

## SUMMARY

This doctoral dissertation addresses the problem of dualistic thinking, which for centuries has been a subject of discussion in philosophy, theology, and the empirical sciences. Dualism—understood as the belief in the existence of two distinct kinds of entities or properties, particularly mind and body—constitutes an essential element of both classical philosophical positions and common-sense conceptions of the human being. Contemporary debate on dualism largely focuses on its psychological determinants, which is reflected in research within cognitive science and developmental psychology. A significant contribution to these discussions comes from Paul Bloom's concept, which interprets dualism as the result of innate cognitive mechanisms that manifest themselves in childhood, regardless of culture.

The aim of this work is to provide a systematic and philosophically in-depth interpretation of the concept of dualistic thinking as a natural, intuitive, and universal way of interpreting the world. The area of analysis is the philosophy of psychology, which has made it possible to reconstruct the philosophical assumptions present in Bloom's psychological framework.

The dissertation examines issues related to, among others, folk physics, artificialism, essentialism, categorization, mindreading, empathy, morality, and folk theology—topics around which Bloom constructs his argument concerning the natural foundations of dualism. The dissertation adopts the hypothesis that the universality of dualistic thinking and the empirical data supporting this mode of interpreting the world are—subject to certain modifications—accurate; however, Bloom's conclusion regarding the naturalization of the concept of the soul is debatable. I argue that the concept of the soul can be legitimately applied in scientific thinking and does not constitute merely a relic of folk psychology.

Methodologically, the work is inspired by M. Heller's (1986) concept of philosophy in science. The research project was carried out in three stages: (1) a systematic review of the philosophical, psychological, and anthropological literature concerning the problem of dualism; (2) a detailed analysis of Paul Bloom's works, including the book *Descartes' Baby* and publications elaborating on his views; (3) a philosophical reconstruction and critique of the assumptions present in Bloom's conception, with particular attention to his proposal for naturalizing the concept of the soul. The structure of the dissertation consists of three principal sections: a historical overview of views concerning dualistic thinking, presented from the perspectives of common-sense and scientific cognition; a reconstruction of Bloom's position; and a philosophical-psychological discussion that includes a critique of Bloom's

concept and an indication of possible extensions. An additional element is an analysis of the proposal for naturalization and the place of the concept of the soul within science.

*Anna Pietryga*