy [...] stworzyć słowo jedynie, o ile rozniecimy w sobie ogień twórczy, rozwijając to, co poeci nazywają naszym popędem tajnym, a co jest po prostu miłością Boga; podnosząc się do stanu, w którym możemy otrzymywać natchnienie, to znaczy obcować z Bogiem” (Adam Mickiewicz) (Kosiński 2007, pg. 27)

The word is not stagnant for Mickiewicz but it is rather living i.e. in act. The role model of this poetry in action is Jesus Christ who Mickiewicz believes, rather than leaving man a list of rules, gave man his entire being... his own life to show man the way, "Jesus Christ is not the creator of any doctrine or legislation in the common sense of the word he did not establish any system... he gave his faithful something more real, positive, and at the same time more demanding, that is, his person, his life, his acts."²⁹ (Kosiński 2007, pg. 28) The actor is therefore not a creator for Mickiewicz, he is also a revealer i.e. he does not imitate nature but imitates Christ who steers him into becoming an "incarnate word"³⁰. (Kosiński 2007, pg. 28) Through this imitation the actor learns to become one with "the content of revelation" and as a result he is transformed into "a revelation" himself. (Kosiński 2007, pg. 28) We can now see why and as Kosiński reminds us, in this school of thought, the actor's vocation is likened to that of "a priest, an active mediator."³¹ (Kosiński 2007, pg. 28) For the Polish tradition of theatre theorists (Mickiewicz, Wyspiański, Limanowski, Osterwa) and many more – we can see that the object of art was not 'creating' aesthetic beauty but 'becoming' i.e. "spiritual transformation, and through it, contact with the absolute."³² (Kosiński 2007, pg. 28)

The atmosphere of innovation and experimentation as well as social and moral responsibility continued to flourish after Wyspiański's short life and subsequently brought about the rise of one of Poland's most treasured theatre practitioners Juliusz Osterwa (1885-1947). He was, as Braun writes, an esteemed "(Polish) actor, director, and master teacher of acting" (Braun 1996, pg. 7). The *Reduta Theatre* (1919-1939) which he co-founded with Mieczysław Limanowski was modeled on the Catholic liturgy and the actor in Osterwa's theatre was called to mirror Christ's Passion and/or the action of the priest during the celebration of the Eucharist; that is the high point of the Catholic mass where the priest (in the person of Christ) consecrates the gifts of bread and wine which are then transformed into the body and blood of Christ in essence not accidents. Osterwa therefore envisioned the theatre as a type of church, the stage an altar, the actors the sacrifice and the audience as receivers of that sacrifice. Osterwa, as Braun continues,

²⁹ "Jezus Chrystus nie jest twórcą żadnej doktryny ani żadnego prawodawstwa w pospolitym tego słowa znaczeniu: nie ustanowił żadnego systematu... wiernym swym dał coś bardziej rzeczywistego, pozytywnego, a zarazem bardziej wymagającego, to znaczy swoją osobę, swój żywot, swoje dzieje. (Kosiński 2007, pg. 28)

³⁰ "A zatem Objawiciel, przepowiadany przez Mickiewicza, nie ma być twórcą dzieła sztuki, ale człowiekiem, który postępując drogą wskazaną przez Chrystusa, dojdzie na drodze osobistego rozwoju do takiego poziomu, na którym nastąpi jego przemiana we wcielone słowo. W akcie tym ów Pośrednik zjednoczy się z treścią objawienia i sam stanie się objawieniem." (Kosiński 2007, pg. 28)

³¹ "aktor jest w tej tradycji uznawany za osobę wezwaną do bycia kapłanem, czynnym pośrednikiem." (Kosiński 2007, pg. 28 & 29)

³² "Sztuka jest dla nich ważna i wartościowa nie jako umiejętność tworzenia „rzeczy pięknych”, ale jako czynność sakralna, umożliwiająca przemianę duchową, a poprzez nią – kontakt z absolutem." (Kosiński 2007, pg. 28)

“both formulated and practiced the ideal of ‘the actor-sacrificer’ who ‘offers himself up’ performing a ‘sacred act’ in the presence of a group of ‘witnesses’ during the performance, which is thereby transformed into a ‘holy ritual’.” (Braun 1996, pg. 7)

Osterwa and Limanowski were, according to Professor Kosiński (and as we have already noted) heavily influenced by Mickiewicz and Wyspiański. There was however a third influence, St Genesius - the patron saint of actors. (Kosiński 2007, pg. 15) Catholic Tradition holds that Genesius was a pagan during the 3rd century and performed in a comedy before the Roman emperor Diocletian, where he mocked Christianity and the sacraments. A miracle occurred however when Genesius was “baptised”- when the actor playing the priest recited the words of the baptismal rite and anointed Genesius with water. The outward signs and the realism of Genesius’ acting is said to have ‘triggered’ an outpouring of grace and Genesius immediately converted and subsequently started condemning the emperor for his treatment of Christians. When the emperor realised he was not joking Genesius was martyred for his faith. (Craughwell 2007, pg. 14 & 15) Genesius’ skill of embodiment i.e. his “gift of experiencing”³³ or “living of the content” became one of the pillars for Osterwa and Limanowski’s “New testament Theatre” i.e. *The Reduta*. (Kosiński 2007, pg. 15)

As Kosiński continues, the theatre company, while they used some of Stanislavski’s exercises to perform this embodiment (which we will describe in more detail) wanted to go beyond “psychological experiencing” and into the highest level of embodiment i.e. “rituality”. (Kosiński 2007, pg. 16) Osterwa describes the two highest levels (out of four he sets out) of embodiment an actor should strive to reach i.e. the total embodiment of the character and becoming an instrument through which God speaks,

(The actor must convince himself) that I am the character I met, that its fate is my fate, that its words are my words, its way of expressing itself expresses my thoughts and my feelings [...] and that the soul of this character has my soul, my will, that this soul (the soul of the character) is currently in my body and moves my body (‘transformation’) and ‘the ability to serve Higher Beings and express their will through one’s mouth in the role of a messenger, deputy, substitute’.³⁴ (Osterwa)(Kosiński 2007, pg. 16)

³³ “Genezjusz niewątpliwie – pisał wiosną 1944 roku – posiadał dar przeżywania, czyli jak to dawniej mówiono – przejmowania się. [...]” (Osiński)(Kosiński 2007, pg. 28)

³⁴ „w mówienie w siebie, że jestem tą postacią, którą poznałem, że jej Los jest moim losem, że jej słowa są moimi słowami, jej sposób wyrażania się wyraża moje myśli i moje uczucia [...] i że dusza tej postaci ma moją duszę, moją wolę, że ta dusza znajduje się obecnie w moim ciele i porusza moim ciałem” („przeistoczenie”) oraz „zdolność służenia Istotom wyższym i wyrażania ich woli przez swoje usta w oznace posła, zastępcy, wyręczyciela”³ („obrzędowość”). (Osterwa)(Kosiński 2007, pg. 16)

These levels of transformation and the feeling that accompanies it, Osterwa likens to the ecstatic experiences of the saints. The rapture/trance that the actor undergoes when he reaches these levels of embodiment is based on the fact that in the moment of 'becoming'- one both forgets "one's fate" and yet profoundly feels "one's existence". (Kosiński 2007, pg. 17) Osterwa refers to the experience of the actor when, during the embodiment of the character, there is (in a sense) a creation of a new person,

(when) we have managed to achieve such a degree of concern for the fate of the character to whom we give our soul and body – that not only the reality of the surroundings disappears from our sight, but also our own, that we fall into a half-open, half-dream unconsciousness and that in terms of its mystery it can only be compared to the mystery of experiences, the proper purpose of which is to create a body for a new being. We suppose that this highest degree of our concern must be similar to the peak of delight (ecstasy) which St. Teresa and St. John of the Cross... mention.³⁵ (Osterwa)(Kosiński 2007, pg. 17)

I would like to note that, as Professor Katarzyna Flader (Doctor of Humanities and theatreologist) writes in her article *Juliusz Osterwa: The Theology of Theatre*, the use of "theological language"³⁶ does sometimes tend to make Osterwa sound like a heretic. (Flader 2011, n.p) This, however, Flader believes, could not be further from the truth. While she acknowledges that the quote often repeated when Osterwa is mentioned does not help her case, "(T)he idea that theatre was created by God, for those for whom the church is not enough" (Flader 2011, n.p) she suggests that Dariusz Kosiński explains Osterwa's ideas the best when he says that his words should be understood in the sense that, "(T)he church appeals primarily to the spirit and not to the senses, and therefore the teachings of the Church may be difficult to understand for some people, or be insufficient for them, while stage art, which affects the senses and emotions, may be more accessible to a wider audience." (Flader 2011, n.p)

This sentiment is fairly in line, although not entirely (as one could argue that the Church, through the use of the Sacraments eg. bread and wine, water, holy oil, laying of hands etc - also appeals to the senses), with Catholic Church teaching and especially with the thoughts of Pope

³⁵ "My wiemy z doświadczenia, bo czasem w grze udawało się osiągnąć taki stopień przejęcia się dołą postaci, której oddaje się swoją duszę i ciało – że nam ginie sprzed oczu nie tylko rzeczywistość otoczenia, lecz i własna, że zapadamy w pół jawną, półsenną bezprzytomność i że to pod względem swej tajemniczości da się porównać tylko z tajemnicą przeżyć, których właściwym celem jest tworzenie ciała nowej istocie. Domyślamy się, że ten najwyższy stopień naszego przejęcia się podobny być musi do szczytu zachwyceń, o jakich, męcząc się w doborze wyrażań, wspomina[ją] św. Teresa i św. Jan od Krzyża." (Osterwa)(Kosiński 2007, pg. 17)

³⁶ "Dla tych, którzy nie znają bliżej myśli Osterwy, heretycko brzmieć może myśl, że teatr stworzył Bóg, dla tych, którym nie wystarcza kościół. Przekonywająco brzmi interpretacja powyższego passusu twórcy Reduty przedstawiona przez Dariusza Kosińskiego, który tłumaczył, że kościół odwołuje się przede wszystkim do ducha a nie do zmysłów, i w tym sensie może być dla niektórych trudno zrozumiały, bądź nie wystarczający, podczas gdy sztuka sceniczna oddziałująca na zmysły i emocje, może być dostępna dla szerszego grona odbiorców..." (Flader 2011, n.p)

John Paul II in his *Letter to Artists*. In this letter the Pope outlines the historic relationship of art (specifically architecture, the fine arts and music in this segment) with Christianity. He states that art had and continues to have such a close relationship to the faith because it has a sacramental type of function. It makes (albeit in a lesser way) the invisible world visible to the senses and therefore helped and continues to help greatly in transmitting the Word of God, "While architecture designed the space for worship, gradually the need to contemplate the mystery and to present it explicitly to the simple people led to the early forms of painting and sculpture...The 'beautiful' was thus wedded to the 'true', so that through art too souls might be lifted up from the world of the senses to the eternal." (LA 1999, #7)

Flader writes that the founder of the Reduta was therefore not committing heresy but using the theatrical space to create a discussion about the relationship "between theatre and theology"³⁷. (Flader 2011, n.p) Osterwa did not want to use theatre for mere entertainment but (like music and the fine arts) as an additional means of spiritual encounter i.e. a vehicle to encounter God. (Flader 2011, n.p) Osterwa wanted theatre to become a way or one of the means to reach the Satiator of the existential ache of man's heart. (Flader 2011, n.p)

Osterwa was known for pushing the limits of the understanding of theatre due to the fact that he conducted many novel and often bold "artistic experiments in acting" (Braun 1996, pg. 7). One of these was based on the emphasis he laid on the relationship between actors and their audience. Osterwa tried to 'close the gap' between the public and performers and therefore he physically broke the fourth wall (the imaginary line between the performers and the public that is usually signaled by the end of the stage), "Osterwa liked to play close to the public; he mixed the actors and spectators in some shows or invited people from local communities during tours to participate as extras on the stage" (Braun 1996, pg. 7). Braun suggests that Osterwa's impact on Polish theatre can be paralleled to that of some of the greatest innovators in theatre in modern times, "Konstantin Stanislavski in the Russian theatre, Jacques Copeau in the French theatre and Lee Strasberg in the United States". (Braun 1996, pg. 7)

In his article *Wyspiański, Schiller, Osterwa - Pillars of Modern Polish theatre* Braun expands on Osterwa's method. Noting the prolific talent that would see him become the principal actor of the National Theatre in Warsaw in 1912, Braun documents the fact that Osterwa was arrested during WWI and sent to Russia where he fortuitously encountered Stanislavski. (Braun 2018, pg. 426). Stanislavski (infamous Russian actor, director, producer credited with the innovation of

³⁷ "Wydaje się... że twórca Reduty był teologiem teatru w działaniu, który konsekwentnie poszukiwał możliwości dialogu między teatrem a teologią, chciał docierać do Boga poprzez sztukę sceniczną." (Flader 2011, n.p)

the 'Stanislavski method' used mostly (although not only) by actors wanting to achieve a more natural/realistic style of acting) was so impressed by him that he actually wanted Osterwa to join *MAT* (The Moscow Art Theatre company he founded). (Braun 2018, pg. 426) While both men had the desire for a "theatre reform", Osterwa created an independent "Polish experimental company in Kiev" instead, where he mixed his own novel thinking with Stanislavski's (Braun 2018, pg. 426). It was here that Osterwa's pedagogy started to be embodied and the *Theatre of Service* emerged "service to theatre, to the country, and to fellow citizens". (Braun 2018, pg. 426)

Braun notes that the emergence of a "communal character" occurred as a natural result of the actors and spectators living conditions and camaraderie during this period of exile and that it fuelled Osterwa's future monastic vision of the theatre as well as helped him foster his idea of the close relation of actors and audience, "all members shared living quarters, performed daily chores, rehearsed, built sets and costumes, and performed together. The actors and spectators alike were refugees, internees, displaced people. They understood each other well, and their interactions bore a strong sense of community." (Braun 2018, pg. 426) When Osterwa returned to his homeland, he implemented those principles in the now infamous *Reduta theatre*.

As we have said Osterwa held a strong belief that acting was in service of and ordered to an objective end i.e. Truth with a capital T (Braun 2018, pg. 428). Saying this, he did not ignore the subjectivity of the actor. His emphasis on self-reflection (through the use of certain concepts from psychology) was fundamental to his unique pedagogy which in part tried to reveal or expose the hidden self of the actors by helping them "to reach the hidden layers of their interiority and to express their truths visibly". (Braun 2018, pg. 428). We see here his similarity to Stanislavski as he relies on psychology and the use of the actor's subjective life and personal experience to create another life i.e. that of the character, "He sought to connect the truth of the actor as a person with that of the character. He asked actors to explore and embody in their roles their own personal, hidden, conscious and unconscious memories and experiences." (Braun 2018, pg. 428)

If the actor understood himself deeply and made himself aware of his inner truth as well as uncovering the individual truth of the character he could then "connect" them and choose to utilize his own life experience for the motivation of his character's actions, "By bringing that inner truth to consciousness, the actor established deliberate motivation for each physical gesture and engaged his will in his performance" (Braun 2018, pg. 429). Self-knowledge and a deeper sense of one's own distinctiveness also gave the actors freedom internally and externally, "actors

(were) free to speak and act from within their own sense of truth and motivations - rather than to imitate the director” (Braun 2018, pg. 430).

It must be noted that we see in Osterwa’s method the aim of realistic embodiment of the character but not through an elimination of self, “characters remained deeply embedded in the actor, even as actors retained their individuality while incarnating the characters.” (Braun 2018, pg. 430). Interestingly in Osterwa’s conception, as Braun notes, the actor does not disappear even though he incarnates the character. It would seem that he believed the incarnation would lead to a deeper revelation of the actor’s own person, “Eventually, the actor’s personality would radiate even more intensely on the stage.” (Braun 2018, pg. 430)

While we know Osterwa used some of Stanislavski’s methods there was however a distinct spiritual goal underpinning his use of psychology. As Flader writes self-reflection was not purely for an artistic or aesthetic end or to “consciously activate unconscious creativity” but to lead the audience to an objective truth via (or at least not excluding) the subjective truth of the individual i.e. it was to provide “a path deep into oneself, but only to the extent that this path led beyond the ‘I’, towards God.”³⁸ (Flader 2011, n.p) As we said before, Osterwa believed that the longing for Truth implanted in every man could find its object via the theatre. (Flader 2011, n.p)

As we have noted, Osterwa saw the activities of the *Reduta* as a type of ministry i.e. “a public service” (Braun 2018, pg. 430). His sense of duty or responsibility arose due to his belief in a moral dimension to the theatrical art. (Braun 2018, pg. 430) A responsibility he believed should be upheld from practitioners to the actors and all those involved in the production. In 1922 Osterwa concretized a set of “ethical guidelines” for all those involved in his form of theatre (Braun 2018, pg. 432). In this list Osterwa highlights the idea we have already mentioned i.e. that theatre has both an artistic and moral good as its end, “All aspects of theatre work possess moral, social, and esthetic dimensions.” (Braun 2018, pg. 432) This denotes that the actor has a responsibility to realize (through a process of self-knowledge) their inner truth and look for means to develop their inner lives and therefore their own morality. Their interior lives (which is part of the instrument of their art) affects not only their own acting ability but the moral dimension of theatre as a whole, “The actor’s internal disposition undergirds the ethical impact of every performance, shapes the acting company to which he/she belongs, and affects the ability

³⁸ Stanisławski poszukiwał metody teatralnej, która świadomie uruchamiałaby twórczość nieświadomą (pomocna była mu w tym psychologia), podczas gdy w Reducie rozwijano metodę świadomego dochodzenia do przeżyć metafizycznych, powiązanych ze sferą religijną. Dla Osterwy i Limanowskiego teatr był „drogą w głąb siebie, ale tylko o tyle, o ile droga ta wiodła poza «ja», ku Bogu”. (Flader 2011, n.p)

of theatre to fulfill its mission in society. Thus, moral values lie at the core of theatre creation.” (Braun 2018, pg. 432)

As we have said undergirding Osterwa's idea of the theatre is service; actors provide a service for their audience, not just an artistic service but a service that has transcendental implications i.e. the sacrifice has a 'redemptive' power, “The actor does more than perform. Actors perform a redemptive sacrifice for the spectators. theatre is not merely a performance for the public, but a priestly sacrifice for a congregation. Action executed on the stage is not only an artistic act, but sacred.” (Braun 2018, pg. 432) The action Osterwa refers to is the action found in religious rituals, specifically the action of 'The Living Word'. As Flader writes, the actor for Osterwa must be a mediator like Christ who was “a mediator between God and the world and man”³⁹ (Flader 2011, n.p) and must therefore embody the Word. (Flader 2011, n.p) Flader notes the capitalization of the 'W' by Osterwa and the fact that this is how “Word” is found in the beginning of St John's Gospel (Flader 2011, n.p) thereby cementing the link between the role of the actor and the role of Christ even more.

As we have alluded to, Osterwa held that the relationship between actors and audience are essential to theatre and he desired to move theatre into a sphere of reciprocity or “equal participation” by getting members of the audience to take part in the plays. (Braun 2018, pg. 430 & 432) For Osterwa, this type of communion is specifically “artistic” and even though it involves (in a somewhat lesser sense) a physical component to this communion it can be all-encompassing i.e. it could encompass the realm of the invisible “spiritual, mental, sensory, and emotional”. (Braun 2018, pg. 430 & 432)

Osterwa's theatrical ideas went one step further however; he held to the dream of a “religious order” of artists going beyond a theatre company which merely had a moral dimension. (Braun 2018, pg. 432) Osterwa actually wanted to create a religious order, which would then have a theatrical function, “(A) religious order that blended artistic work with prayer” (Braun 2018, pg. 432). During WWII he had the time to develop two rules or ways of life: *Dal (Faraway)* – an association, and *Fraternity of Saint Genesis* – a semi-religious order. (Braun 2018, pg. 433) These two ways of life obviously went beyond the stage and entered directly into “the realms of morality and religion” of the “actors – monks/nuns” whose ministry was to “deepen the moral

³⁹ Ponownie zbliża to misję aktora Osterwy do roli, jaką odgrywał w świecie Chrystus, będący pośrednikiem między Bogiem a światem, człowiekiem. Aktor dla Osterwy to spełnik Słowa (znamiennie, że Osterwa zapisuje wyraz „słowo” wielką literą wskazując na jego sakralny, boski wymiar. Tak też zapisywany jest ten wyraz w Prologu Ewangelii według Św. Jana). (Flader 2011, n.p)

consciousness of society". (Braun 2018, pg. 433) Communism, as Braun notes, unfortunately stopped Osterwa's dreams in their tracks. His Catholicism and Idealism was rejected, and he instead used his time to help rebuild the Polish theatre. (Braun 2018, pg. 433)

Kotlarczyk (1908-1978) who was the co-creator of *The Rhapsodic Theatre (Teatr Rapsodyczny)* was (as Braun reveals) also an idealist and innovative force in Polish theatre. As the name of the theatre suggests, the primary focus was the "word" (Braun 1996, pg. 47); the 'Living Word' in fact. Kotlarczyk held this in common with Osterwa, the difference being that he put more of an emphasis on the word in all its aspects: functional, philosophical, literary, cultural, educational, theatrical and spiritual, "the word - spoken, recited, and celebrated: transmitting ideas, embodying poetry, mirroring tradition, and educating the public." (Braun 1996, pg. 47) In the *Rhapsodic theatre* the "word" was not seen as a static but a dynamic force that held a creative power which needed to be harnessed in service of the truth, "the word, for Kotlarczyk, held the meaning it did for the Bible: the vehicle of spiritual and creative energy, a messenger of truth and faith." (Braun 1996, pg. 47) Like with Osterwa, Kotlarczyk transformed the theatre into something of a spiritual space where one could reflect on 'problems' (which we will soon expand on) and a space where one could feast on the truth. The focus on the word enabled this to take place as it "created an artistic reality of the festive and sacred character, appealing to the spectator's soul and stimulating individual contemplation." (Braun 1996, pg. 47)

Like Osterwa, Kotlarczyk's vision of the theatre had patriotic and ethical goals as he also desired to use the stage to depict "spiritual, moral, and national values". (Braun 1996, pg. 47) Unlike Osterwa however, Kotlarczyk encouraged distance between the actors and the characters they were to portray. He did not want the actors to identify with their characters but rather form a boundary "an alienation" with them. (Braun 1996, pg. 47) Kotlarczyk believed that, with this method of acting, the actor was then free to fulfill multiple roles needed to carry out the mission of *The Rhapsodic Theatre* i.e. the actor could be "the performer", "the master of ceremonies", "the interpreter", "the commentator", "the creation and the creator of the show" all at once. (Braun 1996, pg. 47)

Kotlarczyk's focus on the "word", the method of alienating the actors from their characters and the need to develop the ability of the actors to perform these multiple roles naturally led Kotlarczyk to focus on the practical goal of perfecting the vocal capabilities of his actors and also influenced the repertoire of the *Rhapsodic Theatre*. This saw Kotlarczyk draw mainly from "poetry, epics, and novels as well as dramas" whose form made them seem inappropriate for the stage. (Braun 1996, pg. 47). Braun sums up Kotlarczyk's theatre as, "anti-realistic and

metaphorical (*in*) style, emphasizing the word (the spoken text) – pronounced, celebrated and proclaimed – as its principal means of expression.” (Braun 1996, pg. 87)

For Kotlarczyk the “word” was also understood as *logos* which was defined by the Greek philosophers and adopted and deepened by the first Christian theologians as “the divine reason that is implicit in the cosmos, ordering it and giving it form and meaning.” (Encyclopedia Britannica 2024, n.p) Logos finds its full expression as “the word pronounced by God” (Braun 1996, pg. 143) i.e. the Living Word (the person of Christ) found in the opening chapter of the Gospel of John which calls creation and man into being, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things came to be through him, and without him nothing came to be.” (USCCB, John 1 vs 1- 5).

As said before the words expressed in performances therefore were not seen as static but took on (like the Living Word it images) a living “creative power” (Braun 1996, pg. 143). With this power, as Braun notes, Kotlarczyk believed he could reach into the imagination of the audience members and invite them to a form of participation where they could “co-create” (Braun 1996, pg. 143). Like Osterwa, Kotlarczyk also believed in the imperative connection of the actors and audience as the actors were to be in a sense the audience’s artistic/spiritual directors and guide them through their journey into their interior where “word” meets thought. (Braun 1996, pg. 144). Braun highlights Kotlarczyk’s maxim which holds a profound responsibility for all those involved in the creation of theatre - a spiritual responsibility. This responsibility, like with Osterwa, is less about aesthetics but the revelation of Truth; “In creating theatre, you shall seek to reveal its sacred sources and to convey to the audience its spiritual powers.” (Braun 1996, pg. 144)

During WWII the theatre was rather small and utilised the talents of only five principal actors i.e. Kotlarczyk, Wojtyła, Krystyna Dembowska, Danuta Michałowska and Halina Krolikiewicz. (Taborski 1987, pg. 5 & 6) *The Rhapsodic Theatre* had a mission which was a direct reaction to Poland’s occupation. Kotlarczyk wrote that the theatre they had formed was in defense of the Polish identity, “it was a protest against the extermination of the Polish nation’s culture on its own soil, a form of underground resistance movement against the Nazi occupation” (Taborski 1987, pg. 6). Here we see that (in the vein of Wyspiański and Osterwa) Kotlarczyk and Wojtyła were undertaking an “artistic experiment” (Taborski 1987, pg. 6) in order to uncover the true meaning and purpose of the theatrical act and what method best fulfilled this vision. The question is, why did Kotlarczyk and Wojtyła not merely adopt Osterwa’s theatrical vision and pedagogy?

While Osterwa's thoughts of the theatre in a sense captivated Kotlarczyk and Wojtyła they did not appreciate what Taborski notes as "a certain *showmanship* in him" (Taborski 1987, pg. 6). As Taborski knows, this term has many connotations, most of them negative like ostentatious or pretentious - he is therefore careful to clarify that Kotlarczyk and Wojtyła meant this term in the "in the best sense of the word" (Taborski 1987, pg. 6). We can see the origins of this distaste for *showmanship* in the reaction of Kotlarczyk to his experience at the "Salzburg Festival" in 1937. (Taborski 1987, pg. 6) He said that from that day forward he was determined that his work would be far removed from the extravagant 'over the top' style of performance he had witnessed; i.e. his work would be a "quiet protest against over-theatricality in theatre, against the operatic element, against the preponderance of technical effects in Reinhartts's production of Goethe's Faust and Hofmannsthal's Jedermann." (Taborski 1987, pg. 6). Kotlarczyk envisioned a shift in focus from spectacle to the word. While the war aided him in his pursuit (due to the natural lack of space and resources) Kotlarczyk had already dispensed with any distraction from the "spoken word" prior to the conditions imposed by WWII (Taborski 1987, pg. 6). He had done away with all the added effects created by the curtains, stage, scenery, costumes and make-up etc (Taborski 1987, pg. 6).

Saying this, the war provided an opportunity for this experiment to flourish as the performances could only be hosted in "private apartments" (Taborski 1987, pg. 6) and therefore the stage was naturally stripped bare. Wojtyła commented on this phenomenon in his essay *Drama of Word and Gesture* where he saw the absence of costumes and starkness of the set etc as a necessary means of unveiling the essential aspect of the theatre "...the fundamental element of dramatic art...the nucleus of drama" i.e. the "living human word" (Taborski 1987, pg. 6). This type of theatre dispensed of superfluous distraction not only to focus on the word but *how* it becomes living i.e. through the *Rhapsodic Theatre* Kotlarczyk sought to study the "relation between word and action". (Taborski 1987, pg. 379) The experiment Kotlarczyk conducted: of how movement should be incorporated so that the word would not and does not get overshadowed but finds its proper place (Wojtyła believed) was not just a theatrical experiment but had other implications for philosophical anthropology i.e. "the philosophical concept of man and the world" (Taborski 1987, pg. 380).

Wojtyła writes that *The Rhapsodic Theatre* did not want to eviscerate movement but put it in its proper place. The rhapsodists believed that by submitting "gesture" to the "word" they were establishing 'right order' and therefore "impulse" and "movement" would be more easily submitted to thought. (Taborski 1987, pg. 380) Thought (like the word) should not be seen as static however, it is also dynamic and therefore the word does and should harness this

“movement of thought” as the basis or “nucleus of action” (Taborski 1987, pg. 380). We can turn to Aquinas to perhaps better understand what Wojtyła is saying here. When Aquinas is discussing God as Word, he writes about how the ‘word’ has a few meanings. The first meaning is that the word is a vocalization of a thought and its sense/content, “The clearest and most common sense is when it is said of the word spoken by the voice; and this proceeds from an interior source as regards two things found in the exterior word—that is, the vocal sound itself, and the signification of the sound.” (ST I, q. 49 a. 1) For Aquinas what the intellect has abstracted is made manifest by the word, “For, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm) vocal sound signifies the concept of the intellect” (ST I, q. 49 a. 1). Aquinas therefore also equates the word with the concept grasped by the intellect and not only the vocalization that indicates this concept, “first and chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is called a word; secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the interior concept, is so called...” (ST I, q. 49 a. 1) We can therefore see a direct connection to what Wojtyła says about the concept of the word in *The Rhapsodic Theatre* with what Aquinas and Damascene (as cited by Aquinas) perceives the word as i.e. “the natural movement of the intellect” (ST I, q. 49 a. 1).

Action and gestures in *The Rhapsodic Theatre* are therefore not eliminated but reduced and made to “slow down” so that the audience is not bombarded (as in daily life) by the process of thought becoming word becoming action where there is such a demand for action that this “activism... overwhelms his inner, spiritual nature” a process that almost seems like it is happening to man instead of him controlling and “developing it”. (Taborski 1987, pg. 380) The way the audience’s own inner life and intellect function or should function should be mirrored in the way the word is delivered by the actors. The word can therefore be better received because of the harmony created between man’s outer and inner world and can therefore better help develop the functioning of his interior life. (Taborski 1987, pg. 380) There is therefore an experience of *catharsis* for the audience when they feel the right proportion of word and gesture that they, “subconsciously... long for”. (Taborski 1987, pg. 380) Kotlarczyk does not eliminate the action Aristotle defines *tragedy* by, but wants to slow everything down “to understand the inner base of human action, the very fulcrum of human movement.” (Taborski 1987, pg. 380)

In his essay *On the Theatre of the Word*, Wojtyła outlines that in order for “the word to become rhapsodic” the word should not be entwined with physical action but should remain separate like in song where one solely means to capture and relay “thought” in order to make known the invisible “vision of the mind.” (Taborski 1987, pg. 372) In his essay *Rhapsodies of the Millennium* Wojtyła clarifies however that the word used in this type of theatre is closer to concrete reality and to thought than it is to the imaginary world, “The rhapsodists not only derive

the word from immediate needs of concrete life but also refer to that life from the world of thought. Not - it must be stressed - the world of fantasy, but the world of thought." (Taborski 1987, pg. 383)

Kotlarczyk and Wojtyła took great pains to select and summarize "masterpieces of national literature" that would be most important to both the actors and the audience. As we noted before they drew mainly from difficult to stage pieces such as "long narrative poems" and "long dramas" and interspersed these extracts with unbroken "related thoughts" which through the vehicle of the actor - the intellectual participation of the spectators is triggered. (Taborski 1987, pg. 7). The repertoire chosen by *The Rhapsodic Theatre* was not chosen for their plot but rather if it could present an intellectual problem because the word in Kotlarczyk's theatre, "first and foremost, proclaims certain truths, ideas, and structures" and therefore it is not the actor but the "problem" that "acts". (Taborski 1987, pg. 373) The problem is not posed in the form of a plot but in a frank manner, and the story is merely used to exemplify the problem posed. This problem causes the spectators to engage themselves in the act of theatre by the fact that it "demands understanding and a solution." (Taborski 1987, pg. 373)

An important aspect of Kotlarczyk's conception of theatre, as I have said before, was that the actors were taught to propose the characters they were playing rather than embody them. This was to avoid any over inflation of the ego and to direct the actors to a cause higher than themselves and a cause that would unite both actors and spectators, "Kotlarczyk's concept of theatre protects the young actor apriori ... (*he doesn't*) have to create a character; he has only to delineate it indirectly in the consciousness of the listeners-spectators...a group of people collectively...subordinated to the great poetic word..." (Taborski 1987, pg. 386)

It may seem to some, especially in the above words, that the idea of the theatre presented by Kotlarczyk in *The Rhapsodic Theatre* lies in direct opposition to the idea of the theatre offered by Osterwa in *The Reduta*. One might even be tempted to see a similarity to the opposition between Bertolt Brecht's "Epic theatre" (that also encouraged the distancing of the actor from the character he was to play albeit on the basis of Marxist philosophy) and Konstantin Stanislavski's "Realism". This I believe would be a disingenuous comparison. As I have said earlier, some of the underlying beliefs of each dramaturgist were fairly similar regardless of the method they felt their actors should adopt. The *Reduta* and the *Rhapsodic* both recognized that the act of theatre had ethical and moral implications i.e. that there was the formation taking place of the mind and soul of all of those involved (directors, actors and audience). They also believed that the 'Living Word' held a prime place in understanding the underlying structures of the

theatre and that the theatre had a mission that went beyond the aesthetic and into the realm of morality. They also both wanted to help preserve the Polish national identity and the Polish canon of literature. In 1942 Osterwa actually watched one of *The Rhapsodic theatre's* performances of *Wyspiański's Hour* and gave, according to Taborski, the Rhapsodists "his wholehearted support" (Taborski 1987, pg. 8).

2. Wojtyła's Theatrical Vocation

As we said in the introduction, Wojtyła had a close relationship with the theatre not only during his student days but throughout his priesthood and Papacy. Bolesław Taborski writes in his work *The collected plays and writings on theatre by John Paul II* that Wojtyła had multiple roles in the theatre which all contributed to him creating, what Taborski suggests, is a unique conception of the theatre, "Through his manifold participation as dramatist, theoretician, and, for some of the time "non-acting" performer, Karol Wojtyła has contributed to the development of a specific kind of theatre." (Taborski 1987, pg. 1) How different this theatre was from his theatrical influences will be one of the objects of this dissertation. Taborski primarily points to Wojtyła's dramatic works as a basis for the argument that he had developed a unique form of theatre; plays which are so idiosyncratic that they "are not what one might call stage plays". (Taborski 1987, pg. 1). Wojtyła wrote six plays that we know of (*David, Job, Jeremiah, Our God's Brother, The Jeweller's Shop, Radiation of Fatherhood*) – three of which were authored after his entry into the priesthood. (Taborski 1987, pg. 1)

In 1938 Wojtyła began his university studies in Kraków at the Jagiellonian University and he became part of the faculty of Polish philology even though his friends insisted that Wojtyła truly believed the theatre might be his vocation. (Taborski 1987, pg. 3) Wojtyła was not studying literature for literature's sake but to give him the knowledge and "necessary background" to aid him in his theatrical pursuits. (Taborski 1987, pg. 3) In that first year he joined *Studio 39* which was a "semi-professional theatre group" (Taborski 1987, pg. 3) but unfortunately, when the war began in September 1939, everything came to a halt. In the evening however, Wojtyła still managed to continue his studies underground and the time of fear, suffering and persecution proved a fruitful incubator for his introspection and writing. In December 1939 he wrote his maiden play *David* (Taborski 1987, pg. 3). He wrote *Job* that Spring and then *Jeremiah* was written in the Summer of 1940. (Taborski 1987, pg. 4)

When Wojtyła and his actor friends first created a theatre ensemble during the German occupation of Poland, they were initially under the guidance or "loose patronage of a couple of

theatre critics, notably Tadeusz Kudliński” as well as Juliusz Osterwa. (Taborski 1987, pg. 4) At the start of the war Wojtyła’s theatre group merely gathered at each other’s apartments and attempted to perform significant dramatic works (Taborski 1987, pg. 4) but then they became friendly and established a close relationship with Osterwa who had significantly more free time as he had officially been barred from all “theatrical activity under the occupation”. (Taborski 1987, pg. 4) Taborski notes that Osterwa actually watched the groups’ rendition of *An act of the Quail* - a play by Żeromski and a play which Osterwa could offer his firsthand experience in, as he had been the lead in its premier. (Taborski 1987, pg. 4) Osterwa then personally mentored Wojtyła’s group and during this chapter he handpicked a collection of plays, “a grand repertoire for the Polish theatre in the post war period”. (Taborski 1987, pg. 4) Next he personally engaged the group in a project to prepare a translation from “masterpieces of the nineteenth century of world drama”. (Taborski 1987, pg. 4 & 5) As Wojtyła was proficient in Greek, he translated Sophocles’s *Oedipus* which Osterwa is said to have been pleased with. (Taborski 1987, pg. 5)

While Wojtyła was in Kraków meeting with his group of fellow actors and Osterwa, Kotlarczyk was unfortunately isolated living in Wadowice which formed part of the “German Reich” at the time i.e. it was officially separated from General Gubernia where Kraków was situated. (Taborski 1987, pg. 5) Wojtyła wrote to Kotlarczyk regarding the mentorship he and his friends were receiving from Osterwa and he tried to persuade Kotlarczyk to join him in Kraków and create a theatre with him. (Taborski 1987, pg. 5) We read in these letters of correspondence, that were published in *O Teatrze Rapsodycznym* on the 60th anniversary of the founding of *The Rhapsodic Theatre*, that while Wojtyła thought Osterwa to have an immense talent and great ideas, he desired to form a new type of theatre with his ‘brother’ from Wadowice, “And I am always with you, my Brother, as John the Apostle was with Peter, and Peter was a rock, and on this rock His Church is built, and let the Theatre become his Church and... let the National Spirit shine in it...”⁴⁰ (Popiel/Malak 2001, pg. 305) In June 1941, Kotlarczyk moved to Kraków (with Wojtyła’s help) and the *Rhapsodic Theatre* was soon formed. (Taborski 1987, pg. 372)

Wojtyła reached a critical stage in his life when in 1942 he changed his studies from philology to theology as he became a seminarian in Kraków’s underground seminary. (Taborski 1987, pg. 9) While it was clear for Wojtyła that theatre was not his ultimate calling and (although technically in October 1946, having just become a priest, he theoretically should have left the theatre completely) he continued to write letters to Kotlarczyk about the *Rhapsodic Theatre* as well as the plays he had written. (Taborski 1987, pg. 9) I want to make mention of a metaphor Wojtyła

⁴⁰ “I zawsze jestem przy Tobie, Bracie mój, jako był Jan Apostoł przy Piotrze, a Piotr był opoką, a na tej opoce zbudowany Kościół Jego, a Kościołem Jego niech się stanie Teatr ... i niechaj w nim rozjarzy (się)...Narodowy Duch...” (Popiel/Malak 2001, pg. 305)

uses to describe art, which shows his distinct yet connected thought to the theatrical tradition that has formed him. As we have seen and will continue to see, unlike Mickiewicz, Wojtyła does not deem realism or imitation of nature as heretical but (like Mickiewicz, Wyspianski and Osterwa) he also believes that art is a vehicle for revelation and a path to God,

What we often said on Długa, that Art is not, to be only a realistic truth, or only fun, but above all it is a superstructure, it is a look ahead and above, it is the face of religion and a guide on the path to God; it has the romantic dimension of a rainbow: from the earth and from the human heart to the Infinite - before it stands vast horizons, metaphysical and angelic. And such it was above all here in Poland... (Wojtyła to Kotlarczyk) (Popiel/Malak 2001, pg. 308)⁴¹

The uniqueness of Wojtyła's theatrical thought as we will see in the following chapters, and as we acknowledged briefly when we spoke about his idea of artistic intuition/inspiration, is his ability to make use of the imitation of nature to access the world of the spirit, to use real experience to access the world of the individual spirits - the spirits of individuals, and to use this self-knowledge to connect with God.

One might be right in thinking there is no need to try to uncover a philosophy of the theatre by Wojtyła. As we have said, he was after all a co-founder of and declared that *The Rhapsodic Theatre* espoused the same idea of the theatre that he did. It is also clear (as Taborski writes) that even when Wojtyła chose to follow a different path to what Kotlarczyk believed was his true vocation, they remained very connected, "a spiritual bond remained to the end, and the youthful co-founder of the Rhapsodic theatre retained in his heart 'that style of theatre that I consider also my own.'" (Taborski 1987, pg. 15). Taborski also notes that there is no doubt that the *Theatre of the Word* impacted the style Wojtyła created to write his dramatic works. Saying this, and as we said earlier, Taborski also believed that Wojtyła (through the different roles he played in the theatre and the writing style he formulated his plays with) managed to create a unique style of theatre, "...Karol Wojtyła has contributed to the development of a specific kind of theatre. His plays are the most important part of that contribution." (Taborski 1987, pg. 1) Whether this contribution is in the vein of, connected to or completely separate from the idea of *The Rhapsodic Theatre*, will be one of the objectives of this thesis to uncover.

Taborski writes that Wojtyła's play writing falls under the umbrella term of "poetic drama" even though realistically each play is in fact quite unique in form. (Taborski 1987, pg. 15) Wojtyła is

⁴¹ To, o czym nieraz mówiliśmy na Długiej, że nie jest Sztuka, aby była li tylko prawdą realistyczną, albo li tylko zabawą, ale nade wszystko jest nadbudową, jest spojrzeniem wpród i wwyż, jest towarzyszką religii i przewodniczką na drodze ku Bogu; ma wymiar romantycznej tęczy: od ziemi i od serca człowieczego ku Nieskończonemu - bo wtedy stają przed nią horyzonty przeogromne, metafizyczne i anielskie. I taką ona była nade wszystko u nas w Polsce... (Wojtyła to Kotlarczyk) (Popiel/Malak 2001, pg. 308)

however clearly focused more on inner action than external action and seems to move more and more inwards as his canon grows; to the point where (in the play which will be a focus of this thesis i.e. *The Radiation of Fatherhood*) he seems to dispense with external action almost entirely. There is a move towards, a focus on, the interior life of the person, "In his plays, as in his poems, he is concerned not so much with external events as with exploring man's soul; it is there that the (*real*) action often unfolds." (Taborski 1987, pg. 15)

As we will see in a moment, when I analyze *The Radiation of Fatherhood* more concretely, external action is not done away with completely but *human action* (which borders the interior and exterior aspects of man) and primarily *the act of love* is given pride of place. His focus on man's interiority forces Wojtyła, Taborski believes, to find a way of writing that will serve as a vehicle to this new focus, "The formal means he employs to develop the action...was probably not his primary concern... nonetheless, instinctively or deliberately, he searched for new means of expression." (Taborski 1987, pg. 15) In his finding of a new form we see the influence of *The Rhapsodic Theatre* on Wojtyła's dramas; as his plays too are difficult to stage but (as we have said) Taborski is skeptical of the fact that Wojtyła's plays were merely an output of Kotlarczyk's ideas of theatre, "neither then nor later were Wojtyła's plays simply 'dramatized illustrations' of the Rhapsodic theatre's theories." (Taborski 1987, pg. 16) Taborski also notes the influence of the medieval mystery plays on Wojtyła's new form which served as a basis for the "modern religious plays" at the time. (Taborski 1987, pg. 16)

Taborski cautions that while he uses the term "inner theatre" to describe Wojtyła's work, due to the fact that Wojtyła never explicated or "defined his 'inner theatre' as a closed concept", it is merely a term that highlights some of the distinctive features of his dramatic works in retrospect. (Taborski 1987, pg. 16) Saying this he writes that Wojtyła's type of "inner theatre" created its "own dramatic reality". Wojtyła draws the audience into the unseen life of other 'I's, other persons - the timeless place of the mental, emotional and spiritual life. (Taborski 1987, pg. 16) The spotlight is shifted as it were from the focus on word - thought - action to the focus on the action of persons and the connection between the exterior and interior life, "Wojtyła...consistently built his own vision of the drama of human existence: the vision of man's place on earth and in the divine plan of creation." (Taborski 1987, pg. 16)

As much as Wojtyła does a deep dive into man's inner world the tension/harmony of subjective and objective, individual and universal are kept by his ties to and rootedness in realistic metaphysics. He was therefore able to maintain universal ideals and use his words not to destroy man but raise him up to a higher calling... educate him in becoming truly human, "In his plays

he referred to the highest values in our culture, and at the same time, in the days when word and language were totally degraded and devalued by ideologies that demanded their subservience to shallow, often inhuman purposes, he aimed at the revaluation of words.” (Taborski 1987, pg. 16)

A final word on Wojtyła’s innovative work; Taborski believes that Wojtyła was developing a thoroughly “modern form of theatre” which was able to be more easily received by secularists i.e. it was “religious without being devotional” (Taborski 1987, pg. 16). Religious in foundation but more accessible to the modern person who emphasizes subjectivity but struggles with the very idea of an Absolute God. Taborski believes that this new style of theatre, for it is very evident he believes there is a new style, should be looked at by current theatre practitioners, perhaps because he believes there is value there yet unearthed and that it in fact has not been up until that point, “Even though the author of these works did not specifically aim at the theatre at large, they are a proposition that the theatre ought seriously to consider.” (Taborski 1987, pg.16). As we have done an exploration of the relation of philosophical anthropology and the theatre in general as well as discussed the key terms *mimesis*, *action* and *catharsis*, as we have tackled the philosophical problem of beauty and thereby delineated artistic action from moral action, as we have performed a thorough investigation of Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology and have explored his theatrical influences and heritage, I believe it is appropriate to now turn to one of his dramatic works to see if it can provide any insights into his idea of the theatre.

3. An analysis of *The Radiation of Fatherhood* using “*Person and Act*”, “*Love and Responsibility*” and “*Man and Woman He created them: A Theology of the Body*”

While I will be doing my own analysis of this play to ascertain the depth and breadth of the presence of Wojtyła’s philosophical thought so as to better understand what underlying philosophy of the theatre is needed to best realize this play for the stage; I would like to first offer some introductory remarks extracted from the thought of Bolesław Taborski and Father Jan Machniak. Father Jan Machniak in his book *God and man, in the poetry of Karol Wojtyła – John Paul II* writes how *The Radiation of Fatherhood* (Wojtyła’s final play) further develops Wojtyła’s investigation into “the sphere of the theatre of the interior” (Machniak 2007, pg. 150). As with his previous plays, Wojtyła has three main topics of interest “marital love, family, and fatherhood” (Machniak 2007, pg. 150). Father Machniak also notes the inclusion of the word “Mystery” as a subtitle for the play. This is to indicate that Wojtyła has included a theological dimension in his writing. Christian mystery plays, Machniak reminds us, have a transcendental purpose, “in the Christian tradition, mystery plays served to express theological truths. They

were not limited exclusively to current affairs, but took up universal issues relating to Christian life.” (Machniak 2007, pg. 150 & 151)

This is definitely the most internally focused of Wojtyła’s plays, making it notoriously difficult to stage as “the external action disappears almost entirely” (Machniak 2007, pg. 151). What minimal action there is, revolves around the three main characters in the play: Adam (spiritual father), Monika (spiritual daughter) and Mother (spiritual mother). These characters represent ‘everyman’ i.e. they are universal “models of man and woman” (Machniak 2007, pg. 151). It is evident in *The Radiation of Fatherhood* that the “word”, as in the case of *The Rhapsodic Theatre*, holds a key place in Wojtyła’s style of play. Even though there is an appearance of “an element of movement” (Machniak 2007, pg. 151) which is enacted by the chorus, Machniak notes that Wojtyła (like Kotlarczyk) does not eradicate movement, but he attempts to create harmony “to maintain the equilibrium between word and movement. Movement completes and supplements the content, similarly, as do the set and stage direction.” (Machniak 2007, pg. 151 & 152). Machniak also notes the emphasis Wojtyła places on the interconnection between the interior life of the character and the external action, “The footnotes contained in the play are to underscore the close unity that exists between the inner drama of the protagonist and the action which takes place on the stage.” (Machniak 2007, pg. 151 & 152).

According to Taborski, Wojtyła wrote *The Radiation of Fatherhood* while he was an Archbishop, but the manuscript lay in wait and it was only published after he became Pope (Taborski 1987, pg. 323). In 1979 this play which “crowned its author’s efforts in drama” (Taborski 1987, pg. 323) was published in *Znak* (a Krakow based intellectual and religious monthly periodical). Taborski also believes that in this final play, Wojtyła has been able to refine his concept of “inner theatre” more than in his earlier works (Taborski 1987, pg. 323).

As said before, notoriously difficult to stage, this play consists of monologues and dialogues traversing the inner and outer world of the “Archetypes”⁴² i.e. Adam, Monica and the Mother with an occasional Chorus. (Taborski 1987, pg. 323) Following on from *The Jeweller’s Shop* (which is an exploration and meditation on the true meaning of love and the sacrament of marriage) we go into a more thorough analysis of “the themes of human existence - loneliness, fatherhood and motherhood, childhood”. (Taborski 1987, pg. 323) Wojtyła takes us on a journey that man is reticent to traverse in the modern era (especially in the true meaning of interiority); he takes us on “a voyage into the interior of the human soul” (Taborski 1987, pg. 323 & 324). As

⁴² Archetypes are “from Greek (*archetypos*, “original pattern”), in literary criticism, a primordial image, character, or pattern of circumstances that recurs throughout literature and thought consistently enough to be considered a universal concept or situation.” (Britannica 2024, n.p)

we have said and in keeping with *The Rhapsodic Theatre*, to emphasize this internal focus, Wojtyła does not suggest a cluttered set and limits the use of props as well as the “external action”. (Taborski 1987, pg. 324)

Taborski also suggests that this particular play of Wojtyła's is a challenge to understand because it is based on the tradition of *European Mystery Plays* which are not “confined to narrow realism” (Taborski 1987, pg. 323). The audience can be left feeling confused due to the fact that this type of play circumscribes both the natural and supernatural sphere of reality i.e. both the macrocosm of the “Christian universe” and the microcosm that is man i.e. “the interior of the human soul” where “the past and future” unite “in the dramatic present.” (Taborski 1987, pg. 323) Additionally, as God is not bound by time and He sees humanity in its completeness and “not a separate point in time” the audience might also (as a result of the back and forth and lack of a concrete timeline that tries to capture God's perspective) become disoriented. (Taborski 1987, pg. 323) Wojtyła seems to have incorporated this style of play into his own style of writing because Taborski notes that (at the time) if a “Modern drama” wanted to emphasize “sacral values” they tended to use this “approach”. (Taborski 1987, pg. 323)

As with *The Jeweller's Shop*, Taborski notes that “free blank verse” is used but in the first and third section we encounter “prose reflective and philosophical in character” however part two is “written in verse (*and*) contains both monologues and dialogue” (Taborski 1987, pg. 324). This is an important topic that Taborski expands on later in his book where he essentially asks why Wojtyła chose to write a dramatic work versus a philosophical exposition on fatherhood. He elucidates that Wojtyła wanted a visual representation of this problem that he felt couldn't be captured, even in the form of a parable, “Of course, philosophical treatises have been written in the form of dialogue or parable. But the drama of human existence and of man's relation to God is for the author a subject not only for discourse but also for the presentation of visual images.” (Taborski 1987, pg. 324).

3.1 Adam

In *the Radiation of Fatherhood*, we enter into Adam's interiority - the historical Adam from Genesis, the particular character of Adam that recurs throughout Wojtyła's plays and the Adam within each one of us. In the first section we find Adam undergoing, in a personalistic sense, what occurred to him in a historical/theological sense when he was exiled from Eden. Instead of dealing with the themes of original sin and disobedience (i.e. not doing the will of the Father) in

a theological manner; Wojtyła goes instead, directly into the personal experience of what that disobedience looks like - on the level of the 'I' and its interpersonal ramifications.

The biblical account of Adam and Eve is widely known; that they (the first of all created men) were given the command by God to not eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil and that Eve and then Adam decided to disobey this command:

1 Now the snake was the most cunning* of all the wild animals that the LORD God had made. He asked the woman, "Did God really say, 'You shall not eat from any of the trees in the garden?'"

2 The woman answered the snake: "We may eat of the fruit of the trees in the garden;

3 it is only about the fruit of the tree in the middle of the garden that God said, 'You shall not eat it or even touch it, or else you will die.'"

4 But the snake said to the woman: "You certainly will not die!"^b

5 God knows well that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened and you will be like gods, who know* good and evil."

6 The woman saw that the tree was good for food and pleasing to the eyes, and the tree was desirable for gaining wisdom. So she took some of its fruit and ate it; and she also gave some to her husband, who was with her, and he ate it.^c

(USCCB, Genesis 3:1-6)

In the section *I and Metamorphoses*, we encounter Adam dealing with the consequences of that disobedience: the fact that not only has he been exiled from Eden but also exiled from his deepest self by his own decision and choice, "For many years I have lived like a man exiled from my deeper personality yet condemned to probe it." (Taborski 1987, pg. 335) We encounter Adam dealing with the punishment given to him in a personalistic sense and not only the physical punishment that would mandate him to toil the soil for the rest of his days i.e.

17 To the man he (*God*) said: Because you listened to your wife and ate from the tree about which I commanded you, You shall not eat from it,

Cursed is the ground* because of you!

In toil you shall eat its yield

all the days of your life.^h

(USCCB, Genesis 3:17)

As a result of his sin, Adam is cursed to tilling the soil of 'himself' i.e. he is bound to continually try to 'dig out' or unveil the truth of who he is. He is a 'being' condemned to living life in reverse. For rejecting the "truth about the good" he has to look (if he wants to be fulfilled)

deeply into his structure and his lived experience to uncover the end to which he is ordered. He has to ask himself repeatedly: Who am I? What am I? Why am I?

While he was in Eden: Adam was connected with God, with Eve, with himself and the rest of creation. He knew who he was by virtue of knowing 'whose' he was. The creation of the person of Eve revealed even more profoundly who Adam was and who he was called to be. When God said that it was not good for man to be alone, "The LORD God said: It is not good for the man to be alone. I will make a helper suited to him." (USCCB, Genesis 2:18); one could say (and further on we will expand on this point) that the personalist interpretation of this text is that: God is referring to the fact that there is no 'other I' to reveal Adam to himself - who he is and his vocation. When Adam exclaims, "This one, at last, is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; This one shall be called 'woman,' for out of man this one has been taken." (USCCB, Genesis 2:23); this is not only a recognition of Eve being of the same species (the same kind) as him (as opposed to all the other animals) but is a recognition of 'himself' as a result of who she is. (I will expand on this further in the *Analysis of Loneliness*).

However outside of Eden and as a result of original sin and its impact on humanity and therefore society at large, Adam has now become part of the masses, and is desperately trying to hold onto any semblance of his identity, "During those years I have toiled unceasingly to reach it (*his deeper personality*) but have often thought with horror that it was disappearing..." (Taborski 1987, pg. 335) Adam subsequently feels that who he is (which he is trying to uncover) is slipping away from him as he gets lost in the, "processes of history, in which what matters is numbers, mass." (Taborski 1987, pg. 335) The processes that seem to only refer to man from an external point of view and do not take into account or factor in his interiority. The processes that (like the ideologies of Nazism and Communism etc. and as we have discussed) lump man together in a collectivism/totalism and try to nullify his subjectivity.

Adam confesses that he has a "difficult name" because he both is and is always linked with the first father whose physical (DNA) and spiritual aspects (original sin) can be traced in everyman. He is also however an individual 'I', an individual person, who is trying to know himself and retain his identity, "How often have I thought that my footsteps should be wiped out, that I had to obliterate myself, so that I could identify with every man whose history is written by the crowd. Is it written only from without?" (Taborski 1987, pg. 335) How does he keep this difficult balance of being a "common denominator" yet retain his individuality? This situation seems similar to the problem Wojtyła raises about individuality and community that we have already covered. How does one retain one's 'I' in a community of other I's? Adam has an

intuition that these processes of history miss the most important aspect of the human person, his interiority and that the answer seems to lie there, "The thought constantly returns that I ought to find myself in every man - searching not from without but from within." (Taborski 1987, pg. 335)

In this play Wojtyła is calling us to enter deeply into the interior life of Adam. Not just Adam but Monica and the Mother too. Not just the characters in the play but so too - ourselves. The crowd that "passes by" Adam, who (though curious) try to avoid a connection with him and with each other at all costs are each one of us, "There are those who find their way home and quietly shut the door behind them or slam their garden gate. Some look back intently, others do not even turn their eyes. All of them pass by." (Taborski 1987, pg. 335)

The deep dive into Adam's interiority is exemplified not merely through the use of long monologues but the multidimensionality of the internal dialogue. Through Adam, Wojtyła is reflecting everyman's interior life back at them. I believe that there is a deeper intention behind this; the play is to act as a vehicle, not just for the characters, but those who partake in it (audience included) to help understand (and assist them in the process of actualising) their own personhood, "Everyone carries in himself an unrealized substance called humanity". (Taborski 1987, pg. 335) Through the *Radiation of Fatherhood* we can discern that Wojtyła, like Aristotle in his idea of *tragedy*, also makes action an essential feature of his plays. The action Wojtyła reflects however, is not external action and actually not just inner action but the action that involves both: human action and more specifically (in this case) the 'act of love'.

This intention is more explicitly stated in Wojtyła's introduction to the play *Our God's Brother* which is the story of the aristocrat and painter Adam Chmielowski and his journey of giving up a life dedicated to art in favor of one dedicated to religious life and serving the poor. He became a third order Franciscan and adopted the habit and name Brother Albert and was canonized a saint by Pope John Paul II on the 12 November 1989. There are some key insights in this introduction that can be extended to the two plays written after it, *The Jeweller's Shop* and *The Radiation of Fatherhood*: not only for a better understanding of the plays but in trying to ascertain Wojtyła's philosophy of the theatre. He writes that the play:

(W)ill be an attempt to penetrate the man. The character is strictly historical. Nonetheless, between the man and the attempt to penetrate him there runs a line inaccessible to history. For it is characteristic of man in general that it is not possible fully to fathom him historically. Indeed, an extra-historical element in man lies at the very sources of his humanity. And any attempt to penetrate the man is connected with reaching to these sources. (Wojtyła) (Taborski 1987, pg. 159)

Although Wojtyła is talking about the historical figure of Adam Chmielowski, we can connect these words directly with the thoughts about man that Adam from *The Radiation of Fatherhood* holds. The thoughts we discussed just prior to this point, and the fact that even though man for Wojtyła is *persona est sui iuris et alteri incommunicabilis* (a point we have already discussed but will also explore in more detail later) and therefore a world apart/a mystery, there has to be some way (beyond but not excluding external events) that will help us to know him more deeply. As Wojtyła writes, man's interiority is central to his personhood and therefore we have to try to enter into him to know him (we will elaborate on what this means later on). Looking historically at man i.e. at the external events, happenings and actions that include his 'I', possibly engage his 'I' directly with the choices he makes - looking at it from the exterior perspective alone, will not lead to a revelation of who he is, will not unveil him in his fullness.

In this introduction to *Our God's Brother*, Wojtyła explains that we do not only study the humanity of Brother Albert but the idea of humanity in general - a study he continues with *The Radiation of Fatherhood*,

This 'reaching', inasmuch as it is bound, to some extent, to steer free of historical details, will leave something to be desired. For our attention must always be drawn to fact, the fact of humanity - and concrete humanity at that, we assume that this fact is not exclusively historical any more. Such is the basis of our study. The fact of humanity is carefully scrutinized. (Wojtyła) (Taborski 1987, pg. 159)

The lack of too much action does not seem to be substantiated by the same reasons underlying the ethos of *The Rhapsodic theatre* (i.e. reducing action to allow the audience to focus on the 'word' and the relationship between thought, word and action) although these two are inextricably linked as I will discuss later in this thesis. Wojtyła's subject of study is man. The limiting of action, especially action that does not have man acting as an agent, is meant to help the audience focus on what it really means to be a human person. This is in keeping with what Sachs believes is actually the purpose of *tragedy* for Aristotle,

In this introduction to *Our God's Brother*, Wojtyła confesses that he is not under any illusion that he can with one hundred percent accuracy describe the interior life of the *saintly artist* and so too his uniqueness and unrepeatability. He is aware that it might be seen largely as guesswork on the playwright's part, but Wojtyła however believes that with a sincere, "intensity and integrity of the search" one can reach truer conclusions than less. (Taborski 1987, pg. 335) Because we share the same reality (in the objective metaphysical sense), because we too have our own inner reality, through analysing his *lived experience* (action that is human in the deepest meaning of the word) we can in a sense 'participate' in Brother Albert's reality and therefore we can get to a deeper sense of who he really was:

This is where we find ourselves in direct proximity to our hero. In the awareness of each of us his character stands against a rich background, saturated with multifarious reality. He is connected to us by the circle of that reality and through it becomes close and indispensable to us. This too makes us reach to the concrete resources of his humanity, to find in them that peculiar flash of light against the dark background of the reality that connects him to us. To what degree shall we be able to reveal that light and at the same time preserve it in the raw material of expression available to us? I think we can succeed to the extent that we are able to participate in the same multifarious reality in which he participated - and in a way similar to his. (Wojtyła)(Taborski 1987, pg. 159)

In *The Radiation of Fatherhood* Wojtyła draws us into a world of lived experiences, recollections and reflections. We visibly witness man's intellectual back and forth between the making of statements about what one feels and believes to be true, questioning these beliefs and or expanding on them, realizing new truths and reaching newer conclusions. We visibly witness the workings of man's internal structures i.e. the structures of *self-determination*, horizontal and vertical *transcendence* and therefore *decision*, *choice* and *judgment* (as we have discussed) which help him determine what value he wants to attain. We witness the development of the spiritual life of man when Adam (and so too Monica) have long moments of contemplation - which as we have already dealt with in the previous chapter, according to Wojtyła's philosophy, is essentially aided by the mirroring and reflexive functions of *consciousness* and *self-knowledge* - whilst simultaneously recollecting and having conversations with God. We also witness the grappling with Adam (man's) *conscience* in trying to subordinate his actions to truth and the grappling with his emotions (most exemplified by Monica) and trying to order them with the power of reason.

Adam hides from the guilt of original sin through isolation, "Nobody calls loneliness a sin, and I find it easier to feel lonely than guilty of sin". (Taborski 1987, pg. 336) While he does this, he is exceptionally honest with himself, especially with regards to the effects of original sin i.e. (regarding his 'children'/crowd of people - he comments), "I look toward those who approach. Is it true that through my fault "approach" means the same as "draw near to death"?" (Taborski 1987, pg. 336) He is also exceptionally honest with God, who intentionally never gets called by the name of God but is rather referred to by his pronouns which are capitalized in the text or by his relational capacity i.e. that of Father. Adam does not hold back; he brings up both 'good' thoughts and 'bad' thoughts, both thoughts that are in line with God's thinking and those that are not. Honesty seems to be an essential element in realizing, "the unrealized substance called humanity". (Taborski 1987, pg. 335) It also reflects most realistically the interior life.

This play shows the interior struggle of man, his struggle with other I's and the struggle between him and God. Adam wishes to preserve himself, his identity, but simultaneously wants to

disregard the foundation for that identity. Wojtyła alludes to the fact that Adam wants to experience his subjectivity in the fullest sense, feel himself independent and fully apart. Other I's, as in the case of *individualism*, are seen as a threat. As a result of that desire - or false understanding - loneliness enters Adam. A loneliness which he does not have inside Eden. A loneliness that is experientially the opposite of the *original solitude*⁴³ man experienced in the beginning.

Original solitude allowed Adam (through the task given to him by God to name the animals) to become *conscious* (which includes a fundamental awareness and uniqueness of his own body⁴⁴). A *consciousness* that made him realize that he is a being not like the other beings. It was therefore a solitude that allowed for the start of the process of unveiling his own 'I', "Thus, the created man finds himself from the first moment of his existence before God in search of his own being, as it were; one could say, in search of his own definition; today one would say, in search of his own 'identity'." (John Paul II 2006, pg. 149)

In *original solitude* man also experienced the fact that he possessed faculties/powers different to the rest of creation. Wojtyła as Pope John Paul II continues, that when God commands Adam and Eve to not eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the power of the will

⁴³ Original solitude is a term and topic Wojtyła as Pope John Paul II explores in his theological masterpiece *Man and Women He created them: A Theology of the Body (TOB)*. I describe this teaching in my article entitled *The movement of Theology of the Body in Southern Africa: a model for the African continent?* which is in the process of being published by *The Centre for the Thought of John Paul II*, as: "The Pope's prolific Christian anthropology on sexuality and morality delivered over a period of 129 Wednesday audiences he gave as Pope" (Szczecina 2020 (1), n.p) This teaching is the Holy Father's endeavor to wake man up "from...subjectivism and show him the reality of the beauty of his creation as male and female... By going back to the beginning (Genesis in fact) the Holy Father does not demonize the desire for sex, rather he raises it to its heights. Sex, within the bounds of marriage, also becomes a sign; a sign pointing to the ultimate union; the union of Christ and his Church – the union of the Bride and the Bridegroom. (Szczecina, n.p)

Original solitude describes man before the fall and before the creation of Eve and therefore the creation of male and female (which we elaborate on in the section describing *original unity*). Although this is not a theological paper, *Theology of the Body* (as I wrote in my article) is a Christian anthropology which has implications for philosophical anthropology as a whole. Wojtyła uses the two accounts of the creation of man found in Genesis but draws mainly from what he calls the 'subjective account' i.e. Genesis 2-3. This account provides what Wojtyła calls a more "subjective" and "psychological" account of *original man*. He says that this second account, "constitutes in some way the oldest description and record of man's self-understanding and, together with chapter 3, it is the first witness of human consciousness." (John Paul II 2006 pg. 137 & 138)

⁴⁴ "Man... belongs to the visible world; he is a body among bodies. Taking up again and in some way reconstructing the meaning of original solitude, we apply it to man in his totality. The body, by which man shares in the visible created world, makes him at the same time aware of being "alone." Otherwise, he would not have been able to arrive at this conviction..." (John Paul II 2006, pg. 152)

The very term *actus humanus*... derives from *agere*, which directly establishes its kinship to act and action, for *agere* means precisely 'to do' or 'to act'." (PA 2021, pg. 121)

was also exposed as part of the structure of man i.e. God would not command man to do or not do something he did not have the intrinsic ability to do. In this case man is shown to possess the aspects of a person, “(I)n relatively few sentences, the ancient text sketches man as a person with the subjectivity characterizing the person.” (John Paul II 2006, pg. 151)

We can gather, from what Pope John Paul II writes, that Adam's 'aloneness' is not the same as the isolation we see the character of Adam experiencing after the fall in *The Radiation of Fatherhood*. He is not separated from himself, his identity. In fact, he is deeply aware of his subjectivity as his 'aloneness' refers rather to the consciousness he has of his distinct personal nature amongst creation. His 'aloneness' is also not separation from God either. Due to being made in the “image and likeness” of God, man is in a close relationship with his Creator from the very beginning,

Man is 'alone': this is to say that through his own humanity, through what he is, he is at the same time set into a unique, exclusive, and unrepeatable relationship with God himself. The anthropological definition contained in the Yahwist text in its own way approaches the theological definition of man that we find in the first creation account ('Let us make man in our image and our likeness'(Gen 1:26) (John Paul II 2006, pg. 151)

His 'aloneness' also does not refer to being isolated from the 'other'. When God says that “It is not good for the man to be alone. I will make a helper suited to him” (USCCB, Genesis 2:18) it is less about (but not excluding) the feeling of isolation man experiences when he realizes he is different from the rest of creation but more that the introduction of a “helper” will reveal a new dimension of man and therefore his vocation. Not only is subjectivity at the basis of the being of '*original man*' (man before the fall) but unity as well. It is important to note that (as Wojtyła writes) *original man* is not referred to as being male until Eve is created, “The Hebrew text constantly calls the first man *ha-'adam*, while the term '*is*' ('male') is introduced only when the contrast with '*issa*' ('female') emerges. Man was thus solitary even without reference to sex.” (John Paul II 2006, pg.147)

John Paul II expounds on *original unity* and the sexual difference between man and woman and what they reveal about the internal structure of the person. After man is put into a deep sleep “a torpor” with the dream (as the Pope writes) of finding another 'I' - “which is also personal and equally related to the situation of original solitude, that is, to that whole process of establishing human identity in relation to all living beings (animalia), inasmuch as it is a process of man's 'differentiation' from such surroundings” (John Paul II 2006, pg. 159) - God creates man as male and female. Consequently, Adam breaks out in a deep exaltation (as we have referred to already) due to the emergence of another 'I'. The physical difference in sexuality points to a

unity that man is created for. When man looks at his body, he sees that he does not make sense on his own - the call to unity is therefore inscribed in the sexual difference. It is also important to recognize that, as John Paul II writes, "bones" and "flesh" have the meaning of personhood contained in it,

(F)or the Hebrews there was no precise distinction between 'body' and 'soul', (the body was considered the outer manifestation of the personality), 'bones' signified simply... the human 'being'. 'Bone from my bones' can thus be understood in the relational sense, like 'being from being'. 'Flesh from flesh' signifies that, although she has different physical characteristics, the woman has the same personhood that the man has. (John Paul II 2006, pg. 160)

This *original unity* is the final act of the creation of man and is his defining property, "Following the narrative of Genesis, we observed that the 'definitive' creation of man consists in the creation of the unity of two beings. Their unity denotes above all the identity of human nature, duality, on the other hand, shows what, on the basis of this identity, constitutes the masculinity and femininity of created man." (John Paul II 2006, pg. 161)

Pope John Paul II writes that *original solitude* leads us therefore to *original unity* which is termed (as a result of Vatican II) as a *communio personarum* (communion of persons). (John Paul II 2006, pg. 162) Original solitude makes man conscious of his personhood due to his distinctiveness and also "opens himself toward a being akin to himself, defined by Genesis as 'a help similar to himself'." (John Paul II 2006, pg. 162) *Original unity* provides the proper way of relating to another 'I' i.e. it is an exemplar "of an adequate relation 'to' the person, and thus as opening toward and waiting for a 'communion of persons'." (John Paul II 2006, pg. 162) Theologically the *communion of persons* is also a sign most accurately depicting the Triune God is whose image man is made in, "Man becomes an image of God not so much in the moment of solitude as in the moment of communion. He is, in fact, 'from the beginning' not only an image in which the solitude of one Person, who rules the world, mirrors itself, but also and essentially the image of an inscrutable divine communion of Persons." (John Paul II 2006, pg. 163)

As we can see, inside Eden, Adam is connected to himself, he is connected to God and to the 'other' i.e. Eve. He is not separated; he is not alienated. Outside of the garden (because of his choice - which we have expounded on but will again go into a little bit further on) he does not participate in the life of God, he does not participate in the life of the other and as a result does not participate in his own life either.

In *The Radiation of Fatherhood* Adam says that he chose loneliness, he chose loneliness because he could not handle the gift of fatherhood, "I could not bear fatherhood; I could not be equal to

it. I felt totally helpless - and what had been a gift became a burden to me. I threw off fatherhood like a burden.” (Taborski 1987, pg. 336) Through this admission, Wojtyła shows one of the possible reasons for Adam’s disobedience. It is in line with the theological reason that Adam wanted to be a god and not image God, “398... Constituted in a state of holiness, man was destined to be fully ‘divinized’ by God in glory. Seduced by the devil, he wanted to ‘be like God’, but ‘without God, before God, and not in accordance with God’.²⁷⁹ (CCC #398) However in *The Radiation of Fatherhood* Wojtyła goes a bit further; he goes to the core of Adam’s identity, his personal call... his vocation. The fact that Adam was created to be the father of all, but he does not want to assume his role as a father in the spiritual sense. If he does, he will then have to humble himself and return to the original plan, ‘radiate the fatherhood’ of the Absolute Father.

Adam tries instead to run away from ‘imaging’ the Father and tries to become the Father himself and as a result loses himself. Wojtyła suggests that Adam thinks that the only way to ‘image’ God is to become completely separate and isolated from everyone and everything. This is what can be termed as the antithesis of *original solitude* i.e. alienation, (Adam says about God) “He is lonely, I thought. What will make me more like Him, that is to say, independent of everything? Ah, to stand apart from everything, so that I could be only within myself! I should then be closest to You.” (Taborski 1987, pg. 336)

In the section *The Analysis of Loneliness* we enter into the personalistic experience (as we have said before) of the historical figure of Adam, who (as he repeatedly states) is a “common denominator for all men”. (Taborski 1987, pg. 336) This is the subjective experience of Adam and as a result of all mankind, who was commanded to be fruitful and multiply,

27 God created mankind in his image; in the image of God he created them; male and female* he created them.

28 God blessed them and God said to them: Be fertile and multiply; fill the earth and subdue it.* Have dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, and all the living things that crawl on the earth.^m

(USCCB, Genesis 1 vs 27-28)

It is an ‘I’ - witness account: an account of the interior struggle, of not just being a father in the physical sense but in the spiritual sense. Adam expresses how he would have been content if the fruitfulness and multiplicity he was called to, was reserved to the sphere of biological reproduction. Adam seems to feel more comfortable with a concept of reproduction that does not involve the moral dimension: that is more ‘animalistic’ and less ‘personalistic’. He wants to separate the sexual drive from the domain of love and therefore have no need to engage the

power of reason, his conscience and the power of the will in a choice to uphold the dignity of the person as captured by the *personalistic norm* (which we will expand on in a moment). He wants to separate the sexual drive and human action in order to avoid responsibility which is ultimately impossible.

This conversation with God and Adam's internal dialogue echoes the distinction Wojtyła makes in *Love and Responsibility* with regards to the sexual drive apparent in man compared to the sexual instinct found in animals. Wojtyła, both in *Person and Act* and *Love and Responsibility*, defines and delineates the *sexual drive* in man as including the physical sexual reactivity that man experiences but having a broader more encompassing end that corresponds to man's personal nature which includes the moral dimension and the freedom of the will,

So, when we speak about the sexual drive in man, then we do not have in mind an interior source of certain actions that are *'imposed in advance'*, as it were, but instead we mean a certain orientation, a certain direction of the whole human being linked to his very nature. According to this understanding, drive is a certain natural direction of tending, innate in every man, according to which man's *whole being* develops from within and perfects itself. (*Emphasis added*)(Wojtyła)(LR 2013, pg. 40)

Even though Wojtyła writes that the sexual drive is a "universal human property" (LR 2013, pg. 43) and that procreation "is the proper end of the sexual drive" he states that in man, fertility has two manifestations. One is biological and the other builds on the biology to "provide material for the love of persons". (LR 2013, pg. 46 & 47) The second type of fertility must encompass three spheres, "spiritual, moral, and personal" (LR 2013, pg. 46 & 47) This second fertility is only possible because this sexual drive occurs in the human person who can 'possess himself', 'govern himself' and 'determine himself' due to the freedom of the will, "The sexual drive is found in man as a completely different situation than in animals, where it constitutes a source of instinctive actions that are subject to nature itself. In man, the drive by nature is subordinated to the will, and thereby it is subject to the specific dynamic of freedom that is at the disposal of the will." (LR 2013, pg. 42)

The freedom Adam longs for in *The Radiation of Fatherhood* i.e. the freedom to reproduce without responsibility (a term which we will also discuss in more depth later) is diametrically opposed to the freedom (Wojtyła writes and as we have already explained) which is distinctive of human persons. As we have discussed, freedom is given to man that he may transcend the "biological order" so that he may engage in the acts which most reveal him as a person; where he chooses to 'co-create' himself by making a moral choice that will render him good and not evil and also allow to perform an act which most befits his nature and therefore actualises his latent potentialities i.e. 'an act of love', "The sexual drive rises above determinism of the

biological order with an act of love. But precisely for this reason, symptoms of the sexual drive must be assessed in man on the level of love, and actualizations of the drive belong to the cycle of responsibility, precisely the responsibility for love.” (LR 2013, pg. 42)

Before we continue with the analysis of *The Radiation of Fatherhood* it is necessary here to first discuss the *personalistic norm* inspired by Immanuel Kant and further developed by Wojtyła. The discussion begins with Wojtyła's two understandings of the verb “to use”. Inherent in the words “to use” Wojtyła explains, is the making of whatever object we intend on using as a “means to an end” i.e. in order to achieve whatever we intended on achieving we need to “use” that particular object. (LR 2013, pg. 24) Our action comes about due to the outcome we want to achieve, “The end is always that for the sake of which we act.” (LR 2013, pg. 24) The “means” in “means to an end” is therefore recognized as the ‘things’ or “the objects on which our action centers” as without the use of them there would be no way to achieve a certain end. Therefore the “means” as Wojtyła writes is naturally “subordinated to an end” as well as, in some way, to the person using this “means” in an act to achieve his end. (LR 2013, pg. 24) This is a logical conclusion because as Wojtyła says, not only is the end “served” by the “means” but the “means” also serves the “acting subject”. (LR 2013, pg. 24)

This concept does not seem to pose a problem i.e. there is naturally no ethical outrage in ‘using’ a stone or a plant - so long as the end is ethical e.g. the stone is not used to injure or the plant to poison. In the case of “using” animals or any sentient beings, Wojtyła does bring up the prohibition of “torment or physical torture”. (LR 2013, pg. 24) Man therefore is not restricted to use “the whole created world” to develop himself and society so long as he does not do the opposite and, “destroy and squander these natural resources” which will lead to man and society's destruction in the long run. (LR 2013, pg. 24) The issue with the word “to use” seems to come in with particular reference to human subjects. Wojtyła asks the question, “Is it permissible to treat this person as a means to an end and use him in this manner?” (LR 2013, pg. 24)

In some ways it seems that this does and has to take place for certain necessary ends to be reached. Wojtyła brings up workers used by the owner of a factory, the use of soldiers by their commanding officer and the reciprocal use of man and woman during the sexual act. (LR 2013, pg. 25) However, a type of use of a human person “solely” as a “means to an end” is barred by their very nature, says Wojtyła. (LR 2013, pg. 25) This is due to the fact that (as we explored extensively in the previous chapter) man is a subject who is rational and self-determining. He therefore has his own interiority and is also completely capable of deciding for himself what his

end should be. (LR 2013, pg. 25) Being treated “exclusively” as a “means to an end” therefore goes against man’s nature and “natural right” (LR 2013, pg. 25). The right to determine himself is what defines and remains the right exclusive to the person. Obviously, and as we have said in the previous chapter, these ends the man has a right to decide on must be good i.e. in harmony with his nature and lead to his flourishing, “for striving for evil ends is contrary to the rational nature of the person.” (LR 2013, pg. 25)

So, what are we to do in the cases presented above? Wojtyła mentions Kant’s infamous “imperative” which was a basic “principle of the moral order” for him, “Act in such a way so that the person is never a mere means of your action, but always an end.” (LR 2013, pg. 26) Wojtyła refines this principle on the basis of his previous discussion, “Whenever the person is an object of action in your conduct, remember that you may not treat him **merely** as a means to an end, as a tool, but [you must] take into account that the person himself has or at least should have his end.” (LR 2013, pg. 26) (*Emphasis added*) Simply put, whatever end that is needed to be achieved by the means of using the person to achieve it, cannot violate the fundamental end that persons are created for. This is where love enters the discussion (a concept we will develop throughout this chapter).

Here Wojtyła defines love as “the opposite of using” (LR 2013, pg. 26) because even though I can define “using” in what Wojtyła calls a “negative” sense i.e. I must **not use** the person solely as a means to an end, I can also frame this in a “positive” sense. (LR 2013, pg. 27) I can harmonize my will with the other by having the same ends in mind i.e. that we choose to “will the same good”. (LR 2013, pg. 27) Through this process Wojtyła says a “bond” takes place i.e. “the bond of a common good”. (LR 2013, pg. 27) The subordination we defined earlier, the subordination of the object to the person who is using it to achieve his end, does not take place here because both persons are subordinated to the same ends - to the *common good*. (LR 2013, pg. 27) So how does this relate to love? This “shared search for the common good” is what Wojtyła calls a “basic attitude of love” (LR 2013, pg. 28).

The second understanding of the verb “to use”: to use can also have a connection to the *psycho-somatic* life of man especially with regards to the using that occurs in sexual relations with the opposite sex, “To use means to experience (*przeżywać*) pleasure.” (LR 2013, pg. 29) In this case the “means” to achieve this type of pleasure is a person and therefore the problem of how one guards against going against the nature of the person arises here as well. *Spousal love* is not the main theme of *The Radiation of Fatherhood* so we will not go into this topic in great depth, but it is necessary to touch on it. If man is to preserve the personhood of the other, he

cannot use the other 'solely' as a means of achieving pleasure. He has to take into account their (objective) end as well, which we spoke about earlier. The wills have to be harmonized, a *common good* (a real good that leads to the true flourishing of man) has to be sought after, a basic attitude of love needs to occur in order to not violate the person's personal nature. The only way to not devolve into "subjectivism" and "egoism" especially in the sexual act is (as Wojtyła writes) to subordinate both selves to the common good and therefore form a "true objective bond of love". (LR 2013, pg. 24)

What love is, in all its forms, will be developed even more throughout this chapter. For now we can understand the *personalistic norm* in the two senses Wojtyła did i.e. the negative, "this norm states that the person is a kind of good that is incompatible with using, which may not be treated as an object of use and, in this sense, as a means to an end." (LR 2013, pg. 36) and the positive, "the person is a kind of good to which only love constitutes the proper and fully mature relation." (LR 2013, pg. 36) or another variation "The person is the kind of good towards which the only proper and adequate attitude is love" (LR 1981, pg. 41).

Adam (throughout the play) is fighting against performing a true 'act of love' because he thinks it endangers his freedom and ergo his 'I'. An 'act of love' as defined by Wojtyła is a thoroughly human act which honors the end to which man has been created, it "affir(*ms*) the person of the recipient of an action because of his dignity" and is also "by its essence a disinterested act." (LR 2013, pg. 358) This does not mean that the 'I' is forgotten but the 'act of love' is in fact greatly beneficial "for the subject of action". (LR 2013, pg. 358) When man performs an 'act of love' he, "fulfills himself through this act most thoroughly." (LR 2013, pg. 358) We will expand on this point in a moment.

In the *Radiation of Fatherhood* Adam's main complaint therefore is ironically with his 'being' - that God created him with the structures that render him a person. That God touched him with His Spirit, His divine nature and this makes him feel constantly and completely inadequate, (*Adam says to God*) "You could have left me in the sphere of fertility (I would somehow have reconciled myself to nature) without placing me in the depths of a fatherhood to which I am unequal! Why did You plant it in the soil of my soul? Was it not enough that You had it in Yourself?" (Taborski 1987, pg. 336) As a result of being touched by God (being made in the image of God, being given a physical and spiritual nature, being given the nature of a person) Adam finds himself trapped in the microcosm he is. He feels trapped in the tension between his spiritual and material dimensions and that he cannot measure up to the spiritual call of fatherhood.

I believe that Wojtyła (through his dramatic works and most fully in *The Radiation of Fatherhood*) uses theatre as a means of entering the microcosm of man. As with action Wojtyła's theatre is not a focus on the external happenings i.e. a microcosm of the world events but the microcosm of man who is the borderline of the natural and supernatural but also internal and external action. Wojtyła causes all who participate in his dramatic works to enter into the lives of the characters by simultaneously entering into themselves. We will discuss how participation and the 'law of the gift' are the practical means of realizing this type of theatre further on.

In *The Radiation of Fatherhood*, Adam is also fighting with the tension of wanting to be separate from God (as he doesn't want to lose himself and his own 'I') and at the same time knowing that he is completely dependent on God. As we have said, he struggles with the fact that in the human person there is this tension of the interior and the exterior life; he wants them to be separate from each other. An exterior life that deals with biological reproduction and an interior life that is not dependent on anything, one that does not feed into that exterior but allows him to isolate himself. He could then be a father in an external sense but in an internal sense he would be able to remain alienated - completely free. Later on, during the play (points we will expand on) we will see that the reason he wants this alienation is because, as we have said (in the first sense), the opposite of alienation is participation which finds its highest expression in an 'act of love'. To love in its fullest sense means to risk and risk means suffering and ultimately Adam does not want to suffer.

Adam wrestles with his dependency because he experiences that his interior life, his spiritual aspect, is not able to fulfill itself. As Pope John Paul II writes in *Redemptor Hominis*; an encounter with love is essential to man discovering who he is, "Man cannot live without love. He remains a being that is incomprehensible for himself, his life is senseless, if love is not revealed to him, if he does not encounter love, if he does not experience it and make it his own, if he does not participate intimately in it." (RH 1979, #10) Adam knows that the source of this love is beyond himself as he experiences the fact that in him, "love never fulfills itself" (Taborski 1987, pg. 337).

The Jeweller's Shop is the play Wojtyła wrote prior to *The Radiation of Fatherhood*, which as we have said is a meditation on the sacrament of marriage and is an outflow of *Love and Responsibility*. Wojtyła, in *The Radiation of Fatherhood* builds on the concept of love when he distinguishes between, "self-centered love" and "all embracing love that reaches deeper", "Love is not an adventure. It has the flavor of the whole man. It has his weight and the weight of his

whole fate. It cannot be a single moment. Man's eternity passes through it. That is why it is to be found in the dimensions of God, because only He is eternity. (Taborski 1987, pg. 273)

Despite wanting to avoid spiritual fatherhood Adam (due to his structure as a person) still deeply desires to "give birth" interiorly. He knows however that this means he would have to acknowledge his total dependence on God to be able to do this, he cries out that he cannot give birth in the way God does, "I cannot give birth in this way!" (Taborski 1987, pg. 337). Adam knows his limits, his contingency. This is also why he cannot be the ultimate fulfillment for his children. It is important to note here that, unlike biological motherhood and fatherhood, Wojtyła writes that spiritual fatherhood and motherhood are more similar and that a father can in the spiritual sense give birth as well, "The sphere of the spirit stands beyond the scope of sex. Having in mind his spiritual fatherhood with respect to Galatians, the apostle Paul did not hesitate to write: "My children, to whom I give birth suffer... (Gal 4:19)" (LR 2013, pg. 201 & 202)

In *Love and Responsibility* Wojtyła writes about the fact that spiritual fatherhood and motherhood is the second, natural and essential step after biological procreation and birth takes place,

Fatherhood and motherhood in the world of persons are definitely not limited to the biological function, to transmitting life. They reach much deeper—as deep as they must reach, since the one who transmits biological life, i.e. a father or a mother, is a person. Fatherhood and motherhood in the world of persons are the mark of a particular spiritual perfection, which always consists in some "generation" in the spiritual sense, in forming souls. (LR 2013, pg. 201)

This spiritual generation or formation of the soul and so too the personhood of the new child takes place through what Wojtyła calls "education". This education can also be given by other persons and "is a distinctive characteristic of a mature interior personhood of a man and a woman." (LR 2013, pg. 202) When a person matures, his/her wisdom wants to overflow and find vessels to carry it. "Spiritual generation is a symptom of the person's maturity and of some fullness, both of which one wills to give to others (*bonum est diffusivum sui*). So, it seeks "children," i.e. other people, especially younger, who will receive what it wants to give." (LR 2013, pg. 202) This is called spiritual motherhood or fatherhood because, like DNA, it leaves a 'part' of them in their children, "And those who receive become an object of a particular love—similar to the love of parents for their children—again, in a sense, because what became mature in the spiritual father or mother will live on in them." (LR 2013, pg. 202)

The origins of the thought of *Radiation of Fatherhood* seem to lie in the lines that follow (as the character of Adam becomes Monica's spiritual father which we will see in the next section): "Spiritual kinship based on the bonds of souls is often stronger than the kinship that results from the bonds of blood alone. Spiritual fatherhood or motherhood contains some transmission of personhood." (LR 2013, pg. 202) This spiritual fatherhood and motherhood, as Adam notes, cannot rely on nature to fulfill it. It has a *supernatural* source and end.

The 'father' and 'mother' in the world of nature (przyroda) are two individuals of different sex to whom a new individual of the same species owes its biological life. The 'father' and 'mother' in the world of persons are, in a sense, two realized ideals, models for other persons, namely for those who are to be formed personally and develop within the sphere of their influence. In this way the order of nature stops at the facts, which within its realm are finite and ultimate, but in the world of persons they are opened anew, reaching for a new content—one that they do not find in the order of nature alone. The Gospel teaches that they are to draw this content from God himself. (LR 2013, pg. 202 & 203)

In *The Radiation of Fatherhood*, Wojtyła explains that, essentially Adam does not want to be a sign; he does not want to be a sign pointing to the fullness which is found in the Absolute - in God. Realizing and accepting that he is merely a sign would injure his pride, and it would also (he seems to think) require risking the loss of his 'I'. He confesses however that only the Absolute Father's Son i.e. Christ is able to fully say that something is His. As He is God, he takes no risk by using the word 'mine' (a word Adam will start to analyze) yet He takes all the risk of love on himself and he too becomes a sign - a sign pointing to God, the Father. In his encyclical *Redemptor Hominis* Wojtyła writes that, "Christ the Lord. Christ the new Adam, in the very revelation of the mystery of the Father and of his love, fully reveals man to himself and brings to light his most high calling." (RH 1979, #8) By Christ becoming the sign, taking on the risk of love, he is imaging what Adam ought to have done and what all human persons are called to become (to have the fullest realizations of their substance) i.e. Adam and his children are called to become "a sincere gift of self" (Gaudium et Spes 24) This is the only adequate "becoming" or "metamorphoses of man" that Adam says he is constantly preoccupied with, " 'I' and the metamorphoses of so many people. I face this always." (Taborski 1987, pg. 336)

Adam then starts to analyze the word 'mine' which becomes (and all throughout is) an essential aspect of the play. He analyzes it by declaring his need to disregard it even though he knows how essential it is, "I will say more: I have decided to throw the word 'mine' out of my vocabulary. How can I use it when I know that everything is Yours?" (Taborski 1987, pg. 337) This sounds as if he is being humble and finally understanding his place in creation, yet a few lines later reveal the truth, "I am afraid of the word 'mine', though at the same time I cherish its

meaning. I am afraid because this word always puts me face to face with You... And I would rather give up using it then find its ultimate sense in You. For I want to have everything through myself, not through You." (Taborski 1987, pg. 337) The word 'mine', Adam realizes, will always force him to confront the truth about himself, reality and therefore God. This statement is a direct output of Wojtyła's philosophy of man.

Unless you understand the 'co-existence' of *phenomenology* and *realistic metaphysics* in Wojtyła's you would assume that his suggestion of starting with the subjective and the word 'mine' is a philosophical error, a direct devolution into *subjectivism* where Adam would become trapped in his own subjectivity and have no access to the truth of reality. The word 'mine' would not put him in contact with God but would lead him to own relativistic phantasms. But Adam (even in his rebelliousness and insufficient knowledge) through his *lived experience*, realizes that the word 'mine' leads him to the realization of "not mine". This is supported by Wojtyła's philosophy and how subjectivity and objectivity work in relationship with each other and that subjectivity is not independent of objective reality but intimately tied to it and founded on it. The key for Wojtyła's philosophy and so too the *Radiation of Fatherhood* is that one cannot circumvent or evade the word 'mine' to get to the truth of 'not mine'. It is precisely through an in-depth exploration of one's own *lived experience* that one's subjectivity and objective reality (and all this entails) are revealed. An objective reality that has to be based on a metaphysical framework and one that shows Adam is indeed contingent.

When Adam's children come to him, come to him looking for answers about fatherhood, answers about themselves - he says "Leave me! Do not always find your way to me! I am only the common denominator of you all - do not try to find anything else in me! An association with the idea of the Father..." (Taborski 1987, pg. 338) By throwing off personal responsibility Adam is ironically throwing off his beloved subjectivity. He ironically declares that he just wants to be a 'universal', he just wants to be a 'general concept'. We can note that this seems to mirror Wojtyła's fear that the cosmological account of man does not capture man in his entirety.

In this section Adam realizes that he is not as closed off (as a result of *original sin*) as he thought, that God can still and somehow does enter into him, although he respects his personhood, "You enter into what I call loneliness, and You overcome my resistance. Can one say that You force Your way in or only that You enter through a door that is open anyway? You did not make me closed, You did not quite close me." (Taborski 1987, pg. 338) This is in line with what Catholic teaching says with regards to man's nature and how much it was affected by original sin. In the Catechism of the Catholic Church where it discusses man inheriting original

sin by analogy and not through a personal act of sinning, it elucidates on this matter, "...human nature has not been totally corrupted: it is wounded in the natural powers proper to it, subject to ignorance, suffering and the dominion of death, and inclined to sin..." (CCC #405) Therefore Adam, through a hard process of reasoning, can and does realize that his personal structure is made for and oriented towards a good end regardless of the defects caused by original sin, "Loneliness is not at the bottom of my being at all, it grows at a certain point". (Taborski 1987, pg. 338)

This means that loneliness or alienation is not within the structure of the human person, that there is another property that - when denied, not actualised or when chosen not to work in harmony with - gives rise to loneliness. This seems to be an analogy to the idea of the 'privation of the good' found in Aquinas - when one does not choose to order one's actions to one's final end i.e. the good of that being, evil "grows", it is in fact the absence of the good, "But evil has no formal cause, rather is it a privation of form; likewise, neither has it a final cause, but rather it is a privation of order to the proper end; since not only the end has the nature of good, but also the useful, which is ordered to the end."(ST I, q. 49 a. 1) Dr Peter Kreeft explains this in *A Summa of the Summa*, "St Thomas does not see evil as illusory, but as negative; not as unreal, but as something other than a being, entity, essence, form, or nature. It is an absence - more exactly, a privation, or deprivation, of good." (Kreeft, n.p) One could say that loneliness is a choice but for Wojtyła it seems to be; not a choice *for* alienation but the *result* of choosing *not* to love/participate - or more precisely *choosing to not take on the risk of love*.

Even though Adam is not "closed off" God respects him and his subjectivity, his freedom and his will so fully that he does not impose Himself on him, "God created man a rational being, conferring on him the dignity of a person who can initiate and control his own actions. God willed that man should be 'left in the hand of his own counsel', so that he might of his own accord seek his Creator and **freely** attain his full and blessed perfection by cleaving to him." (*Emphasis added*) (CCC #1730) However, man (Adam) is still made for union with God and his structure therefore allows God to enter in a way that respects this freedom.

In this next section, God enters or "aims" at Adam "through a child" and his "resistance weakens", his "resistance to love" weakens. (Taborski 1987, pg. 338) Adam is overcome by the innocence and non-threatening nature of the child. Through this experience of love, Adam feels a massive existential shift. He is in harmony with others, God and himself once again. For a moment he has returned to Eden. Adam is participating in the love he was created for, and he finds his subjectivity preserved and not being pushed out even though God is "expressing"

Himself in and through him i.e. radiating His Fatherhood, "You want me to love... Nothing remains of the loneliness with which I resist You. You, however, express Yourself deeply." (Taborski 1987, pg. 338)

Unfortunately, he lapses into isolation once again when his ego (an ego detached from objective reality and so too God) takes over, "Gradually I cease to feel that You express Yourself in me, and I begin to think that I express myself in myself. And it is always so until love gives pain, the pain caused by lack of fulfillment, a lack of my ego in the beloved and the beloved's in me". (Taborski 1987, pg. 338) Through Adam, Wojtyła reflects the vacillating interiority of man - the back and forth of man's ego - the experience of being embedded in "the source" and then wanting to be embedded in "oneself" in order to ensure that one is the "master" of one's own existence. To ensure Adam remains embedded in the source would require a death - not of the self but a false understanding of the 'I' - which the Mother discusses in the final act of the play. Adam wants to avoid this type of suffering, even if it is suffering that will help him reach the end to which he has been made. Even if he will suffer not choosing this type of suffering that actually has a purpose.

By not choosing the suffering that has a purpose, Adam will suffer regardless, due to the type of love - or illusion of love - that he in cowardice participates in - that results from egoism and thus leaves a man feeling used and empty. This *lived experience* uncovers the fact that due to the nature of love, the fact that it is inscribed in our being but also that it requires sacrifice (i.e. death of one's ego that remains isolated and not the 'I' that is embedded and blossoms in the Absolute), one can start to feel one's subjectivity fading if one does not have a proper understanding of 'subjectivity' and 'participation' and 'love' ergo the 'law of the gift',

The Creator inscribed in the nature of the personal being the potency and power of giving oneself, and this potency is closely joined with the structure of *self-possession* and *self-governance* proper to the person, with the fact that he is 'sui iuris et alteri incommunicabilis'. What is rooted precisely in this ontic 'incommunicability' is a capacity for giving oneself, for becoming a gift for others. Only and exclusively a being that possesses itself is able to 'give itself', that is, to make itself a gift. (LR 2013, pg. 228)

Before we continue to analyze *The Radiation of Fatherhood* it seems imperative to discuss *The Metaphysical Analysis of Love* found in *Love and Responsibility* and subsequently the 'law of the gift'. In the *Metaphysical Analysis of Love* Wojtyła takes as a starting point a simple definition, "love is always some reciprocal relation of persons. In turn, this is based on a certain relation to the good. Each person remains in such a relation, and both of them also remain in it." (LR 2013, pg. 58) In the case of romantic love between a man and a woman, while the sexual sphere of the body is always involved, it is not reduced to it. Love is specific to persons and

therefore involves the moral dimension, "The love of a man and a woman is a reciprocal relation of persons and possesses a personal character. This is linked most closely to its profound ethical meaning, and in this ethical meaning it constitutes the content of the greatest commandment of the Gospel." (LR 2013, pg. 58)

Fondness is an essential element of love for Wojtyła, but not the fondness associated with mere sentiment. It has the element of choice embedded in its structure, "Fondness is not only thinking about some person as a good; fondness means a commitment of thinking about this person as a certain good, and this commitment can be brought forth ultimately only by the will." (LR 2013, pg. 59) The decision in seeing someone as a good means that the power of reason (as well as the will) is involved in fondness, "This is, so to speak, cognition committing the will, and it commits because it is committed by the will. It is difficult to explain fondness without granting a reciprocal penetration of reason and will." (LR 2013, pg. 59)

This does not mean that affectivity is not inherent to love, it is part of the response to the person as a value, "The natural attitude of this sphere is expressed in an emotional - affective reaction to a good." (LR 2013, pg. 59) The affective life is part of the process of love and has an impact on what type of good will attract the person, "To a large extent this life conditions the direction that fondness will follow, which person it will turn to, and what in this person it will focus on above all." (LR 2013, pg. 60) While there may be a subjective element to love in terms of who we are drawn to, it must be noted however, that every person is objectively a good (as Wojtyła writes) by the mere fact that they have been created, "a good that is complex beyond words and in a sense not unvarying. Both a man and a woman are by nature bodily-spiritual beings. They are also goods of such a kind. As such this good stands in the field of vision of another person and becomes an object of fondness." (LR 2013, pg. 60)

While *fondness* does not exhaust the definition of love, it is a substantial element of it, "Fondness is not only one of the elements of love... but also it is one of the essential aspects of love as a whole. Applying the principle of analogy, we can already speak of fondness itself as love." (LR 2013, pg. 60) The problem with affections is that while they "do not have cognitive power" they do possess the ability of "disposing and orienting cognitive acts" (LR 2013, pg. 61). It must however be noted that for Wojtyła, even though he admired Scheler's critique of Kant (as we have spoken about in the previous chapter) he did not believe that "emotional-affective reactions" could ascertain the good. This is reserved to the power of reason alone which, "grasp(s) the truth about the object." (LR 2013, pg. 61) If left to its own devices (without the intervention of reason) the affections can make a person "blind" to the truth of the good, "To be

fond of something (podoać się) means to present this something as a certain good, moreover, as a good that it is (this must be added in the name of truth, so important for the structure of fondness)." (LR 2013, pg. 63)

Again, Wojtyła does not discount the value of value. If the person recognises the truth of the good of a particular person, "The object of fondness, which stands as a good in the field of vision of the subject" he recognises the person as beautiful. (LR 2013, pg. 63) While Wojtyła does not go into an in-depth analysis of the beauty of persons, he does say that the beauty of persons (in both men and women) must not be relegated to the physical sphere but include their essential interiority, "man is a person, a being whose nature is determined by "interiority."" (LR 2013, pg. 63)

Desire, like fondness, is also an essential aspect of love and arises from a need to satisfy the "one-sidedness" of being either a male or a female. Man needs women and women needs man to 'fulfill' their 'potentialities' and desire is what manifests to create the situation of fulfillment, "Thus, a man needs a woman as if to complement (uzupełnić) his being, and in a similar way she needs a man. This objective, ontic need is manifested through the sexual drive." (LR 2013, pg. 64) Love arises on the basis of this drive, "This love is love of desire, for it proceeds from a need and aims at finding the missing good." (LR 2013, pg. 64)

The statement that desire is essential to love can raise alarm bells. One could fear that love equals the use of the person as an object to satisfy the sexual needs of another. This fear arises (according to Wojtyła) if "love of desire" is "reduced to desires alone". (LR 2013, pg. 65) While a person can obviously be 'of use' in satisfying the lack that the person of the opposite sex intuitively has, this is however not the same as using merely as a means to an end, "(L)ove of desire presupposes a real need, thanks to which... 'you are a good for me'. The good that serves to satisfy a need is in some way beneficial or even useful. But to be useful or even beneficial is different from being an object of use." (LR 2013, pg. 65)

Love is so intrinsic/essential/substantial to man because, as Wojtyła writes, man becomes himself most fully when he partakes in it. Through an 'act of love' all that is specific to the personal structure of man i.e. his potentialities are activated, and he thus moves into a fuller realization of himself,

Love is the fullest realization of the possibilities that dwell in man. Potentiality (from Latin *potentia*: possibility, potency, power) that is proper to the person is actualized most fully through love (the word "actualize" comes from Latin *actus*: act, perfection). The person finds in love the greatest fullness of his

being, of his objective existence. Love is such action, such an act, which most fully develops the existence of the person. (LR 2013, pg. 65)

The love that Wojtyła says helps man “become” is “true love”. It is a love that has a good (vetted by truth) as its object and is oriented towards this object, “in a true way, that is, the way that corresponds to the nature of the good.” (LR 2013, pg. 65)

So far, we have dealt with a definition of love that desires the other as a “good for oneself”. This is not the fullest understanding of love, however. Wojtyła broadens the definition to include love as - desiring the good of the other. (LR 2013, pg. 66) *Love as Benevolence* is inherently selfless and ensures against “egoism” which would render love as not true. (LR 2013, pg. 66) How can one desire the other as a good yet be selfless and want their good primarily. Wojtyła explains that a person who is desired will not be a good, and therefore will not be desired as a good, if the good is not obtained by the person who is desired, “Let us say that Y [he] wants X [her] as a good for himself. In that case, however, he must want X to be a good, since without this she cannot be a good for him.” (LR 2013, pg. 66)

This configuration however still contains self-interest even if it shows the connection between love as desire and love as benevolence. *Benevolence* goes one step further, it “separates itself from any self-interest... (it) is simply disinterestedness in love: ‘I do not long for you as a good,’ but ‘I long for your good,’ ‘I long for what is good for you.’”(LR 2013, pg. 67) Love as benevolence according to Wojtyła is devoid of self-interest and therefore is the highest/trupest/purest type of love and by virtue of this, partakers in this form of love, “come as close as possible to what constitutes the “pure essence” of love.” (LR 2013, pg. 67) This type of love is that which moves man into becoming more of a person and bestows on the person who is loved the same gift, “Such love perfects its object the most; it develops most fully both his existence and the existence of the person to whom it turns.” (LR 2013, pg. 67)

Wojtyła deals with the fact that love is by its very nature meant to be a reciprocal exchange because it takes place “between persons”. (LR 2013, pg. 68) This means that love in its fullness is not isolated it “is precisely inter-personal and not individual” and therefore moves man from a state of alienation into a type of community and unity, “It is closely linked with the force of joining and uniting, and by its nature opposes dividing and isolating. (LR 2013, pg. 68) Reciprocity, as Wojtyła writes, plays a pivotal role “for the fullness of love” as it provides the foundation for two separate individuals “two I’s” to move into the dynamic of the “we” relation. (LR 2013, pg. 68) It is also a sign because a type of community is formed through reciprocity which (as Wojtyła says) shows that love has blossomed into “its full nature”. (LR 2013, pg. 68)

Wojtyła writes that love of *desire* and love of *benevolence* are not mutually exclusive, you can desire the other person as “a good” for yourself and also desire “a good” for the other person. (LR 2013, pg. 68) Wojtyła continues that reciprocity shows that you can long for the other not simply as “an object of desire” but as someone to build a type of ‘life’ with - a “co-creator of love”. (LR 2013, pg. 68) The desire for a “response” in order to create a unity through love is therefore not selfish because it is inherent to love and therefore the “disinterested character of love” is honored. (LR 2013, pg. 68) It cannot however endure “two egoisms” as this type of reciprocity is first of all not reciprocity at all and only lasts for as long as the two egos involved keep up the charade or the “pretense of reciprocity” (LR 2013, pg. 70). Love is based and thrives on “unity” where two ‘I’s that keep themselves separate yet perhaps benefit from the agreed sexual use of each other cannot survive. As Wojtyła says, “Love has a structure of interpersonal community.” (LR 2013, pg. 70)

When we return to the *Radiation of Fatherhood*, we see that the woman that crosses this “threshold of loneliness” is somehow not afraid. She is not afraid of “the risk of love” (which we will flesh out later on). She is not afraid of using the word ‘mine’. By living out her true nature “gift” she brings life, “The Woman has entered loneliness. She has entered and enters all the time... In her, new life has been conceived. So she walks with extreme caution. Even from outside she tries to enfold the Being she carries in her womb. She is a Mother.” (Taborski 1987, pg. 339)

In the section “Between meeting and fulfillment” Adam realizes that only in the Son (Christ) is the word ‘mine’ used without any difficulty, “In Him the word ‘mine’ finds complete justification, it can be spoken credibly by Him. Without such a justification and credibility this word is a risk - love is a risk...” (Taborski 1987, pg. 339) As everything is in and of God, only God can say the word ‘mine’ without the pain of realizing that it is then not His. Adam shudders at having to call something ‘mine’ and then this term leading him to the humbling reality that it is not ‘mine’, “How much the word ‘mine’ must hurt when it turns out later to mean ‘not mine’.” (Taborski 1987, pg. 339) Still, Adam acknowledges that Christ (who was the only person in history who did not have to undergo the pain of saying ‘mine’ and then giving the ‘mine’ up) gives himself completely to the father, his life and his will. That which is genuinely his, which he genuinely governs and possesses, which he acknowledges in scripture is his own,

17 This is why the Father loves me, because I lay down my life in order to take it up again.

18 No one takes it from me, but I lay it down on my own. I have power to lay it down, and power to take it up again.* This command I have received from my Father.”^h

(USCCB, John 10: 17-18)

He gives himself, his own 'I', up for the sake of love. Adam acknowledges that even though he knows that nothing is his and even though he says he avoids saying anything is his, because he knows nothing is his and even though he knows God is the solution to his loneliness - he still tries to force this fact out, "After all, in all of us the common denominator of our loneliness remains, and in it, against all the logic of existence, 'mine' still tries to force out 'Yours'." (Taborski 1987, pg. 339)

We get to the crux of the matter, where Adam admits he does not want to become a son because he does not want to, like Christ did, accept the suffering caused by risking love. He reasons that he does not feel like he is adequate or "equal to it". In this feigned humility we see that even though he knows the truth, his fear of losing himself and the fear of giving up the false idea of the ego is too great, "Could I too become a son? I did not want to be one. I did not want to accept the suffering caused by risking love. I thought I would not be equal to it." (Taborski 1987, pg. 339)

Adam recognizes that being entirely absorbed by one's own 'I' and not recognizing the relational aspect of one's being makes the act of participation and so too the act of becoming 'gift' virtually impossible. It stops man from seeing the true good of his being, "My eyes were too fixed on myself, and in such a situation love is most difficult." (Taborski 1987, pg. 339) In *Love and Responsibility* we read that the opposite of love is not hate, but as we have said - the use of another solely as a means to an end. In *Radiation of Fatherhood*, loneliness is posed as the opposite of participation and furthermore the opposite of the 'act of love'.

An interesting point raised by Adam is when he states, "But I find it even harder to retain a sense of my own greatness than a sense of my loneliness. In loneliness one can hide and forget. But what am I to do when I keep falling off pedestals?" (Taborski 1987, pg. 340) At this point, we hear echoes of Wojtyła or John Paul II's call for man to recognize his own greatness not only his place in creation, but in how he images the Divine, "Man must reconcile himself to his natural greatness....he cannot forget that he is a person." (LR 2013, pg. 183) Again, being called to one's greatness seems like something egotistical/closed in on oneself - yet according to Wojtyła, when one does not realize one's greatness, one does not enact one's responsibility. When one does not recognise the greatness of personhood to be precise. Adam does not want to measure up or does not think he measures up or can measure up to the greatness that he truly possesses, because he will not be able to enact the responsibility that is then required. We see this in Wojtyła's anthropology, that man is set a superior task in nature: the task of fulfillment, of co-creating

himself. If one does not realize this greatness of being a 'co-creator', then one will not take part in this 'co-creation' and take the steps and choices necessary to fulfill that greatness. This greatness is obviously a mere reflection of the greatness of God.

A moment of enlightenment dawns on Adam: if he stays isolated, he will/his 'I' will disappear, but there is a way to preserve it, "Two thoughts just came to me. The first thought: Fathers will not return to themselves, so you are not wanted; go, mix with the crowd now, and lose yourself in it. The second thought: Fathers return through their children; the father always revives in the soil of a child's soul." (Taborski 1987, pg. 340) In the section "mother" Adam sees himself in a relational aspect, in the aspect of participation - where he enters into the world of the other and the other enters into his world (a concept we will develop) - he realizes that he remains, he does not disappear.

When Adam realizes that his 'I' does not get eviscerated by participation and that there is an option, other than just becoming one of the many and becoming lost in history, when he realizes that his 'I' that he holds so dear yet rejects, continues in the soil of a child's soul, it brings with him a true sense of freedom. He says he feels a sense of "liberation". This must come from the fact that the natural desire he has for continuity, the desire for an everlasting 'I', that there is a way for that to be satisfied.

Whilst Adam has this revelation that his 'I' can in fact continue, the mother steps in because she knows that he is going to become afraid again. As beautiful as the thought is to be "revive(d) in the soil of a child's soul"- it means to go against what Adam has been doing up until this point. He has been alienating, isolating, making himself lonely - he is riddled with anxiety as he fears taking on the "risk of love" - he is still in hiding. She compares this spiritual birth of the father in the soil of a child's soul to that of childbearing which she knows so well, and the pain that goes along with it, "Do not be afraid. This must hurt. It is a pain like the pain of birth. A woman knows infinitely more about giving birth than a man." (Taborski 1987, pg. 340) For Adam to realize his spiritual fatherhood - he would have to embrace the fact that pain accompanies it.

As said before, one of the keys to understanding the *Radiation of Fatherhood* is Wojtyła's concept of love, especially *spousal love*. This is exemplified in the intimate relationship between mother, child and father. That even the mother is not understandable without drawing from the father, "Still, motherhood is an expression of fatherhood. It must always go back to the father to take from him all that it expresses." (Taborski 1987, pg. 341) Obviously this thought has theological implications, but also speaks to philosophical anthropology as well as biology; The

fact that the reproductive process entails the reception by the woman of the man's seed i.e. what he "expresses". Motherhood does not exist without receiving the 'gift' of the father first.

We then have another key sentence, "One must enter the radiation of fatherhood, since only there does everything become fully real." (Taborski 1987, pg. 341) The realistic metaphysical philosophy underlying this statement is the idea of the Absolute - *Ipsum Esse Subsistens*. As we have said in the previous chapter on the *Philosophy and the Theatre*, the Absolute is the highest of all perfections, He is being in its fullness, He is existence in its fullness, He is the fullness of reality. In order to properly engage with reality, one needs to engage with the foundation of being. The sentence shows that (like Wojtyła does in his philosophy) one must root one's subjectivity in the fullness of reality and not cut it off from the framework of being, "For at no point can the world be fiction, the inner world even less than the external world." (Taborski 1987, pg. 341)

"Just think! Think, all of you: one must choose to give birth! You have not thought about this. One must choose to give birth even more than to create." As we have said before, the biological reproductive aspect of this command is easier than giving birth in the spiritual sense/personalistic sense. One would have to make a choice. We can already ascertain that the fact that choice is involved, which is, as Wojtyła says the most human action there is, the spiritual giving birth engages the person in their fullest capacity and requires them to be able to transcend themselves in order to make this choice. Adam will only be able to radiate fatherhood, the Absolute Fatherhood, if he chooses to give birth spiritually, "One must choose to give birth even more than to create. In this consists the radiation of fatherhood. It is no metaphor, but reality. The world cannot depend on metaphor alone, the inner world even less than the external world." (Taborski 1987, pg. 341) Here Wojtyła is emphasizing that the inner reality is as real as the outer reality - it is not some mere abstraction.

3.2 *The experience of the child*

In the section *The Album* we meet the 'character Adam' who appears regularly in Wojtyła's plays. In a newly discovered text that was published in 2022 (which is seemingly the first draft of ideas for *The Radiation of Fatherhood* and *The Jeweller's Shop*) we have much more information about who the character Adam is. The draft is entitled *Ten Który Szuka Nas Wszystkich - The One Who Looks for Us All* and is found in the newly published volume of Wojtyła's poems and dramatic works *Dzieła Literackie i Teatralne: Tom III Dramaty Szkice*. Adam plays a significant role in both *The Jeweller's Shop* and the *Radiation of Fatherhood*. These plays must however not be seen as a continuation or saga as even though Teresa and

Andrew and Monica are a married couple in *The Jeweller's Shop*, they have a son named Christopher. Monica then is the product of the troubled marriage of Stefan and Anna in the *Jeweller's Shop* but in *The Radiation of Fatherhood* she is the child of Teresa and Andrew.

Still, it must be noted that the plot that Andrew dies in WWII when Monica is a child is extended to *The Radiation of Fatherhood*. In this newly discovered "first draft" we find out that Andrew dies in the war, and he asks Adam, the character, to remember his wife and his daughter. Adam fulfills this promise and visits Teresa and Monica some years later. It is interesting how detailed this first version is in terms of plot compared to the final version which is written more in terms of philosophical reflection. The final version; in this case we have used the official Vatican approved English version translated and published by Bolesław Taborski as well as the Polish edition from the recently published 2023 (in some places translated into English, for the purposes of this thesis) - is less literal, more poetic, more general, yet it does not cut out *lived experience* entirely.

While the final play may not describe many instances of action in the sense of "something happening to and in man" it, however, takes the limited events that come from an external source and describes how it impacts the interior life of the persons involved. We have Monica losing her father and Adam trying to be her father in a spiritual sense. This seems to be in keeping with *The Rhapsodic theatre's* focus on a problem as we spoke about earlier. It is also in keeping with and further deepened by Wojtyła's philosophy. While these 'happenings' from the external source do not originate in man and do not engage him as an agent, he does 'subjectivise' the action with his consciousness - the audience members become witnesses of this process of interiorization, the resultant contemplation and response.

At the start of the section, entitled *The experience of a child*, Wojtyła makes a director's note, "The external situation drawn here is, step by step, an outcome, or offshoot, of the inner situation. This is most important." (Taborski 1987, pg. 341) Both the note and title of the section are very fitting and directly connected with his philosophical thought. As we have said previously, for Wojtyła, *lived experience* is a vital 'dimension' within existing categories. A 'dimension' that makes known a deeper understanding of who man truly is. By virtue of *lived experience* we can access man's interior life and his essence. His mystery and uniqueness are glimpsed in *lived experience* specifically when he is an agent of his own actions but not excluding the something that happens to and in him which always has an impact on his subjectivity as well.

Another key part in the director's note are the words, "For all the action in this part has something of wondering or striving about it: the inner striving finds its counterpart in the external action." (Taborski 1987, pg. 342) Again, we have Wojtyła trying to parallel these two realities (internal and external action) which is very difficult to do especially in a theatrical setting. He is trying to show how neither of them are apart from each other, yet they work in tandem with each other and that the person undergoing the plot is also having an internal plot themselves. He really is not getting rid of plot per se but limiting the plot as we have already observed.

In the section where Adam is looking through the photos of Monica - photos where he literally was not present, he has a thought connected to Wojtyła's understanding of the continuity and unity of the 'I'. Monica has undergone all these events, all these growth spurts (both physical and spiritual). Her whole life (which is constantly in flux - where she is constantly changing and transforming) is captured by these pictures - yet one thing remains, "the history of her eyes". The external eyes represent the internal 'I'. As Wojtyła writes in *Person and Act*, the 'I' is the *lived experience* of the *suppositum*. It does not consist of fleeting thoughts, moments and memories; it is not a stream of consciousness but is more fundamental to man, more concrete, "The history of those eyes through all these pictures they remain, more than anything, they unite everything in one stream, which absorbs more and more traits, in them rests the identity of the soul." (Taborski 1987, pg. 342) While the 'I' forms the basis and unity in man, it can become more of an 'I' i.e. man becomes more himself, depending on the actions he chooses to partake in - actions which are good in the moral sense.

We then get to the part where Adam (who has become a father figure for Monica and is grappling with what it means to be a spiritual father) says that, in her younger days, Monica was more 'outside' of him, "though it appeared to be the other way around..." This is interesting in terms of Wojtyła's philosophy. You would think that, the more dependent she is on Adam, the more she is inside of him. It seems to be however (and we will see later on) the more she performs *human acts* and therefore the more her personhood matures and she is able then to make the decision to unite her will with her father's will - this determines whether she is "inside" or "outside" of him.

Before we move onto the next section it is important to note Adam's words when he says, "Poor child, I thought, poor child, she will never see her father..." It is important because at the start of Adam's journey of becoming a spiritual father to Monica he thinks words of sympathy. *Sympathy* according to Wojtyła in *Love and Responsibility* means; to suffer with, "The word

'sympathy' is of Greek origin and consists of the prefix *syn* (together with somebody) and the stem *pathein* (to suffer). Literally then, sympathy means as much as 'co-passion.'" (LR 2013, pg. 70 & 71) Sympathy is not an act of the will but arises due to an affection that develops between people and creates a type of community based on these emotions, "sympathy signifies above all what "happens" between people in the field of their affections—that through which emotional-affective lived-experiences unite people." (LR 2013, pg. 71)

The Polish use of the word *sympathy* is commonly used to denote that, as Wojtyła writes, someone is "agreeable (*sympatyczny*) to me". (LR 2013, pg. 71) This feeling makes the person 'visible' to me, "he is located in my field of awareness as an "object" that is accompanied by a positive affective overtone, and this overtone denotes at the same time a "plus" for that person." (LR 2013, pg. 71) Wojtyła writes, as quickly as the feeling of sympathy arises it can fade and therefore the person can disappear from our "field of awareness". (LR 2013, pg. 71) Sympathy cannot be equated with the fullness of love but it is a stepping stone. A person starts to see the other as another 'I' through the feeling of sympathy, "this "plus" of the person that is based only on sympathy can turn gradually into a thorough conviction about the person's value." (LR 2013, pg. 71) Adam starts to see Monica as a person due to the sympathy he feels for her.

The difficulty with sympathy is that it tends to dominate our capacity to be persons, our capacity to perform human actions which require the faculty of reason because it "takes into possession man's affection and his will, often independently from the objective value of the person to whom it turns. The value of affection replaces in some sense the value of the person (of the object of sympathy)." (LR 2013, pg. 71) In the same breath, as with emotions and desire, sympathy is fundamental to love because it draws people together in an "experiential way." (LR 2013, pg. 71) It is a key point that Wojtyła raises and must be kept in mind throughout the *Radiation of Fatherhood*, "love is experience (*doświadczenie*) and not deduction only". (LR 2013, pg. 71) Monica clearly clings to experience and Adam to deduction and therefore while having sympathy for her takes into possession his will and emotions, it still has the positive effect that it draws him into the possibility of love. Sympathy is so essential to love because through it we do not just intellectually grasp someone as a person, but we feel "the other's whole personhood". (LR 2013, pg. 71) We start to move into the domain of love through sympathy because we start to live "in the circle of the other" and they start to live in ours. (LR 2013, pg. 71)

It is therefore paramount to bring the power of the will into this discussion. The connection created by sympathy, as Wojtyła writes, will disintegrate if a friendship is not established. It is too weak to survive the fluctuation of emotions. Friendship denotes the introduction of the will,

"I want the good for you as much as I want it for myself, for my own 'I'." (LR 2013, pg. 71) Friendship is an offshoot of *love as benevolence* because of its selflessness but it does not forget that one's own 'I' needs to be oriented and obtain the good for oneself as well. In friendship there is unity of persons, an entering of the one 'I' into the world of the other 'I'. Simultaneously both I's exist in each person involved in the friendship because in a friendship you simultaneously will your friends good and your own. This is created through what Wojtyła calls, "a characteristic "doubling" of the subject, a doubling of the "I": my "I" and your "I" constitute a moral unity, for the will relates to both with equal favor. Thus, as a matter of fact, your "I" becomes in a sense mine; it lives in my "I" as my "I" does in itself." (LR 2013, pg. 71) Adam needs to move from sympathy into a type of friendship if he is to move into his call to love and spiritual fatherhood, "It is necessary to find the means by which affections not only will find their way into the will, but—what is more—will bring about this unity of the will (*unum velle*), thanks to which two 'I's become one 'we'." (LR 2013, pg. 75)

In the section 'The child's sanctuary' Monica discusses her experience (both internal and external) of the loss of her biological father, and the subsequent finding of her spiritual father. At first her consciousness is not developed, and she is not aware of his non-presence, "My father's history in me. The beginning is lost in the darkness of my soul, a child's, long before the wandering begins to trace his presence, because first there was absence." (Taborski 1987, pg. 344) As she ages, Wojtyła shows how her consciousness develops, and she becomes aware of something missing. This information must have been given from the outside, but Wojtyła wants to show the inner discovery of her father's absence. Her desire for a father figure develops and the searching and wandering begins, "In the spring I picked flowers for someone, for someone, for someone... Daddy was not by me; Daddy was not on earth. I want my daddy on earth, close, very close to my heart." (Taborski 1987, pg. 344)

She begins to trace his presence, and she realizes in full consciousness that her father is not by her, that he's not on earth and that she desires that he be there. We witness an opposite reaction from Monica than the one from Adam; Monica very much wants a relationship with Adam (her spiritual/replacement father figure), she wants the *other* to participate in her, she wants to have someone call her *mine*. She wants, as in Wojtyła's definition of friendship: Adam's 'I' to become her 'I'. She wants Adam's 'I' to live in her 'I' as her 'I' lives in itself and vice versa she wants to be in Adam as his 'I' lives in himself. She tries to achieve this by being very demonstrable and constantly reminding Adam of her presence and not her absence in a physical way i.e. by putting flowers on his desk, "Many a time I took flowers, and when he was not in the room... He would

recognize my presence from the flowers in the vase near his books. He would think I am in her heart and look for me in his own heart, if only for a while.” (Taborski 1987, pg. 344)

Monica's interior life is dominated by her emotions and by virtue of this they dominate her *lived experience* and her motivations behind the actions she chooses to take. Adam, being more internally mature is more reasonable and does not trust his emotions as much. He is also by virtue of his personality and choices, more reserved and closed (as he admitted to earlier). He is cautious in becoming her father because he first wants to understand the meaning of spiritual fatherhood and whether it is actually possible for him to enter into that meaning and what will be the implications of taking on this role.

Even though Monica is more led by her emotions than Adam that does not mean she is completely cut off from the ability to reason. While she is indeed very motivated by the emotional surge that accompanies the fact of being called 'someone's mine', it does correspond to her intuition - her intuition garnered from her *lived experience*, “If you were not on earth, I would look with pity on the album of my infant days.” (Taborski 1987, pg. 345) If her spiritual father Adam had not come into her life then, “Everything would be split. disunified”. (Taborski 1987, pg. 345) As much as she is emotional, she realises through experience that she needs a father in order to be or to have unity and stability of her 'I' (a stability for her identity).

When Monica speaks about the roots of her biological father being embedded in her and that she is the unity of the love between her mother and her father we get a glimpse into Wojtyła's *Love and Responsibility* and what the child represents in a marriage. It also shows why she did not become conscious of her father's absence in the beginning of her childhood, “everything grows out of one system, out of common roots. So did father grow in me through mother, and I was their unity, that segment of the mass of the tree through which both trunks grow... So father grew in me through mother - but for a long time I did not perceive him, did not feel his absence because his roots were embedded in mine”. (Taborski 1987, pg. 345) This is a reference to the idea of *Spousal Love* and that in marriage *the two become one* - the world of the one becomes the world of the other and the world of her father was therefore alive in her mother, regardless of whether he was physically alive or not.

Before we enter more deeply into the subject of *Spousal love* (even though as a topic it is more prevalent in *The Jeweller's Shop*) it is worth noting what Wojtyła says about *companionship*. This type of relationship has more objective underpinnings. It does not involve the emotions so it is not like sympathy and it does not have the doubling of the I's like in friendship, “this ‘I want the good for you as if for my own ‘I’ does not yet come to light in it.” (LR 2013, pg. 74)

Still, a community is formed but on more stable factors i.e., “common work, common objectives, common interests.” (LR 2013, pg. 74) An “objective community” is therefore formed which is also essential to love as it provides a “durability”. (LR 2013, pg. 74) It creates the “we” relation and it also creates an “environment” which will be essential to marriage, “People who are capable of living in an environment, who are capable of creating it, are rather well prepared to confer on the community of the family the character of a cohesive environment in which a good atmosphere of shared life prevails.” (LR 2013, pg. 75)

Spousal Love draws its uniqueness (as opposed to all the types of love discussed previously) from the fact that (even though friendship seems to come close in the duplication of I's) it is a reciprocal exchange of persons and therefore seems to violate the ‘incommunicability’ of persons, “The essence of spousal love is giving oneself, giving one’s ‘I.’” (LR 2013, pg. 76) As we mentioned earlier, Wojtyła agrees with the adage *persona est sui iuris et alteri incommunicabilis*: “A person is a being of its own and does not have its being in common with any other.” (John Crosby, pg. 44) The person is “non-transferable” and “incommunicable” as Wojtyła writes; the person is *self-possessing* and *self-governing* i.e. “his own master (*sui iuris*)” and therefore cannot be treated as an object and “impart or give himself” away as an object. (LR 2013, pg. 76) This idea of *spousal love* and “self-giving” seems to run counter to the very essence or “nature” of the person. (LR 2013, pg. 76)

Wojtyła reaffirms that, especially in a “physical sense” and “in the order of nature” it is erroneous to say a person can give himself to another. (LR 2013, pg. 76) However Wojtyła then makes a fundamental distinction: while ontologically one cannot give oneself to another, “what is not possible and correct in the order of nature or in the physical sense” can occur in the personal dimension, “in the order of love and in the moral sense.” (LR 2013, pg. 76) A human person is able to give himself to God and to another in this sense. This type of love is also the most complete act of love, “The fullest and so to speak the most radical form of love consists precisely in the fact of giving oneself, of making one’s nontransferable and incommunicable “I” someone else’s possession.” (LR 2013, pg. 76 & 77)

Wojtyła reiterates that love (as we have said before) is pivotal in actualising man’s potentialities and therefore plays a vital role in man reaching his ultimate end and therefore his fulfillment. But if man is by his very nature also “non-transferable, incommunicable” how can these two truths be reconciled? Wojtyła further exposes the implications of *Spousal love* when he states that it seems counter-intuitive that one can even “go out of one’s own “I” in this way” and furthermore he explicates that it seems, “that by doing so, this “I” is not in the least destroyed or

devalued, but, on the contrary, is developed and enriched—of course in the supra-physical sense, in the moral sense.” (LR 2013, pg. 76 & 77)

Wojtyła then turns to a personalistic understanding of the scriptural passage as a solution, “For whoever wishes to **save** his life will **lose** it, but whoever **loses** his life for my sake will **find** it.” (*Emphasis added*) (USCCB, Matthew 16 v 25) This passage reinforces the personalistic norm (you cannot give what you do not yourself possess) as well as gives a blueprint to, “develop this norm in various directions.” (LR 2013, pg. 76 & 77) This passage also seems to reveal that the interior life or “the world of persons” has “its own laws of existence and laws of development.” (LR 2013, pg. 76 & 77)

As we have seen in the *personalistic norm* love has the ability to safeguard the person against use and therefore by its proper definition it implies responsibility, “There exists responsibility in love—responsibility for the person, the one who is drawn into the closest community of being and acting, who in a way is made one’s possession by taking advantage of his self-giving.” (LR 2013, pg. 101) The responsibility lies in the fact that one must develop and mature “one’s own love” to such an extent that it can preserve the “enormous trust” made by the other person who has put their hope in the love of the relationship, that it will not destroy them but lead to their flourishing, “that one does not lose one’s “soul” by giving oneself, but, quite the contrary, finds the greater fullness of one’s existence.” As we have said, the “responsibility for love” is basically “responsibility for the person” (LR 2013, pg. 101). So inherent is responsibility to love that if there is no responsibility then love does not in fact exist and “as a rule, is always egoism.” We can also therefore measure the depth of love by the amount of responsibility, “The more the sense of responsibility for the person, the more true love there is.” (LR 2013, pg. 102)

Before we enter more deeply into one of Wojtyła’s key teachings it must be noted once again that Wojtyła sees the “ontological” and “moral (ethical)” orders as distinct yet interconnected. Grzegorz Ignatik explains this simply as, “These orders denote that *which is* and that *which should be*, respectively. Furthermore, these two orders are intrinsically linked; that *which can and should be* must proceed from that *which is*.” (*Emphasis added*) (Grzegorz Ignatik 2021, pg. 114) As Ignatik writes, Wojtyła and likewise Pope John Paul II is deeply interested in “understanding the human person in terms of love” (Grzegorz Ignatik 2021, pg. 114). *The Radiation of Fatherhood* is no exception. To understand why Wojtyła believes that this is the case and that it is even possible, includes also turning to his view of creation. As Ignatik explains, Wojtyła holds the view that creation is created out of ‘love’ and this forms the basis for his hermeneutics of the gift, “Fundamentally, the entire world is created, that is, made out of

nothing (ex nihilo). In other words, the act of creation is a bestowal of being. According to Wojtyła, the motive for this creation is love: that which exists is a gift from someone who loves. This means that love underlies life: love creates life.” (Grzegorz Ignatik 2021, pg. 113) Creation is a result of God’s generosity and not out of his need. All of creation is marked with a “similarity” to the Creator and carries “within itself the mark of the gift”. (Grzegorz Ignatik 2021, pg. 113) Man however (because of his freedom of the will and the fact that he can possess, govern and determine himself) is the sole being amongst created things who is able to, “consciously, deliberately, and totally love in the proper sense of the word.” (Grzegorz Ignatik 2021, pg. 113)

Wojtyła (Ignatik explains) observes that this “law of the gift” is not opposed to the essential structures inherent in man, “The Creator inscribed in the nature of the personal being the potency and power of giving oneself, and this potency is closely joined with the structure of self-possession and self-governance proper to the person.” (Grzegorz Ignatik 2021, pg. 113) By virtue of the fact that we **can** possess and govern ourselves means that we **can** make a gift of ourselves. In this statement we can see how close the relationship between the “ontological” and the “moral (ethical) orders” are for Wojtyła and that (as he says in his essay *The Personal Structure of Self Determination*) the relational capacity of man presupposes the substantial capacity (PA 2021, pg. 466), “Only the being that possesses and governs itself in virtue of its ontic incommunicability (the being that is *sui iuris et alteri incommunicabilis*) can freely affirm the value of another up to the point of freely giving itself for the sake of this other.” (Grzegorz Ignatik 2021, pg. 113)

Wojtyła continues to explain in this essay, that the idea of the “law of the gift” is obtained from *Gaudium et Spes (a constitution from Vatican II)* which draws from revelation,

Indeed, the Lord Jesus, when He prayed to the Father, ‘that all may be one. . . as we are one’ (John 17:21-22) opened up vistas closed to human reason, for He implied a certain likeness between the union of the divine Persons, and the unity of God’s sons in truth and charity. This likeness reveals that man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself. (GS 1965, #24)

This does not mean, however, that the law cannot be found in the nature of the person. If, as Wojtyła says, “The ‘law of the gift’, to put it this way, is inscribed in the depth of the dynamic structure of the person”, it should also be visible and confirmed in a phenomenological analysis of *lived experience* (PA 2021, pg. 466) The discussion as to how much Wojtyła’s style of philosophy is ‘pure’ i.e. free from other influences as in revelation is a separate discussion. We cannot, however, deny how the ‘law of the gift’ enriches and extends his philosophy. Ignatik

writes about how the 'law of the gift' is observable in the sexual difference between man and woman, "The human person, this need for self-gift underlies all psycho-somatic dynamisms, including the sexual drive." (Grzegorz Ignatik 2021, pg. 113) For Wojtyła the underlying motivation of sexual relations between man and woman is not their "sexuality" but the fact that inherent to them, inscribed in their nature, is the desire and need to make a "reciprocal" gift of themselves, "It is not sexuality that evokes in a woman and a man the need for reciprocal self-giving but, quite the contrary, the need for self-giving, which is latent in every person, is unfolded in the conditions of bodily existence and on the substratum of the sexual drive through the bodily and sexual union of a man and a woman in marriage." (Grzegorz Ignatik 2021, pg. 113)

Wojtyła expands on the "law of the gift" in *Love and Responsibility* and the fact that when a person gives himself to another or for another he actually gains more of who he is, he is more fulfilled, "Through the gift of self, through "a sincere gift," the person confirms and, so to speak, deepens the self-possession and self-governance proper to himself. Through the gift of self in the moral sense, the person does not lose anything but becomes richer instead." (LR 2013, pg. 230). While Wojtyła poses the problem of how to unify the metaphysical and phenomenological understanding of man, "how the being of the person and the 'law of the gift' inscribed in it are related to each other" and "what ultimately determines the person: substance or relation" he offers no solution. (LR 2013, pg. 230) Wojtyła does assert the fact that they have to be synchronized, "In order to explain the reality of the human person, both senses, the ontic and the moral (referring to Fr. Szostek's expression), must be unified." This is in keeping with, Wojtyła states, the quote from *Gaudium et Spes*, "man is the creature (i.e., a being) that God willed "for its own sake," and at the same time this being finds itself fully "through a sincere gift of self." (LR 2013, pg. 230)

He also highlights the fact (a fact that is important in understanding the characters in *The Radiation of Fatherhood*) that this law of the gift cannot only be reserved for *Spousal love* but is inherent in all "acts of love". Wojtyła specifies "true acts of love". He quotes Father Szostek to explain this phenomenon,

Giving oneself to somebody else, serving the other, dedicating oneself, etc., express different forms and degrees of love, yet the moment of giving, of sacrificing oneself, as the expression of affirming the one to whom it turns, is contained in every act of love. Questioning the right to self-giving in spousal love at the same time undermines man's right to self-giving in any other form (. . .). Although, in fact, a difference exists regarding the degree of the "fullness" of this giving among different forms of love, the structure of the

action of the subject is always similar and depends on the same principle: the principle of man's freedom and the right to govern himself. (LR 2013, pg. 230)

It is no accident then that the 'law of the gift' forms the foundation for *Spousal love* and its validity. Instead of just being a moment or instance of self-giving, *Spousal love* is long term and must involve constant reciprocal self-giving otherwise there is a danger of one of the spouses becoming an object of use, "In the human profile of spousal love, the "law of the gift" constitutes above all the foundation of the durable, indissoluble union of persons. Such a union cannot exist without their reciprocal and durable belonging to each other." (LR 2013, pg. 233)

When Monica then analyzes/reflects on her relationship with her new spiritual father, she realizes there is a difference (even though she does not have the experience of her biological father's physical presence). How is she then to love Adam? She knows she has to take a different path so that he can be born in her soul, "How I do love you, my father, my strange father, born in my soul. Father, you who were born in me to give birth to me." (Taborski 1987, pg. 345) She knows he has to be in her to give birth to her (how this happens is revealed as the play unfolds). It seems that Monica has reached a new level of maturity and reflection that will allow Adam to begin the process of education we referred to earlier. She makes a statement that galvanizes Adam into teaching her about "the source". She states that the interior longing she felt, has been satisfied by his spiritual fatherhood, "I did not know for many years that you had grown so much in me...until the day I linked the immense longing in my soul precisely with you, until the day the absence had to become the presence it had once been." (Taborski 1987, pg. 345)

This insight precedes their entry into the forest. The forest which represents a 'going into oneself', an exploration of one's interiority. Adam (even when his ego would like it to be different) knows that he is a sign - he is a sign or prism (which we will expand on later) through which the "radiation of fatherhood" disperses itself. He knows that he is not the source. Monica in her longing for a father is not only longing for a replacement but "the source" of Fatherhood itself. Monica is conscious of things embedded in man or things unsaid that are contained in both her and Adam and she asks when the words will come to give voice to it, "When will be spoken what is contained in you and me, what lies in the depth of consciousness and must wait for words?" (Taborski 1987, pg. 346) This statement; about whether or not we can communicate what is deep down in our consciousness (or even in our subconsciousness) and if we can find words to express what is deep down is also a reference to the person *as et alteri incommunicabilis*. That man is so "unique" and "unrepeatable" that this shows that he is a world entirely apart and in himself. This shows the difficulty of participation. The difficulty of love. How can one enter into the world of the other if they remain so unique and therefore so apart?

At the end of the section, Monica is in a state of emotional elation that she now has a father and she feels that she has reached him and that she has him now, "How good it is that you are in the world, because I thought you no longer were, and then I thought, I cannot reach you, yet I have reached you and feel that I have you now." (Taborski 1987, pg. 347) This is an interesting declaration because we know that Adam is so hesitant because of the risk it will take to have Monica in him and himself in Monica, that we have to question if it is Monica's idea of him that is in her or really him as he is.

Monica needs to see herself more "apart" not as a part of her new father. From a personalistic point of view, she has to try to respect the individual person more. She has to see her father as still separate from her, that he still is his own person. If she does not, she will miss his uniqueness, and he will somehow become 'personless'. If she does not keep his individual personhood in mind, if she aims too quickly at the unitive stage without understanding the 'separateness' she will go against the *personalistic norm* and absorb him for her own end. Adam understands the separateness too well and tries to avoid the unitive stage as we have already discussed.

In the section 'Father, be my Way, Be my Source!' Adam takes Monica deeper into the forest. He again brings out the parallel that Wojtyła in his philosophy tries to make clear; that is, how the external happenings are connected to the internal. Adam speaks about the literal thicket that they have to walk through and describes the struggle, "But it is not enough to look from the outside. You must enter. You know the thicket that is in me..." (Taborski 1987, pg. 347) The thicket is a metaphor for the internal struggle, the struggle that Adam says some people believe is not possible to go through, because they are too 'self' reliant, "How many people can believe that none of us is closed and unchangeable? We only carry in us the content that outgrows us in its absolute form, but we are attached to and dependent on it." (Taborski 1987, pg. 347)

As said before, the entire forest can be seen as a metaphor for man's interiority. They (Adam and Monica) are physically walking through themselves - through their inner lives - and encountering their struggles and their spirituality. Wojtyła has made visible (in a theatrical manner) the invisible life of man. That is why Adam has taken Monica there - he has directed her to her interiority to analyze what is within so that she can grow beyond her emotions and so that she can personally look and find the source of the Fatherhood she so desperately seeks for herself. When Adam says, "we only carry in us the content that outgrows us in its absolute form, but we are attached to and dependent on it" (Taborski 1987, pg. 347) he is speaking in a metaphysical realist sense. As we explained in previous chapters, we are not the cause of

ourselves, we are not the cause of our existence and essence and that existence and essence is not existence and essence in its absoluteness. "To be" means to participate in that Absolute Being who has "out of love" deigned that we are and continue 'to be' for as long as He permits. Adam says multiple times that he only indicates "The Great Meaning". (Taborski 1987, pg. 347) Adam's understanding is correct but he seems to equate the fact that he only indicates the 'Great Meaning' with the idea that he should therefore alienate himself and not enter into the world of the child at all. This is because of his paralyzing fear that he will then not be 'in himself' enough.

The education of Monica by Adam is most apparent when he does an analysis of her character. It must be remembered that, and as we have said before, for Wojtyła, educating is intrinsic to parenthood. Wojtyła as Pope John Paul II reinforced and expanded on this point in the document *Familiaris Consortio: The document on the role of the Christian Family in the Modern World*. Pope John Paul II clarifies what this type of education (that of parents to children) is, what it entails and we can therefore extend it to the education given by spiritual parenthood and ergo the education given by Adam,

The task of giving education is rooted in the primary vocation of married couples to participate in God's creative activity: by begetting in love and for love a new person who has within himself or herself the vocation to growth and development, parents by that very fact take on the task of **helping that person effectively to live a fully human life**. As the Second Vatican Council recalled, 'since parents have conferred life on their children, they have a most solemn obligation to educate their offspring... For it devolves on parents to create a family atmosphere so animated with love and reverence for God and others that a **well-rounded personal and social development will be fostered among the children**. Hence, the family is the **first school of those social virtues** which every society needs. (*Emphasis added*) (FC 1981, #36)

The education given by Adam is also therefore an education in love, as love (as we have said before) actualises the potentialities in man leading him to become **fully human**. In the notes from the editor in *Love and Responsibility* pertaining to the *Author's Introduction to the Second Polish Edition (1962) of Love and Responsibility*: there is a note referring to Wojtyła's idea of the *education of love*. The editor notes it as being the most pivotal type of education for Wojtyła i.e. when one is taught and through grace is able to overcome the domination of the ego. That is why Adam takes Monica to the stream (which we will address later); to experience the Source (The wellspring of Grace), "...for Wojtyła the education of the person is above all the education of love: man's education in love and to love. The education of man's love, as overcoming various shapes of egoism, becomes fully adequate when man cooperates with the "grace of love." The education of love must proceed from the truth that "God is love" and that "love is from God." (LR 2013, pg. 248)

In Taborski's version of *The Radiation of Fatherhood* quite a crucial part is missing. I have therefore translated Adam's analysis of Monica's character from the newly published Polish edition of Wojtyła's poems and dramatic works i.e. *Dzieła Literackie i Teatralne: Tom III Dramaty Szkice*. I have also inserted the part (with the analysis that is in the original Taborski version below) so that it is complete.

Adam: (Taborski version 1987, pg. 347 & 348)

You are very shy. That is not yet simplicity, though you are also simple: when you cannot express something, when you are ashamed of your feelings, you know how to cry in secret. You also know how to bring a bunch of flowers and put it on my desk when no one can see. Your views are hermetic and grow from first impressions. You find it hard to stand outside - and so you often feel like a stranger, even among friendly people. You adapt yourself with effort. You are very ambitious, too; you are dependable to the point of willfulness, I look at your features, at the way they are formed. I look at the impenetrable sanctuary of a child.

Addition from New Publication: *Dzieła Literackie i Teatralne: Tom III Dramaty Szkice 2022*, (pg. 199, 200 & 201)

You make up for your small amount of physical strength with willpower - or rather with nervous tension? Will I ever teach you to be able to separate the latter from the former? Will I ever teach you to think calmly and soberly, not just to feel! You are a child of the heart. A rich spectrum of feelings that rule over you and to which you listen attentively. You listen to feelings and believe your heart: you believe your heart and listen to your feelings. You try to find them or intuit them in others. This is the path to straightforward but difficult decisions. Since in yourself you cannot find an alternative way, you might tire yourself out and suffer. Will it be suffering out of love?

I do not know if I will manage to build in you a kind of second space; made up of thoughts, beliefs and even such suspicions as this; that do not hurt anyone and yet protect the heart from bleeding out in close encounters. I would like to create a space in you that is more reflective and neutral, which will allow you to maintain a greater agility in your sensitive self. Learn not to cut yourself off, suddenly standing in the void of this 'I'. Be able to look at yourself critically. I don't want your heart to be a cliff, which you and others can easily slide down. I also don't want it to be a mountain pass that is open through and through.

We walk together through the thicket - you and I: your I and mine. The child's sanctuary has not yet been fully explored. We walk side by side - the child's sanctuary and my loneliness. The clearing ends nearby. The grass is waving gently, intertwined it forms a carpet with juniper and heather.

The heat is growing. A path runs through the middle - it seems as though people or animals have walked there. It is only a trampled line between the walls of grass. The heat is tiring. Normally we would move into the shade, sit under a tree and fall asleep - in the gentle breeze that makes the grass sway - fall asleep. I walk as if gazing into my own dream - and into yours as well.

You breathe evenly, gently, like all of nature, which would like to inhale the breeze. I approach, stand and look - I look at your features, which carve themselves. I look at the child's sanctuary which is impenetrable. You have been lulled to sleep by the excess of nature, which harmonizes with the deficiency in man.

(John Paul II 2022, pg. 199, 200 & 201)

Original text in Polish

Nikły zasób twoich sił fizycznych nadrabiasz siłą woli - czy raczej napięciem nerwów? Czy kiedyś sprawię, byś to drugie umiała oddzielać od pierwszego? Czy nauczę cię kiedyś myśleć spokojnie i trzeźwo - nie tylko czuć! Ty jesteś dzieckiem serca. Bogaty dyktat uczuć, którego słuchasz z uwagą. Słuchasz uczuć i wierzysz sercu: wierzysz swojemu sercu i słuchasz swoich uczuć. U innych próbujesz je znaleźć lub przeczuć. To droga do rozstrzygnięć prostoliniowych, lecz trudnych. Skoro w sobie nie znajdziesz odwrotu, możesz bardzo się męczyć i cierpieć. Czy to będzie cierpienie z miłości?

Nie wiem, czy mi się uda zbudować w tobie jakby drugą przestrzeń, złożoną z myśli, przekonań, a nawet z takich podejrzeń, które nikogo nie ranią, a jednak chronią serce, by nie wykrwawiło się w spotkaniach wręcz.

Chciałbym stworzyć przestrzeń refleksyjną i bardziej neutralną, która pozwoli zachować większą zwrotność w twym wrażliwym „ja”. Naucz się nie odcinać, stając nagle w próżni tego „ja”. Umiej patrzeć w siebie krytycznie. Nie chcę, by twoje serce było urwiskiem, po którym łatwo obsunąć się tobie i innym. Nie chcę też, by było przełączną otwartą na przestrzał...

Idziemy razem przez gąszcz - ty i ja: twoje „ja” i moje. Rezerwat dziecka nie jest jeszcze przepatrzony do końca. Idziemy tak obok siebie - rezerwat dziecka i moja samotność.

Wyrąb się kończy opodał. Już z lekka falują trawy splecione w jeden kobierzec z drobnym jałowcem i wrzosem.

Upał roślinie. Środkiem biegnie ścieżka - widać chodzą tamtędy ludzie, albo zwierzęta. Jest to tylko smuga przedceptana między ścianami traw. Upał mężczy. Usunęlibyśmy się w cień, aby usiąść pod drzewem i usnąć - przy łagodnym powiewie, od którego falują trawy - usnąć. Idę jakby zapatrzony w mój własny sen - a także w twój.

Oddychasz równo, łagodnie, jak cała przyroda, która by chciała odetchnąć teraz powiewem. Dochodzę, stoję i patrzę - patrzę w twoje rysy, które rzeźbią się same. Patrzę w rezerwat dziecka - nieprzenikniony. Uspiał cię nadmiar przyrody, który harmonizuje z niedosytem w człowieku.

(John Paul II 2022, pg. 199, 200 & 201)

The psychological and spiritual maturity that Adam is trying to move Monica towards is evident in this passage. I will however only pinpoint the lines that have reference to Wojtyła's underlying philosophy. We immediately pick up the *emotionalism* that dominates Monica's

interiority and actions, when Adam calls her a "child of the heart". Monica has not been able to transcend herself and submit her feelings to knowledge and self-knowledge. She operates on the level of feelings and intuition but does not (has not developed the ability to) submit it to reason, does not submit it to truth, "You listen to feelings and believe your heart: you believe your heart and listen to your feelings." She does not yet engage all the powers that are distinctive of the person. Adam (and ergo Wojtyła for his audience) would like Monica to, "create a space in you that is more reflective and neutral, which will allow you to maintain a greater agility in your sensitive self." He wants her to recognize that there is this interiority in man and that it is her duty to co-create it.

This requires that she "know herself" - she becomes accustomed with her virtues and vices and who she is personally (both a subject and object for herself), that she knows what and whose she is. He wants her to engage with her 'I', not let it be dominated by her emotions but connect with it through the process of honest reflection of *lived experience*, "Learn not to cut yourself off, suddenly standing in the void of this 'I'. Be able to look at yourself critically." Her heart, which is part of her interiority, is to be guarded and not treated like a plaything or object or a passageway for people to just "pass through". To allow people to pass through and not engage in a love that is reciprocal is to allow the use of oneself, a use that violates one's own person, "I don't want your heart to be a cliff, which you and others can easily slide down. I also don't want it to be a mountain pass that is open through and through."

Wojtyła confirms the idea that the forest is the inner life of both Adam and Monica and this line also speaks to Wojtyła's idea of dialogue/accompaniment/proposing not imposing - when Adam educates Monica by walking simultaneously through his own interiority, "We walk side by side - the child's sanctuary and my loneliness." He can also only accompany her because man is *alteri incommunicabilis* and therefore, "the child's sanctuary... is impenetrable." During this journey Monica falls asleep because she has been, "... lulled to sleep by the excess of nature, which harmonizes with the deficiency in man." In the new publication the word "excess" can be translated as "abundance" and therefore nature in some sense tries to 'compensate' for the lack of fulfillment in man and this causes a temporary peace in the restless soul of Monica.

After this period of education, Adam again reflects on the fact that he still remains lonely because again, he is still not wanting to take on the "risk of love" which would ensure that his world would be in Monica and Monica's world would be in him. Suddenly a viper appears and threatens his life and Monica's; "suddenly a rustle wakes me" (Taborski 1987, pg. 348); this rustle both wakes him externally and internally and immediately, the thought "I am not lonely"

(Taborski 1987, pg. 348) pervades him. He is not lonely in the sense that the viper is with him, and he trembles because of the fear of losing his own life i.e. his natural drive of self-preservation has been activated. He starts to realize that he is also not lonely because he experiences the fear of losing Monica's life too, he repeats, "I am not lonely for I tremble, my whole awareness throbs with this one meaning - viper - that clings to it from outside. At the same time another meaning appears, which clings from within: child. One must protect this child!" (Taborski 1987, pg. 348)

This second fear, the fear of losing Monica, indicates that Adam is on the verge of 'un-isolating' himself, he is on the verge of performing an 'act of love' because the presence of the viper has shown him how deeply he cares for Monica. He needs to concretize this internal experience, but this requires that he takes it further. He needs to face the 'risk of love' which he has avoided facing up to now. The *lived experience* of the threat to Monica's life brings about a moment of decision.

A decision that requires the most human of actions - Adam must choose. He must choose to create himself in the image of the good. To preserve his 'I' he must risk his life in order to preserve Monica's 'I', "I am immensely moved. I know now that something has happened. But I do not yet know exactly what." (Taborski 1987, pg. 348) Wojtyła is taking us through Adam's *lived experience* of becoming a spiritual father that is simultaneously an external and an internal action. It is an action (he chooses to save Monica's life at the risk of losing his) that he has not yet processed completely, but one that he will return to in the future, "I am immensely moved. I know now that something has happened. But I do not yet know exactly what". (Taborski 1987, pg. 348)

Adam then returns to the topic of the Absolute Father. The word "His" is capitalized and we see that Adam is not just talking about the father that gave Monica biological life or his own spiritual fatherhood but the Father that gave her, her entire being. Monica seems to misunderstand the fact that Adam cannot be the source that will fulfill her deepest longing, (*she says to Adam*) "father be my way be my source" (Taborski 1987, pg. 347).

She obviously lacks a biological father, and she naturally feels the emptiness this brings but on a deeper level Monica is like all of us who (even if we have both biological parents) still experience a yearning for the Absolute Father. Adam wants her to understand this but on an experiential level and not just an intellectual one. On a theological basis, revelation shows that God is the ultimate source. But Adam (and ergo Wojtyła) is trying to show the experience of longing in the human person; that it is both a natural longing for natural fatherhood but also a

supernatural longing that one experiences. Wojtyła is trying to display the ache in man that can only be satisfied by the God who created man, "Thou hast formed us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless till they find rest in Thee." (St Augustine of Hippo, *Confessions*, 1,1.5)

There is an Absolute 'content', an Absolute Fatherhood that the fatherhood on earth is just a sign of. Adam tries to show this to Monica without preaching scripture to her. The whole play is in fact Wojtyła preaching the gospel but through showcasing the *lived experience* of man which includes a deep dive into his interiority and the analysis of the experience of love. As in his philosophy, Wojtyła is trying to show the truth of the good. Instead of Adam saying that he knows he must obey the New Testament law "You shall love your neighbor as yourself" (USCCB, Mark 12 vs 31) he experiences what it means when the viper arises to threaten Monica's existence. He experiences the movement of the heart and the voice of his own conscience that indicates that he should lay down his life for the other. He experiences the battle between *alienation* and *participation* in that very moment.

It is interesting to note that a snake is the animal that threatens the life of Monica. Original sin and Adam's chosen *alienation* comes through the temptation posed by the devil in the form of the snake in the garden of Eden. As we have said before, the interior life is likened to a forest in *The Radiation of Fatherhood*. One could say that a forest is also a type of garden except that it holds all the effects of the fall; humans searching for their identity and natural dangers are included. Wojtyła seems to be using the very thing that caused the fall to awaken man to 'return' to his original state before the fall.

Instead of a literal interpretation of the viper one could also imagine the viper representing anything that (in Adam or in Monica) threatens to end their spiritual 'life'. Adam therefore, not only saves Monica from the literal poison of the viper, but the poison that threatens to render her spiritually dead or even a non-person. Adam could be saving her from repeating his sin, saving her from performing a non-human action - not choosing to love in the proper sense. Loneliness, as we have said before, is the opposite of choosing to love. It is the opposite of participation.

Adam tries to explain to Monica that he only indicates/represents the "Great Meaning". Again, here Adam is trying to guide her (while not discounting her feelings), to direct her feelings or her deepest yearning/ache to the Ultimate Father. But Monica is persistent and unable to comprehend what he is telling her, "Fill it; fill it with yourself! You must fill it with yourself! Do you know how much I need you, how much I took from you and am still taking?" (Taborski 1987, pg. 349) Monica is still stuck in the experience of an emotional high caused by the fact that she did not have a physical father and now she's found one to replace him. There was an

emptiness, a loneliness caused by not being someone's daughter. Still, Adam knows that although that experience cannot be discounted it must be guided to reach the full truth of what it means to be filled with true Fatherhood. Adam, however, can only tell Monica about the "Great Meaning". She has to have a personal and an internal encounter, "And for you I can trace only from outside that Great Meaning that we long for with all our human nature, especially from a certain moment." (Taborski 1987, pg. 349)

The stream that Adam takes Monica to is his answer to his dilemma. He wants her to have an experience of the stream and in the stream, Monica has a *lived experience* of her rebirth/her baptism. Following this rebirth, she will then hopefully start to ask where this stream comes from and by virtue of these interior questions, she will see that every stream has a Source. Monica is in ecstasy/jubilation because she feels her 'I' in its fullness, "what freshness, what rebirth! Life enters anew into all my cells. Ah, as I am being born anew from this forest stream, I ask: Be water for me! I ask. Be water for me!" (Taborski 1987, pg. 350) The chorus makes an important statement that in the translation by Taborski says that "The bank of the stream is both the edge of the earth and the edge of human thought." From the newly published Polish edition, we can translate it to also mean, "the bank of the stream is both the *border line or the border* between earth and human thought". This second translation seems to indicate that the stream is a meeting point between the external happenings and the internal happenings of the 'I' which, as we have said before represents the microcosm man is. Like Monica, Adam also has an experiential encounter with the stream and so too its Source. He breaks out in praise, "We have come down to the forest stream to praise you, the water that has given birth to man anew, yet we have passed by unaware of your own goodness. I praise you, cool forest water, for having saved for me the breath that I feel so close to my heart: the breath of a child by my side." (Taborski 1987, pg. 350)

Monica does not want to move from this water because here she feels the most fulfilled, she feels "most like a child" which we know that Monica has been desiring to be the entire time. Throughout the play Monica longs to be someone's child, which is the opposite to Adam who (as we have said before) does not want to be a child and therefore cannot 'radiate fatherhood' adequately. We will expand on this later when we encounter the Mother but here, in the stream, Monica feels most like someone's 'mine', "I will not move from this place, from this child's place I will never move. I want to embrace you with all my childhood..." (Taborski 1987, pg. 351) She has plunged deep into her interiority and it is here that her 'I' meets with its Source. She still reverts back to Adam; however, she still does not make the connection yet i.e. that the stream is coming from the Source thereby enabling this experience of her fulfillment.

Adam again tries to redirect her, "Through the stream do you not reach the SOURCE where everything begins? Through the stream do you not embrace the SOURCE?" (Taborski 1987, pg. 351) Again we know this is why Adam has brought her to the stream: to experience that a stream comes from a Source and to realize for herself that the feelings that she treasures of being reborn, being loved, being refreshed - that there is an Absolute cause of that. Monica seems to comprehend this for a brief moment when she says, "Through the stream the SOURCE EMBRACES ME TOO." (Taborski 1987, pg. 351) She feels in the stream...when she enters deeply enough...where the internal and external meet...she feels her own 'I', she feels this mutual relation and participation i.e. she is in the Source and the Source is in her.

We arrive at a key section in the text *The Father and the Child Embrace One Another by Means of the Word 'Mine'*. Here the word 'embrace' has a physical meaning and a meaning that refers to interiority. Here father and child embrace each other's whole person by means of the word 'mine', they embrace each other's 'I'. They embrace each other's outer and inner world - all that makes them individual, unique, unrepeatable, incommunicable - through using the word 'mine'. This is a fundamental moment because as we know, the person is incommunicable. As we explored in the previous chapter, Wojtyła writes, we only know that the other has an inner world/an interior life because we ourselves have an interior life but somehow through the word 'mine' we are able to move towards an 'act of love' that would then embrace/enfold the other into our own 'I', (*Adam says*) "my child. When I first decided to think of you as my child, by that very fact I accepted the meaning of the word "mine". What happened? Something quite simple yet eternal. Some words carry weight, even small words. Such is the word 'mine'. With this word, I accept as my own, but at the same time I give myself." (Taborski 1987, pg. 352)

Monica seems to think the source of the word 'mine' is the affective sphere, "I do not know how it happened, but I think this word emerged on the waves of my heart. The waves of the heart flow over us often in ebbs and tides - I have felt a wave rise and fall again." (Taborski 1987, pg. 352) Wojtyła is highlighting here the very experiential aspect of feeling like someone's 'mine' - the experience of being loved in fact. As we have said before, for Wojtyła, emotions play a part in love but so does reason and the identification of the object (which is a good) for the will. Love has to address the person in his wholeness.

Monica however has grown since she entered into the forest of her own 'I' and she admits that she prefers "stillness" to the overwhelming surge of emotions because the emotional waves make her feel less in touch with herself, "I...feel less strongly the banks of my being. The banks grow distant then." (Taborski 1987, pg. 352) When the banks grow distant, then her being, her

connection with her subjectivity and objectivity starts to lessen. Wojtyła, as I have written, is very specific in *Person and Act*, when he speaks about how the emotions render one almost without one's 'I', because they are so strong and dominant. Monica continues, "I dream of a stillness so great that even those strange beings could emerge on the wave of my heart as if they were my own." (Taborski 1987, pg. 352) The "strange beings" are the other 'I's that she wishes to participate in to such a degree that they become to her as if they were herself.

Adam then goes into his history with the word 'mine'. The fact that he has been hesitant to use it for so long. The reason why he has been hesitant to accept it and use it, is because he knew that it was not just a word that could be used frivolously. There was something very deep and eternal about it. That deepness lies in the fact that when you use the word 'mine', responsibility immediately emerges. He says, "Do you know that we must not accept what emerges only on the wave of the heart until we assume responsibility for the truth of this word, the common simple word 'mine'? We may return to the heart once we have dealt with the logic of words." (Taborski 1987, pg. 353) He is educating Monica in the process of reasoning; to realize that even though she may have had the wonderful emotional experience of the word 'mine', indeed of love, she cannot (and this is where choice comes in) be taken away by the waves of emotion. She has to use her reason, self-knowledge, her consciousness and her conscience to direct her will.

The word 'mine' implies the harmonization of wills. This harmonization is part of the responsibility intrinsic to the word 'mine' because the harmonization of wills helps to ensure the good of the other - the 'mine'. As Adam says, in the translation for Taborski, "One must transfix feelings with thought." (Taborski 1987, pg. 353) Going back again to the Polish version of *The Radiation of Fatherhood* in the newly published edition *Dzieła Literackie i Teatralne Tom III* (line 571 pg. 207) the word *przeświecić* in the sentence, "trzeba *przeświecić* je myślą" can also be translated as *illuminate* in place of *transfix*, i.e. "one must *illuminate* feelings with thought". That would seem to be one of the necessary processes of the 'interior life' i.e. to take the feelings that we experience and illuminate them with knowledge obtained by reason. It also links to the inner radiance the Mother clothes Adam's children in. There's an inner freedom that comes with this process of submitting feelings to thought because the emotions then do not suffocate ones 'I', "I transform the delicate heart of hearts in which I stay more and more freely; I live there as if it were my own." (Taborski 1987, pg. 353) The more Adam submits his feelings or illuminates them with thought and with truth, the more his interior life becomes free and the more he feels as if it is his own 'I'.

A crucial moment (that is really an offshoot of Wojtyła's philosophy) is when Adam finally realizes what it means to give birth spiritually and deepens this understanding. Adam realizes that birth can also occur through choice, "We are born also through choice then we are born from within, and not at once, but bit by bit. So, we are not born but rather become. But at a particular moment we may not become, may not be born. This depends on us." (Taborski 1987, pg. 354) This really is a reflection of the 'moral' *fieri* or 'becoming' that Wojtyła speaks about in *Person and Act* i.e. the true meaning of *metamorphoses*. The fact that we are 'co-creators' in the moral sense. As we have said before; ontologically we are born, given to ourselves and morally we have the responsibility of 'creating' ourselves - becoming either a good or an evil person. This is possible, as we have said, because we possess and govern ourselves. In order to determine ourselves in a certain way and so that the 'I' becomes or develops and grows, every moral action (or human action as Wojtyła calls it) or every time we are faced with a moral decision - the choice that we make, defines us. It defines us and gives birth, further birth into our 'I'. As Adam notes here - this is not a one-time event but occurs "bit by bit" and is therefore better termed as a "becoming".

Another significant thought of Adam's is when he states that, "Giving birth begins with unity and aims at unity. In this love consists." (Taborski 1987, pg. 354) The person is a unity; an ontological unity, body and soul. The 'I' is, while it undergoes different *lived experiences* and therefore reflects the change of the person in the moral sense, provides a unity for these changes. So too then should the process of *fieri* or 'becoming' and therefore the actions that promote the 'becoming' of the person in the moral sense - so too must this aim at maintaining the unity of the person. Man is not just (as we've said before) a stream of moments and memories. The subjective life of the person is not separate from the objective sense of the person, but it begins with both of these in unity. All the actions that the person undertakes, specifically the human act, the decisions that the person makes in moments of moral dilemmas - need to aim at preserving the unity of that person.

The act of love is no different. Love is also a unity that corresponds to the relational nature of man which has already been addressed. The human person is brought into the world through the unity of mother and father, the unity continues between mother and child as the child is carried in the mother's womb for nine months of his existence. Then the child (through the process of birth) gains his independence, and he needs to return to unity with his parents once again by becoming born of the father as well. And the only way to do that is by, as Wojtyła writes, "penetra(ing) the depths of his will" (Taborski 1987, pg. 354). Not a superficial imagining but a deep and truthful understanding of his will. Through choice, aligning one's will with the will of

one's father. This really lies at the foundation of what it means to love. That to have the other in you and to be in the other means to accept what their 'I' consists of, "If you are to be born of your father, you must first penetrate the depths of his will. This is giving birth through choice. And to choose means to accept what makes my world, what is in me and what is of me". (Taborski 1987, pg. 354) For love to occur, the wills of both of the persons need to harmonize. They need to aim (as we discussed in the previous chapter) at the same *common good* - the good of the 'other' as 'other'.

We now enter into the part of the play where Adam definitively declares that he wants to be in Monica, but he gives a caveat, "Now if I am to find you in myself, I must find myself in you. Do you know that if I do this, you are not altogether free? For love denies freedom of will to him who loves. Love liberates him from the freedom that would be terrible to have for its own sake." (Taborski 1987, pg. 354) Reciprocity is essential. Monica needs to be open to Adam as well. This is the risk Adam was terrified of; harmonizing one's will with the other means freedom has an object. We are no longer free in the sense of freedom for its own sake. Freedom is used for love. It is voluntarily accepting each other's wills. We long for the good of whom we love, we see the other as a good in itself and desire their good in a selfless/disinterested manner. The experience of pain is caused by the denial of freedom for its own sake.

Further evidence for the adherence to the *personalistic norm* in *The Radiation of Fatherhood* is when Adam says that the real struggle in 'being in the other' is that the other cannot disappear. The other (Monica whilst having Adam in her, whilst harmonizing her will with his) still remains completely herself, as her own person at all times. To be able to honor the dignity of the other while 'being in them' is such a great task that it causes Adam, once again, to tremble. The fear of losing Monica to the viper enacts the same reaction in Adam when he thinks he could lose Monica if he does not respect this *personalistic norm* i.e. he trembles. It will not be a physical death, but it will be the death of her 'I' and therefore their relationship, "I must tremble too because she, being born of me, will not for an instant cease to be herself. Thus, I have to split and divide myself from her always, having both myself in her and her in myself." (Taborski 1987, pg. 355) Wojtyła highlights the power of the 'higher values' like love in this section, i.e. that even though Adam would like to stop intellectually at this point, love propels him, or love motivates him, love draws him into actively living the word 'mine' out, "And though I would very much wish to stop at the edge, love will draw me in... Do you understand this."

In the section *Father and Child Always Find One another by Means of the Word Mine* we witness Monica's experience of 'being in the other' and 'the other being in her'. We witness her

interior struggle and her thoughts on what it means to be herself, to be independent, yet being able to fit another world within her and be in another. We witness the internal struggle of the harmonization of wills. In the original text (*Ten Który Szuka Nas Wszystkich - The One Who Looks for Us All*), Monica actually encounters the man that she will become engaged to in *The Jeweller's shop*, Christopher (Krzysztof). Christopher suggests that she cut her hair as he believes that it is best for her. She, however, takes his suggestion but makes her own decision to do it because she believes it will be comfortable for her and make her look modern. (lines 1334 - 1335) (John Paul II 2022, pg. 407) Regardless of the reason, she cuts her hair and goes back to her parents, her spiritual father Adam and her biological mother Teresa, and she registers their reactions.

Her mother raises her eyes and comments that Monica cut her hair. Adam however does not say anything. (Line 1344) (John Paul II 2022, pg. 408) Monica understands in that moment that what seemed to her as something really mundane, has deeply affected her parents. Her hair represented the picture her mother had of her in her mind and heart (lines 1390 - 1394) (John Paul II 2022, pg. 410) All this is to show, in a very simple external action, that Monica's will was not harmonized with her mother's and her father's. She asks the question in Taborski's translation of *The Radiation of Fatherhood*, "Can I always want what he does when I simply want what I want?" (Taborski 1987, pg. 356) This is in reference to Adam and reveals that Monica is now experiencing not just the emotional elation but reality of the word 'mine'.

Adam tries to guide her with the words, "One must desire together. One cannot escape by desiring. For then the feeling deceives... and the word 'mine' remains in a void and hurts because of that... when we love, a common current runs through our wills. From it a certainty grows, and freedom is born again from certainty. And this is what love means. And then without fear I think 'mine'." (Taborski 1987, pg. 356) In this section, Adam is again emphasizing the unity of the wills as being the foundation for love. That one cannot merely rely on *sympathy* or *love as desire* (as we discussed earlier) but instead one needs to make a choice to desire together - this is foundational and most difficult. The love that reflects the unity of the wills is *true love*, which is found in *love as benevolence, friendship, companionship* (common goals unite the wills of those involved in this type of love) and *spousal love*. These types of love form a stability, form a reassurance because they provide the "certainty" that the *personalistic norm* will be adhered to. Therefore, there is "certainty" that in this reciprocal relationship the 'I' will be preserved and brought to a higher fulfillment. It is a state where a common current runs through the wills; when we know that the other truly has our good as the basis of their will, and we have

their good as the object of our will. It is here that one knows that one's subjectivity will be safeguarded and respected, not drowned out by the masses.

What is essential for love is above all the affirmation of the value of the person; by being based on it, the will of the loving subject tends to the true good of the beloved person, the good that is full and complete, the good 'in every respect'—this good is identified with happiness. This attitude of the will in the loving person is completely contrary to any attitude of the will to use. (John Paul II 2006, pg. 143)

Up until this point, we have followed Adam through his entire internal process of fearing to say 'mine' because he did not want to lose himself. We have followed him through his realization that he would lose himself anyway by virtue of the fact that he was isolated and alienated which ran counter to his make-up, ran counter to his objective good, ran counter to his personal structure and therefore ultimate fulfillment and happiness. We saw how his love for Monica propelled him into participation and made him realize that his 'I' could be maintained and even (by virtue of the relationship with Monica) could be made to flourish. Monica, however, is still struggling. She almost sounds like Adam when he speaks to God in the beginning of the play, she is making excuses of why she does not want to remain in him, "is it not true that I took from you so much, can one take more?" (Taborski 1987, pg. 356) This is because she realizes that, and as Adam says, that her father is "determined", or it seems as though the father is "determined" as God for Adam is "determined". This means that she will have to make sacrifices on her part, "you demand radical changes". (Taborski 1987, pg. 357)

As said before, Adam takes on his 'co-creative' capacity when he realizes what it means to be a father. He now has a bond with the world that he previously alienated himself from and he has someone to shape that world with, "Gradually I learn through you what it means to be a father: it means having the strongest bonds with the world... So let us shape that world together!" (Taborski 1987, pg. 358) When he takes on his role of father he has more of a responsibility, he is more motivated and has a stronger sense of purpose/mission/vocation. Still, Adam realizes that fatherhood does not take him away from himself even though it binds him to Monica. It is also through the fulfillment of the relational aspect of his being that he becomes more himself (Monica has 'become' a part of him but as a result he has become more himself), "But I cannot now cease to be myself together with what binds me from within - my burden and happiness - because it has somehow become myself too." (Taborski 1987, pg. 359) He has not lost himself; he has gained a deeper/richer/wider 'I'.

Monica then returns from a trip to the mountains which we can assume she took without her father. It was a spiritually enlightening journey that she has made independently from him. In this time (which is an allusion to independent self-discovery); she has been able to contemplate

herself and others. She has been able to reach deeper into herself and into her father, "A man can hide and muse. Discover the depths of other beings and his own - discover, reach. Reach with what is in me that which is in You." (Taborski 1987, pg. 359) The 'You' is now capitalized, and she seems to be referring (at last) to the Absolute Father as the foundation of her being when she exclaims "I am, I am! Please forgive me, I want to be always. You must not doubt this." (Taborski 1987, pg. 359)

She has obviously had a moment of enlightenment where she has felt her 'I', her being in its fullness. She then asks for forgiveness and she promises her father (both God and Adam) that she has reached the end of her education (all that Adam had to teach her - to have an inner life, gain control of the emotions, learn what 'mine' means - has been achieved), "Your child is here. You see, she will evade the vicious viper." (Taborski 1987, pg. 359) Monica alludes to a second baptismal experience (one could liken it to the sacrament of confirmation) where she goes even deeper into the stream and she feels the renewal that she did when she was younger, "ah, Father!- I feel, I feel my body anew and my soul!" Up until the point where Monica has her own interior experience of herself in the Divine, she has been asking her father to 'fill her'. In this monologue for the first time, she capitalizes Father. This shows a growth in her understanding of God as the source and fulfillment of her being.

Adam said at the beginning, the only person who can say the word 'mine' in the truest sense "is your son" is Christ. Whereas Adam and Monica know that they participate in a smaller 'mine'/a 'mine' without the capitalized M because they cannot belong to each other as they belong to God or will belong to God in heaven. As we have said before there's an interesting paradox in *The Radiation of Fatherhood* which reflects that found in Wojtyła's philosophical writings: that in order to give yourself to others and to God you first have to possess yourself. Whether one can give oneself to anyone let alone God was addressed by Wojtyła using the explanation Father Szostek offered,

The person is incommunicable without exception in the ontic sense: nobody, not even the Creator, can decide about the person instead of the person himself. However, the person is 'communicable' in the moral sense: he can accept that someone else governs him. He does not violate his personal dignity in this way because in 'giving himself' to somebody he wills the same thing that somebody wills." (LR 2013, pg. 227)

We are therefore able to give ourselves to each other in the moral sense but not the ontological sense. The type of self-giving we partake in on earth is just a sign of the full self-giving that will occur in heaven, "The self-giving to God and the self-giving to man is accomplished (thus) on different planes: the self-giving to man should constitute a certain stage and a way of self-giving

to God, which will be fully realized in heaven where nobody will marry nor be given in marriage anymore.” (LR 2013, pg. 227)

Before we get into the third act which introduces the Mother and inner radiance, I would like to hearken back to the very beginning of the play where Adam states that he does not want to be a prism, “Why ask that he allow the radiation of Your fatherhood to enter him so that he can refract it as a prism refracts light”. (Taborski 1987, pg. 337) Adam fears becoming a prism because he fears eradicating himself, becoming a tool or an instrument (an object of use). In a sense he is correct in wanting to defend his personhood but we know that his fear, primarily rests on the fact that he fears making room in himself, he fears what he perceives as a threat to his ego and not his ‘I’. Adam has filled himself so full of his own ego and therefore has a darkened or unenlightened interior life (because of his alienation from God, other persons and his inner self) because he has blocked out or off any possibility of the radiation of his Father’s light.

Adam states that he would rather be clay, “If having formed me of clay, You had said Clay: go on forming. I would have formed many things.” (Taborski 1987, pg. 337) This alludes to the biblical sense of Adam being created from dust and therefore seems to be in accordance with his nature; “then the LORD God formed the man* out of the dust of the ground and blew into his nostrils the breath of life, and the man became a living being.” (USCCB, Genesis 2 vs 7) Clay, however, does not let light pass through it and therefore it only has an “external” function. Adam, if we remember (at the beginning) is quite fine with merely operating in an external capacity. He wants to live as a universal, as an abstract ‘I’. He knows he is and wants to solely be a “common denominator”. As the first father and due to original sin, we know that every man is marked with him biologically and spiritually. However, Adam wants to remain a universal concept which is what Wojtyła writes against in his philosophical anthropology. The cosmological account of man given in realistic metaphysics is not enough, through abstraction we do not arrive at the deep mystery which is man. We only arrive at the Boethian definition: *A person is an individual substance of a rational nature.*

Adam wants to be abstract yet retain his own ‘I’. This is impossible without participation, as we said earlier. Adam has forgotten that not only is he made out of ‘clay’ but he is infused with *Ruah* - the breath of the Creator Spirit (the Holy Spirit) - and is therefore made in the image and likeness of the Triune God - an eternal exchange of love between the persons of the Trinity. Adam cannot remain a generality - he needs to enter into his personhood - and in this final act we see God through the Mother calling him to enter into *lived experience* of not only being a father but a bridegroom as well.

3.3 *Mother*

The figure of the Mother seems to be a synthesis between Eve and Mary but the emphasis is more on the *Theotokos* i.e. The Mother of God whom the early church fathers called the *Nova Eva* (the New Eve in virtue of Christ being the New Adam). Wojtyła shows once again that the intrinsic relational capacity of man has not only natural but eternal consequences. Even after death, through love, we remain 'in' each other. He also shows the personalistic role rather than the strictly theological role that Mary played and continues to play, "All who depart remain in me. And all who pass by have their place in me - not just a wayside stop but a permanent place. I gather the people whom Adam has dispersed. There is in me a love stronger than loneliness. That love is not of me." (Taborski 1987, pg. 360) Eve as the first mother and Mary as the mother given to all of humanity by Christ on the cross - "When Jesus saw his mother* and the disciple there whom he loved, he said to his mother, "Woman, behold, your son." (USCCB, John 19: 26) - holds all the other 'I's in her womb ready to be born in their fullest realization. Her womb is an incubator for those who want to be born in the image of her Son. This occurs because her will is in complete harmony with the Absolute Father and that means that He is in her as she is in him. As a result, His love floods her being and she is able to then be more spiritually fruitful i.e. give birth to many in the spiritual sense.

She describes life as a pilgrimage between two poles: man journeys from the pole of loneliness to the pole of love - the pole of alienation to participation - the pole of apathy or evil to the pole of choice and the good. As depicted in the infancy narrative, through an act of choice - "Behold, I am the handmaid of the Lord. May it be done to me according to your word." (USCCB, Luke 1: 38) - Mary was able to move into the pole of love and give birth to love itself, "The Holy Spirit will come upon you, and the power of the Most High will overshadow you. Therefore the child to be born will be called holy, the Son of God." (USCCB, Luke 1: 35) When she gathers these 'I's together, those abandoned by Adam, she helps move them out of isolation and "the strangest community - the community of loneliness" (Taborski 1987, pg. 360) A community of separated 'I' 's - a 'non-community' in fact.

She again highlights the importance of the relational aspect of man where she says that Adam would see the "features of the bridegroom in himself" (his true imaging of God) if he knew "the whole truth about" her (Taborski 1987, pg. 360). If he knew that she was his bride then he would know the truth about himself. She would reveal, like Eve before the fall, himself to himself. Adam would see that he is not just a father but a bridegroom as well, which has the implications of then reflecting the Absolute Bridegroom.

Wojtyła then takes us through the internal life of Mary under her relational aspect i.e. that of Mother. Her thoughts and attempt at an interior conversation with Adam about how she is able to give birth to his children who have been cut off from the “radiation of fatherhood”, “People who have departed, who have fallen in so many battles - for life is full of battles are born anew in me... I fill these people with radiance from within.” (Taborski 1987, pg. 361) Even if Adam ignores the interconnectedness of their relationship, all is not lost. Mary can still radiate the Absolute Fatherhood - especially through her son - because (as said before) she has harmonized her will with the will of the Father. He is able to be present in her and her in him in a fuller sense. He is physically able to be in her, as an infant through the incarnation. Through her and her Son, Adam’s children are able to reconnect with the Father.

Adam’s refusal of becoming a prism through which the radiation of fatherhood flows, means that he blocks his children from God’s light. He does this by choosing loneliness. This means God does not live in his ‘I’ and therefore cannot radiate to others through his ‘I’. This plunges his children into darkness. The darkness of not knowing their own ‘mine’ and therefore that they are God’s ‘mine’. In Genesis, when Adam and Eve do not accept that they are God’s ‘own’ because they want to be their ‘own’ and they think that their own I’s will become most apparent when they are apart from God; they realize they are naked and become ashamed:

7 Then the eyes of both of them were opened, and they knew that they were naked; so they sewed fig leaves together and made loincloths for themselves.

8 When they heard the sound of the LORD God walking about in the garden at the breezy time of the day,* the man and his wife hid themselves from the LORD God among the trees of the garden.^d

9 The LORD God then called to the man and asked him: Where are you?

10 He answered, “I heard you in the garden; but I was afraid, because I was naked, so I hid.”

(USCCB, Genesis 3: 7-10)

Wojtyła analyzes the theological meaning of this text in the *Theology of the Body*, and he also analyzes the concept of shame in *Love and Responsibility*. In *Love and Responsibility* in a chapter entitled the *Metaphysics of Shame*, Wojtyła expresses that *shame* is a specifically human reaction, a “striving for concealment” (LR 2013, pg. 135) and is fundamentally different from fear. While fear and shame are linked i.e. when “man feels shame for something, this is also accompanied by the fear of bringing to light that which in his opinion should be hidden.” (LR 2013, pg. 135), shame is inextricably linked with persons precisely because of their interior life. Fear is obviously apparent in the animal kingdom and is not specific to persons, “The need to conceal, which is characteristic of shame, is born in man due to a terrain, as it were, residing in

him that is suitable for concealing some contents or values—the interior life.” (LR 2013, pg. 136) Wojtyła is speaking here specifically about “sexual shame” or “shame of the body” and man’s tendency to conceal the organs that distinguish the sexes, “Among people an almost general tendency exists to conceal them from the sight of others, especially from the sight of persons of the other sex.” (LR 2013, pg. 136)

Why would man, even those the gospel has not reached, instinctively cover up the organs related to sexual difference? Wojtyła explains that man intuitively values himself as a person and he conceals what is of great worth so that he will not have the value diminished, “what is essential in this shame is the tendency to conceal the sexual values themselves, first and foremost inasmuch as they constitute in the consciousness of the given person ‘a possible object of use’ for persons of the other sex.” (LR 2013, pg. 137) Shame is not only a way of protecting the value of the person but love itself, “It is understandable that shame, which strives to conceal the sexual values in order to protect the value of the person, also strives to conceal the very co-experience (*współprzeżywać*) of the sexual values in order to protect the value of love itself, above all for the two persons who experience (*przeżywać*) it together.” (LR 2013, pg. 140)

In love the *shame* or mechanism to protect the dignity of persons due to the concealing or veiling of their sexual organs, is “absorbed”. This is obviously to allow the *sexual act* to take place, but it carries with it ethical implications,

Shame becomes in a sense absorbed by love, melted in it, so that both a woman and a man cease to feel shame for co-experiencing (*współprzeżywać*) the values of *sexus*. This process has an enormous significance for sexual morality... For this is a natural process that can be by no means understood without grasping the proper proportion between the value of the person and the sexual values in man and in the love of a man and a woman. (LR 2013, pg. 141)

How does shame, which is a “natural self-defense of the person against descending or being pushed into the position of an object of sexual use” become absorbed? (LR 2013, pg. 142) Wojtyła writes that only in love can this take place due to its inherent nature. As we have said before, love safeguards the inherent dignity of persons and prevents them from being an object of use because love is, “the relation of one person to another (Y to X, and X to Y) which from its very foundations excludes treating the person as an object of use... Precisely for this reason, in such a natural way shame opens to love.” (LR 2013, pg. 142) Only love which sees the value of the ‘other’ and orientates the wills of the persons in the reciprocal exchange of love to the good of the ‘other’ “the good that is full and complete, the good ‘in every respect’—this good is identified with happiness.” - only this type of love can absorb shame (LR 2013, pg. 142 & 143).

In his *Theology of the Body* Pope John Paul II writes how, before the phenomenon of lust enters the picture due to a loss of innocence i.e. before *original sin*, Adam and Eve are completely vulnerable before each other and do not have a need to activate the mechanism of self-defense, "The man and his wife were both naked, yet they felt no shame." (USCCB, Genesis 2: 25) They see themselves in their fullness (body, mind and soul). They see the other not as an object of 'use', but as a unique, unrepeatable, incommunicable 'I'. They are able to look at each other's bodies in purity because they see each other as integrated wholes (body and soul) and as persons with inherent worth. As John Paul writes with regards to what he calls *original nakedness*,

'they did not feel shame' can only signify (in an indirect sense) an original depth in affirming what is inherent in the person, that is, what is 'visibly' feminine and masculine, through which the personal intimacy of reciprocal communication is constituted in all its radical simplicity and purity. To this fullness of 'exterior' perception, expressed by physical nakedness, corresponds the 'interior' fullness of the vision of man in God, that is, according to the measure of the 'image of God'. (John Paul II 2006, pg. 177)

Their only attitude towards each other is love, which we have already expanded on before; which absorbs shame, and they therefore see each other as 'gift' and become 'gift',

According to Genesis 2:25, the man and the woman 'did not feel shame'; seeing and knowing each other in all the peace and tranquility of the interior gaze, they 'communicate' in the fullness of humanity, which shows itself in them as reciprocal complementarity precisely because they are 'male' and 'female'. At the same time, they 'communicate' based on the communion of persons in which they become a mutual gift for each other, through femininity and masculinity. (John Paul II 2006, pg. 178)

When they disconnect themselves from God, each other and their own subjectivity a change takes place, they are still naked but become ashamed. They clothe themselves because they know that the other will not see them in their fullness. That they will become an object of use which is the object of lust and not love. They, therefore, through the self-protection of shame, which in a world after the fall protects the dignity of the human person, clothe themselves.

The problem that Wojtyła brings up in the final act of *The Radiation of Fatherhood*, is that while Adam and Eve have a solution to protect their bodily dignity (which, due to its interconnectedness, impacts on their soul) they do not have clothing for their interiority. The Mother refers to this type of nakedness in reference to the inner life, "I must constantly clothe his children in light because they walk naked from within." (Taborski 1987, pg. 361) There is, in the interior life of those born of Adam, a great darkness, a great fear and a great vulnerability. Because, unlike before the fall, they are naked on the inside...yet they are ashamed. They hide (like Adam and Eve did), they hide from the word 'mine', hide from participation, hide from performing an 'act of love' - they alienate themselves.

The Mother tries to clothe them in inner radiance; an inner radiance that will liberate them “from the shame of existence”. (Taborski 1987, pg. 361) An inner radiance that will give them the enlightenment needed to journey from the pole of loneliness to the pole of love. An inner radiance that will allow them to enter into the depths of the self and find the Source. She encourages Adam’s children to, “Take into yourself the light that will guide you through Adam's loneliness and lead you to the Father.” This is also the moment of my birth, the moment in which I become a Mother.” (Taborski 1987, pg. 362) When Adam’s children follow her, we are not only seeing the spiritual birth of Adam’s children but the birth of Mary’s spiritual motherhood.

I would now like to refer to the beginning of the play where Adam states that,

Everyone carries in himself an unrealized substance called humanity. This is connected with the painful experience of so many generations. Can one hide in it? Or on the contrary, should it be brought out of hiding, like an object one admires or despises? O humanity, which can be filled to its upper limit or weakened to its lowest. What distance separates those limits? (Taborski 1987, pg. 335 & 336)

A substance that, as we know through Wojtyła’s philosophy, is given to us to ‘possess’, ‘govern’, ‘self-determine’ and ‘transcend’. A substance that can only be formed through the human action taken in the realm of morality primarily through an ‘act of love’. I hearken to this thought because, at the end of the play, Adam speaks about Christ and he is acknowledging that the Son is filled to the brim with “human substance”. (Taborski 1987, pg. 362) He is filled with what the human substance is called to become - He is completely connected to his ‘I’, He *is* participation in its fullness, He is a total and complete gift of self, “the living denial of all loneliness” (Taborski 1987, pg. 362) Adam knows that there is a need to implant himself in the Son - to be filled with his love in order to love, “If I knew how to implant myself in Him, if I knew how to live in Him, I would find in myself the love that fills Him.” (Taborski 1987, pg. 362)

The Mother surmises that even though Adam avoids her she cannot avoid him and in fact experiences jubilation in meeting with him through his children, “When a child is born, you are born in it anew, and I rejoice in that birth.” (Taborski 1987, pg. 363) She however seemingly desires the opposite to what a normal mother would desire i.e. she desires the death of her child, “At the same time - Adam, Adam - *I desire you to die in it*. I desire your death and in that wish, I find the very nucleus of life”. (Taborski 1987, pg. 363) This is due to the fact that she knows that the death of Adam will bring about his true life. As we discussed before, love can only occur with the death of the idea that the ego subsists in itself. The death of an ‘I’ that opposes the will of the Father will ensure the fullest realization of his ‘I’.

As he does at the start of the play, Adam explains why he continues to choose loneliness, "I choose loneliness to remain myself and nobody else. This is what my world is created from." (Taborski 1987, pg. 363) As we have mentioned a number of times, Adam understands being a person as being independent/separate/cut off from everyone and everything. He then asks once again the pertinent question, "Do I really remain myself?" (Taborski 1987, pg. 363) He reflects on the fact that staying in this kind of alienation binds him with the material world and therefore his inner world, while seemingly developing, is in actual fact disintegrating because it "lacks what might profoundly unite it." (Taborski 1987, pg. 363) It is not that God's love which unites and holds everything in being is not there. It is that Adam has blocked it out by not being in a reciprocal exchange of love with the Absolute Father. This means that God cannot radiate His love through Adam and therefore Adam's world and the world at large could fracture at any moment causing him to completely lose the 'I' he is so precious about.

In the Mother we have a unity of the 'radiation of fatherhood' and the 'dying of fatherhood' i.e. the dying of fatherhood makes possible the radiation of Fatherhood. The giving up/the death of the idea that one's ego subsists in itself and therefore harmonizing one's will with the will of the Father - allows Him to radiate Himself most fully. Our union with the will of the Father requires our death (our belief of subsisting in ourselves to attain the fullest realisation of our 'I') because the will of the Father is directed at the absolute good which is Himself and therefore the fullest good for our own 'I's.

Adam in this third act, and all throughout the play, is not really aware of the mother and is mainly talking to himself and to God and he seems to think that what is the most essential is the relationship of "father, child and love". (Taborski 1987, pg. 362) He has totally cut off the other relation that God has imaged himself through and that image is foundational to nature; that of mother, sister and bride. Without the Mother we have no children. Without the Bride man cannot reflect the Triune nature of God. Even though the marital covenant is just a sign, it is a sign (like fatherhood) that needs to be entered into, to grasp the full truth of humanity in its natural and supernatural capacity. Therefore mother, sister and bride cannot be ignored.

Adam thinks that foundationally in everything, in all created things and in our interior life; the "father, child, and love" is embedded and there are signs pointing to that, "And everything else will then turn out to be unimportant and inessential except this father, child, and love. And then, looking at the simplest things, we will all say, could we not have learned this long ago? Has this not always been embedded in everything that is?" (Taborski 1987, pg. 364) The Mother contradicts his moment of epiphany, however. He brought his children near to death therefore it

is not just about, "father, child and love". In her, in the mother of all, will his children survive, "the heritage of all men implanted in the bridegroom's death". (Taborski 1987, pg. 362) She carries the children that he has rejected and gives birth to them spiritually. She clothes them with an inner radiance so that they are not lost in time and in passing. They remain in her by becoming her spiritual children and these spiritual children are implanted in the death of her Son whose love is the soil for their growth and eternal life.

Through this play we are brought into the interior life of man - the interplay of his knowledge, self-knowledge, his consciousness and his conscience. We are brought into the interplay of his sense of the need to guard his freedom because he senses his own 'I' and the importance of it and his desire for relation because it is intrinsic to him as well. We are brought into the interplay between alienation and participation, love and responsibility. All the interplay that creates the drama that is man. The tension that is man. The microcosm that is man. This seems to be an output of what happens when you emphasize the word and limit superfluous action, but it goes deeper into the structures of man who (as an image of Christ) is a person - an embodiment of the word.

If *The Rhapsodic Theatre* put the word and its relationship to action under a microscope, Wojtyła focused it on action that reveals man as he truly is i.e. human action and specifically the 'act of love'. Does this create a need for a new philosophy of the theatre? I would say yes and no. While Wojtyła's dramas are an offshoot, a continuation of the *The Rhapsodic theatre* as well as *The Reduta Theatre* (with its emphasis on subjectivity as well as sacrifice and service which have a strong connection to the 'law of the gift') he developed as we have read (in his philosophy and his dramatic writings) deeper roots for not only a theatre of the word but a *theatre of the gift* that prioritizes the fundamental structure of man.

Word and gift could be seen as synonymous in the theological sense, as Christ is equated with both; but the focus on 'gift' has different practical implications, a different emphasis to the practical implications of the 'word'. While the 'word' was the 'Living word' for Kotlarczyk (so it is even more synonymous with the word 'gift') Wojtyła provides a more detailed analysis of what imaging the 'Living word' actually looks like in the human structure and human action with his philosophy. In the next section we will explore how interiority, self-determination, self-transcendence, participation, the 'act of love' and the 'law of the gift' all contribute to founding a unique philosophy of the theatre as well as the practical realization of this philosophy and how it impacts the type of script selected or written, the way the director 'steers his ship', the role of the actors, the role of the audience and the ethics of theatre itself.

Chapter 5: Towards a *Theatre of the Gift*

1. An analysis of the types of 'participation' inherent in Theatre

Peter Brook (renowned contemporary theatre director) in his book the *Empty Space* stated that all that is needed for an act of theatre to take place are actor and audience, "I can take any empty space and call it a bare stage. A man walks across this empty space whilst someone else is watching him, and this is all that is needed for an act of theatre to be engaged." (Patrice Pavis 1998, pg. 400) While many things can be done away with i.e. props, costumes, set design, lighting, music etc - this relationship is seemingly essential. Without the audience...the performance is, in actual fact, just a rehearsal. The discussion over whether the vocalised word/script is essential or merely physical action, as we have said, is heavily debated (especially by Grotowski and his followers). While it is an important matter, we will not take this discussion up in this thesis - we will assume it is essential, in order to follow the legacy/the impact of *The Rhapsodic Theatre* on Wojtyła's dramatic works. In the observation that the *actor-audience* relationship is essential, we are confronted with the idea that theatre not only requires *mimesis* or the 'imitation' of an *action* in the Aristotelian or even in the Wojtyła sense. In order for the theatrical act to take place; there is both an 'imitation' of *action* and an a taking place of different degrees/forms of '*participation*'. This thought is discovered and verified through experience.

While other artistic genres also involve a 'connection' of artists and their observers, it is not an immediate connection but delayed and often involves (or the art itself is in fact) an 'intermediary' - a boundary between the artist and the observer e.g. an art gallery wall, a streaming service or music albums, movie/television/computer screens, radio, pages of a book etc. With the exceptions of 'live' comedy and music, dance productions, poetry/book readings - in general, theatrical performances are the main artform that provides an immediate 'live connection' between the artist and the audience. This 'live connection' seems to be an essential constituent in fact. One may ask why it is significant that the connection is 'live'; a 'connection' is surely a 'connection' regardless of its immediacy? The fact is that; while a painting, song, poem, book etc can all be created without the immediate or even the delayed presence of an audience i.e. they can be created without any audience at all in fact, the very creation of theatre/the theatrical act hinges on the actor-audience relation. While preparation all takes place beforehand, the theatrical act exists only in the present moment (unless filmed which is another discussion). It can also only exist, as we have said, if there is an audience present (otherwise it is

a rehearsal). Therefore the theatrical act requires (by its very nature) an immediate 'live' connection between actor-audience.

Historically, as we have already expanded on, the 'connection' between actor and audience has always been a fundamental discussion and one of the major objects of theatrical inquiry. The idea of the fourth wall, which we have spoken about i.e. an artificial boundary between the actors and the audience, does nothing to dispel the fact that theatre is something 'live' and performed in front of a 'live' audience. As we have already said, many theatre practitioners (Osterwa, Kotlarczyk, Grotowski) have and continue to play with the idea of the fourth wall as part of realizing their own philosophy of the theatre. While the actors may be experiencing the action on stage in their own 'reality' and the audience is experiencing the actors experiencing the action on stage/ in their own 'reality', there is some type of overarching 'experience' that is taking place that includes both spheres. This is obviously different from a crowd witnessing an organic real 'live' fight between two people, as the audience (unless encouraged by the director due his concept of theatre) does not interfere with the action being played out. Still the audience is 'engaged' - through their physical presence, their attention, their senses, their intellect and their imagination.

The issue posed by Plato over *mimesis* and his fear that the audience was being educated in the art of deception or being taken away from the truth itself by observing a staged performance, shows that (at the heart of the question) he is very concerned by the 'connection' or 'exchange' taking place between actor and audience as well as the relationship of actor - script/truth/word - audience. Aristotle, albeit in the positive vein, also clearly sees that a type of 'connection' takes place. Something different to a professor giving a lecture on 'virtue ethics' and his audience/students - although an 'exchange' and 'connection' takes place here as well. If Aristotle equated theatre with the pure relaying of information, I highly doubt he would have taken up a defense of the artform itself. He sees that man can somehow benefit by witnessing the *imitation* of *action* in a theatrical production, not just being made to think about virtues through the ingesting of information.

Catharsis seems to rely then on this essential 'connection' or 'exchange' between the players and audience as well as (as we have noted) the type of action being imitated by the actors. This is not to say that *catharsis* does not take place in the watching of movies which is mediated by a screen and obviously does not require the physical presence of both parties, but this is a subject for another paper. I am comparing here pure information on 'virtues and vices' being relayed via a teacher/lecturer versus the theatrical 'embodiment' of these values and the witnessing of them.

The discussion of the embodiment of values in persons in everyday life being a greater teacher of values than either of the aforementioned ways i.e. as exemplified by the Saints, while an extremely important discussion, is also not the topic of this paper. As to what type of 'connection' and 'exchange' occurs or needs to occur between actors and their audience - specifically in a Wojtyła philosophy of the theatre - will be the object of this chapter to discover.

For Wyspiański the theatre did not just have an aesthetic end but it was a means of discovering and showcasing the "universal truth about man" i.e. his fate. (Kosiński 2007, pg. 19 & 20)⁴⁵ The stage was to therefore showcase the universal truth and relay it to the audience via the actor's embodiment of the character who then "became alive and had their own will... and whose "will was everything...". (Kosiński 2007, pg. 19 & 20) The actor who is a "hero of active cognition" was, for Wyspiański, regarded as an accompanier of the poet in this search for and proclamation of the Truth (Kosiński 2007, pg. 20).

With Mickiewicz, the actors were to be 'revealers'/'intermediaries'/'go-betweens' of the infinite and finite world. They were to reveal to their audience the world of "individual spirits - the spirits of individuals" (Kosiński 2007, pg. 26). They were to help 'save' their audience by imitating Christ and proclaiming the truth/inspiration/the word received through their own personal communion with God himself as well as the word given in revelation.

With Osterwa we observed that he wanted to create not just a connection but a "communion" between the actors and audience. He also wanted the actor to become a "sacrifice" and the audience "witnesses" and receivers of that sacrifice. As we already cited: Braun states that Osterwa, "both formulated and practiced the ideal of 'the actor-sacrificer' who 'offers himself up' performing a 'sacred act' in the presence of a group of 'witnesses' during the performance, which is thereby transformed into a 'holy ritual'." (Braun 1996, pg. 7). He therefore envisioned a theatre of service, "service to theatre, to the country, and to fellow citizens." (Braun 2018, pg. 426).

Kotlarczyk believed that this 'connection' however, rested on the words the actors emitted and the imagination of the audience members. As we already said, he wanted the actors to guide the

⁴⁵ "wszystkich artystów teatru nie polega na powtarzaniu fikcyjnych historii, ale na czynnym dochodzeniu do prawdy o LOSIE LUDZI: I aktora, i autora obchodziła TRAGEDIA, dramat ich obchodził, los ludzi, LOS LUDZI, i to tych ludzi, o których mówiła tragedia. – Ludzie ci albo rodzili się z legendy i powieści, albo rodzili się z przypomnień tych artystów. Stawali się żywi i mieli swoją wolę. Ich wola była wszystkim. Scena służyła, aby ich pokazać. Do tego jest scena. Teatr jest więc drogą wiodącą do poznania uniwersalnej prawdy o człowieku." (Kosiński 2007, pg. 19 & 20)

audience to engage with the 'word' i.e. "co-create" (Braun 1996, pg. 143) with it. At the same time the actor could be "the performer and the master of ceremonies, the interpreter, and the commentator, the creation and the creator of the show" (Braun 1996, pg. 47) and the audience could be therefore led in a reflection and contemplation on a certain 'problem'.

While we do not have the capacity in this thesis to expand on every practitioner's idea of the relationship between actors and audience members, even Bertolt Brecht (who wanted to alienate the actors from their characters) suggested this for the sake of the audience whose emotions he did not want to manipulate. We know that while Jerzy Grotowski was inspired by Osterwa and seemed to agree with the sacrifice the actor needed to 'make of himself' it was not necessarily for the audience's sake.

As we have already mentioned in the *methodology*, interestingly (although his relationship with the Catholic Church was very complicated i.e. Grotowski was famously reprimanded by Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński for his seemingly blasphemous rendition of *Apocalypsis cum figuris*) he seems to use the same language found in *Gaudium et Spes* published in 1965 (three years earlier) and Wojtyła's philosophical anthropology when describing the *Laboratory theatre's* method, "Ours is not a deductive method of collecting skills. Here everything is concentrated on the 'ripening' of the actor, which is expressed by a tension towards the extreme, by a complete stripping down, by the laying bare of one's own intimacy - all this without the least trace of egotism or self-enjoyment. The actor makes a **total gift of himself.**" (*Emphasis added*) (Grotowski 2002, pg. 16) The answer of *who* the actor makes a gift of himself *for* is rather elusive however i.e. (as we said in the methodology) Grotowski has no answer other than an indefinable and "secure partner" who is discovered by and relative to the actor in the process of acting. (Grotowski 2002, pg. 247)

What does it mean that an 'exchange', a 'connection' or 'communion' takes place between the actors and their audiences? As we have observed, in each case presented, every practitioner acknowledges the connection/exchange but seems to have their own ideas of what it is or should be. We will show in a moment what formula seems to be used by these theorists to arrive at their conclusions, but I would like to note briefly that - what seems to be underlying all of these theories (whether it is acknowledged or not) - is the theatre theorist's/practitioner's idea of the human person and their relational aspect.

The problem is if and seems to be the case that many theatre theorists in the contemporary era have taken this idea for granted or have glossed over it in fact. As I have said before, it is in my opinion, one of the most essential questions for theatre. It seems to be that for the duration of the

production at least, a temporary 'community' seems to be formed: while it is obviously persons acting as fictional persons and persons observing these persons playing these fictional persons, nevertheless persons are implicit in this interaction. Persons therefore also seem to be the most basic element of the theatre. While we cannot equate the 'exchange' or 'connection' taking place between actor and audience with two individuals having a real interaction in ordinary life, or people observing a real interaction, we also cannot remove it from real existence entirely.

We cannot remove it from real existence entirely, because there is a conundrum inherent to the theatrical act. A conundrum we have mentioned in the introduction and a conundrum that (as can be seen from the plethora of acting methodologies) has been a long standing discussion for actors and directors. The fact that the actor is both the artist and the instrument as well as the fact that (in a theatre that aims at *realism*) he is himself at the same time as he is another character. Even though *The Rhapsodic Theatre* under Kotlarczyk did not follow the 'naturalistic' vein, I would like here to quote again from the artist retreat given by Wojtyła, a quote we cited in the introduction. A quote that seems to suggest that Wojtyła was not necessarily wedded to the idea of alienating the actors from their characters. A quote that seems to indicate a proposal of 'embodiment' based on his philosophy of man,

One pays so much for talent! For vocal talent, for physical talent. How many attempts are needed to *draw out* a different theatrical character from one's own concrete, unequivocal character, to *create*—from the *person* that I am—another *person*. What a huge *transfer* of my *individuality*, personality; what a huge *plasticity* of all of the dispositions of my *person* is required so that in its place, a different '*I*' *arises*—authentic and original. (Wojtyła 2021, Lesson II section, para.6)(*Emphasis added*)

Wojtyła seems to be suggesting that who the actor is in terms of his own personhood, lays the foundation for what he has to work with in order to 'bring a character to life' and or transmit a message to an audience. Before he is an actor and during his portrayal of a character (another person (in the fictional sense)) - he is and remains a human person. An 'original philosophy of the theatre of Karol Wojtyła' and any philosophy of the theatre in fact, cannot therefore overlook the most important question for the theatre: what does it mean to be a human person.

In the schools that adopt a *realistic* acting method, it is in fact very difficult for an actor to run from questioning the reality of man. He is forced to constantly confront *personhood* because he is taught to be attuned to all that man is composed of, all of his faculties and specificities, all of his structures, so that he can draw from them. The actor encounters himself on deeper levels than let us say an accountant does during his work, because his job *is* to 'know himself' - so that he can 'play'/'be'/'act' like someone else. The problem is with the metaphysics that underlies the philosophical anthropology that underlies the philosophy of the theatre that underlies the acting

techniques/methodologies that theatre practitioners employ. If the philosophy of being and philosophical anthropology that underlies the philosophy of the theatre reduces man to mere matter, and limits the understanding of subjectivity and interiority i.e. they only address the physical, mental and emotional aspects of man but negate his spiritual and moral life; these acting methodologies, while helpful in exploring the aforementioned aspects, ultimately distance the actor from a complete understanding of the person he is to play and theoretically hamper his embodiment of the character.

The acting methodologies are thereby more susceptible to creating what I would term a 'superficial' connection/exchange in between the actor and his character, the actor and other actors, the actors and their audience etc. Superficial in the sense that there is a 'connection/exchange' but not a connection in the fullest sense, in the sense of what the theatre can provide as a value. Here I would add that a connection in the Wojtyła sense i.e. based on his concept of 'participation' is the antithesis to this superficial exchange, but we will get to this matter in a moment. Again, while we cannot equate all the different types of 'relations'/'communities' that occur in the experience of theatre (although some can be - which we will elucidate later on) with communities in real life, because persons are essential to theatre, a reduction of the understanding of the human person impacts theatre in its entirety. It impacts what is imitated and what good end the show is steering the audience towards. When the actor reduces himself, his character and others - to an understanding of the person that sees man as operating on animal instinct and not what is inherent to the person i.e. he negates freedom 'for' values, reason and the will, self-determination, self-governance, self-possession, self-transcendence, decision, choice, duty, love - then his 'embodiment' of the character is less complete, theatre also becomes reduced as a value and therefore the exchange between actor and audience is more superficial as well.

As we have described in the first chapter, since the dawn of modernity, art was and has now become so politically charged that deconstructing previous cultural norms seems to be the primary function of the artist as well as the thespian. Although it must be noted that the theatre did not follow the exact path the rest of the art world did, today (especially in the last decade) there is a trend of either writing new plays or using plays from the traditional canon (it especially seems to be the case in Poland) and morphing it into a mouthpiece for political ideologies or immorality itself. One example is Olivera Frljića's controversial play *Klątwa*. The play was an adaptation by the Croatian director of one of the works of Stanisław Wyspiański whom we have already mentioned. Although the original play was also controversial, as it depicted a woman bearing two children by a village priest and then having to end her children and her own life to

save the reputation of the priest, *Frljića's* rendition was an output of (at the time of production) the politically charged critique of the perceived 'political domination' of the Catholic Church in Poland. In this rendition an actor actually simulates oral sex with a figure of Pope John Paul II (David Karpiuk 2017, n.p). Cardinal Stanislaw Dziwisz (Polish prelate and personal secretary to JP II) commented on *Klątwa* that, "To those who say that with artistic freedom you can say anything, I remind them that in a citizens society, there is no unlimited freedom, because individual freedom ends when this freedom encroaches on the other person's rights". (Piotr Rapalski 2017, n.p)

The point *Frljića* was trying to make seems to be lost in the disrespectful handling of John Paul II. The disrespect is not due to the Pontiff's place in the church and even Polish history but refers to his personhood. I am not calling for censorship of the questions of the place of the church in society, nor the dismissal of anything that brings up the sometimes very real abuses of children by certain members of the clergy. The problem lies in the scene where the actor simulates having oral sex with a statue of JP II. The director and actor have both reduced the truth of reality by reducing persons to only their sexual nature and in their critique of the Pope the actors have 'depersonalized' him and robbed him of his dignity. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the director's belief that the Pope was a "Defender of the Paedophiles" (Piotr Rapalski 2017, n.p) and that he deserves to have himself 'depersonalized' is another matter - one that sees theatre as having some sort of judicial power.

In the era of relativism and materialistic determinism, in any era in fact, one has to question what type of 'connection', 'exchange', 'communion', 'participation' is and should take place between actors and their audience. It is apparent that even if artists/thespians have tried to divorce art from the transcendentals i.e. 'Beauty, Goodness and Truth' there still seems to be a continuous belief that there is a purpose to art, that art can deposit a message or that it can incite some kind of change in the audience. If this belief did not exist, political ideologies would not form the basis of many contemporary productions. Modern theatre practitioners need to question (if they hold to materialistic determinism and relativism) if the audience cannot be changed i.e. if they do not have free will, if reason is divorced from truth and everything is relative - then is there even a point in putting on a theatrical production?

If the actors view themselves as mere matter, if they were truly honest with themselves, they would not partake in a theatrical act. It is duplicitous for one to believe that art can change society if there is no philosophy that sees one of man's defining characteristics as the innate desire for truth and that his will desires the good both as a value and as a means to transform

himself into a good person. Only if there is a proper concept of the human person, only if there is true purpose to art/theatre, that engages the free will of the person so that he can choose to partake in the message being presented and move towards something greater – is the act of theatre necessary. Incomprehensible chants, disfigured writhing and pornographic scenes feed into the doctrine of *nihilism* and leave man feeling empty, hopeless and alienated. These three words indicate anything but 'communion' or 'participation'. The audience is not feasting on the truth/word as in Wyspiański's, Mickiewicz's, Osterwa's and Kotlarczyk's 'ideas of the theatre' - the audience is in fact being starved.

It must also be noted that it is not only a problem when theatre practitioners and actors not only believe in the reduced image of the person but if they use the theatre as a vehicle to 'reduce' the image of man (not just for ideological/political reasons) but for 'shock value' - in an attempt to be controversial, entertaining or trendy. Instead of providing a satisfying meal that enriches the audience i.e. that speaks to their full nature as persons, the theatre practitioner or actor decides to 'take' rather than 'give'. In this case their *moral action* has in fact "affected" their artistic action. Instead of being 'gift' in the Wojtyła sense, they have chosen to feast on their own egos i.e. they have held gaining notoriety as a primary value and this has impacted the parts/scripts they choose to create or perform in and so too the action they believe should be imitated and promulgated.

In this case, instead of feeling fulfilled by an encounter with beauty or wonder as Aristotle posited (that is if the audience is attuned to what defines his personhood, as many have become numb or devour the junk food with vigor) the audience will walk away desolate and hungry. Instead of the theatre acting like a 'pre-philosophical' microscope where the audience can focus on the wonder of what actions are truly human, the *personalistic norm* will have been violated. The audience will have been in effect used for the director's and actor's benefit. In the moral sense participation does not seem to be a 'task' taken up by those involved in the theatre/in the creation of the theatrical act in this particular case. We must note that there is obviously the opposite problem (as we mentioned in the discussion of pornography) where actors can be used by their audience and have their dignity violated as well..

When analyzing the experience of the theatrical act even further, one unveils not just the 'connection', 'exchange', 'communion', 'participation' taking place between actors and the audience but multiple 'connections'/'exchanges' in fact: actor-character, actor-actor, director-actor, director/actor-script-audience. As we have seen, the type of 'connection' between *actor-characters* is very dependent on the theatre practitioner's philosophical understanding of

the nature or *end* of theatre which is based on his philosophical understanding of the nature and *end* of man. This produces the 'mission' of the theatre and affects what type of action he wants to *imitate* and the methodology that the actors will use to best imitate and display this type of action as well as the 'connection' that the practitioner wants to encourage between *actor-audience*. It will also obviously affect the script which links the actors with each other and the actors with the audience as well.

In the case of Osterwa he saw the end of man as *beatitudo* i.e. union with God. He therefore wanted to create a theatre which helped man on his path to communion with God - he wanted to create a type of 'pre-liturgy'. As we said, the type of action he wanted to *imitate* was not just that of the character but a "holy act" i.e. Christ's sacrifice on the cross. He wanted to create an acting method that enabled the actors to not only imitate the character via embodiment but he wanted them to embody the Word. The type of 'connection' or 'exchange' he envisioned (between actor and audience) was therefore like 'holy communion'. The actor was a sacrifice/priest and the audience were to be receivers of this sacrifice. The transmission was not the "body and blood of Christ" but also a type of life or renewal caused by the depositing or guiding to the truth about God. The type of script he used to create this connection was taken from the traditional Polish canon of poet-prophets.

Kotlarczyk, while he also saw the end of man as *beatitudo*, wanted to imitate what he felt would bring this communion (between God and man) about. He wanted to *imitate* the word i.e. the moment between thought and gesture, "the inner base of human action, the very fulcrum of human movement." (Taborski 1987, pg. 380) The acting methodology he adopted therefore was to distance the actor from embodiment of the character because he felt it would not expose the source of human action i.e. the connection between thought, word and gesture. He wanted to train his audience to slow things down and therefore the type of 'connection' or 'exchange' he was concerned with is similar to that experienced between a spiritual director and his directee during meditation. The actors were therefore trained to be 'guides' who could lead their audience into having a more adequate relationship between thought and gesture via the active engagement of their own interiority, intellect and imagination. The scripts he used to create this connection were also from the traditional Polish canon but focused on the pieces that were difficult to stage and focused on the word itself.

If we apply this process of reasoning to a theoretical theatre by Wojtyła (who also saw man's end as *beatitudo*), we could logically deduce that what he saw as true human action - that which enables us to become fully ourselves - should become the focus of an 'original philosophy of

the theatre' by him. This 'focus' would impact the type of connection/exchange he would have possibly encouraged between actor and audience. Since, as we have read throughout this thesis, we know he defined man by that which he believes reveals and constitutes him most clearly as a person i.e. *conscious action* in the sphere of morality and most fully in the *act of love*; we could deduce that he would want his actors to either *imitate* this action via embodiment (like Osterwa) or guide the audience to interiorly grasp and possibly experience through the characters what creates this type of action like in Kotlarczyk. The 'connection'/'exchange' he would possibly expect between the actors and audience would be based on his idea of participation and so too his idea of *gift*. The scripts he would have used to expose this action and create this connection are obviously his own dramatic works which, as we have expanded on, are unique and based on his philosophy of man.

In terms of the actor-audience relation, this type of 'participation' cannot obviously be based on an '*I - Thou*' relation for a number of reasons. There are obviously too many persons involved and there is too limited a time and interaction for the 'I' of the other to truly reside in the other 'I'. At minimum a connection based on the 'we' relation which is based on a *common good* could be aimed at. At maximum however, because of the *law of the gift*, actors could be understood in Wojtyła's conception of the theatre as close to Osterwa's idea, that of being 'sacrifices'. A sacrifice that we have discussed is rooted in *benevolent love* and the idea that not just self-determination and vertical transcendence but a disinterested 'act of love' fully actualises the person, "This type of love is that which moves man into becoming more of a person and bestows on the person who is loved the same gift, Such love perfects its object the most; it develops most fully both his existence and the existence of the person to whom it turns." (LR 2013, pg. 67) A sacrifice that, as we said previously, is not "against nature, for it corresponds in every man to the property of participation and, on the basis of this property, opens to him the path toward fulfillment." (PA 2021, pg. 399) I would like to note that, as these quotes reveal, this love is obviously not meant here in the romantic sense but linked with the good and realization of all the potentialities inherent in man.

The actors could therefore be seen as 'gifts' (in their embodiment of the word which we will discuss in a moment) that help honor and develop the I's that make up the audience as well as honoring their own interiority and subjectivity and their own relational aspect. The audience, with their sacrifice of time and presence, respect for the artform, the actors and what is being presented, the engagement of their intellect and imagination could also be seen as making a type of 'gift' of themselves. A 'gift' which actually makes an act of theatre possible.

I would like to note here that I use the terms *based on* before 'participation' due to the fact that, as we have already said, that in some ways the 'connection'/'exchange' between the actors and audience (while real) is different to the 'connection'/'exchange' amongst persons, yet there is some kind of similarity. The word/script and its embodiment via the actors as well as the imagination of both actors and audience - all act as intermediaries i.e. as that which and through which the connection is made. The actors and audience remain persons during the theatrical act and therefore have to adhere to creating and ensuring a true participation (in the moral sense) with anyone they come in contact with or form a community, regardless if they are in the theatre or not. As Maritain says, artists are persons at the same time as they are artists. They are therefore morally obliged to fulfill themselves as persons first. At the same time, in the case of theatre and as we have explained, we see an overlap of moral and artistic action. If the end of theatre is to bring man at minimum to wonder and at maximum to *beatitudo* (or at least set the audience on the path to these ends) the actors, theatre practitioners etc have to agree to form a temporary type of community based on a mission that reflects the *common good* which in Wojtyła's case encompasses the personal good.

The form of giving and the amount of giving is obviously not the same. The actor dedicates many hours and strains his very person (body, mind and soul) to give life to the script. Saying this, the audience also risks themselves by putting themselves in a vulnerable position to receive whatever is being presented. In the moment of the theatre performance however, we could see, as Osterwa believed, a moment of "equal participation". (Braun 2018, pg. 432) Regardless of this fact we can clearly state that as a whole the actor makes more of a 'gift' of self in this interaction. However, underlying both the actor-audience relation (despite the disproportion in reciprocity) is a type of 'gift' of self.

The level of disinterestedness that comes with *benevolent love* i.e. it "separates itself from any self-interest... (*it*) is simply disinterestedness in love: 'I do not long for you as a good,' but 'I long for your good,' 'I long for what is good for you.'" (LR 2013, pg. 67) is an interesting discussion as the audience wants to obviously receive what 'gift' is being made by the actors and the actors want (not necessarily the applause or recognition of the audience) but to receive the 'gift' of the audience so an act of theatre can be produced. As Wojtyła writes on the meaning of the term 'to use' - this type of 'using' seems necessary for theatre to occur, but in his philosophy of man and therefore in his philosophy of the theatre it cannot be seen as a 'mutual using'. Both actors and audience have to be subject to an overarching *common good* - a *common good* that upholds the dignity of both the actors and the audience. At minimum the *personalistic norm* has to be upheld. They cannot 'use' each other *solely* as a means to an end.

I would like to return to the discussion of *actor-character* 'participation' and the topic of acting methodologies. In order to stay true to Wojtyła's dramatic works - where there is not an elimination of persons but the characters reveal what has happened and is happening in their interiority in long monologues and where plot or external action is not driven out but limited to that which reveals the interiority of the characters and persons in general, where dialogue is limited but not eliminated by long soliloquies that uncover inner thoughts - it seems we would need an acting method that captures this reality. I would like, at this moment, to suggest a type of *synthesis* between the methods of both Osterwa and Kotlarczyk. This is to not only reflect the influence they both had on Wojtyła but a *synthesis* could also help nullify the contradiction between what Wojtyła said on the 1962 artist retreat where he seems to be inspired by the Osterwan approach of 'embodiment' (supplemented by his own anthropology of course) and with what he viewed as a style he called his own i.e. the Rhapsodic style of alienation and guidance.

A *synthesis* of an actor alienating himself from the character he is to portray versus full 'participation' by embodiment i.e. where the 'I' of the character lives alongside the 'I' of the actor; seems to be impossible - but for the fact that I believe the audience can still be guided by, not a narration per se, but a first person account from the character about his own interiority. In this instance the actor can embody the character but still remain a guide. He guides through giving voice to his internal action in a moment of lived experience. Actors could then both embody the persons they are portraying as well as (through the display of their interiority by walking through their own experience) guide the audience to walk through their own interiority (and through the engagement of their intellect and imagination) by portraying what is crucial to human action in all its fullness. The audience could be taken through all their own internal structures by the characters displaying and moving through their own: the engagement of the mirroring and reflexive functions of their consciousness, their use of knowledge and self-knowledge, the engagement of their powers of reason and the will, their self-governance, self-possession, self-determination, self-transcendence, the grappling with their conscience, their coming to judgements through decisions from choices of certain values, their sense of duty and what leads to their fulfillment. The audience could be taken through what it means to love in all its stages and variations i.e. sympathy, love as desire, love as benevolence, love as friendship, spousal love, reciprocity, the harmonization of wills etc. In fact, as we saw in *The Analysis of the Radiation of Fatherhood* this is exactly what Wojtyła does.

In my opinion it would be less effective if the actors did not try to embody the characters they are playing because they are unveiling (not only narrating) what makes the character most

human via the *lived experience* the character is undergoing - a *lived experience* that unveils his subjectivity/his interiority. Even though his external acts are limited, the characters in Wojtyła's plays are subjectivising them and when the character's act in a conscious manner involving the moral sphere, we need to *see* the moment of decision transferred from his inner life to external reality. The actors have to *imitate* the *lived experience* and not just *narrate* the *lived experience* of man. Therefore, I see no place for 'alienation' in Wojtyła's concept of the theatre. Only perhaps if the actor was playing a very evil and almost *in-human* character or had a character to portray that had moments of in-humanness... then the actor could be justified in using 'alienation' as a technique to portray what is not of the nature of personhood. Just to note here that while I am speaking about 'alienation' as a theatrical technique, just like I did earlier when I said 'participation' by embodiment - we see here how even acting methodologies - becoming another - reflect the relational aspect of man explicated by Wojtyła.

This topic as well as what it means, as Wojtyła says, "to create—from the person that I am—another person" (Wojtyła 2021, Lesson II section, para.6) while extremely important lies outside the scope of this paper. I do want to mention however that it is in fact ontologically impossible, that the actor suddenly loses his own self, which is linked intrinsically to his own being and adopts a new self without the basis of the person he is. This is why Wojtyła probably uses the words "draw out" in his reflection, "How many attempts are needed to *draw* out a different theatrical character from one's own *concrete*, unequivocal character, to create—from the person that I am—another person." (Wojtyła 2021, Lesson II section, para.6) The being and the self of the actor always remains, yet something obviously does take place. A new "I" does seem to "arise" i.e. "authentic and original". (Wojtyła 2021, Lesson II section, para.6) The question is how does this take place?

In the *I - Other* relation we discussed how the other is understood on the basis of my own 'I'. (PA 2021, pg. 519) The other is therefore not just another but "an other I". (PA 2021, pg. 519) Because, through *self-consciousness*, my own subjectivity is revealed to me - I can therefore transfer this understanding "to all people". (PA 2021, pg. 519) This is not just a "general" understanding that "the other" is *ontologically* the same as me, but that he also possesses his own subjectivity and therefore has his own internal structures e.g. of *self-possession*, *self-governance*, *self-determination*, *self-transcendence* etc which we have described already in detail. Because I transfer the understanding of my own "I" onto "an other I" this other I becomes a "second I – a neighbor". (PA 2021, pg. 520) This understanding could therefore be transferred onto this imaginary 'I' to a point as well. Even though the character is not ontologically another

'I', through the imagination and understanding of what makes up the character in his subjectivity, this "becoming the character" could theoretically take place.

It would seem that an in-depth discussion of the imagination especially in the Wojtyła sense would be vital here. The synthesis of methods I suggested could also mean a rediscovery of Osterwa's method of embodiment where he, as said before, used the actor's subjective life and personal experience to create another (that of the character) while also not eliminating the actor himself, "characters remained deeply embedded in the actor, even as actors retained their individuality while incarnating the characters." (Braun 2018, pg. 430)

Actor-actor 'participation': Reciprocity, i.e. acting and reacting, giving and taking is a fundamental concept that underlies any theatrical production. Unless the actor is portraying someone who does not interact with others for whatever reason i.e a hermit or someone mentally disturbed; if the actor (through an enlarged ego) becomes closed in on himself, absorbed with his own performance and notoriety, or in having not memorized his script has become therefore too preoccupied with what he must say rather than what his fellow actor is saying to him - the play will naturally fail. We have found here another clear example, not of how *action* in the *artistic sense* can impact *action* in the *moral sense*, but how action in the moral sense can actually subvert action in the artistic sense.

The interactions between actors demand that there be a giving and taking or reciprocity as without it the play; at worst would not even exist or at best would seem forced or contrived. Whether there is verbal dialogue or not (i.e. in the case of miming or physical theatre) the interaction still requires a type of 'participation'. Seemingly, making a 'gift' of oneself, on the part of the actors as persons will enable a 'participation' to occur between the characters. The teaching for the moral good seems to enable the artistic good in this case.

Director/Actor - Script - Audience participation: Just as the Bible is filled with stories of sinners and the ideal of holiness is not reduced, so too the portrayal of man in a "reduced capacity" i.e. an evil character does not necessarily eliminate the adequate understanding of the person. Still the "reduced capacity" cannot be the end of the story. While it is beneficial and even necessary to show the various facets of the human person and their struggles – vices and virtues combined, if the play leads to the promotion/edification of a lesser vision of man, this will run contrary to a philosophical vision of the theatre by Wojtyła. As we have said, Wojtyła is focused on human action. The edification or praise of a person performing acts that do not lead to his fulfillment will not make any sense.

The script the director chooses, and actors decide to perform - forms another type of 'participation' that we explored with Kotlarczyk: a participation through the word - through the truth of reality as we discussed in the section on pornography. Here more than in any of the other participation's is "participation as a task" and responsibility most apparent. A clear *common good* is necessary here.

The actors 'become one' with the word, they embody it and display it or deposit it into the imagination of the audience members. A basic *common good* (through dialogue and discernment) needs to be agreed upon that ensures that the script and director as well as the actors do not reduce the person and therefore the audience to less than they are. 'Participation' through the word can only occur in its true form if what is being conveyed about reality is the truth. 'Superficial participation' and or alienation occurs through a script that promulgates distortions of reality or blatant falsities. When the director chooses the script or the author writes a script, as we explained before in the section on Aristotle, they must identify what can be qualified as actions and which actions "are worth paying attention to". (Sachs, n.p)

This, however, does not mean that there is no space for the fantastical i.e. a winged horse would obviously be permissible. Again, the need for a reflection on the Wojtyła understanding of the imagination becomes even more apparent. We also acknowledge that Wojtyła's plays are not necessarily about historical figures, although some are, but archetypes. Still, he bases most of his plays on and in real life as the mystical aspect is left to traversing the interiority of man and the non-conformity to time apparent in Christian mystery plays that we discussed before. At this point we could perhaps state that a theatre based on Wojtyła's philosophy of gift could accommodate a fantastical world as long as the script does not denigrate the proper understanding of the person, the values he is an object of and the end to which he is called i.e. the Absolute - God.

Finally let us turn briefly to the Actor-director participation: As with the other roles mentioned there is also a historical debate over the role of the director. Some pedagogues believe that the director's role is irrelevant if only to help the script (i.e. the author) to direct the production, others see the director as an intricate choreographer, others an activator of potentiality in the actors, some see the director as having a duty to take the script and in a sense rewrite it, another view is that the director should so infuse himself in the play that he should be a part of the production and therefore steer it from within. Regardless, if the role of director exists, there occurs a relation between actor and director.

Following Wojtyła, the director should help the actors to have a more genuine 'participation' with the script, characters and the audience. This is done partly through his own interaction with the actors as well as helping them to understand the purpose of theatre and the structure of the person. By being a "gift", the director models the behavior the actors need to imitate for the fullest participation to take place. If the director is merely using the actors as pawns to fulfill his egotistical vision, then the actors will feel used and violated. The director cannot use the actors as tools the way an artist uses his paintbrush – the director must realize he is working with human persons.

The director is not just bound to a responsibility for the formation of the actors in terms of characterisation but as in Osterwa's conception, perhaps the formation of their interior lives. At the very least the director needs to realize that what he makes the actors do is not just part of the job but will impact their persons, mind, body, soul. While the actor has a responsibility towards himself, he is placing himself in the control of someone who will require him to do various things for the sake of the play. The relationship between director and actor cannot be a power struggle where the actor submits to every request with the risk of acting contrary to his human nature. There is also a type of 'community' formed between all those involved in the theatrical act (actors, director, set designer etc.). As we saw this community can become as close, as in the case of Osterwa, as a family or religious order. The director stands in a sense at the head of this community and in some ways is responsible for ensuring that the *common good* is upheld, or at least assists (directs) everyone to dialogue and head towards this *common good* together.

2. Is the *Theatre of the Gift* inherently religious?

There is also the discussion of whether a *theatre of the Gift* would be religious. Boleslaw Taborski brought this up, as we already noted, when he said that Wojtyła created a "modern form of theatre" which was able to be "religious without being devotional". (Taborski 1987, pg. 16) The fact is that God is always involved in Wojtyła's plays. As we mentioned and saw in *The Radiation of Fatherhood* there's always a big theological aspect to his works. Yet his work is definitely more accessible to the modern person who emphasizes subjectivity but struggles with the very idea of an Absolute God. As we said earlier, *The Radiation of Fatherhood*, is in fact Wojtyła preaching the gospel but through the lived experience of man which includes a deep dive into his interiority and the analysis of the experience of love. As in his philosophy Wojtyła is trying to show the "truth of the good". Instead of Adam saying that he knows he must obey the New Testament law "You shall love your neighbor as yourself." (USCCB, Mark 12 vs 31) he experiences what it means when the viper arises to threaten Monica's existence. He experiences

the movement of the heart and the voice of his conscience that indicates that he should lay down his life for the other. He experiences the battle between alienation and participation in that very moment.

Wojtyła's method - his ability to get to God (in his philosophy, dramatic works and even his *Theology of the Body*) not from tyrannical proselytizing but through causing persons to look at their lived experience, truly look at their lived experience in order to encounter the Absolute - must be honored. The *law of the gift* is obviously rooted in scripture i.e. "For whoever wishes to **save** his life will **lose** it, but whoever **loses** his life for my sake will **find** it." (*Emphasis added*) (USCCB, Matthew 16 v 25) but it is verified as Wojtyła says in personal lived experience. A form of theatre based on this type of participation can theoretically perform scripts that are not overtly religious but the intention must always be to lead the audience to a proper understanding of the person who it is correct to say - fully becomes himself only when he makes a "sincere gift of himself" GS 1965, #24). But we must not leave out the other part of the verse, "This likeness reveals that man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself..." (GS 1965, #24). Man is only a "gift" because he reflects the nature of the God whose image he is made in. As long as the plays do not distort this truth and in fact try to lead to it through a focus on truly human action, then it would seem in harmony with Wojtyła's thought. As with Osterwa the theatre in the Wojtyłaan sense could be seen as "a path deep into oneself, but only to the extent that this path led beyond the 'I', towards God." (Flader 2010, n.p)

As I said at the start, with this thesis I hope to show that the answer to a society Grotowski diagnoses as "less and less defined by religion" and more and more defined by *subjectivism* and which has caused the problem of experiencing theatrical *catharsis* as "spectators are more and more individuated in their relation to the myth" (Grotowski 2002, pg. 23)... that the answer (i.e. the form of theatre that would be best received in modern culture) is arrived at through the actor becoming 'gift' but for reasons and in a manner which lies beyond Grotowski's explanation. A reason that speaks to the experience not only of the actor but the experience of the human person. I believe that Wojtyła's form of theatre (as his philosophy does) addresses the modern man's thirst for the subjective while rooting him in the objective and therefore enables him to experience a true *catharsis*. A *catharsis*... not brought about by indoctrination by religion or myth but through the process of self-understanding which gets to the truth of *homo religiosus* and the Divine but through a path that respects the subjectivity of the person.

3. The *common good* in a *Theatre of the Gift*

While one can create a dialogue over the common good within those who are involved in creating the act of theatre, it seems impractical and leads to a demystification of the art of theatre to create a *common good* through dialogue and discernment with the audience. Perhaps having an *ethos* that the audience can read and either accept or reject (prior to watching a production) would be helpful for this type of theatre. A dialogue after a production might aid in ascertaining the needs of the community that the theatre could address as well as help with the connection between actors and audience. Still the *common good* seems to lie largely in the hands of those involved in the theatrical production.

Wojtyła, as we have said, clearly believes that art can render, “an exceptional social service in favor of the common good.” (LA 1999, #4) Whatever the *ethos*, mission and *common good* of the *theatre of the gift* is, must be linked with the concepts of persons, gift and beauty. As John Paul II further wrote in his *Letter to Artists*, artists should have an “ethic, even a ‘spirituality’ of artistic service” which allows for the “life and renewal” of man. (LA 1999, #4) A *common good* must therefore encompass this generation of “life and renewal” as well.

The Catechism of the Catholic Church defines the *common good* as “the sum total of social conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfillment more fully and more easily.” (CCC, #1905) The *theatre of the Gift* in all these types of ‘participation’ must aim at contributing in a way art does to the fulfillment of the persons both performing and observing the theatrical production. The reason why I believe we can use the *law of the gift* - a law from the moral sphere - to undergird creative action is not only because the actor is both the instrument and the tool therefore persons and their moral lives are implicit in the creative act of theatre but as we alluded to earlier; theatre whether portraying a script that leads to the destruction of or the edification of the person still demands that the actor make “a gift of himself” in the moral sense before he can create in the artistic sense (as was seen especially in the case of actor-actor participation). This shows how the moral and artistic good are entwined in the theatrical art. As we said before, Wojtyła expands on the “law of the gift” in *Love and Responsibility* and the fact that when a person gives himself to another or for another he actually gains more of who he is, he is more fulfilled, “Through the gift of self, through “a sincere gift,” the person confirms and, so to speak, deepens the self-possession and self-governance proper to himself. Through the gift of self in the moral sense, the person does not lose anything but becomes richer instead.” (LR 2013, pg. 230). By focusing on and creating a participation based on ‘gift’ that underpins all the forms of ‘participation’ in the theatre, the type of imitation will

not be destructive but be in harmony with the understanding of art proposed by Aquinas. The type of imitation in *The theatre of the Gift* would be that which consciously brings nature to its goal, aiding nature to fulfill itself. (Ralph 1990, n.p)

If we remember, in Aristotle's idea of tragedy, wonder/beauty which is based on truth should be the aim of theatre. It should be a pre-philosophical microscope that focuses on the "ordinary things of everyday life" to uncover the extraordinary "deeper aspects of reality". (Piper 2009, pg. 110) A *theatre of the Gift* must specifically put man and his most human action i.e. *conscious efficacy* and an *act of love* under the microscope so that the audience can look at deeper aspects of their own reality as persons. This view can be further substantiated by Wojtyła's words as John Paul II in his *Letter to Artists* where he says that "The artist has a special relationship to beauty. In a very true sense, it can be said that beauty is the vocation bestowed on him by the Creator in the gift of 'artistic talent'." (LA 1999, #3) The beauty the actor in the *theatre of the Gift* must reveal is the beauty of the person that comes from imitating true human action i.e. 'man acts' and the 'act of love'. As we said before, Art (for Wojtyła) must be a servant of the Truth of reality and Beauty must be the most defining feature i.e. what makes it recognisable as a work of art.

Conclusion

As we have expounded on the appropriateness of a *theatre of the Gift* in terms of its emergence from as well as coherence with Wojtyła's philosophical anthropology as well as its connection to both Osterwa and Kotlarczyk's concepts of the theatre; for the concluding remarks we will turn to its place in Polish theatre history.

As we read at the start, in the 19th century due to being divided into three partitions, those involved in the Polish theatre or any area of culture for that matter suddenly had a different task, "On all Polish lands, in the absence of political freedom, culture and art assumed a fundamental significance, as instruments for the preservation of the nation's tradition, identity, and language, as well as its moral and spiritual values. theatre performed educational, political, patriotic, and civic functions." (Braun 1996, pg. 5) When Osterwa, Kotlarczyk and Wojtyła co-operated, Poland was undergoing (though in a different form) another threat to her identity i.e. the Nazi invasion and subsequent occupation by Russia and her Communist ideology. The task that underpinned both the *Reduta* and *Rhapsodic Theatre* (as we have said) continued this tradition of "preservation". This task seems to have never left Wojtyła, not even when he ascended to the throne of Peter, although he widened its scope in a certain sense.

Due to the fact that Wojtyła tried to address the evils of Nazism and even more so Communism by going to the heart of the matter i.e. the human person he not only took on the task of preserving polish national identity but the identity of man, the identity of the person. An identity that in contemporary times is trying to be manipulated, deformed and wiped out by invisible occupiers. The occupiers of materialistic determinism, utilitarianism, relativism and subjectivism. As I wrote in my paper, *The explosion of St John Paul II's Theology of the Body in the Catholic Church in America and its global implications for the New Evangelisation*, "Richard A. Spinello opined that the Pope recognised that modern man is undergoing an identity crisis. He fails to understand himself and his role in the world. Man is in a haze, a fog that is a result of profound scepticism and "stands on the precipice of a desolate nihilism". This haze or fog needs a radical reality check; A reality check that reveals "the truth about man". (RH 1) Spinello believes that John Paul II's writings can give modern society the clear vision they have been robbed of for over a century,

Throughout the encyclicals the Pope explains that modern man has lost sight of the provident Creator, seduced into thinking that he is the center of the universe. He has been given false hopes by philosophers such as Freud, Sartre, and Marx who promise temporal bliss through pleasure, unfettered freedom, or an egalitarian utopia. (Spinello, 2016, p. X) (Szczecina 2020, pg. 197 & 198)

It is my opinion that Wojtyła has not only left the world with a philosophical and theological answer to the current crisis man is undergoing, but a means of implementing this antidote. He has given us a tool to help propose the “truth about the good” - a tool that harnesses the unique power of the theatre i.e. *The theatre of the Gift*. He has taken Wyspiański's “doctrine of liberation” seriously, which as Braun says is the basis of “modern Polish theatre” and lies at “the very heart of the Polish theatre - a theatre which, at its best, has always linked the artistic, moral, and political aspects of the production.” (Braun 1996, pg. 6). Yet, as I have said, Wojtyła has not focused on Poland directly and how to help her adapt to her newfound freedom; his lens is wider. He wants to turn man, all men, in all countries to the true understanding of liberation i.e. The freedom “for” making one's own life, one's own moral life, “a work of art, a masterpiece.” (LA 1999, #2) As well as the freedom “for” love which actualises the inherent potentialities in man. As Adam expands on in *The Radiation of Fatherhood*, “For love denies freedom of will to him who loves. Love liberates him from the freedom that would be terrible to have for its own sake.” (Taborski 1987, pg. 354)

It is also, I believe, imperative here to make some concluding remarks on action in the creative and action in the moral sense: especially pertaining to theatre. At the start we made apparent the difference between *moral* and *artistic good* as well as *moral* and *artistic beauty* with Maritain (in the vein of Aquinas) who stated that art “is concerned with the good of the work” while morality is concerned “with the good of man.” (Maritain 1960, n.p) Artistic beauty is as a result of a “good work” performed by an artist in the creative sense and moral beauty is the result of “a good act” performed by a person in the moral sense. We then saw however that the actions which tend to the moral good and actions which tend to the artistic good lie very close together. This is because the foundational unity is the person who undergirds both, “the realm of Art and the realm of Morality are two autonomous worlds, but within the unity of the human subject.” (Maritain 1960, n.p) Because the artist is first a man then an artist, the art he makes (for Maritain) we said, should be subordinate to the man he makes of himself. (Maritain 1960, n.p)

As we saw, Wojtyła seems to agree with this sentiment, and he almost equates the artistic work or the artist's creative action with the action “man acts” as being a mirror into man's interiority. As we said before, Wojtyła believes (while he holds a difference between artistic and moral good), with each piece of art the artist not only reveals the idea he had in mind or the part of reality that he wanted to represent or the beauty that he desired to connect with and disclose, but when he creates he reveals an aspect of his inner life at the very same moment, “The distinction between the moral and artistic aspects is fundamental, but no less important is the connection between them. Each conditions the other in a profound way. In producing a work, artists express

themselves to the point where their work becomes a unique disclosure of their own being, of what they are and of how they are what they are.” (LA 1999, #2)

As we have said though, the difference seems to lie in the fact, as illustrated by the above quote, that the artistic work mirrors the result of action in the moral sense. While creative action in the sphere of art may not be equivalent to human action in the sphere of morality; the action in the sphere of morality that the artist takes up, that forms him into a good or bad person, an action that Wojtyła in his philosophical works says reveals his subjectivity, his uniqueness, unrepeatability, his transcendence, his self-possession, his self-governance, his freedom... is reflected in the creative action in the sphere of art. Art (like a mirror) reveals the *result* of the morally good or bad actions the artist has chosen to perform throughout his life. Who the artist is, i.e. more good or less good, more evil or less evil, (Wojtyła suggests) will be revealed in the subject matter i.e. what he chooses to portray as well as the form i.e. the way he chooses to portray it.

In the problem of art and pornography, again while Wojtyła held a clear distinction between the moral good and artistic good, we saw more clearly the way the power of reason connects the two. Reason is implicit in both the acts in the moral sense and acts in the artistic sense because the truth of reality has to be ascertained for both acts to take place. While the process is different for each one; As we saw with morality in the chapter, *I act therefore I am*, the axiological truth (after reason attains the ontological truth) discerns not the truth of the essence of the object but rather its “value”. (PA 2021, pg. 246) Whereas, as we discussed in the chapter which covered the problem of beauty, art (as a virtue of the practical intellect) again after the ontological truth has been obtained, indicates “the right method” one should adopt in the production/creation of things “(*recta ratio factibilium*)”. (Waldron 1912, n.p) If the artist chooses to “imitate nature” (a debate we said previously lies outside the scope of this paper) the beauty that he produces is both a result of the skill of the artist but also as a result of whether his work corresponds with ‘right reason’. As Wojtyła said in his retreat to Artists, beauty is “attractive to our knowing” (Wojtyła 2021, Lesson I section, para. 4) and as Aquinas says, “beautiful things are those which please when seen” (Jaroszyński 2018, pg. 583). We noted that this type of knowing is very interesting because as Wojtyła writes, and as we explained using Gilson, it is not a “purely intellectual” knowing i.e. “There is a certain unique sensitivity to beauty in the human soul; a kind of musical string that vibrates when a person meets up with beauty.” (Wojtyła 2021, n.p) Beauty seems to offer the mind the “rare joy of a pure apprehension of truth... their perception becomes an end in itself and leaves no more to be desired.” (Gilson 2002, pg. 312)

This does not mean that in the process of creating, beauty can occur without the truth, the ontological truth abstracted by reason. No, it seems the artist has to have an even more intrinsic relationship with the whole truth of reality, the reality of the person (self-knowledge as well knowledge of man in general) than modern artists would like to admit. He needs to be so close to the truth of reality (man's internal and external world) in fact, that through his skill, he can lay the truth out in such a way that the persons observing are seized by it. A perfect depiction of something ugly can be beautiful because it displays the truth of reality in a masterfully skilled way. Beauty is inextricably linked to the ontological truth the artist has abstracted as well as is the means the artist displays the truth he has cognised by.

The discussion over why some artists leading morally corrupt lives can still produce beautiful works - seems to be partly answered by what (as we have said) Wojtyła describes in the problem between art and pornography. He writes that pornography is not bad art because it is an action that is immoral but it is a creative act that does not adhere to the truth of reality. The objective function of art for Wojtyła is that it, "grasp and convey in a beautiful way some fragment of reality." (LR 2013, pg. 150 & 151) Pornography does not do this. We can state that it in fact presents a distorted image dressed up as something beautiful. Beauty does not intrinsically radiate from it but whatever beauty is left is played on to create an addiction on the side of the observer.

That does not mean to say Wojtyła does not believe it has a negative impact on the moral lives of men but it is because, through the vehicle of art (which in our case is the theatre and therefore that which focuses on what Wojtyła calls "man acts") man is given, through a type of beauty, a distorted image of man. This distorted image, which will very possibly be taken by the observer as truth, will affect the whole process of action, their action, in the moral sense. This is due to the fact that the power of the will, will gravitate to a good that harmonizes or is based on this truth it received through the beauty of the art form, "Once the deformed image becomes equipped with the prerogatives of artistic beauty, a greater possibility exists that it will be accepted and engrafted in the consciousness and the will of the recipients. For concerning this point, the human *will* very often displays a great susceptibility to accepting a deformed image of reality." (LR 2013, pg. 150 & 151)

An interesting connection between the moral good and artistic good that we have observed in our analysis of participation is that the artistic good directly rests on the moral good in the theatrical act. As we said in the chapter *Towards a Theatre of the 'Gift'*, the *law of the gift* seems fundamental to any theatre i.e. the actor cannot perform a theatrical act unless he makes a "gift

of himself'. He has to choose to put the good of the other ahead of his own good for the sake of the good of the art.

Embodying a script requires sacrifice, time and effort to internalize it, it is not one's own thoughts (unless self-scripted or in the case of improvisation) but someone else's. A performance is not an outpouring of one's own inner dialogue where one can let one's own ego run loose but requires submission not just to the script i.e. the word but the 'Living Word' as in Osterwa and Kotlarczyk i.e. the Truth. With more specific focus, as in the case of Wojtyła's concept of the theatre, it requires submission to the truth of the person. In the case of the director-actor participation the actor also has to make a "gift of himself" as he needs to be willing to respond to the needs and demands of the director. Yes, this is for the good of the art but the action in the moral sense is prior and fundamental.

Most visibly, as we said before, in the actor-actor participation, the importance of reciprocity is unveiled. One needs to be so present, so free from the script, so free from one's own preoccupations (again from one's own ego) in order for both the character one is embodying as well as the connection with the other actor's (which is not natural and therefore cannot take the weight of one's egoism) to take place. Yes, the actor can obviously choose not to make a "gift of himself" in the moral sense but this would make the theatrical act both contrived and or impossible. Inherent to theatre it seems are persons: not only their subjectivity but relational aspect as well. Unless one is improvising a self-indulgent, one-man, self-directed act of theatre - egoism has no place in the theatre or the *Theatre of the 'Gift'* for that matter.

A quick note on further topics that seems to emerge from this line of inquiry and are outside the scope of this thesis. The question as to why actors who lead morally disordered lives can somehow act in the roles of more morally ordered individuals requires a full analysis again, which lies outside the scope of this paper. I would like to say that the audience does not see the rehearsal process. It might be very difficult for someone who is sexually promiscuous to then throw out their life experience to realistically portray, for example, an innocent maiden. I would say this is not impossible because the truth of reality can still be grasped by the actor. At some point in his life he might have been more morally good, he might still have many moments of moral goodness (the human person as we have seen throughout this thesis is pliable on a moral level) and he therefore can try to mold himself into that image once again. Or perhaps he knows or researches someone who is very spiritual and he tries to imitate them. This really relies on the artistic skill of the actor but I would say that it might be an easier task (unless the actor is very

skilled) process wise for a person who knows from firsthand experience what it means to be in a state of innocence (although again we are all sinners).

So, what about the question of playing an evil character, is this morally permissible? Again, this paper does not deal with ethics directly, but if the actor has a responsibility to the *common good* then the script cannot counter the truth of reality. An actor cannot play a part that vilifies or indulges the distorted image. In the case of the *Theatre of the 'Gift'* it cannot indulge or vilify a distorted image of the person. Embodying the character of say the devil in order to expose the disintegration that occurs due to sin seems permissible. The problem rises from the philosophy of the theatre to the level of the acting methodology. As I said before, alienation or an internal distancing from the character might make sense here. Though a morally corrupt person still has an interiority he may operate instinctively and not in a manner proper to the person. A mere physicalization of the character might be helpful here. Regardless, a *Theatre of the 'Gift'* cannot promote anything that violates the truth of the person.

The sexual aspect of man has to be treated with great care in the *Theatre of the 'Gift'* as even though Wojtyła says it is good and even necessary that art portrays the beauty of love and the sexual difference, it cannot portray it in a distorted manner. A discussion of whether an actor who is married can even kiss someone who is not his wife in a production, even if it upholds and even reveals the truth of the person in a more profound way, is therefore a very difficult matter. It involves not only the actor but his wife and their consciences, as well as the acting methodology adopted by the actor. I would say here, again while this is not a paper on ethics and lies outside the realm of this paper, the reality is that there is a difference between a piece of prose or an artwork depicting the beauty of the sexual embrace and an actor showing the beauty of that embrace in a piece of live theatre. The issue of the actor being the artist as well as the instrument crops up again. What if an actor had to take part in a scene, to show the destructive nature of sin, where he imitates an act of sexual abuse. This issue of the line or distance between actor and character and implications of the moral choices of the character on the actor is another very important discussion. We could also ask whether these scenes where the actors embody the sexual act, at least in a physical sense, are necessary? As we asked earlier: what does embodiment of a character entail? I repeat that this calls for an analysis of a Wojtyłaan understanding of imagination.

At the start of this paper, we set out to discover an "original philosophy of the theatre" using the philosophical, theological and dramatic works by Karol Wojtyła. I feel that this has been achieved yet the word "original" could be questioned. As we have seen, the concept I proposed

neither contradicts nor fully replicates the idea of the theatre posed by Wojtyła's strongest influences. The *Theatre of the 'Gift'* is both founded on and an extension of both Osterwa and Kotlarczyk. In our investigation we also discovered how Aristotle's idea of tragedy, at least through the eyes of Sachs, could help build the idea of a Wojtyła *Theatre of the 'Gift'*. This is because of the obvious connection with Aristotle's understanding of action and therefore the idea of action which forms part of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition Wojtyła draws from, and which becomes his main object of philosophical inquiry. Due to Wojtyła's philosophical focus it was easier to build a theory of the theatre. Although never explicitly stated, it became apparent with Wojtyła's use of Aristotelian terms e.g. *catharsis* that he and Kotlarczyk were working off, as a basis, the idea of theatre proposed by Aristotle. This was further confirmed with Kotlarczyk's focus on a type of action i.e. the interplay of thought and action or internal action as the basis of the *Rhapsodic Theatre*. I therefore felt justified using Wojtyła's idea of human action as the basis of an original philosophy of the theatre by him.

The use of his theory of action, due to its incorporation of phenomenology allowed me to truly enter into and therefore take the *Theatre of the 'Gift'* into the domain or primary focus (although not forgetting Osterwa and Kotlarczyk) of more modern theatre practitioners e.g. Brook and Grotowski. The domain of the actor-audience relationship. We soon discovered that there were multiple types of participation and that due to the implicitness of persons in the theatrical act Wojtyła's *law of the gift* could help explain and perhaps is inherent to all these types of participation in the first place. It is therefore coherent and justified, I believe, that a theatre that holds the truth of what makes a person truly a person i.e. "man acts" and an "act of love" as its primary focus not only in content but in the actual practice of the theatrical craft, is not only that which will best portray Wojtyła's works but is in keeping with what seems to be natural to theatre itself. At the start of this thesis we formulated a working definition for the 'philosophy of the theatre' in light of Wojtyła. That it is a form of philosophical inquiry which has theatre as its object and tries, by going back to classical philosophers and through the application of philosophical reasoning (which includes a dialogue with modern philosophy and theatre theorists by an in-depth reading of theatrical experience and reduction) to ascertain its most essential aspects i.e. its foundational causes and ends. From all we have gathered, I believe that we can logically conclude that, for Wojtyła, personhood is both the foundation and end of theatre. Therefore, in addition to the imitation of a truly human act which reveals this personhood in its fullness, participation is the means by which theatre is submitted to personhood.

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Summary

This dissertation attempts to uncover an 'original philosophy of the theatre' in the writings of Karol Wojtyła (his theatrical, philosophical and theological works) to enrich the current canon on theatrical thought and to provide a firm foundation to aid in the expression of his dramatic works for the stage. This thesis therefore has a broader aim of serving as a precursor to an acting methodology that encompasses the philosophy of the *Theatre of the 'Gift'*. It must also be noted that this paper has also sought to try to rectify the division of *theatre theory* and the *philosophy of the theatre* which has brought about the removal of the object of *normative issues* from the field of philosophy. This division, I believe, has arisen due to the loss of a framework provided by realistic metaphysics (the philosophy of being) which once provided the basis on which to build a philosophical anthropology (the philosophy of man) and ethics (the philosophy of morality).

While Wojtyła never wrote a philosophy of the theatre per se, or at least not independently from his close collaborator Mieczysław Kotlarczyk (whom he co-founded *The Rhapsodic Theatre* with); Bolesław Taborski was in fact sceptical of the fact that Wojtyła's plays were merely an output of Kotlarczyk's ideas of theatre, "neither then nor later were Wojtyła's plays simply 'dramatized illustrations' of the Rhapsodic theatre's theories." (Taborski 1987, pg. 16) Additionally, in a retreat given to artists in Kraków in 1962, Wojtyła seemingly expresses a very different understanding of the role of the actor compared to that found in the Rhapsodic's theory of theatre. He does not see the actor as merely a guide but an embodiment of the character, an embodiment that includes his understanding of the person in *Person and Act* and seems to draw inspiration from another Polish pedagogue Juliusz Osterwa. We after all cannot forget the influence of an entire lineage of Polish dramatists that preceded John Paul II and the milieu he would have been formed in,

One pays so much for talent! For vocal talent, for physical talent. How many attempts are needed to draw out a different theatrical character from one's own concrete, unequivocal character, to create—from the person that I am—another person. What a huge transfer of my individuality, personality; what a huge plasticity of all of the dispositions of my person is required so that in its place, a different "I" arises—authentic and original. (Wojtyła 2021, Lesson II section, para.6)

This work is 'interdisciplinary' in nature; that is, in order to try to piece together an original philosophy of the theatre (while the primary emphasis will be on Wojtyła's philosophy of man) I drew from Wojtyła's/Pope John Paul II's dramatic, philosophical and theological works. I used this 'interdisciplinary' approach due to the fact that (as the Italian philosopher Giovanni Reale observed and as Professor Wierzbicki explains) Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II (1920-2005) was a

“pilgrim of the Absolute” i.e. Wojtyła himself strove to reach the ultimate source of being i.e. the Truth itself in a threefold way of poetry, philosophy and theology. (Wierzbicki 2015, pg. 292) While John Paul II's literature was separate from his philosophical writings one cannot deny the fact that his philosophy heavily influenced his dramatic works...this influence need not remain on the level of content however. In this thesis therefore, I have attempted to extend his *philosophy of man* to the theatrical domain and have actually tried to use it to determine what the essence of the theatre would look like for Wojtyła - what would he see as its foundation and end. I have also used his *philosophy of man* to determine how theatre can submit itself to this foundation and end.

Philosophy and the theatre have a long-standing historical link i.e the very emergence of the term *person*, which comes to represent the object of philosophical anthropology, is adopted from the Greek theatrical tradition and later on becomes further deepened and enriched by the writings of Christian theologians on the Trinity. This thesis therefore 'goes back to the beginning' as it were and tries to ascertain the link between philosophical anthropology and the theatre. It explores the intersection of the term *microcosm* as it pertains to man (in the Aristotelian-Thomistic realistic metaphysical tradition) and as it has been used to describe the relationship between the theatre and the world i.e. the *theatrum mundi* (a term which is rooted in ancient Greece but seems to reach its height in the time of Shakespeare). I have then worked to establish what Plato and Aristotle meant by *mimesis* and have then moved on to try to grasp Aristotle's understanding of *tragedy* and therefore *action* and *catharsis* - terms he uses to describe the distinguishing features of the theatrical act in the *Poetics*. I have used Aristotle as a base not only because he is one of the fathers of Western philosophical thought and Wojtyła is a product of this tradition (further reinforced by his acceptance of metaphysical realism) but because in his writings on *The Rhapsodic Theatre* we see how Wojtyła and Kotlarczyk partially work off and try to develop what Aristotle defines theatre/tragedy as.

An in depth analysis of Wojtyła's philosophical opus *Person and Act* in chapter three has provided the opportunity to understand Wojtyła's philosophical basis for seeing man as 'gift' i.e. how he understands being able to honour man's personhood - his self-determination, self-possession, self-governance, self-transcendence - in light of his relational aspect (participation). I have looked at his study of the *Person and Act*, precisely because (as explained in the previous chapter) theatre is based on these two very things i.e. man and his action. In order to ascertain what a philosophy of the theatre is according to Wojtyła, we therefore needed to grasp what he understands by these two terms. Not only did we have to look at man in his individual capacity but his relational capacity as well, as not only does this for Wojtyła, fully

express man as a person but because theatre is based on this very capacity as well (as we have explored in the final chapter).

This thesis also sought to explore Wojtyła's theatrical roots with a historical account of the idea of the "sacred" in the Polish theatre by turning to its founding fathers: Adam Mickiewicz and Stanisław Wyspiański and it additionally uncovered the foundational ideas of Wojtyła's main theatrical influences i.e. Juliusz Osterwa and Mieczysław Kotlarczyk. By turning directly to Wojtyła's writings on *The Rhapsodic Theatre* as well as his letters of correspondence to Kotlarczyk we were then able to perform an analysis of *The Radiation of Fatherhood* using primary sources of the *Person and Act*, *Love and Responsibility* and *The Theology of the Body*. This was to further introduce us to Wojtyła's proper understanding of man as 'gift' and the action which helps him truly fulfill all of his potentialities i.e. the 'act of love'. While this application helps to understand Wojtyła's dramatic work the primary purpose of this analysis, as I have said, was to arrive at a philosophy of the theatre that would best realise this play (and its philosophical content) for the stage. I then concluded by applying what we have discovered to the essential structures of theatre in the chapter *Towards a Theatre of the 'Gift'*, and have additionally attempted an exploration to determine the types of 'participation' that are apparent in the theatre as well. When analyzing the experience of the theatrical act even further, one unveils not just the 'connection', 'exchange', 'communion', 'participation' taking place between actors and the audience but multiple 'connections'/'exchanges' in fact: actor-character, actor-actor, director-actor, director/actor-script-audience.

What was discovered in this thesis therefore was that a theatre that holds the truth of what makes a person truly a person i.e. "man acts" and especially an "act of love" as its primary focus not only in content but in the actual practice of the theatrical craft, is not only that which would best portray Wojtyła's works but is in keeping with what seems to be natural to theatre itself. At the start of this thesis we formulated a working definition for the 'philosophy of the theatre' in light of Wojtyła. That it is a form of philosophical inquiry which has theatre as its object and tries, by going back to classical philosophers and through the application of philosophical reasoning (which includes a dialogue with modern philosophy and theatre theorists by an in-depth reading of theatrical experience and reduction) to ascertain its most essential aspects i.e. its foundational causes and ends. From all we have gathered, I believe that we can logically conclude that, for Wojtyła, personhood is both the foundation and end of theatre. Therefore, in addition to the imitation of a truly human act which reveals this personhood in its fullness, participation is the means by which theatre is submitted to personhood.

Filozofia teatru Karola Wojtyły

Ku teatrowi „daru”

Streszczenie

Niniejsza rozprawa próbuje odkryć „oryginalną filozofię teatru” w pismach Karola Wojtyły (jego dziełach teatralnych, filozoficznych i teologicznych), aby wzbogacić obecny kanon myśli teatralnej i zapewnić solidne podstawy, które pomogą w wyrażaniu jego dzieł dramatycznych na scenie. Ta rozprawa ma zatem szerszy cel, jako prekursora metodologii aktorskiej, która obejmuje filozofię Teatru „Daru”. Należy również zauważyć, że niniejszy artykuł stara się również naprawić podział *teorii teatru* i *filozofii teatru*, który doprowadził do usunięcia przedmiotu *zagadnień normatywnych* z pola filozofii. Uważam, że podział ten ujawnił rozdział, który powstał z powodu tej utraty i był spowodowany przez utratę ram wypracowanych przez realistyczną metafizykę (filozofię bytu), które niegdyś stanowiły podstawę do zbudowania antropologii filozoficznej (filozofii człowieka) i etyki (filozofii moralności).

Choć Wojtyła nigdy nie napisał filozofii teatru jako takiego, przynajmniej nie niezależnie od swojego bliskiego współpracownika Mieczysława Kotlarczyka (z którym współtworzył *Teatr Rapsodyczny*), Bolesław Taborski był w istocie sceptyczny co do faktu, że sztuki Wojtyły były jedynie wynikiem idei teatru Kotlarczyka, „ani wtedy, ani później sztuki Wojtyły nie były po prostu «dramatyzowanymi ilustracjami» teorii teatru rapsodycznego” (Taborski 1987, s. 16). Ponadto, podczas rekolekcji dla artystów w Krakowie w 1962 r., Wojtyła najwyraźniej wyraża zupełnie inne rozumienie roli aktora w porównaniu z tym, które znajdujemy w teorii teatru rapsodycznego. Nie postrzega aktora jedynie jako przewodnika, ale ucieleśnienie postaci, ucieleśnienie, które obejmuje jego rozumienie osoby w *Osobie i czynie* i wydaje się czerpać inspirację od innego polskiego pedagoga Juliusza Osterwy. Nie możemy przecież zapomnieć o wpływie całej linii polskich dramaturgów, którzy poprzedzali Jana Pawła II, i środowisku, w którym został ukształtowany:

Tyle się płaci za talent! Za talent wokalny, za talent fizyczny. Ileż prób trzeba podjąć, by z własnego, konkretnego, jednoznacznego charakteru wydobyć inną postać teatralną, by z osoby, którą jestem, stworzyć inną osobę. Jakiegoż ogromnego przeniesienia mojej indywidualności, osobowości; jakiej wielkiej plastyczności wszystkich dyspozycji mojej osoby potrzeba, by na jej miejscu powstało inne „ja” – autentyczne i oryginalne. (Wojtyła 2021, rozdział Lekcja II, akapit 6)

Ta praca ma charakter „interdyscyplinarny”; to znaczy, łączy oryginalną filozofię teatru Karola Wojtyły i jego filozofię człowieka, oraz czerpie z dramatycznych, filozoficznych i teologicznych

dzieł Wojtyły/Papieża Jana Pawła II. Zastosowałam, te „interdyscyplinarną” metodę ze względu na fakt, że (jak zauważył włoski filozof Giovanni Reale i jak wyjaśnia profesor Wierzbicki) Karol Wojtyła/Jan Paweł II (1920-2005) był „pielgrzymem Absolutu”, tzn. Wojtyła dążył do osiągnięcia ostatecznego źródła bytu, tzn. samej Prawdy, na potrójny sposób: poezji, filozofii i teologii. (Wierzbicki 2015, s. 292) Podczas gdy literatura Jana Pawła II jest oddzielona od jego pism filozoficznych, nie można zaprzeczyć faktowi, że jego filozofia silnie wpłynęła na jego dzieła dramatyczne... jednakże ten wpływ nie musi jednak pozostać na poziomie treści. W tej pracy zatem starałam się rozszerzyć jego *filozofię człowieka* na dziedzinę teatru i faktycznie próbowałam użyć jej do określenia, jak wyglądałaby istota teatru dla Wojtyły - co uważałby za jego fundament i cel. Wykorzystałam również jego *filozofię człowieka*, aby określić, w jaki sposób teatr może podporządkować się tej istocie i celowi.

Filozofia i teatr mają długotrwałą więź historyczną, która sięga samego pojawienia się terminu „*osoba*”, i która reprezentuje obiekt antropologii filozoficznej (człowieka) i który jest przejęty z greckiej tradycji teatralnej, a później zostaje dalej pogłębiany i wzbogacony przez pisma chrześcijańskich teologów na temat Trójcy. Ta praca zatem „wraca jakby do początku” i próbuje ustalić związek między antropologią filozoficzną a teatrem. Bada przecięcie się terminu *mikrokosmos*, tak jak odnosi się on do człowieka (w arystotelesowsko-tomistycznej realistycznej tradycji metafizycznej) i jak był używany do opisu relacji między teatrem a światem, tj. *theatrum mundi* (termin, który jest zakorzeniony w starożytnej Grecji, ale wydaje się, że osiągnął swój szczyt w czasach Szekspira). Następnie pracowałam nad ustaleniem, co Platon i Arystoteles mieli na myśli przez *mimesis*, a następnie przeszłam do próby uchwycenia Arystotelesowskiego rozumienia *tragedii*, a zatem *działania* i *katharsis* - terminów, których Arystoteles używa do opisu cech aktu teatralnego w *Poetyce*. Wybrałam Arystotelesa jako podstawę nie tylko dlatego, że jest on jednym z ojców zachodniej myśli filozoficznej, a Wojtyła jest produktem tej tradycji (co jest dodatkowo wzmocnione przez jego akceptację realizmu metafizycznego), ale również dlatego, że w jego pismach na temat *Teatru rapsodycznego* widzimy, jak Wojtyła i Kotlarczyk częściowo pracują nad tym, co Arystoteles definiuje jako teatr/tragedia, i próbują to rozwinąć.

Głęboka analiza filozoficznego dzieła Wojtyły *Osoba i czyn* w rozdziale trzecim umożliwiła do zrozumienia filozoficznych podstaw Wojtyły, aby postrzegać człowieka jako „dar”, tj. jak rozumie on możliwość uhonorowania osobowości człowieka – jego samostanowienia, samo posiadania, samorzędności, samo przekroczenia – w świetle jego aspektu relacyjnego (uczestnictwa). Przyglądałam się jego studium *Osoby i czynu*, właśnie dlatego, że (jak wyjaśniłam w poprzednim rozdziale) teatr opiera się na tych dwóch rzeczach, tj. człowieku i

jego działaniu. Aby ustalić, czym jest filozofia teatru według Wojtyły, musimy zatem pojąć, co rozumie on przez te dwa terminy. Musimy nie tylko spojrzeć na człowieka w jego indywidualnej zdolności, ale także na jego zdolności relacyjne, ponieważ nie tylko dla Wojtyły w pełni wyraża to człowieka jako osobę, ale ponieważ teatr opiera się również na tej samej zdolności (jak zbadaliśmy w ostatnim rozdziale).

Praca ta miała również na celu zbadanie teatralnych korzeni Wojtyły z historycznym opisem idei „sacrum” w polskim teatrze, zwracając się do jego ojców założycieli: Adama Mickiewicza i Stanisława Wyspiańskiego, a ponadto podkreśla fundamentalne idee głównych teatralnych mentorów Wojtyły, tj. Juliusza Osterwy i Mieczysława Kotlarczyka. Zwracając się bezpośrednio do pism Wojtyły na temat *Teatru rapsodycznego*, a także jego listów korespondencyjnych do Kotlarczyka, byliśmy w stanie przeprowadzić analizę *Promieniowania ojcostwa*, korzystając z podstawowych źródeł *Osoby i czynu*, *Miłości i odpowiedzialności* oraz *Teologii ciała*. Miało to na celu dalsze wprowadzenie nas do właściwego rozumienia człowieka przez Wojtyłę jako „daru” i działania, które pomaga mu naprawdę spełnić wszystkie jego możliwości (potencjały), tj. „aktu miłości”. Podczas gdy ta aplikacja pomaga zrozumieć dramatyczną twórczość Wojtyły, głównym celem tej analizy, jak już powiedzieliśmy, było dojście do filozofii teatru, która najlepiej zrealizuje tę sztukę (i jej filozoficzną treść) na scenie. Następnie zakończyliśmy, stosując to, co odkryliśmy, do podstawowych struktur teatru w rozdziale *Ku teatrowi „daru”*, a dodatkowo podjęliśmy próbę eksploracji, aby określić typy „uczestnictwa”, które są również widoczne w teatrze. Analizując doświadczenie aktu teatralnego jeszcze głębiej, odsłania się nie tylko „połączenie”, „wymianę”, „komunię”, „uczestnictwo” zachodzące między aktorami a publicznością, ale w rzeczywistości wiele „połączeń”/„wymian”: aktor-postać, aktor-aktor, reżyser-aktor, reżyser/aktor-scenariusz-publiczność.

Odkryliśmy zatem w tej pracy, że teatr, który odsłania prawdę o tym, co czyni człowieka prawdziwie człowiekiem, tj. „człowiek działa”, a zwłaszcza „akt miłości” jako swój główny cel nie tylko w treści, ale w rzeczywistej praktyce teatralnego rzemiosła, jest nie tylko tym, co najlepiej przedstawi dzieła Wojtyły, ale jest zgodne z tym, co wydaje się naturalne dla samego teatru. Na początku tej pracy sformułowaliśmy roboczą definicję „filozofii teatru” w świetle Wojtyły. Że jest to forma filozoficznego dociekania, którego przedmiotem jest teatr i która próbuje, poprzez powrót do klasycznych filozofów i poprzez zastosowanie rozumowania filozoficznego (co obejmuje dialog z nowoczesną filozofią i teoretykami teatru poprzez dogłębną lekturę doświadczenia teatralnego i redukcję), ustalić jego najbardziej istotne aspekty, tj. jego podstawowe przyczyny i cele. Ze wszystkiego, co zebraliśmy, sędzę, że możemy logicznie wnioskować, że dla Wojtyły osobowość jest zarówno fundamentem, jak i celem teatru.

Tak więc, oprócz naśladowania prawdziwie ludzkiego aktu, który w pełni ukazuje tę osobowość, uczestnictwo (partycypacja) jest środkiem, za pomocą którego teatr zostaje podporządkowany osobowości.