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**THE PROBLEM OF THE HUMAN PERSON'S SUBJECTIVITY IN THE  
ANTHROPOLOGICAL THOUGHT OF KAROL WOJTYŁA**

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## Biography of Karol Wojtyła

There have been many authors who wrote biographies of Karol Wojtyła/St. John Paul II in detail from his childhood to his pontificate. We can find it in various books as well as on official websites on the internet.<sup>1</sup> Here I only present a brief history of his life, especially the major and important events in his life.

Karol Wojtyła was a Polish Catholic priest of the archdiocese of Krakow, metropolitan bishop of Krakow, 264th Pope of the Catholic Church, saint, philosopher, theologian, educator, and poet. He was born on 18 May 1920 in Wadowice into a middle class family. His father was Karol Wojtyła, a lieutenant in the military, and his mother—Emilia Kaczorowska. His childhood was marked by the death of those closest to him. His mother died on 13 April 1929 and three years later his brother Edmund passed away (he was a doctor at the city hospital in Bielsko and died from the infection with scarlet fever caught from his patient).

Wojtyła began his education in 1930 at the state Gymnasium for boys in Wadowice. After graduating in 1938, he and his father moved to Krakow. On October 1938 he began studying Polish philology at the philosophy faculty of the Jagielonian University, which was interrupted by the Second World War. He worked from 1940–1944 as a miner in Zakrzówek and then in a factory of the Solvay chemical company in Borek Fałęckidi to earn a living and avoid being deported to Germany. He met Jan Tyranowski, a layman who worked as a tailor; Tyranowski became the guide of Wojtyła's spiritual life during a youth retreat at the St. Stanisław Kostka Dębniaki Parish. There Wojtyła came into contact with a mystique of St. John of the Cross.

Wojtyła's father died on 18 February 1941. On October 1942, he began studying philosophy and theology at the clandestine faculty of theology of the Jagelonian University, directed by archbishop Adam Stefan Sapieha. At the same time, he was one of the organizers of

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<sup>1</sup> For more detailed biography of Karol Wojtyła, see John Paul II, *Gift and Mystery* (New York: Doubleday, 1966); "Biographical Profile John Paul II (1920–2005)," The Holy See, accessed December 27, 2022, [https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/biografia/documents/hf\\_jp-ii\\_spe\\_20190722\\_biografia.html](https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/biografia/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20190722_biografia.html); "Biography of Pope John Paul II," Catholic News Agency, accessed December 27, 2022, <https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/resource/55014/biography-of-pope-john-paul-ii>; Grzegorz Hołub, Tadeusz Biesaga, Jarosław Merecki, Marek Kostur, *The Polish Christian Philosophy in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century Karol Wojtyła* (Krakow: Ignatianum University Press, 2019); Rocco Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła the Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*, trans. Paolo Guietti and Francesca Murphy (Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1997); George Weigel, *Witness to Hope The Bibliography of Pope John Paul II 1920–2005* (New York, London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999).

the “Rhapsodic Theatre.” He was ordained a priest on 1 November 1946 by Cardinal Adam Stefan Sapieha. After his ordination, he went to Rome to continue his studies at the theological faculty of the Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas also well known as Angelicum. In Rome he met Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, a Thomist, who introduced him more deeply to St. Thomas Aquinas and St. John of the Cross. In 1948 he received a doctorate degree with a dissertation thesis: *Doctrina de fide apud S. Joannem a Cruce*. In this dissertation he shows his interest in the phenomenology of mystical experience. There is an emphasis on the subjective dimension of personal action in mystical experience.

After returning to Poland, Wojtyła was appointed to work at the parish of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Niegowić, and later at the parish of St. Florian in Krakow where he provided pastoral care for university’s students. Besides that, he also published poems in *Tygodnik Powszechny*. In 1951 he was appointed by the archbishop of Krakow to be educated at the theology faculty of the Jagiellonian University. At the university he came into contact with Roman Ingarden and phenomenologists from Krakow. Phenomenologists introduced him into Max Scheler’s philosophy and modern philosophy, especially Emmanuel Kant. In 1953 he presented his Habilitation Thesis on “Evaluation of the Possibility of Constructing a Christian Ethics on the System of Max Scheler.” In 1953–1954 he became a lecturer in moral theology and ethics at the Krakow major seminary and the theological faculty of the Jagiellonian University. Since 1954 until 1978 he was a lecturer in ethics at the Catholic University of Lublin and also the head of the Ethics Department. During this time he produced a number of published works such as: *The Lublin Lectures*, *Love and Responsibility*, and *Person and Act*.

On July 4, 1958, Pope Pius XII appointed Karol Wojtyła auxiliary bishop of Krakow. On 28 September 1958, archbishop Eugeniusz Baziak ordained him in Wawel Cathedral (Krakow). He was active in the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) and made a significant contribution to the draft of the constitution *Gaudium et spes*. On 13 January 1964, Pope Paul VI appointed Bishop Karol Wojtyła as archbishop of Krakow and subsequently named him a Cardinal, on 26 June 1967. Following the death of Pope John Paul I, Cardinal Karol Wojtyła was elected Pope at the Conclave on 16 October 1978 taking the name John Paul II. During his pontificate, he undertook 104 international apostolic journeys. The documents from his papal teaching include: 14 Encyclicals, 15 Apostolic Exhortations, 11 Apostolic Constitutions and 45 Apostolic Letters. He also wrote a number of books including: *Crossing the Threshold of Hope* (1994); *Gift and Mystery: On the Fiftieth Anniversary of My Priestly Ordination* (1996); *Roman Triptych*,



*meditations in poetry* (2003); *Rise, Let Us Be on Our Way* (2004) and *Memory and Identity* (2005).

John Paul II died on 2 April 2005 and was buried in the crypt of Saint Peter's Basilica. On 1 May 2011 he was beatified by his successor Pope Benedict XVI, and on 27 April 2014, he was canonized by Pope Francis.

## INTRODUCTION

Human being is the only living being in this terrestrial world who has the ability to reflect on himself and his activities such as action, thinking, feeling, etc. Roughly speaking, only the human beings are capable of reflecting their subjectivity. Through the exploration and analysis of problem of subjectivity, I would like to discover the principle or the cause of subjectivity of the human person, which also helps to lead to the apprehension of the correct understanding of man. I chose Karol Wojtyła/Jhon Paul II's anthropological thought to achieve this goal.

Wojtyła adopts the Thomistic principle that action always follows the existence of a being, *operari sequitur esse*. Therefore, subjectivity actually refers to the subject and its activities. Understanding of actions will determine the apprehension of the subject, and vice versa the apprehension of actions depends on understanding of the subject. An adequate understanding of the human being can be obtained through an analysis of this dynamic relationship. Through the analysis of action, one can understand the internal experience of the ontic structure of the human person as well as the subject of subjectivity. Only the human person is the subject of action and at the same time the subject of what happens in him. In the modern and contemporary era, the discussion of the problem of subjectivity is associated with the problem of self and consciousness, and it remains an area of a serious debate in philosophy as well as in science. In philosophy, the problem of subjectivity in relation to the self remains an interesting object to be explored in almost all philosophical traditions. Of course, the issue of correct understanding of man cannot be comprehensively explained solely by purely scientific explanations with an empirical approach. The issue of understanding subjectivity that leads to a correct understanding of man demand the role of philosophy for exploring and explaining it. Wojtyła explains:

In addition, the problem of subjectivity of the person—particularly in relation to human community—imposes itself today as one of the central ideological issues that lie at the very basis of human praxis, morality (and thus also ethics), culture, civilization, and politics. Philosophy comes into play here in its essential function: philosophy as an expression of basic understanding and ultimate justifications.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, the problem of subjectivity of the human person is not a trivial matter in philosophy, on the contrary, it is a crucial issue that lies at the basis of human action or praxis. Because it is so

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<sup>2</sup> Karol Wojtyła, "The Person: Subject and Community," in *Person and Community Selected Essays*, trans. Theresa Sandok, OSM (New York: Peter Lang, 1993): 220.

crucial, the problem of subjectivity in relation to the self remains an interesting object to be explored in various philosophical traditions which have given it conflicting meanings.

In the modern epoch, the construction of philosophy of subjectivity has developed since the emergence of Descartes' philosophy. Descartes uses the term *cogito* (I think) as subject of consciousness which is equated with the self, immaterial substance (*res cogitans*), which is distinguished from material substance (*res extensa*). Man is the *cogito*, thinking thing, which is the principle of human subjectivity. Hume is well known as an empiricist who deconstructs the concept of self, or person as a substantial self (metaphysical self) that remains unchanged throughout our lives. According to him, based on the naturalistic approach he uses, we do not have experience of the self, therefore we cannot have knowledge about it.<sup>3</sup> Our knowledge is highly dependent on sense perception, therefore, a blind person cannot have knowledge of colors and a deaf person cannot have knowledge of sounds. Hume constructs ideas or knowledge of the self more as a unity or a bundle of impressions and perceptions.<sup>4</sup> And for him, substantial self is impossible because "I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception."<sup>5</sup> Self is only a fiction that the human being creates from illusion of identity in consciousness caused by human imagination. In addition, Kant rejects Descartes' notion of I as *res cogitans*, or immaterial substance as the reason for subjectivity, and also opposes Hume's idea of rejecting the self-concept as if it were only an illusion, by emphasizing the human reason as the basis for the self and as the cause of subjectivity.

The formulations of the concept of subjectivity, or self and its actions by philosophers in modern times continue to influence the thoughts of philosophers in the contemporary era who continue to live in debates. The reduction of human essence as well as the principle of subjectivity to human properties due to the limitation of approaches and methods, even with purely empirical tendencies, is getting sharper in this era. Man as a substance as in the traditional view is not accepted at all. Marxism underscores social-economical relation as basis of self and action. Martin Heidegger, with his phenomenological method, understands human being as *Dasein* ("to be there" in the world) which refers only to human being with explicitly reflective self-awareness,<sup>6</sup> and who always exists with others, as the basis of human subjectivity. Max Scheler, with his phenomenological method, understands the person simply as a unity of experience of action, where the person is revealed in every action, which has emotive

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<sup>3</sup> Kim Atkins, "Commentary on Hume," in *Self and Subjectivity* (Chardon: Blackwell Publishing, 2005): 33.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>5</sup> David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book One, ed. D. G. C. Macnabb (London: Fontana/Collins, 1962), 301–302.

<sup>6</sup> Kim Atkins, "Commentary on Heidegger," in *Self and Subjectivity* (Chardon: Blackwell Publishing, 2005): 114.

characteristic. Likewise, behaviorists hold that human behavior is simply a response to environmental stimuli. In addition, functionalists also understand every being as a process of action.

The problem of subjectivity becomes a crucial issue and has been explored in Wojtyła's anthropology, in an effort to reach a correct understanding of man. There are more or less two main problems that condition Wojtyła's attention to the human person and the problem of subjectivity as one of the important issues in understanding the human person. The first is the problem of political ideology, social and economic orientation.<sup>7</sup> Wojtyła experienced firsthand the horrors of two brutal tyrannical regimes namely Nazism and Communism. The two ideologies develop a negative view of man. Anyone with a different ideology, nationality, political affiliation or even religious beliefs is considered less human or not human at all. Those who believe in and work in different ideologies and religions are treated inhumanely.<sup>8</sup> He expressed his personal tragic experience with these two brutal regimes that made him concern on the dignity of the human person.

The two totalitarian systems which tragically marked our century—Nazism on the one hand, marked by the horrors of the war and the concentration camps, and communism on the other, with its regime of oppression and terror—I came to know, so to speak, from within. So it is easy to understand my deep concern for the dignity of every human person and the need to respect human rights, beginning with the right to life.<sup>9</sup>

For Wojtyła, political ideology with a brutal regime and economic orientation that causes suffering and underestimates human dignity must be resisted. In addition to these two brutal totalitarian systems, Wojtyła also highlights the growing consumerism in the west. Consumerist society in the West is more concerned with the quantitative development of the human condition than the human person itself. And the way of opposing them is the philosophy of the human person which relates to anyone regardless of race, religion, nationality or political affiliation etc.

Second, the problems found in the realm of philosophy (anthropology and ethics) relate to specific issues of the human person, namely the subjectivity of the human person. Wojtyła traces the roots of this problem in the history of western thought where there is an antinomy between subjectivism-objectivism and idealism-realism that has emerged primarily in the area of theory of knowledge (epistemology) which has formed a demarcation line between the basic

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<sup>7</sup> Jove Jim S. Aguas, "Karol Wojtyła: On Person and Subjectivity," *Ad Veritatem* 8, no.2 (March 2009): 416, [https://www.academia.edu/8682582/Karol\\_Wojtyla\\_On\\_Person\\_and\\_Subjectivity](https://www.academia.edu/8682582/Karol_Wojtyla_On_Person_and_Subjectivity).

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 414.

<sup>9</sup> John Paul II, *Gift and Mystery*, 66–67.

orientations in philosophy. He stated: “the antinomy of subjectivism vs. realism, along with the underlying antinomy of idealism vs. realism, created condition that discourages dealing with human subjectivity—for fear that this would lead inevitably to subjectivism.”<sup>10</sup> In analyzing this problem, he took a realistic position in his studies.<sup>11</sup> Metaphysics, though enriched with phenomenological methods, remains the basis for his investigation and analysis of the issue. That means he views the human person as a subsistent “I” who is the subject of his existence and actions, and who experiences himself as a subject. There is an affirmation of the ontological status of man as a subject or *suppositum* and aspect of consciousness so that the human person is also a conscious subject. Thus, there are two combinations of important aspects in the analysis of the problem of subjectivity, namely being (the human person) with aspects of awareness, and aspects of action with aspects of experience. The positioning of study of this problem is very important; it goes together with Wojtyła’s distinction of subjectivity from subjectivism where the former means the human person is the subject and the aspect of the person’s consciousness has an essential significance for asserting man’s subjectivity, because it is consciousness that allows man to experience himself as the subject.<sup>12</sup> Meanwhile, the latter one emphasizes consciousness “as a total and exclusive subject—the subject of experience and values.”<sup>13</sup>

Consequently, it is very relevant to explore Wojtyła’s concept of subjectivity for the attainment of a correct understanding of man. The acquisition of this understanding is also an attempt to overcome a dangerous trap of a reductionist thinking which reduces and even eliminates the nature and dignity of human being as person. Therefore, there are a number of main questions that must be answered and discussed in this dissertation, including: what is Wojtyła’s concept of the subjectivity of the human person? What is the purpose of his notion of the problem of subjectivity of human person? Is subjectivity the same as subjectivism? How is the subjectivity of the human person manifested in the experience of the human being? In which moment does the self manifest itself? What form of act of man is appropriate to express man as person? What does it mean for the human person to be a subject according to Karol Wojtyła? Which faculty has the role of expressing the person in action? What are the consequences of Karol Wojtyła’s conception of subjectivity?

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<sup>10</sup> Karol Wojtyła, “Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human being,” in *Person and Community Selected Essays*, trans. Theresa Sandok, OSM (New York: Peter Lang, 1993): 209.

<sup>11</sup> See Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person, Analecta Husserliana The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research Volume X*, trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht, Boston, London: D. Reidel Publishing, 1969), 57.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 58.

## Object and Aim of Investigation

The concept of the subjectivity of the human person is the object of the investigation in this work. The inquired and analyzed object is an anthropological problem. It is required to be solved within a theory of metaphysics of man, which is based on the philosophy of being.<sup>14</sup> The theory of metaphysics of man as a special branch of general metaphysics investigates man (being) as a reality that exists and is experienced directly and immediately both in the form of inner and outer experiences.

In this dissertation, the author highlights the problem of subjectivity from the anthropological point of view of Karol Wojtyła. Wojtyła's philosophy is entirely focused on man.<sup>15</sup> The source of his anthropology is, first of all, the lived experiences of the actions of person. Furthermore, the Polish philosopher bases his construction of anthropological thought, as a metaphysics of man, on the basis of the philosophy of being from the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.<sup>16</sup> That means, the analysis of the subjectivity of the human person is based on the analysis of being, so that it is found that all human activities, in the experience, originate from the human person which is a substance. The philosophy of consciousness is added also to make up for the shortcoming of the philosophy of being to emphasize the experiential aspect of the

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<sup>14</sup> Kamiński explains that "it is possible to distinguish validly (with regard to their own starting points) the following disciplines of the theory of being beside general metaphysics: the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of the human being, the philosophy of morality and the philosophy of other area of culture. [...]. The disciplines of particular metaphysics, although they are independent at their points of departure, are structurally dependent on general metaphysics, as they refer in their ultimate explanation also to its theses." Stanisław Kamiński, *On the Methodology of Metaphysics Z Metodologii Metafizyki*, trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin-Rome: PTTA SITD, 2018), 220–221.

<sup>15</sup> Hołub et al., *The Polish Christian Philosophy*, 12; see also Tadeusz Styczeń SDS, "Kardynał Karol Wojtyła-Filozof Moralista," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 27, no.2 (1979):15–32.

<sup>16</sup> Although Wojtyła often talks about metaphysics, and directly use metaphysical themes, in fact, he never provides or develops a metaphysical system of his own. He refers to and follows the metaphysics of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition combined with phenomenology to build his anthropological thinking. As Adrian J. Reimers said, "Although Karol Wojtyła speaks sometimes about metaphysics, he does not develop his own metaphysical thought. In *Love and Responsibility* we read that the human sexual drives are related not only to the biological order but also to the order of existence; subsequently he titles one major section 'Metaphysical analysis of love' and another 'Metaphysics of shame.' In *Person and Act* he describes metaphysics as the 'realm of thought in which are founded the roots of all the sciences,' and takes the occasion to discuss at some length the importance of the *potentia-actus* relationship. Most famously, perhaps, he calls for 'a philosophy of *genuinely metaphysical* range, capable, that is, of transcending empirical data in order to attain something absolute, ultimate and foundational in its search for truth.' Although Karol Wojtyła does not provide his own metaphysics, he does point to that of others, specifically to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. Karol Wojtyła does have a metaphysics. Theoretically it is taken from the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas." Adrian J. Reimers, "Karol Wojtyła's Aims and Methodology," *Academia*, accessed on April 1, 2022, [https://www.academia.edu/12026529/Karol\\_Wojtylas\\_Aims\\_and\\_Methodology](https://www.academia.edu/12026529/Karol_Wojtylas_Aims_and_Methodology). The same is said in *The Polish Christian Philosophy in the 20th Century Karol Wojtyła*, "Because he based his metaphysical assumption on Thomistic Philosophy [...]" Hołub, et al., *The Polish Christian Philosophy*, 14; see also Grzegorz Hołub, "Karol Wojtyła on the Metaphysics of the Person," *Logos i ethos* 2, no.39 (2015): 97–115, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.15633/lie.1538>.

person as a complete substance. On this basis, Wojtyła developed his “personalism” or “a developing of a realistic metaphysics of the person,” as “brand” of his philosophical system.

Certainly, the discussion of this dissertation is limited to the object of investigation i.e., the concept of subjectivity in Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropological thought which is based on the philosophy of being and the philosophy of consciousness. The author does not investigate and present comparative studies from other fields, or from the thoughts of certain thinkers. If anything, as in the explanation of Chapter I, it is only as a general description which affirms that the problem of subjectivity is a crucial and intriguing issue in philosophy, and it is not intended primarily for a comparative study of Wojtyła’s notion of subjectivity. The author also does not criticize Wojtyła’s concept of subjectivity, but accounts it and presents its consequences.

Thus, the main issues that are of concern in the investigation of the concept of subjectivity include: the human person as a *suppositum* or subject of existence and action, consciousness and its role in the experience of the subjectivity of human person, the dynamism of personal agents, the personal structure of self-determination (freedom), human faculty, self-fulfillment, transcendence and integration of the person in action, conscience, responsibility, participation and community, and also the implications of the concept of subjectivity of human person.

Meanwhile, the main purpose of this research is to dissect, analyze and explain the specificity of the concept of subjectivity of the human person which Wojtyła developed in his philosophical anthropology. It is hoped that this work presents a justification of the concept of subjectivity, which ultimately ends in the justification of the human person as the subject of subjectivity, and the apprehension of a true and comprehensive understanding of human being. Wojtyła points out that thanks to the analysis of the action of man, we can discover the personal structure of the self-determination. Through it we cognize that the person who reveals in self-governance and self-possession is a complete substance with a rational nature, as it is understood and inherited by the Thomists from the Boethius’s definition.

## The State of Research

There have been various philosophical inquiries and publications on Wojtyła's philosophical thought in the fields of anthropology and ethics. However, as far as research has been carried out, the author finds that philosophical work that specifically addresses the problem of subjectivity as a central issue is in the work of J.J.S. Aguas, *Karol Wojtyła: On Person and Subjectivity*, published in 2009. In his work, Aguas first explains the person as a conscious subject and then proceeds to explain the categories of the person's lived experience and the role of consciousness. It seems that he embarked his explanation from the person as the source of subjectivity and then followed with the human phenomenon, and ended by showing the role of consciousness as a human aspect. In addition, the problem of subjectivity is also explored in the work of Grzegorz Hołub, *Karol Wojtyła on the Metaphysics of the Person*, published in 2015. In this work, Hołub highlights the sources of Wojtyła's metaphysics, Wojtyła's approach to the personhood and *suppositum*, and a critical look at Wojtyła's notion of *suppositum* and person which are strengthened by Norris Clarke's notion of substance. He explains the relation of *suppositum* and person as well as the relation of metaphysical subjectivity and personal subjectivity. In personal dynamism, the personal *suppositum* displays its specific character which is certainly different from the *suppositum* in general. Thus, personal subjectivity goes beyond the *suppositum*. He also shows Wojtyła's notion that the relationship between metaphysical subjectivity and personal subjectivity occurs at the level of potentiality and not ability, or at the level of metaphysics and not at the phenomenological insight. He adds Clarke's idea of explaining the dynamic character of the *suppositum* and its relation to the personal subject by exploring the concepts of "existence" and "substance" which Wojtyła did not explain in detail. Another work that addresses the subjectivity issue is the work of Peter Emmanuel A. Mara, *Understanding Man as a Subject and a Person: A Wojtyła Personalistic Interpretation of the Human Being*, published in 2007. Mara, in his work, begins by explaining how to understand human being in cosmological and personalistic types, then he explains the meaning of human being as a person and as a subject, and ends with the appearance of a person in action and self-fulfillment through action.

There are some insufficiencies in the presentation of the above works; a number of issues require more exploration in further research. First, the explanatory mode of the problem of subjectivity should depart from the exploration and description of human phenomena towards discovering the cause of these phenomena. In other words, we should use Wojtyła's way of explaining the problem of subjectivity by starting from human experience to apprehension of the



principle of subjectivity. Another thing that needs to be explored further is the manifestation of the subjectivity of the human person through human properties and faculties. Additionally, the role of human faculties that express transcendence and integration of person in action, as well as self-fulfillment in the community require also to be more scrutinized. This means that there is a need to explore human faculties which create activity that is appropriate for the human being as a person and the activity that reveals the personal structure of self-determination. Third, there is space that is still open to explore the consequences of the concept of subjectivity of the human person in Wojtyła's thought.

Generally, as the author's investigation shows, the problem of subjectivity exists in a number of works by some scholars regarding Wojtyła's anthropological thought but it is not the main concern of these works. It is simply a part of other anthropological problems, which are the main focus of their works. Even though, they are very useful to assist the author to extract Wojtyła's notion of subjectivity. These scholarly works can be seen in the secondary sources which are mentioned in the source of literature.

## **Research Structure**

In order for us to be able to apprehend Wojtyła's understanding of the subjectivity of human person, the result of the author's analysis will be outlined in the structure of this dissertation into four chapters.

In the first chapter, the author attempts to describe and explain the context of the discussion of the problem of subjectivity in philosophy. The context is not intended to be presented chronologically, but based on naturalistic, spiritualistic, existentialist, and metaphysical approaches. The reason the author includes the interpretation of these approaches is because Wojtyła in building his philosophical system has made contact with the philosophical thoughts of a number of thinkers who emphasize these approaches. In his anthropological and ethical thought, he blatantly shows his opposition to Marxism and Skinner's behaviorism. He also came into contact with the ideas of some spiritualist philosophers such as Kant and Scheler, whom he accepted and adopted a number of their ideas along with criticism. Appreciation is also addressed to existentialists, although not without reservation, because of their emphasis on special existence from a human perspective in which existence is merely an anthropological existence. Of course, he had an affinity with the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophical tradition which he took as the basis for developing his philosophy of person. His rejection and criticism of

some views of naturalists, spiritualists and existentialists cannot be separated from the influence of those traditions.

In the second chapter of this dissertation, I present manifestations of subjectivity of human person in the experience of reflection, decision and action. This chapter describes the moment of objective self-appearance as a self-experiencing subject. One experiences oneself as a subject, in the first instance, in self-awareness. And, especially in the moment of self-determination and action, a person experiences himself more as a subject, agent as well as an object of action. The role of the reflective and reflexive functions of consciousness, in relation to knowledge and self-knowledge, greatly contributes to self-consciousness, self-determination and self-fulfillment.

Furthermore, in the third chapter, the principle or cause of the subjectivity of the human person is explained in Wojtyła's anthropological thought. Based on the principle of *operari sequitur esse*, Wojtyła elucidates action as a starting point to find the subject of human action. Based on this principle, then, action is a proper venue to obtain the knowledge of the principle or cause. It also elucidates the status and role of will which is not only a faculty but rather shows the personal structure of self-determination, and the cause of the transcendence and integration of the person in action. Besides, the crucial role of will in cooperation with reason and conscience contribute in achieving self-fulfillment. This kind of cooperation indicates also the spirituality of the human soul which cannot be experienced directly but can be grasped through philosophical reflection.

In the fourth chapter of this dissertation, the author includes the consequences or implications of Wojtyła's notion of subjectivity for philosophical anthropology, ethics, social life and culture (constitution of culture). The analysis of the concept of subjectivity leads us to the understanding that man as person, composed of body and soul, is an experienced subject. As such, the study of the human person should include the wholeness or unity of man. Metaphysics of man, or rather realistic metaphysics of the person as a kind of philosophical anthropology warrants that kind of study. That means, a study of the human person rooted in philosophy of being from Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy tradition which is complemented and enriched by modern and contemporary philosophical trends (Kantianism, Phenomenology and existentialism), science and theology. In line with the implications for anthropology, this analysis also leads to the understanding that the person and his rational nature are the basis of morality. It is connatural in man. As such, ethics as a normative theory of morality must be based on the metaphysics of man. The analysis of the concept of subjectivity also has

implications for the social life of the human person. It shows that social life in the form of *communio personarum* can only be achieved through participation in “I-thou” and “we” relationship. Furthermore, this conception of subjectivity confirms that culture is a characteristic of human life and its constitution is based on transitive and intransitive praxis. Emphasis on praxis that has a transitive character only produces a “culture of human works,” while praxis of intransitive character constitutes a “culture of person.” The culture of person is a true humanistic culture the formation of which is closely linked with disinterestedness inherently connected with universal values such as truth, good, beauty and faith.

## Methodology

The methods used in this research are mainly metaphysical explanation and phenomenology, which are none other than the methods that Wojtyła has employed in his philosophical anthropology. The metaphysical explanation method addresses the facts given in experience by finding the causes that justify the existence of these facts and their essential contents. These facts are actions of the human person given in experience. This method guarantees the discovery and explanation of the reason for the facts of human actions. This method is nothing but a metaphysical reduction method which basically aims to find the principle of the fact of action given in experience, which then requires no further reduction. In the context of explaining the problem of subjectivity, it is about something that cannot be reduced, which is no other but the principle of the subjectivity of the human person.

The phenomenological method allows for the analysis of the personal experience of the subject and the essential manifestations of the fact of being a personal subject, given in lived experience.<sup>17</sup> The analysis embarks from personal phenomena, that is in the realm of experience from various actions of person and inter-subjective experiences and then ends at personal foundations or personal discoveries of being, as Wojtyła says “the act is a particular moment of the vision-that is, the experience-of the person.”<sup>18</sup> With this method, there is an interpretation

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<sup>17</sup> Through the phenomenological method, “lived experience” is introduced as an anthropological category, in which the human person is an experienced subject, where he himself, his existence, and his actions are not only observed from the outside by others but he himself experiences them. He himself lives in his actions and in his experiences. This is different from experience in the empiricist concept where experience is understood only in the context of the senses or sense perception. What the mind knows is only what the senses perceive or experience. See Aguas, “On Person and Subjectivity,” 428–429.

<sup>18</sup> Karol Wojtyła, “Person and Act,” in *Person and Act and Selected Essays, The English Critical Edition of the Works of Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II*, trans. Grzegorz Ignatik (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2021): 102.

and description of the lived experience of the subjectivity of the human person, namely the lived experience of a conscious personal subject and its manifestations in its activities.

In addition to the aforementioned methods, this research which focuses on Wojtyła's concept of subjectivity is based on text analysis from Wojtyła's works, as well as from secondary literatures. Through this method, the author discovers Wojtyła's concept of subjectivity and its manifestation in experience, and then reconstructs it in this dissertation. Additionally, there are also classical and relevant sources used in the research to obtain the main concepts of subjectivity in history of philosophy, therefore the historicism method is also used in this dissertation.

### Scope and Sources of Literature

The author classifies the sources from the literature used in the research in four classes. The first class is primary sources consisting of Wojtyła's works which I have listed in the bibliographical list of this dissertation. Of course, I do not use all of Wojtyła/John Paul II's works in the investigation, only relevant sources in connection with the research of the subjectivity problem and the supporting ideas that I used in this dissertation. Among them are his main works, including: *The Problem of Faith in the Works of St. John of the Cross* (Doctoral Dissertation),<sup>19</sup> *Evaluation of the Possibility of Constructing a Christian Ethics on the System of Max Scheler* (Habilitation Thesis),<sup>20</sup> *The Lublin Lectures* (the Published Lectures),<sup>21</sup> *Love and Responsibility*,<sup>22</sup> *Person and Act* ([*The Acting Person*] the most important philosophical work or *magnus opus* of Wojtyła),<sup>23</sup> *Ethics Primer*,<sup>24</sup> *Considerations on the Essence of Man*,<sup>25</sup> *Man in*

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<sup>19</sup> K. Wojtyła, *Doctrina de fide apud S. Ioannem a Cruce. Dissertation ad Lauream* (Rome: Pontificia Universitas S. Thomae Aquinatis, 1948).

<sup>20</sup> K. Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maksa Schelera* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1959).

<sup>21</sup> K. Wojtyła, *Akt i przeżycie etyczne* (1954), *Dobro i wartość* (1955), *Norma i szczęście* (1956). These were collected in *Wykłady lubelskie* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2006). English edition: *The Lublin Lectures*, translated by Hugh McDonald (Lublin: PTTA, 2020).

<sup>22</sup> K. Wojtyła, *Miłość i odpowiedzialność* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1960).

<sup>23</sup> K. Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn* (Kraków: Polskie Towarzystwo Teologiczne, 1969). There is a serious problem in translating the original title of *Osoba i czyn* into the English edition, *The Acting Person*, translated by Andrzej Potocki and edited by Anna T. Tymieniecka. Fr. Wierzbicki explains, "English translation of the title of that book *The Acting Person* is inaccurate, since for the author it is not a matter of a view of human action or of a view of man as an acting being, but of a metaphysical reduction of human act to its ontic source, which is the person. What a person is is revealed in the light of his act, in accordance with the classical principle *operari sequitur esse* [action follows being], to which Wojtyła refers directly, showing the presence of a metaphysical dimension in the phenomenological analysis of the experience 'man act.'" Alfred M. Wierzbicki, Introduction to *Man in the Field of Responsibility*, by Karol Wojtyła, trans. Kenneth W. Kemp and Zuzanna Maślanka Kieroń (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2011), xv. See also Małgorzata Jałoch-Palicka, "Spiritual Substance: The Essence of Man-Person According to Karol Wojtyła," *Studia Gilsoniana* 6, no. 1 (January March 2017): 97–130, <http://www.gilsonociety.com/files/097-130.pdf>; Kenneth L. Schmitz, *At the Center of the Human Drama, The*

*the Field of Responsibility*.<sup>26</sup> Among these works, *The Acting Person*, translated by A. Potocki and edited by T. Tymieniecka, is a major source in the author's research. Additionally, the most recent translated version, *Person and Act and Related Essays, The English Critical Edition of the Works of Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II* translated by Grzegorz Ignatik is also used by the author to clarify a number of Wojtyła's notions which seems to be translated differently in *The Acting Person*.

Other sources are secondary sources consisting of works of students, co-workers of Wojtyła, and some scholars including: Tadeusz Styczen, *Kardynał Karol Wojtyła-Filozof Moralista* (1979), Andrzej Szostek, *Karol Wojtyła's View of Human Person in the Light of the Experience of Morality* (1986), Rocco Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła the Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II* (1997), Miguel Acosta and Adrian J. Reimers, *Karol Wojtyła's Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person and Act* (2018), Grzegorz Hołub, Tadeusz Biesaga, Jarosław Merecki, Marek Kostur, *The Polish Cristian Philosophy in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century Karol Wojtyła* (2019), Tomasz Duma, *The Foundations of the Human Person's Dynamism in Karol Wojtyła's Anthropology. A Study in Light of "The Acting Person"* (2020), and Jarosław Merecki, *On the Sources of Karol Wojtyła's The Acting Person* (2021). These works as well as other works that are secondary sources should also be listed in the bibliography. The next source consists of classical texts from Plato's works to St. Thomas Aquinas and other relevant sources that I refer to and analyze to extract the main idea of subjectivity in the history of philosophy. The bibliographic list is closed with items classified as auxiliary literature.

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*Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II* (Washington: The Catholic University of America, 1993), 40.

<sup>24</sup> *Elementarz Etyczny's* original text is from the book: Karol Wojtyła, *Aby Chrystus się nami posługiwał* [That Christ may make use of us] (Kraków: Społeczny Instytut Wydawniczy "Znak", 1979), 127–182. The *Ethics Primer* edition translated by Hugh McDonald and published by PTTA Lublin and SITD Roma is available in bilingual, Polish and English.

<sup>25</sup> *Rozważania o istocie człowieka* was a manuscript of lectures which first delivered in 1949 for a group of students, members of the "Academic Pastoral Care" program, at St. Florian Church in Cracow where a young Fr. Karol Wojtyła exercised his ministry. It appeared in book form in 1999 and 2003, published by the Jesuit publisher WAM. In 2016, the Polish Association of St. Thomas Aquinas published the bilingual edition, Polish/English version. See Andrzej Maryniarczyk, From the Publisher to *Considerations on the Essence of Man*, by Karol Wojtyła (Lublin-Roma: PTTA SITD, 2016), 7–9; see also Jałoch-Palicka, "Spiritual Substance," 138, fn.31.

<sup>26</sup> It seems that it is the late and unfinished book. See Wierzbicki, Introduction to *Man in the Field of Responsibility*, vii, xvi; see also Grzegorz Hołub, "Philosophical Anthropology and Ethics in the Thought of Karol Wojtyła," *Studia Gilsoniana* 11, no.1 (January-March 2022): 153. DOI: 10.26385/SG.110105.

## **A Note of Terminology**

It is necessary to clarify the use of several terms in this dissertation to avoid ambiguity. I use the words “man” and “human being” interchangeably in this dissertation, as they have the same meaning. In Wojtyła’s work: *The Acting Person*, these two words are used interchangeably to denote the Polish term *człowiek*. The use of both words and the addition of the article “the” or “a,” along with the pronoun “his” refers to man in general and does not refer to a particular man. Likewise, the same thing applies to the use of the term “person” and the pronouns “I, he, his, himself, myself,” not intended to refer to the individual person but to everyone or all persons in general.

# CHAPTER I

## THE CONTEXT OF DISCUSSION ON SUBJECTIVITY

In this first chapter, I want to present the problem of subjectivity in philosophy. I will not discuss all concepts of subjectivity but only the most significant positions. The presentation will be limited to highlighting this problem from naturalistic, spiritualistic, existentialistic, and metaphysical points of view. Indeed, all the interpretations that will be looked over are not the main focus of my dissertation review, but I consider it is essential to show them so that we realize that the problem of subjectivity is one of the crucial problems in philosophy. This problem has received serious attention in the history of philosophy, especially from modern times to the present.

### 1.1. Terminological Explanation of Subjectivity

Subjectivity is reviewed and discussed in various scientific disciplines. For contexts outside of Philosophy, subjectivity alludes to something lacking objectivity, which cannot be objectively seated and dissolves only subjectively. Subjectivity may be easily seen as something that colors our thoughts and understandings which hinder the achievement of objective knowledge, so subjectivity should be left behind or placed aside for the scientific pursuit of truth.<sup>1</sup>

Subjectivity is a complex and elusive notion and it is rather difficult to define it. This notion also has a long and intriguing history. More or less, in Philosophy, subjectivity is related to such notions as consciousness, human agency, and self.<sup>2</sup> According to some commentators, St. Augustine paid attention to the importance of the *inner man* (*interiore homine*). Nevertheless, there are also a number of commentators who argue that subjectivity arose in classical philosophy by Protagoras and Aristotle. The notion of subjectivity of Protagoras was found in his famous expression, and articulated by Socrates, “Of all things the measure is Man, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not.”<sup>3</sup> This statement

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<sup>1</sup> Dan Zahavi, “Subjectivity and the First-Person Perspective,” *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* XLV (2007): 66, [https://www.academia.edu/4374051/Subjectivity\\_and\\_the\\_First\\_Person\\_Perspective](https://www.academia.edu/4374051/Subjectivity_and_the_First_Person_Perspective).

<sup>2</sup> Marina F. Bykova, “On the Problem of Subjectivity: Editor’s Introduction,” *Russian Studies in Philosophy* 56, no. 1 (2018): 1, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10611967.2018.1471254>. For further explanation, see also Norman Malcolm, “Subjectivity,” *Philosophy* 63, no. 244 (April 1988): 147–160, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3750411>; Albert Shalom, “Subjectivity,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 38, no. 2 (December 1984): 227–273, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20128151>; Shadworth H. Hodgson, “Subjectivity in Philosophy. A Reply,” *Mind* 8, no. 29 (January 1883): 92–101, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2246825>.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, *Theaetetus* 152a, Perseus Digital Library, accessed December 20, 2021,

reveals that man as a measure of all material entities is accessible to the senses. However, man is understood to be an empirical man, so there is no subject in the metaphysical sense of the statement. Man is the measure of knowledge of what exists, but not his own being; there is, therefore, subjectivity, but not yet a subject.<sup>4</sup> It is only related to the characterization of human knowledge.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, subjectivity is also associated with Aristotle's notion on empirical self as the "rational soul" capable of processing thought.<sup>6</sup> However, subjectivity is recognized as a philosophical problem in the early modern period.<sup>7</sup> It was René Descartes who moved subjectivity into the main stage of philosophy, based on the first person perspective of "my self-awareness."<sup>8</sup> Subjectivity becomes an important concept in his philosophical system—where *cogito* becomes a single fact that cannot be debated and determines other facts—and then gives space for further philosophical systems such as idealism and phenomenology.

The concepts of subjectivity, as well as the self or "I" in modern and contemporary times, stem from Descartes's problematic description of the human situation in terms of natural philosophy and rationalism. Heidegger argues that philosophy after Descartes became an expression of the subjectification of Being, in which everything was seen in relation to self-awareness.<sup>9</sup> Subjectivity can be understood as a capacity for our reflective activities. Here, we question, what constitutes subjective experience or what is the basis of the subjective experience of one's self? After Fichte and Hegel argued about self-consciousness that emerged before or after relations with others, contemporary philosophers also debated whether subjectivity precedes or follows encounters with others.<sup>10</sup> From Kant's time to the German idealists (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), the theory of subjectivity has accommodated the integration of cognition and action or practical agents which include moral agents, body and mind integration and the integration of individual subjects with their natural and social environment. More specifically,

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<https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0172%3Atext%3DTheaet.%3Asection%3D152a>; To find this notion and its explanation, see also Elena L. Chertkova, "Subjectivity as the Theme of Philosophy: Stages of the Development," *Russian Studies in Philosophy* 56, no. 1, (2018): 39–48, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10611967.2018.1448645>; Steve Fuller, "The Metaphysical Standing of the Human: A Future for the History of the Human Sciences," *History of the Human Sciences* 32 (2019): 23–40, DOI: 10.1177/0952695118807118.

<sup>4</sup> Chertkova, "Subjectivity as the Theme of Philosophy," 42.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>6</sup> Bykova, "On the Problem of Subjectivity," 1.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Kim Atkins, "Commentary on Descartes," in *Self and Subjectivity* (Chardon: Blackwell Publishing, 2005): 7. The elucidation of Descartes' notion of subjectivity, see also Andrea Strazzoni, "Subjectivity and individuality: Two Stands in Early Modern Philosophy, Introduction," *Society and Politics*, 9, no. 1(17), (April 2015): 5–9, <https://socpol.uvvg.ro/docs/2015-1/1.pdf>; Hubert Schwyzer, "Subjectivity in Kant and Descartes," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 47 no.188 (July 1997): 342–357, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00063>.

<sup>9</sup> Roger Frei, *Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Modern Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: A Study of Sartre, Binswanger, Lacan, and Habermas* (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), 8.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 11.



for German idealists, subjectivity is not ontological but functional. Subjectivity is not exclusively as active, but as entirely in activity. Subjectivity is revealed by what it does and how it does it, not by what it is made of.<sup>11</sup> In this contemporary period, the theory of subjectivity continues to develop with various complexities of interpretations.

This brief explanation of the term subjectivity explains that the subjectivity problem is not a simple problem that is easily explained. However, in this work, I try to expound it from perspective of Karol Wojtyła's philosophical anthropology by continuing to discuss some thoughts from classical to contemporary philosophy.

Karol Wojtyła viewed subjectivity not only in terms of human understanding from the cosmological paradigm such as Aristotle that man is a rational being, and all of his activities are the actualization of his potencies. He also did not limit it to a metaphysical concept that emphasizes the individuality of a person based on his rational nature, such as Boethius' concept that a person is a *rasionalis naturae individua substantia*. Wojtyła saw deeper into a man on the uniqueness of human subjectivity, which was based on the person. Therefore, Wojtyła did not reject Aristotle's cosmological concept or Thomistic conception which is based on Boethius' personalistic concept, but instead saw the uniqueness of human subjectivity,<sup>12</sup> from different way. It can be said that his view complements their notion with the philosophy of consciousness. Thus, in Wojtyła's anthropology, subjectivity is not only subjective but also objective.

A deeper explanation of subjectivity will be explained in Chapters 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup>, but I would like to precede that by giving a brief description of the problem of subjectivity. This will be discussed in chapter 1<sup>st</sup>. For Wojtyła, subjectivity, as an anthropological problem, must be analyzed from a realistic metaphysical perspective and philosophy of consciousness. That means that subjectivity is seen, first of all, in its manifestation in experience. Subjectivity refers to both the subject and its actions. Actualization of the subjectivity in man without relation to the conscious person as a subject is only a subjectiveness of what happens in man. Here, the role of consciousness is an important factor of "I" in the experience of subjectivity. Through consciousness, I reflect on and experience myself as really my own "I" and a subject of action, as well as I reflect and experience that the action is really my action.

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<sup>11</sup> Bykova, "On the Problem of Subjectivity," 3

<sup>12</sup> See Wojtyła, "Subjectivity and the Irreducible," 211–212.

## 1.2. Naturalistic Conception

Naturalism is a system of thought in philosophy that interprets reality based on scientific methods. There are various systems of this thought, but in general, naturalists emphasize that there is no supernatural or spiritual reality and scientific approaches or methods should be used to investigate reality including the typical human activities like thinking, decisions, morality or religious acts. In this section, problem of subjectivity will be explored based on a naturalistic approach which clearly appeared at the beginning of philosophy in ancient Greek, and was developed to a fuller extent in modern times.

### 1.2.1. Ancient Greek Monism

Materialistic monists, in early ancient Greek, understood that everything came from matter, including man. In the context of man, this kind of monism rejected the view, present in ancient religious beliefs, that body and soul were separated substances. This school of thought rather argued that the body and soul are one substance. Both constitute man. But the main claim found in the ancient Greek monism is the placement of matter as the primordial principle or *arche* of all things. Matter as the primordial principle is eternal, simple, endowed with life and cannot be destroyed.<sup>13</sup> We know the representatives of materialistic monism in names of philosophers such as Thales, Anaximenes, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Democritus, etc. They explained that the basic principle of everything was matter, but they had a different view of the type of matter that was the principle of everything.

Thales (585 BC) has stated that the principle of everything that exists was water. Water was the central element and essence of everything. Anaximenes (6th Century BC) has stated that the principle of all things was air. Air was the beginning and essence of everything that exists. Heraclitus (540–480 BC) was concerned with change, so it revealed that the principle of everything that exists was fire. The nature of fire was dynamism and mutability. The primordial particle of fire imparts a certain character of “mobility” to everything so that the change occurs in everything as a modification of fire. According to him, the fragile existence of material things expressed the eternal law of the *logos*, which is the law of passing away. This law emphasizes that everything flows and nothing is constant (*pánta rhéi kai oudén ménei*).<sup>14</sup> Hence, material things are manifestation of the universal nature of fire and at the same time carry out the

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<sup>13</sup> See Andrzej Maryniarczyk SDB, *The Monistic and Dualistic Interpretation of Reality Notebook on Metaphysics*, vol. 1, trans. Hugh McDonald (Lublin: PTTA, 2010), 50.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 54.

unchanging and eternal law of *logos*. These primordial material elements were understood as the entirety of reality, whereas particular things, such as human beings, animals, plants, are multiplications of these primordial elements. It means that there was only one universal nature of being and no individual or particular one. The plurality of reality was an illusion and therefore secondary in human knowledge, because everything was from one and everything was one.<sup>15</sup> If particular things experience destruction, then they will return in to primordial elements of this matter.

If man is a particular thing which is a multiplication of primordial material element, then human personality or selfhood or essence is nothing more than some form of matter. Human individuality also concerns only something external and phenomenal. The man differs from other entities only in his external form of primordial particles and proportions.<sup>16</sup> Admittedly, Ancient Greek philosophers also used the concept of the soul, but for them, the soul was only a property of primordial particles. Indeed, these monistic philosophers did not realize and make a difference between spirit and matter, nor did they realize the implications of that.<sup>17</sup> Everything that is spiritual in nature originates and is determined by matter. For them, this reality including man is determined solely by primordial matter. In the context of action, it is the law of nature that determines human actions. The term subjectivity and, subject of action, of course, have not yet become a concern of these philosophers, because the ultimate problem of their philosophical investigations concerned reason or foundation of existence of entities.<sup>18</sup> However, the problem of subjectivity could be related with primordial matter.

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>16</sup> See Ibid., 58.

<sup>17</sup> See Frederick Copleston SJ, *History of Philosophy Volume I: Greek and Rome. From the Pre Socratics to Plotinus* (New York: Doubleday, 1962), 20.

<sup>18</sup> See Maryniarczyk, *The Monistic and Dualistic Interpretation*, 47.

### 1.2.2. Marxism

Karl Marx combined two great thoughts for the construction of his philosophy. He took the dialectical method from Hegel's philosophy and Feuerbach's materialism.<sup>19</sup> Marx's philosophical theory was then built on dialectical materialism.

Hegel once made a famous statement that shook the academic world in Berlin: "what is rational is real and what is real is rational."<sup>20</sup> Marx, as a left-wing Hegelian, interpreted that a political system is only truly real if it is also rational. For Marx, there was an inconsistency in the dialectics of Hegelian thought. For him, Hegel's philosophy was a peak of rationality, but rationality still remained in the dimension of thought. The social-political reality has not been touched at all.<sup>21</sup> Marx also followed Feuerbach, who rejected the core of Hegel's metaphysics, which emphasized that the universal spirit revealed itself in human thought and history. For Feuerbach, the universal spirit was only a creation of the mind and is not real. The only real is a man. From this critique, Feuerbach then criticized religion. For him, religion and God are only projections of the human mind. And for Feuerbach, religion is man's alienation from himself.<sup>22</sup>

For Marx, there was an important question that Feuerbach did not answer: why people alienated themselves into religion. For him, people alienated themselves into this imaginary situation because the situation of society was not conducive for man to realize himself seriously. For Marx, people fled to religion as alienation from themselves, because they were oppressed by the system of society.<sup>23</sup> The oppressive system of society is the system of capitalist society. In this system, the capitalists enslave the workers or the proletariat. For Marx, capitalism is also a form of human self-alienation. It happened because in this system, workers did not work freely according to their talents and interests to develop themselves but were forced to survive. Therefore, Marx encourages a revolution without class. Revolution would present a socialist society. And for man to return to his own nature and be free from alienations, there must be the elimination of productive private ownership rights.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, Marx said that the human

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<sup>19</sup> Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, *I-Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology* (New Britain, Conn: Mariel Publication, 1983), 48.

<sup>20</sup> G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 20; see also J. Loewenberg, "Reviewed Work: *The Ethical Theory of Hegel: A Study of the Philosophy of Right* by Hugh A. Reayburn," *The Philosophical Review* 32, no. 5 (September 1923): 551–556, [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2179593?seq=2#metadata\\_info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2179593?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents).

<sup>21</sup> Franz Magnis-Suseno, *Dari Mao ke Marcuse: Percikan Filsafat Marxis Pasca Lenin* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2013), 7.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 14.

essence was not an inherent abstraction in every single individual.<sup>25</sup> In reality, it is an ensemble of social relations. Therefore, man does not have anything outside of society. It also cannot only exist outside the society but also cannot think independently of society.<sup>26</sup>

In contemporary times, Marxism discussed human problems with concern for ontological and axiological status. According to Marxists, man is a natural being. But there is a qualitative characteristic that distinguishes man from other creations, namely on three basic things: awareness, work and social relations.<sup>27</sup> These characteristics are conceived as the ontic structure of man.

With regard to work, this is a characteristic that distinguishes man from other natural creations. Through work, man shows himself as a natural and conscious being who dominates the world. Work shows that man is a conscious being who also has a goal which is to make the world a human world, with its civilization and culture. In addition, work also transforms the existence of man and himself. Thus, the work or the process of creation is a process of self-creation.<sup>28</sup>

In fact, human consciousness is different from animals. Man has self-consciousness. Animals are directed to the world and the environment around them by instinct. Human consciousness is reflective, universal, and free. Therefore, man can reflect himself independent of nature and can dominate it.

Regarding social relations, as the ontic structure of man, Marxism teaches that man has lived in unity with others. Unity with others is necessary. This unity guarantees human preservation and the creation of situations for the future of human development. Marxists believe that man does not have anything independently and personally. Society is first and foremost. Man is like *tabula rasa*. It is this society that has shaped the particular individuality of man and demonstrated how to act in real social situations. Thus, the social relations in which there is work and awareness that shape a man. Personality is only a function of social relations. Thus, the subject of human action does not refer to the person, because the person is only a function. The subject of human action is focused on social relations in society. Therefore human subjectivity is determined by the social relations of society.

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<sup>25</sup> Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. V (New York: International Publisher, 1975), 7; Krapiec, *I-Man*, 50.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 49.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

### 1.2.3. Frederick Nietzsche

Nietzsche's notion of self or the subject is inseparable from the concept of will to power. He made a distinction of his theory of will from the earlier philosopher, Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer distinguished between particular will and metaphysical will. He argued that in experience there were desires that kept changing. What drives these desires to continue to exist? For Schopenhauer, that is because of the will (*Wille*).<sup>29</sup> For him, the core of life and even the core of the universe, which always wants to change and always have new desires, is the will. It penetrates all the particular wills that exist in the universe without certain finality.

For Schopenhauer, the will is not causality (*causa sui*) in a metaphysical sense, because it has no purpose. Nevertheless, the will is the essence of the life of the universe. Or in other words, the world is constituted by something that is an unconscious, striving force that is the will. The will manifests in many forms of living things.<sup>30</sup> In the human context, the will uses the intellect as one of the instruments to manifest itself.

Nietzsche disagreed with this notion and criticized it. For him, the two wills were similar and cannot be distinguished. According to Nietzsche, all living things, including man, was imbued with urge which was creative and also destructive. The urge is not merely reactive but has transformative energy, which he calls "will to power."<sup>31</sup> He stated that "this world is the Will to Power—and nothing else and you yourselves too are this Will to Power—and nothing else."<sup>32</sup> It is the essence of universe and as a process of becoming and it exists in its manifestation. It also can be found in everything and everywhere. However, it cannot be understood in a metaphysical sense.<sup>33</sup>

For Nietzsche, the will involves the entire human body, which it appears as something that whacks, stimulates and moves the body. The will also consists of various elements including

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<sup>29</sup> See A. Setyo Wibowo, *Gaya Filsafat Nietzsche*, (Yogyakarta: PT. Kanisius, 2017), 262.

<sup>30</sup> Kim Atkins, "Commentary on Nietzsche," in *Self and Subjectivity* (Chardon: Blackwell Publishing, 2005): 71.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. Other references to more explanation about "will to power," see G. Watts Cunningham, "On Nietzsche's Doctrine of the Will to Power," *The Philosophical Review* 28, no. 5 (September 1919): 479–490, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2178323>; William Mackintire Salter, "Nietzsche's Moral Aim and Will to Power," *International Journal of Ethics* 25, no. 3 (April 1915): 372–403, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2376825>; Wolfgang Müller-Lauter and Drew E. Griffin, "Nietzsche's teaching of Will to Power," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, no. 4/5 (Autumn 1992/Spring 1993): 37–101, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20717572>; Donovan Miyasaki, "Nietzsche's Will to Power as Naturalist Critical Ontology," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (July 2013): 251–269, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43488072>; Christian J. Emden, "Nietzsche's Will to Power: Biology, Naturalism, and Normativity," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 47, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 30–60, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jnietstud.47.1.0030>.

<sup>32</sup> Frederick Copleston SJ, *A History of Philosophy Volume VII Modern Philosophy: From the Post-Kantian Idealists to Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche*, (New York-London: Doubleday, 1965), 407.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

reason. For him, the reason was in the will and what was in the will was not the reason but the entire human body. The will was also understood as the “affect of the command,” which was not simply for desiring, striving and demanding, but commanded, regulated and unified the elements in themselves without eliminating one element and without also allowing one element to be absorbed by another.<sup>34</sup> Thus, the unity of all the elements in one subject is called the will. Human activity or psychological activity in the human being is an expression of the will to power.<sup>35</sup>

In Nietzsche’s notion of self, “I” or the subject is a unity arising from the process of unifying those urges. Or in other words, the process of unifying the plurality of urges in the human body those results in the emergence of the will or “I.”<sup>36</sup> Here, he considers that the will and “I” are the same as the synthesis of the unifying process. For him, the will is his own, his own body, his own strength and weakness. He does not understand desire as popular understanding. He also rejects the substrate notion of self. Kim Atkins explains the following:

What we call the self, on his view, is just a unity of urges that compose the living body. It is a “subject unity,” rather like the head of a community. However, the head is not one individual of the community, but its entirety. Nietzsche stresses the point that there is no doer behind the deed, no thinker behind the thought; the domain of the self is the entire complex living organism, a living unity of urges. Nietzsche specifically rejects the substrate view of “self,” arguing that this view arises from a fundamental confusion where from the fact that something is done (thinking, willing, feeling, etc.), a certain kind of doer is inferred, whose nature consists in just these acts – that is, a thinking, willing, feeling thing.<sup>37</sup>

Thus, self and subjectivity are determined merely by transformative energy which has been explained previously as the will to power. Moreover, For Nietzsche, the harnessing of the transformative energy of the will to power results in a new and more powerful form of life that overcomes self-suffering. He refers to it as *Übermensch*, or “overman,” which is often translated as “superman.” *Übermensch* is a man who puts his inner world at the service of non-rational impulses to create an authentic and unique existence.<sup>38</sup> For him, the *Übermensch* creates a new

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<sup>34</sup> Wibowo, *Gaya Filsafat Nietzsche*, 285; see also Müller-Lauter and Griffin, “Nietzsche’s Teaching of Will to Power”; Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, “Nietzsche’s Doctrine of the Will to Power,” in *Nietzsche as German Philosopher*, ed. Otfried Höffe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 115–200.

<sup>35</sup> See Copleston, *A History of Modern Philosophy Volume VII*, 408 & 412.

<sup>36</sup> Wibowo, *Gaya Filsafat Nietzsche*, 289.

<sup>37</sup> Atkins, “Commentary on Nietzsche,” 72.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 73. Regarding *Übermensch*, see also Bernd Magnus, “Perfectibility and Attitude in Nietzsche’s ‘Übermensch,’” *The Review of Metaphysics* 36, no. 3 (March 1983): 633–659, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20127877>; Luke Phillips, “Sublimation and the *Übermensch*,” *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 46, no. 3 (Autumn 2015): 349–366,

form of life out of the deconstruction of Christian customs. This is the man who is “the most exuberant, most living and most world-affirming man.”<sup>39</sup>

#### 1.2.4. Psychoanalytic View

Psychoanalysis was originally developed by Sigmund Freud in order to build theories about the structure of human personality as well as to show a different direction from the psychology of consciousness that has developed since the birth of modern psychology.<sup>40</sup> Modern psychology, from the beginning, was inseparable from the influence of Descartes’ philosophy of consciousness. For Descartes, unconscious psychic activity is a contradiction because psychic life is tantamount to consciousness.<sup>41</sup> Therefore, psychoanalysis comes by setting a different direction from previous psychology.

Psychoanalysis distinguished itself from previous psychology by trying to find the cause of psychological phenomena that were very often unknown to consciousness. The discovery of the cause of the phenomenon found the unconscious aspect of the psychic as a suppressed desire. This aspect of the unconscious has an important role in motivating the life of a conscious psychic. Psychoanalysis is also concerned with the historical approach of evolution in seeing psychological phenomena. Psychic phenomena with impulses in them, especially sexual urges, are actualizations of personal characteristics that have emerged in childhood.

Freud explained that impulses or sexual energy, which he called *libido*, were the principal power of human life.<sup>42</sup> In the analysis of neurosis patients it was found that there are types of neurotic disorders caused by actual sexual life and past events. He also incorporated *libido* and instinct in his theory of sexual drive. Both are really fundamental drives in life. Both are sexual drive as well as drive of pleasure and also self-preservation. Those are instincts of life called *Eros*. For him, these impulses arise from human organisms, and at the same time, these

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[https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jnietstud.46.3.0349?seq=1&cid=pdfreference#references\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jnietstud.46.3.0349?seq=1&cid=pdfreference#references_tab_contents); Paul S. Loeb, “Finding the Übermensch in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality,” *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, no. 30 (Autumn 2005): 70–101, [http://www.jstor.com/stable/20717864?seq=1&cid=pdfreference#references\\_tab\\_contents](http://www.jstor.com/stable/20717864?seq=1&cid=pdfreference#references_tab_contents).

<sup>39</sup> Atkins, “Commentary on Nietzsche,” 73.

<sup>40</sup> The term Psychoanalysis is generally used in several senses. Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, in his book *I-Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology* has mentioned it. First, psychoanalysis means empirical observation of such psychological determinants of personality that don't permit themselves to be uncovered by an analysis of rational motivation. Second, psychoanalytic is intended as a method or a complex of activities directed toward the disclosure and examination of unconscious psychical activities for the purpose of psychical therapy by removing disorders caused by these unconscious factors. Third, psychoanalysis as a theoretical anthropological system which would have been a theoretical conception truly rooted in empirical observation but modeled on hypothetically deductive theory. Krąpiec, *I-Man*, 51.

<sup>41</sup> Kees Bertens, *Etika* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2013), 53.

<sup>42</sup> Krąpiec, *I-Man*, 53.



impulses exist as physiological drives and mental representations.<sup>43</sup> Meanwhile, based on observation of war, he explained aggression as an expression of the instinct of death, called *Thanatos*. As such, psychological life is only a function of the biological energy system. That way, the soul or something mental is the expression of the second arrangement of bodily functions.<sup>44</sup> The dialectical strain between the two passes through the unconscious, pre-conscious, and conscious phases.

In subsequent developments, Freud established three areas of human life or sometimes also seen as the structure of human personality, namely the *Id* (it), *Ego* (self), *Superego* (super self). These three areas are related to the unconscious, pre-conscious and conscious phases. The *Id* is an instinctual drive that is indeed unconscious. The *Ego* has the greatest complexity because it deals with the whole mental life that combines aspects of the unconscious, pre-conscious, and conscious systems. The *Superego* can be described as conscience.<sup>45</sup> As Atkins explains that "It is an unconscious, socially acquired mechanism that controls thought and behavior, a kind of censor, or 'moralizer' of the mind."<sup>46</sup> The *Ego* becomes the center of conscious life and plays an important role in reconciling the demands of the impulse of the *Id* and the demands of social reality, as well as to reconcile the demands of the *Id* and the prohibition of the *Superego*. In terms of actions or behavior, the *Ego* stands between the instinctual drive and the action. The *Ego* transforms energy into specific actions or behavior in the material world.<sup>47</sup> The *Ego* is also responsible for the repression or defense mechanisms of self-destruction and violence from direct conscious expression in thoughts, feelings, and actions. *Ego* is among other the domain of moral agency, free will and choice. The problem is that every psychological or mental life is only a function of the biological energy system. The subject, as traditionally understood, is replaced or reduced to the strong power of the *Id*, and the *Superego*, which is based on a biological energy system. Thus, Freud's psychoanalysis reduces human subjectivity only to biological forces or energies (instinct) which are absorbed or decentered in the three agencies: *Id*, *Ego* and *Superego*.

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Kim Atkins, "Commentary on Freud," in *Self and Subjectivity* (Chardon: Blackwell Publishing, 2005): 196.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 197.

### 1.2.5. Evolutionism

Evolutionism seeks to explain humanity as the most perfect stage of natural evolution, in relation to the laws of nature. A concept of a human being from the perspective of biological evolutionism is shown by J. Huxley. According to him, origin, human development and structure are the definite results of an evolutionary process.<sup>48</sup> In philosophy, evolutionism influenced many contemporary philosophical currents dealing with the problem of the human being, which will be discussed in the following paragraphs. The presentation of evolutionism in this section will be limited to P. Teilhard de Chardin's view. He was a thinker who did not deny transcendence, as the representatives of naturalism used to do. However, his strict reliance on the theory of evolution gives grounds for describing his views as "evolutionism of a naturalistic, monistic and pantheistic nature."<sup>49</sup> Due to Teilhard's broad influence, especially on Christian philosophers and theologians, it is worth briefly referring to his statement. His view of evolutionism is influenced by his background as a geologist, palaeontologist and priest. Therefore, he tried to integrate the ideas of evolutionism and the teachings of Christianity, especially Christian revelation.

According to Teilhard, we cannot make a sharp distinction between matter and non-matter like Creationism. Creationism argues that it is impossible for living things to originate from non-living.<sup>50</sup> For Teilhard, matter always contains a spirit that can be understood as both life and consciousness. Teilhard stated:

To the extent that it is subject to experiment, the phenomenon of spirit is not a divided mass; it displays a general manner of being, a collective state peculiar to our world. In other words, scientifically speaking, there are no spirits in nature. But there is spirit, physically defined by a certain tension of consciousness on the surface of the earth. This animate covering of our planet may with advantage be called the biosphere or more precisely (if we are only considering its thinking fringe) the noosphere.<sup>51</sup>

It means that matter from the beginning has an internal aspect (*le dedans*) and an external aspect (*le dehors*).<sup>52</sup> The external aspect is the physical-chemical aspect, and the inner aspect is the aspect of conscious life. If the "inner aspect" reaches a fairly large intensity, then life emerges. Man is an example of life, because of his great internal intensity. He also stressed the law of

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<sup>48</sup> See Krapiec, *I-Man*, 39.

<sup>49</sup> Philippe de la Trinité, *Rome et Teilhard de Chardin. Paryż: Arthème Fayard*, (Paris: Arthème Fayard, 1964), 38.

<sup>50</sup> Kees Bertens, *Sejarah Filsafat Kontemporer: Perancis*, Jilid II (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2013), 40.

<sup>51</sup> Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "The Phenomenon of Spirituality," *Human Energy* (London: Collins, 1969), 95. Such quotation can be found also in Krapiec, *I-Man*, 43–44.

<sup>52</sup> Bertens, *Sejarah Filsafat Kontemporer: Perancis*, 40; P.A. Van der Weij, *Filsuf-Filsuf Besar tentang Manusia*, dialihbahasakan oleh K. Bertens (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2014), 194–195.

complexity-consciousness (*La loi de complexite-conscienciere*). It means that this law emphasizes the close relationship between the complexity of the material structure and the intensity of consciousness. Therefore, if the external aspect is more complex, the internal aspect is more intensive. These two things are what gave rise to human life. For him, higher awareness and complex anatomical structures are two aspects that meet the same phenomenon.

Thus, the inner aspect or spirit or consciousness is not something foreign to the world, and it is just a situation that is different from matter. He stated: "This irrefutably explains the links and also the contradictions between spirit and matter. And in a sense they are both fundamentally the same thing."<sup>53</sup> Thus, spirit or consciousness, which is nothing but a situation different from matter, manifests itself in personality. Personality arises from natural processes which are united with consciousness. In this personality, there is a static morality which is based on obedience to commands changing to dynamic morality. This morality is a movement that tends towards the future in the search for God. It is the dynamic morality that is most important that shows the existence of radical and total evolution. This total evolution produces a new human being that is characterized by love and social passion and shows that God is the beginning and the end, *alpha* and *omega*. Here, Teilhard shows concern for his faith and the teachings of his evolution that after concentration on him, man will evolve into concentration into God as a new central point. He assumes God is the creator (*Alpha*) and the final point (*Omega*) of all evolution. He also quoted the words of St. Paul that, God may be all in all (1 Cor 15:28).<sup>54</sup>

The evolutionism concept of Teilhard, a synthesis of natural science and his Christian faith, explains that man is the culmination and end of the evolution of the material world. In fact, the synthesis of his thought background illuminated by faith produces human ideas that are interpreted in a trans-science way. However, when viewed from a philosophical perspective, the idea of evolutionism does not explain the ontic structure of man. Therefore, human actions that require the involvement of elements in the ontic structure are more influenced and determined by the spirit, which is another situation of matter. This indicates that it is difficult to find both subject and subjectivity in the understanding of evolutionism.

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<sup>53</sup> de Chardin, "The Phenomenon of Spirituality," 96. Krąpiec, *I-Man*. 44.

<sup>54</sup> Bertens, *Sejarah Filsafat Kontemporer: Perancis*, 44; Van der Weij, *Filsuf-Filsuf Besar*, 198.

### 1.2.6. Structuralism

Structuralism, which I mean in this work, was a school of thought that developed in France in the 60s as a reaction to phenomenology and existentialism.<sup>55</sup> Not all those involved in this school of thought are professional philosophers, but their works have philosophical implications, such as those of Claude Levi Strauss.<sup>56</sup> Understanding of subjectivity in the context of structuralism will be limited to Levi Strauss and Jacques Lacan's thought.

In his cultural anthropological thought, Levi Strauss explores the relationship between linguistics and anthropology. For example, the kinship system can be considered the same as the language system because of relations and communication. Both can be equated because it is a communication, dialogue or exchange system. Those are products of the unreflexive or unconscious human mind or psyche.<sup>57</sup> Levi Strauss followed structuralists like G.F. de Saussure emphasizing the linguistic aspect in structuralistic analyses. He believed that objective human language contained everything that was de facto expressed and became human property. Language is a structure that embraces all human spiritual possibilities.<sup>58</sup> In this way, a human being with his spiritual aspects as well as kinship relationships in ethnographic studies or cultural anthropology is explained through an objective linguistic structure. Levi Strauss understands that all this is conditioned by the objective function of language.

In his work entitled *The Savage Mind* (1962), Levi Strauss explained that there was no principal difference between savage and tame thought, between primitive and current thought. These thoughts are logical in different ways. Primitive thought is a concrete thought and it works on a sensory level.<sup>59</sup> This kind of thinking is suitable for structural investigation that is the inquiry of the unconscious level and the classification of the existence of oppositions and differences. Thus, the difference between these forms of thought lies in the level of historical development in which man finds himself.

From this kind of thinking, Levi Strauss developed his thoughts on the very materialistic mind or psychic life of human being. For him, the human mind is nothing but an object. Levi Strauss says as follows: "As the mind too is a thing, the functioning of this thing teaches us something about the nature of things: even pure reflection is in thing last analysis an

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<sup>55</sup> Bertens, *Sejarah Filsafat Kontemporer: Perancis*, 174.

<sup>56</sup> Claude Levi Strauss is not a philosopher, he is more a cultural anthropologist

<sup>57</sup> Bertens, *Sejarah Filsafat Kontemporer: Perancis*, 188.

<sup>58</sup> Krapiec, *I-Man*, 64.

<sup>59</sup> Bertens, *Sejarah Filsafat Kontemporer: Perancis*, 194.

internalization of the cosmos.”<sup>60</sup> Levi Strauss considers the mind or psychological aspects of a human being to be only part of the material world. The human mind is a part of the cosmos or material reality that reflects the cosmos itself. From the human mind, we can see the material reality in the cosmos and truth in the human mind is from the world. Levi Strauss stated:

Seen in this light, therefore, myself is no more opposed to others than man is opposed to the world: the truths learnt through man are “of the world,” and they are important for this reason. This explains why I regard anthropology as the principle of all research.<sup>61</sup>

Furthermore, regarding the human mind, he said it did not originate from the subject. The thinking was classifying or differentiating. The subject had no role. Therefore, he rejected Descartes’ *cogito* concept. For him, thinking only shows the human practice of structures contained in reality, which is the reality of things. Thus, for him, the aspect of the human mind or psyche is not something special in the midst of other beings.

How to understand the man in Levi Strauss’ concept of structuralism? Man can only be understood based on ethnology. “I” is only the appearance or interiorization of objective language.<sup>62</sup> In the structure of objective language, and not in history, man can be understood and explained and based on it we can apprehend the unconscious psyche of man. Hence, he radically rejected also the human subject. It can be reduced to the structure of language. Therefore, on the basis of structuralism, human subjectivity and transcendence are ignored.<sup>63</sup>

Jacques Lacan, a structuralist psychoanalyst of French, strongly emphasized the aspect of language as a guideline for turning psychoanalysis into authentic anthropology. Freud has shown a deeper layer in man, i.e., the unconscious layer. Lacan explains it in a linguistic light in which there is a fundamental similarity.<sup>64</sup> Language is a system consisting of relations and oppositions which are not designed by man. The unconscious is a structure and man does not control this structure. Man adapts to it. For Lacan, subject is formed linguistically. The formation of subjectivity is intrinsically bound to the linguistic relations to others.<sup>65</sup> Man as subject/self is not like an isolated monad but from very early on he enters into communication with others through exploration of his body. The image of the body is needed as an intermediary in the construction

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<sup>60</sup> Claude Levi Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, trans. George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd (London: The Garden City Press Limited, 1966), 248; see also Bertens, *Sejarah Filsafat Kontemporer: Perancis*, 93.

<sup>61</sup> Levi Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, 248.

<sup>62</sup> Krapiec, *I-Man*, 67–69.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 70

<sup>64</sup> Tobin Siebers, *The Ethics of Criticism* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), 159; see also Jan Miel, “Jacques Lacan and the Structure of the Unconscious,” *Yale French Studies*, no. 36/37 (1966): 104–111, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2930403>.

<sup>65</sup> Frie, *Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity*, 12.

of the subject, so that the subject is not the result of pure perception.<sup>66</sup> Communication is a condition of the formation of the self or subject and not vice versa as a result or consequence. So, the communication is primary, the subject is secondary. Therefore, Lacan also rejected the idea of *cogito* or consciousness as a subject.<sup>67</sup> He considers the *cogito* as a moment or an element. Man as *cogito* is not the center of structuration. *Cogito* is not someone who creates structure, but someone who is structured. This means that it is the result or product.<sup>68</sup>

He is the same as Levi Strauss who radically rejects the *cogito* as a subject. Therefore, human subjectivity is not related to *cogito* or anything spiritual. Subjectivity is also better understood as the result of a structuring process that is not controlled by a human being. Here, there is a lack of being at the heart of subjectivity.<sup>69</sup>

### 1.2.7. Behaviorism

Behaviorism is a doctrine or scientific study of a living being's behavior. Behaviorism is built on the assumption that behavior is what organisms do.<sup>70</sup> As a scientific study, behaviorism, in particular, highlights the behavior of individual organisms, whether human or animal.

There are three types of behaviorism, namely: methodological, psychological and analytical behaviorism.<sup>71</sup> Methodological behaviorism claims that psychology is the science of behavior and not the science of inner mind. Psychological behaviorism stresses that behavior can be described and explained without significant reference to mental states or internal psychological processes. The source of behavior is from outside, from the environment. While analytical behaviorism claims that mental terms or concepts are disseminated in the description and explanation of behavior. Mental terms or concepts should be replaced or translated into behavioristic terms and concepts.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> See Edith Kurzweil, "Jacques Lacan: French Freud," *Theory and Society* 10, no. 3 (May 1981): 423, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/657471>; see also Diana Gasparyan, "Mirror for the Other: Problem of the Self in Continental Philosophy (from Hegel to Lacan)," *Integr Psych Behav* 48 (2014): 1–17, DOI 10.1007/s12124-013-9247-x.

<sup>67</sup> Frie, *Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity*, 12.

<sup>68</sup> Bertens, *Sejarah Filsafat Kontemporer: Perancis*, 200; see also S. Ysseling, "Structuralism and Psychoanalysis in the work of Jacques Lacan," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 10 (1970): 102–117, DOI: 10.5840/ipq19701017.

<sup>69</sup> Frie, *Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity*, 12.

<sup>70</sup> George Graham, "Behaviorism," in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, accessed September 20, 2021, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism/>.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid. Methodological behaviorism is found in the work of John Watson (1878–1958). Psychological behaviorism is present in the work of Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936), Edward Thorndike (1874–1949), as well as Watson and also in the work of B. F. Skinner. Analytical behaviorism may be found in the work of Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976) and the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), and may also be found in the work of Daniel Dennett.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

These three branches of behaviorism have their historical backgrounds. Methodological behaviorism is strongly influenced by positivism. The main purpose of positivism is to unite psychology and natural science. Analytical behaviorism is influenced by the philosophical movement known as logical positivism. Logical positivism emphasizes that the meaning of the statements used in science must be understood in terms of experimental conditions or observations that verify their truth. Therefore, analytical behaviorism strongly emphasizes that mental concepts must refer to behavioral tendencies or must be translated into behavioristic terms.<sup>73</sup> The historical roots of psychological behavior begin with the classical associationism of empiricists, especially John Locke and David Hume. Associationism assumes that behavior is a product of associative learning. Psychological behaviorism claims that the origin of behavior refers to the stimulus that is physical events in the environment. Behavior is responses. The task of psychological behavior is to establish the types of associations, understand how environmental events control behavior, and predict how behavior changes as the environment change.<sup>74</sup>

How to understand the subjectivity in the perspective of behaviorism? Specifically, in this writing I more emphasize psychological behaviorism of B.F. Skinner (1904–1990), which is well known also as “radical behaviorism.”<sup>75</sup> His radical behaviorism is a psychological behaviorism which actually includes the other two types of behaviorism mentioned above. Of course, this claim is debatable. However, it is not the main focus in this exploration. Skinner rejects the inner mental or mental information processing as an explanation for the causes of behavior. According to him, the external behavior of a man does not refer to the internal behavior or mental processes, or cognitive activities, or any term that refers to the mental processing. The mental process exists, but is not relevant for a functional analysis. The mental process is a behavior even though it is internal. Skinner stated: “The objection to inner states is not that they do not exist, but that they are not relevant in functional analysis. We cannot account for the behavior of any system while staying wholly inside it; eventually we must turn to forces

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid. Skinner’s Radical Behaviorism can be found in various scientific works such as: John C. Malone Jr and Natalie M. Cruchon, “Radical Behaviorism and the Rest of Psychology: A Review/Précis of Skinner’s ‘About Behaviorism,’” *Behavior and Philosophy* 29 (2001): 31–57, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27759415>; Willard Day, “On the Difference between Radical and Methodological Behaviorism,” *Behaviorism* 11, no. 1 (Spring 1983): 89–102, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27759016>; Michael Martin, “Interpreting Skinner,” *Behaviorism* 6, no. 2 (Fall 1978): 129–138, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27758912>; Rochelle J. Johnson, “A Commentary on ‘Radical Behaviorism,’” *Philosophy of Science* 30, no. 3 (July 1963): 274–285, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/186240>; Robert Audi, “B.F. Skinner on Freedom, Dignity, and the Explanation of Behavior,” *Behaviorism* 4, no. 2 (Fall 1976): 163–186, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27758864>.

operating upon the organism from without.”<sup>76</sup> Thus, behavior is conditioned by something which is non-behavior and it is the stimulus of the environment or the interaction of the organism with the environment. As he said: “the external variables of which behavior is a function provide for what may be called a causal or functional analysis. [...] Our ‘independent variables’—the causes of behavior—are the external condition of which behavior is a function.”<sup>77</sup>

In addition, Skinner specifically shows his reluctance to free will and claims that the environmental interactions that control behavior.<sup>78</sup> For him, mental processes, thoughts or inner human beings exist but must be treated the same as the external behavior. Because according to him, if it is permissible to talk about mental processes or the “innerness” of man about the causes of behavior, it will also be permissible to talk about immaterial substance or also an agent who is endowed with free will. In addition, in relation to the self, for Skinner the self depends on the context because the different context produces different self.<sup>79</sup> The self or person is “sum of current activities, including overt behavior, verbal behavior, and visceral activity.”<sup>80</sup>

That way, the stimulus of environment triggers the emergence of behavior and self-formation. The inner mental processes depend on external determination. Thus, Skinner’s radical behaviorism ignores the existence of metaphysical subject, and, arguably, this neglect is shown in other branches of behaviorism as well. Therefore, the subjectivity issue is only reduced to behavior as a response to the environment. Thus, behaviorism ignores the existence of metaphysical subject, because the action or behavior is only in response to the environment, and less explanation of inner mental process.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> B.F. Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), 35.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Malone Jr and Cruchon, “Radical Behaviorism,” 51.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 52.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., Graham, “Behaviorism.”



### 1.2.8. Functionalism

Functionalism is a theory about the nature of the mental state. It was popularly endorsed in the last third of the 20th century. Here I am only highlighting functionalism as a philosophical thesis and focusing on the “nature of the mental state.” According to functionalism, mental states are identified “by what they do rather than by what they are made of.”<sup>82</sup> In other words, it does not depend on its internal constitution but on the function or role it plays. Functionalism, here, shows its arguments about the nature of the mental state to counter arguments built on behaviorism and identity theory.<sup>83</sup>

If Functionalists hold the mental state (thought, desire, pain, etc.) more as what is done or its function rather than its internal constitution, then, is there a cause of mental states or bearer of mental states that can be said to be a subject? The general feature of functionalism is the understanding of the mental state identities in terms of the causal relationship between inputs from the environment, body outputs or behaviors and interactions with other mental states.<sup>84</sup> Arguably, mental state is the cause of behavior and self-identity, but it is also caused or based on physical states. So, the identity of human being is determined in the process of this causal relation. Sensory inputs, behavioral outputs and relationships with other mental states do not imply a stable self as the basis or bearer.<sup>85</sup> Self-identity is the same as the mental state identity that appears, persists in the process of action, namely in the relation of mental state, sensory input and output behavior. Therefore, in the view of functionalists, being is considered as doing. Functionalists’ interpretation is very different from the dualistic problem of body-mind as in the Descartes concept. In the concept of Descartes mind is a substance that is different from the substance of the body. Functionalists do not see mental states in such context. Functionalism also distinguishes itself from Skinner’s behaviorism, which also accepts the concept of mental state, but the mental state that the behaviorists understand depends only on the stimulus from the

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<sup>82</sup> For the informative presentation and the explanation of the mental state in functionalism, see Thomas W. Polger, “Functionalism,” in *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, accessed September 20, 2021, <https://www.iep.utm.edu/functism/>; Peter Godfrey-Smith, “Triviality Arguments against Functionalism,” *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition* 145, no. 2 (August 2009): 273–295, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27734479>; Eric T. Olson, “What Does Functionalism Tell Us about Personal Identity?,” *Noûs* 36, no. 4 (December 2002): 682–698, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3506231>; Thomas M. Olschewsky and Tom Olschewsky, “Functionalism Old and New,” *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (July 1992): 265–286, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27744022>; Robert D. Rupert, “Functionalism, Mental Causation, and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessary Effects,” *Noûs* 40, no. 2 (June 2006): 256–283, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3506132>.

<sup>83</sup> Cf., Olschewsky and Olschewsky, “Functionalism Old and New,” 275.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 265; see also Arvid Bave, “Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism,” *The Philosophical Quarterly* 67, no. 266 (March 2016): 1–21, DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqw029.

<sup>85</sup> Olson, “Personal Identity?” 698.

environment. Functionalists also does not agree with identity theory which insists mental state only as particular kinds of biological states, that is, states of brain.<sup>86</sup> For functionalists, mental states become mental states because of what they do. It means without behavior there is no mental state. Or in other words, the mental state exists because of its function. In this connection, functionalists give an example of a key. The key becomes the key not because of its constitutive elements but because what can be done from the key is to open a lock.<sup>87</sup>

There is a metaphysical question rise, what is the essence of the mental state? So the functionalists will answer the essence of the mental state is its function in a system of relations that present the output of behavior or action. Hillary Putnam, an expert on machine state functionalism, identifies computing machines and programs with the creature that has mind. If the machine is in a certain state, then given an input, it will go to another state, and produce output. The creature with mind exists in such a resemblance. In this theory, if a human being is in a state or has a belief that it will rain after seeing the weather report, he will not only then take an umbrella when going out, but in distinguishing from behavioristic theory, then he will not only take an umbrella because of the weather report, but because he is in a state of wanting to keep it dry or not wet. So it is not first environmental stimuli that determine action such as behavioristic theory but the mental state. Therefore, for Putnam the mental state is the functional state,<sup>88</sup> and the kind mind is functional. In other words, being is also functional being.<sup>89</sup> Thus, the discussion of subjectivity is completely ignored in functionalism. Something spiritual or mental is only associated with causal function. Of course, this understanding will have negative implications for moral action and responsibility in an ethical context, just like the branches of naturalism discussed earlier.

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<sup>86</sup> See Bave, "Self-consciousness," 2.

<sup>87</sup> Polger, "Functionalism"; In terms of mental state's function, see also Robert C. Richardson, "Functionalism and Reductionism," *Philosophy of Science* 46, no. 4 (December 1979): 533–558, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/187248>.

<sup>88</sup> See Darren Bradley, "Functionalism and The Independence Problems," *Nous* 48, no.3 (2014): 545, DOI: 10.1111/nous.12007; Filipe Lazzeri, "Extended Functionalism from a Behavioral Perspective," *Behavior and Philosophy* 45 (2017): 1–21, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/90018260>.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid; see also Hillary Putnam, "The Nature of Mental State," accessed August 3, 2021, <http://web.csulb.edu/~cwallis/382/readings/482/putnam.nature.mental.states.pdf>.

### 1.3. Spiritualistic Conception

Spiritualism in philosophy refers to the various systems of thought that claim that the true reality cannot be perceived with the human senses. In the context of anthropology, the human being is understood as a spiritual being. In this section, I will present the subjectivity problem from a spiritualistic approach where the self/“I” is reviewed as an immaterial being or spiritual subject of activities.

#### 1.3.1. Plato

In the Platonic concept, man is internally fragmented, whereby what is spiritual is contrary to physical matter. For Plato, the human body was a prison for the soul. The body was not a natural place for the soul, inasmuch as the body is changes and not eternal. Meanwhile, the soul was a divine idea, permanent, immaterial, unchanging and absolute. The soul was in its own world and existed previously without a body, as was the concept of the Orphic tradition, but then imprisoned in the body.<sup>90</sup> According to Plato, the soul was imprisoned in the body, since the soul betrays the truth, good and beauty. Difficulties concerning the connection between the soul and the body he explains by the myth of the kingdom of Goddess Lethe. The soul has fallen from the eternal world to the world of Goddess Lethe. This world was a land of forgetfulness. The task of the imprisoned soul is to regain truth, good and beauty without discovering anything new but by negating forgetfulness.<sup>91</sup> The soul, which is absolute and unchanging, is a principle or source of autonomy from motion or self-initiating motion.<sup>92</sup> In addition, Plato delineated the soul as an agent of life, such as the concept of early Ionian philosophers, and also functions to know the world of ideas.<sup>93</sup> Plato divided the soul into three types. First, the intellectual soul that was active in the head. Second, the irascible soul located in the heart. Third, the vegetative soul took place in the liver. This division of souls helped Plato to make a difference in social class within the State. Based on this division, the intellectual soul guided the lives of philosophers, who in the State play the role of instructors and leaders. The Soul of the irascible directed the lives of the soldiers to protect the state, and the vegetative soul guided the lives of the hand laborers (artisans) and peasants who were obliged to serve the life of the upper classes.

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<sup>90</sup> See Maryniarczyk, *The Monistic and Dualistic Interpretation*, 100; Krapiec, *I-Man*, 5; Giovanni Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy Volume I: From the Origin to Socrates*, ed. and trans. John R. Catan (Albany: State of University of New York Press, 1987), 67–69; Copleston, *A History of Philosophy Volume I*, 207–215.

<sup>91</sup> See Maryniarczyk, *The Monistic and Dualistic Interpretation*, 101–103.

<sup>92</sup> Copleston, *A History of Philosophy Volume I*, 207.

<sup>93</sup> Krapiec, *I-Man*, 5.

In short, according to Plato, the essence of man is the soul. The soul governs the body like the sailor on the ship and the rider on a horse. In other words, the body is an instrument of the soul. So the source of human movement is focused on the soul, which is the self. The soul regulates and is responsible for bodily movements. The problem is with an individual man whose body is only seen as a shadow or illusion; and on the other hand, the soul, which is the essence of man, is only an eternal idea. The soul is the eternal idea along with other ideas that come from the Good or the One as the *arche*. Because of that, self, or even human subjectivity, is based solely on his soul as a universal and abstract idea.

### 1.3.2. St. Augustine

St. Augustine developed a philosophy of anthropology based on the quest for understanding God, through the workings of reason in the light of faith.<sup>94</sup> Faith or religion also includes levels of self-knowledge. According to him, man is the image of God. What makes man an image of God is his soul, not his body, and the part of the soul that is closest to God is the mind.<sup>95</sup> He was like other ancient philosophers who understood that man is a compound of body and soul. An individual human or person is just a soul-body composite and not just a soul or a body. But the soul, especially its rational part, is superior to the body.<sup>96</sup> The soul is the element of life, the center of consciousness and thought, and the governing part of man. It is that which governs sensual desires, and it is guide human direction towards God as the highest being and the highest good that makes man wise.<sup>97</sup> The soul has divine origin and even resembles God

<sup>94</sup> Mary T. Clark, "Persons and Personal Identity Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, K.Wojtyła on Person and Ego," Paideia, accessed July 19, 2022, <https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/PPer/PPerClar.htm>.

<sup>95</sup> Bruno Niederbacher, S.J., "The Human Soul: Augustine's Case for Soul-Body Dualism," in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, Second edition, eds. David Vincent Meconi and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 126. For the explanation about notion of soul and self, see also Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, trans. L.E.M.Lynch (New York: Random House, 1960); Marguerite Witmer Kehr, "The Doctrine of the Self in St. Augustine and in Descartes," *The Philosophical Review* 25, no. 4 (July 1916): 587–615, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2178254>; Mateusz Stróżyński, "There is No Searching for the Self: Self-Knowledge in Book Ten of Augustine's 'De Trinitate,'" *Phronesis* 58, no. 3 (2013): 280–300, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/42000239>; Henry Chadwick, "Self-Justification in Augustine's Confessions," *The English Historical Review* 118, no. 479 (November 2003): 1161–1175, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3490589>.

<sup>96</sup> Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 15.7.11, *The Logic Museum*, accessed December 22, 2021, [http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Augustine/On\\_the\\_Trinity/On\\_the\\_Trinity\\_Book\\_XV](http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Augustine/On_the_Trinity/On_the_Trinity_Book_XV); Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 15.7.11, ed. W. J. Mountain (Turnhout: Brepols, 1970); Bruno Niederbacher, S.J., "The Human Soul: Augustine's Case for Soul-Body Dualism," in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, Second edition, eds. David Vincent Meconi and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 125.

<sup>97</sup> St. Augustine said: "wisdom, in my opinion, is 'not only the knowledge of, but also the diligent search for, those things human and divine which have relation to happiness,' if you wish to split up that definition, the first part, in which knowledge is embrace, pertains to God, and the second part, which is content with searching, pertains to man." St. Augustine, *Ancient Christian Writers-The Works of the Fathers in Translation- St. Augustine: Against The Academics*, I.8.23, trans. and ann. John J. O'Meara (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1950), 61.

although it is not divine in itself. According to him, the soul is immortal and at death it separates from the body. The body will disintegrate and dissolve into the elements.

St. Augustine followed the Jewish and patristic tradition that the qualification of man according to the scriptures as the image of God, especially based on the text of 2 Corinthians 4:16, is not a physical body but an “inner man” or mind (*mens*).<sup>98</sup> The general pattern of Augustine’s argument is from external to internal and from the senses to God. The constitutive elements of the mind include memory, intellect, and will. Memory stores external objects through sensory perception, and objects in the mind itself such as a concept or an image. Intellect or cognitive faculties are activated and shaped by objects. The will that makes the cognitive faculties turn to its object is associated with love. He claims that the mind has always known itself because it is always present and aware of itself. The mind is a pre-reflexive self-awareness (*se nosse*) which is a condition for all actions of conscious knowledge. Self-knowledge is achieved when self-awareness is actualized for conscious self-thinking (*se cogitare*). Through the act of thinking, self-awareness is more explicitly shown. For him, the mind is “I” or “self” that has been formed at the level of pre-reflexive self-awareness. In relation to man or person as a unity of soul and body, he claims that the actions of “I” are in the name of the whole as a human being so it is not just the soul. He also emphasized that the mind is created as an image of God not because it is capable of self-knowledge but because it has the potential to be wise, namely to remember, know and love God, the Creator.<sup>99</sup> Thus, human subjectivity in St. Augustine thought is based on the mind or “I” which is identified as the image of God.

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<sup>98</sup> Christian Tornau, “Saint Augustine,” in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, accessed September 20, 2020, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/augustine/>.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

### 1.3.3. René Descartes

Descartes was known as the father of modern philosophy. It was inseparable from the object of his philosophical research project which was connected with the transition from a medieval image of the world oriented towards God to anthropocentrism, with a new methodical foundation in his philosophy. Descartes has given a different shape to his philosophy which reflects a man with his natural abilities and seeks to find ways or methods of achieving principles of knowledge. Fundamental certainty and solid truth (*Fundamentem certum et inconcussum veritatis*) must be achieved through adequate methods. That method is a methodical doubt (*le doute methodique*).<sup>100</sup> Through this method, Descartes found the truth and fundamental certainty of knowledge, called *cogito*.<sup>101</sup> *Cogito* was truth and unwavering certainty because it was understood clearly and distinctly (*Claire et distincte*). Even this *cogito* is found through one's own mind and not through something outside of oneself such as scriptures, fables, myths, people's opinions, etc.<sup>102</sup>

Furthermore, Descartes had two fundamental concepts of a substance called *Res Cogitans* or thinking substance and *Res Extensa* or extended substance. *Res Cogitans* was a real substance, independent in its existence, called by Descartes the soul. Subjective experience or subjectivity always refers to this kind of substance, which is identified with the "I" (ego). "I" is a non-physical being and at the same time a subject.<sup>103</sup> Meanwhile, for Descartes, the essence of extended substance was spatiality or extension. He emphasized not only the essence of extended

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<sup>100</sup> Concerning further exposition of this method, see René Descartes, *Meditations on The First Philosophy* (LaVergne, TN: Simon and Brown, 2011), 19–26; René Descartes, *Meditationes First Philosophy with Selection from Objection and Replies*, trans. int. and notes by Michael Moriarty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2008; René Descartes, *The Principle of Philosophy*, I–VII, trans. John Veitch (LaVergne, TN: 2014); Joseph Almong, *Cogito? Descartes and Thinking the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); David Owens, "Descartes's Use of Doubt," in *Blackwell Companions to Philosophy A Companion to Descartes*, eds. Janet Broughton and John Carriero (Malden-Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008): 164–178.

<sup>101</sup> *Cogito* or I think, for Descartes as "I aware." To be aware and consciousness are something really new that Descartes brought, for which there are no terms in Latin or French. For Descartes consciousness is the essence of man. Man is aware that he/she is really man and whatever is made by man, he is aware of it as the actor. From here began reflexive philosophy, namely philosophy that is rooted in consciousness. Phenomenology follows this tradition but phenomenology rejects the closed *cogito* or immanentism of Descartes. For phenomenologists, consciousness does not only mean a presence in itself but consciousness always has intentionality to the world and other people. See Bertens, *Sejarah Filsafat Kontemporer: Perancis*, 213–214.

<sup>102</sup> F. Budi Hardiman, *Pemikiran Modern dari Machiavelli sampai Nietzsche* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2019), 39; see also Sarrah Petterson, "Clear and Distinct Perception," in *Blackwell Companions to Philosophy A Companion to Descartes*, eds. Janet Broughton and John Carriero (Malden-Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008): 216–234.

<sup>103</sup> See Albert Shalom, "Subjectivity," *The Review of Metaphysics* 38, no. 2 (December 1984): 234; Atkins, "Commentary on Descartes," 8; Chertkova, "Subjectivity as the Theme of Philosophy," 43.

substance or material but also its operation, which is motion.<sup>104</sup> The motion, he meant, was not in the sense of the concepts of motion from Aristotle and Scholasticism, that motion was the actualization of what exists in potentiality, but the body that moves successfully to another locus.<sup>105</sup> All living organisms have this spatiality and local motion. The human body also has it. Descartes pointed to “the law of nature” or “the laws of motion of elementary mechanics” to govern local motion. This distinction between *Res Cogitans* and *Res Extensa* makes the anthropology of Descartes dualistic, which sharply distinguishes the soul and the body. This distinction does not solve the mind-body problem or the problem of mental and physical interaction, which later will become a concern for philosophy and cognitive science. For Descartes, the relationship between the soul and the body was in a part of the brain called brain’s pineal gland. He also added in his ethical view that the soul (*cogito*) controls person’s behavior. Desiring is an operation of thinking substance.<sup>106</sup> Furthermore, man has desire and lust, but if he is able to control it, he will become free and autonomous. But his freedom is not absolute because he is guided by divine providence.

The problem of subjectivity or subjective experience cannot be referred to extended substance. The extended substance is only related to spatiality and local motion. Because for Descartes, all living organisms also have spatiality and motion, but they do not have “pure thinking.”<sup>107</sup> They cannot say we are thinking or experiencing. As such, they lack subjective experience. Subjectivity must refer to the essence of Thinking Substance. Its essence is thinking. Thinking clearly and distinctly is the basis for subjectivity and personal identity. It means that subjectivity is only at the level of the human mind or human consciousness.

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<sup>104</sup> Shalom, “Subjectivity,” 231; Regarding material substance, see also Vere Chappell, “Descartes on Substance,” in *Blackwell Companions to Philosophy A Companion to Descartes*, eds. Janet Broughton and John Carriero (Malden-Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008): 251–270.

<sup>105</sup> Shalom, “Subjectivity,” 231

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., 237.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 233.

### 1.3.4. Immanuel Kant

Kant began his philosophical project by asking three central questions: what can I know, what should I do, and what can I expect.<sup>108</sup> The first question is discussed in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781, Epistemology), the second question is answered in his *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788, Ethics) and the third is discussed in his *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793, Philosophy of religion), and the *Critique of [the Power of] Judgment* (1790, Aesthetics and teleology). Through this project, Kant first and foremost wants to examine the validity of knowledge based on *a priori* principles in the subject. Here, he synthesizes the idea of knowledge from empiricism and idealism or synthesizes between *a posteriori* and *a priori* elements.

Kant answered the first question by saying that I could only know objects from the perspective of the forms of my senses and my concepts of understanding. In other words, things are understood from the perspective of the subject. On the contrary, we cannot know the object in itself (*das Ding an Sich*). Kant used the term *phenomenon* for visible reality, which can be grasped from the perspective of the subject and the term *noumena* for a thing as such that cannot be grasped and understood by the subject.

Regarding human knowledge, Kant claimed that knowledge was only related to *phenomena* and not *noumena*. Knowledge is the synthesis between *a priori* and reality, which is seen in experience and senses. In other words, knowledge is *a priori* which corresponds to the representation of objects that appear in the experience of reality. Thus, the subject's knowledge, according to Kant, is based on the *a priori* synthesis judgment.<sup>109</sup> In this judgment, *a priori* elements of reason are called categories, which synthesize the sensory data. For Kant, knowledge of "I" as a thinking being or immaterial substance like Descartes' notion is impossible.<sup>110</sup> Here, he was the same as Hume who rejected "I" as substance. In his understanding, "I" emerged from the spontaneous *a priori* of unity of consciousness.<sup>111</sup> With a concept like this, for Kant, metaphysics, investigating *noumena* (*das Ding an sich*), is not a science. Because *das Ding an sich* is unknowable. Metaphysics is only related to ideas of pure

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<sup>108</sup> Hardiman, *Pemikiran Moderen*, 131.

<sup>109</sup> Kant distinguishes three types of judgment including: analytical judgment, synthesis judgment and a priori synthesis judgment. Analytical judgment is a judgment whose predicate is already contained in the subject, so the predicate is only an analysis of the subject. For example: all objects are extended. Synthesis judgment is a judgment whose predicate is not contained in the subject, so the predicate is a new piece of information. For example: All objects are heavy. A priori synthesis is a judgment whose predicate is not contained in the subject and is not an analysis of it (synthesis) and there is no need for an investigation of the event before concluding it.

<sup>110</sup> Atkins, "commentary on Descartes," 9.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., 48.



reason (*Vernunft*) and not at all related to intellect or understanding (*Verstand*) which has a close relationship with the ability of sensibility. The ideas of pure reason include the idea of God, World, and Soul.

After explaining the pure reason and its relationship with knowledge, Kant explained the practical reason in relation to moral knowledge or principles of action. If pure reason establishes an object through cognition, then practical reason makes the object or manifest act through the determination of the will. With regard to the moral act, Kant stressed that everyone was obliged to do a good act not necessarily in relation to the reality that exists (*das Sein*) but must be in relation to the reality that should exist (*das Sollen*). A good act is not to act in accordance with an obligation, but it must be a result taken from obligation, because actions for obligations are moral actions.<sup>112</sup> Moral actions should be based on two things that are principles and maxims. The principle is a fundamental objective moral law that is based on pure practical reason.<sup>113</sup> It is the principle by which man will act if he is a rational moral agent. Maxim is a subjective principle of volition.<sup>114</sup> Kant also distinguished maxims into two types, namely empirical maxim (material maxim) and *a priori* maxim (formal maxim). Empirical maxim refers to the effect of action, while *a priori* maxim obeys universal law and does not refer to sensual desires. For example, an empirical maxim is a person who swears by the oath of salvation for his soul. For Kant, man's morality will be chaotic if it refers to the empirical maxim. Morality must refer to the maxim *a priori* which obeys universal law.

According to Kant, if a man is truly the pure rational moral subject, then the principle of morality must be in accordance with the principle of the will (maxim). In fact, there is often a gap between principle and maxim, between objective moral principles and subjective will. The objective principle is an order which requires subjective will, while an imperative is a form of decision of an order. Kant distinguished two kinds of imperatives, namely hypothetical imperative and categorical imperatives. Hypothetical imperative means that the objective principle will be carried out with certain conditions if the subject's goals are achieved by carrying out these principles. The formula, wanting A, then doing B. For Kant, it is not a moral imperative. The moral imperative is in the categorical imperative. This imperative commands to do something not for a specific purpose but because the command is good in itself. This imperative is *a priori* and universal. If this imperative is *a priori* and universal, then what does

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<sup>112</sup> Frederick Copleston SJ, *A History of Philosophy Volume VI, Modern Philosophy: From the French Enlightenment to Kant* (New York, London: Doubleday, 1940), 316; Hardiman, *Pemikiran Modern*, 144.

<sup>113</sup> Copleston, *A History Of Philosophy Volume VI*, 318.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, 319.

the subject do without a specific purpose? If so, is this *a priori* imperative without purpose? For Kant, the goal of the imperative category must be something universal and absolute, and that is a rational man. Man in himself is goal and not tool or mean. As Kant said: “So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, always at the same time as an end, and never merely as a mean.”<sup>115</sup> In other words, rational man underlies the objectives of the imperative hypothesis.

From the explanation of Kant’s notion of pure reason and pure practical reason, it can be understood that man is a moral subject of pure rationality. As the subject of actions to carry out obligations, the human will must be based on moral laws that are rational, *a priori*, and universal. Thus, the basis of subjectivity is only *a priori*, formal from the unity of consciousness and not thinking substance as Descartes stressed.

### 1.3.5. Max Scheler

Scheler developed his philosophical system with a phenomenological approach, especially in anthropology and ethics. He developed Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology by emphasizing the emotional intuition of a person and the phenomenological facts that are the essence of reality. Intuition is naturally directed to phenomenological facts and on the contrary phenomenological facts manifest themselves in phenomenological experience. The phenomenological experience contains the essence of reality, namely value. It is *a priori* and not empirical or contingent,<sup>116</sup> but it is intuitively encountered in experience without specific desire.

Scheler conceived human being differently from earlier philosophers. He did not see man as *homo rationale* like Aristotle or *homo volens* like Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. He understands man as *homo amans*. Man is *homo amans* inasmuch as his essence, as a spiritual being, called love. According to him, love preceded cognition and will.<sup>117</sup> Love is what makes man stand in the midst of nature and is distinguished from animals and plants. Through love, man creates a bridge between himself and nature, and the world of values. For Scheler, through love, man becomes a perfect being, a being that is complete and can save himself from the “blind alley” of its own nature.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 328.

<sup>116</sup> Karol Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures Wykłady Lubelskie*, trans. Hugh McDonald (Lublin: PTTA, 2020), 7–8.

<sup>117</sup> See Krapiec, *I-Man*, 82.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid; see also A.R. Luther, *Person in Love: A Study of Max Scheler’s Wesen und Formen der Sympathy* (The Hague: Martinus Nihoff, 1972).

Man as loving being reveals the element of spirit, which is different from aspects of physiology. Human being is able to objectify and transform the environment or the world because he has the element of spirit. For Scheler, this spiritual center is called a person. Through this spirit element, man can objectify things and also himself as objects. Thus, through spirit, man can transcend himself and things. The spirit is a pure actuality and fullness of action and is not a type of subject because spirit is not a substance. Spirit is powerless and it states itself only as a function. This can be understood because the spirit has no ontic basis.<sup>119</sup> It only gets energy from impulses through the process of sublimation. Moreover, he also explained, “the person must never be considered a thing or a substance with faculties and powers, among which the “faculty” or “power” of reason etc., is one. The person is, rather, the immediately co-experienced unity of experiencing; the person is not a merely thought thing behind and outside what is immediately experienced.”<sup>120</sup> Therefore, he understood the person not as a substance but unity of acts. He emphasize further:

Of course these beings would still be (logical) subjects that execute rational acts: but they would not be “persons.” [...]The same would hold for beings whose entire contents were given only as projects of willing. They would be (logical) subjects of a willing, but not persons. For the person is precisely that unity which exists for acts of all possible essential differences insofar as these acts are thought to be executed.<sup>121</sup>

In addition, all these acts have intentionality toward the value. In terms of value, he stated that the highest value in the hierarchy has less energy while the lowest value, such as material value, has more power. Emotional actions or feelings and values have an inherent *a priori* order.<sup>122</sup> Value, which is *a priori*, exists only in an ideal sphere. It is achieved through emotional actions. Meanwhile, the moral value is also “on the back” of the preferring towards value.<sup>123</sup> Or in other words, good value arises from preferring the highest value, while evil value arises from preferring the lowest value.<sup>124</sup> Thus, one becomes good or evil depending on his preferring toward *a priori* values intuitively. In other words, *a priori* values determine action and constitution of oneself.

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<sup>119</sup> Krapiec, *I-Man*, 85.

<sup>120</sup> Max Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values a New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 371.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 381–382.

<sup>122</sup> Manfred S. Frings, “Max Scheler: The Human Person in Action and in the Cosmos,” in *Phenomenology World-Wide* (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, 2002), 174.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid. Regarding moral value, see also Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction* (The Hague: Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 1971).

<sup>124</sup> Frings, “Max Scheler,” 175.

For Scheler, emotional actions or feelings aimed at values do not originate from the substance as understood by traditional philosophy. He rejects the concept of powerful substance, the source of all actions or functions. According to him, it seems that man is completed, even though he still continues to becoming. The concept of subjectivity in Scheler's anthropology is aimed at emotional actions or feelings that are rooted in love and *a priori* values. Therefore, it may be understood that human subjectivity is based on something that is objective *a priori*.

#### 1.4. Existentialist Conception

In this section, I highlight the subjectivity problem, with an existentialist approach. Existentialism as a philosophical theory emphasizes its orientation on human existence. Based on this approach, human existence must first be analyzed by phenomenological methods. This means that the capture of human existence is rooted in conscious direct and spontaneous experience.<sup>125</sup> Through this way we can grasp the reality of human existence pre-reflective or pre-scientific. I, here, present some of the ideas of thinkers in relation to problem of subjectivity as representations of existentialists.

##### 1.4.1. Martin Heidegger

Heidegger is an existentialist who took the anti-essentialist position. He ignores the classical definition of human being understood as a rational animal. He admitted that he was deeply indebted to Edmund Husserl. Starting with the method of bracketing (*epoche*) phenomenology, Husserl aims to establish the epistemological foundations of meaning. From here, Heidegger is interested in finding the foundation of meaning in the structure of objects that we encounter every day. The task of philosophy, for him, is to see "the meaning of Being" from the entities in our lives.<sup>126</sup> Being is not a phenomenon but a wholeness of reality.<sup>127</sup> The meaning of Being begins with an analysis of the meaning of human being. The basic inquiry is to understand the meaning of "to be" (*sein*), and he starts to question "ourselves" in terms of *Dasein*. *Dasein* comes from two concepts, to be (*zu sein*) and there (*da*), which means to be there (*Dasein*), in the world (*in der Welt sein*). That means *Dasein* belongs to the world. "To be there" simply means being thrown into the world or what he calls facticity. *Dasein* is ontologically

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<sup>125</sup> Anton Bakker, *Metode-Metode Filsafat*, (Jakarta: Galia, 1986), 119.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., 113.

<sup>127</sup> Cf., F.Budi Hardiman, *Seni Memahami, Hermeneutika dari Schleiermacher sampai Derrida* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2015), 106.

present with others, as Heidegger said “*Dasein* in itself is essentially Being-with.”<sup>128</sup> Therefore, *Dasein* as “to be there” is something essentially “being with.”<sup>129</sup> Man as *Dasein* means he is there with others. And *Dasein*, concerning human being, mainly refers to selfhood. For him, *Dasein* is a type of being which is self-reflective. Thus, *Dasein* is a being that can investigate its own existence as an enquirer. He then identified *Dasein*’s ontological structure by analyzing of the nature of the self-conscious experience.<sup>130</sup> In this analysis he used the phenomenological method. According to him, with this method we encounter objects in visible practical experience, and here we are aware of our existence as conscious self in the world.

Heidegger’s concept of self and subjectivity began with his review of *Dasein*. *Dasein*, in Heidegger’s philosophy, is not an object or substance. It means *Dasein* without essence, without soul and purpose to determine what will happen. *Dasein* is more like a strength, potency, or a way of existence that shapes being. As a potentiality, *Dasein* formulates assignment to will be someone; a task will be self-determination based on self-interpreter.<sup>131</sup> This self-interpreter is achieved when a person forms an understanding of himself, namely historical in which there is a chronological and conceptual continuity of one’s past, present, and future.<sup>132</sup> Therefore, the meaning of one’s existence and one’s whole life is only our own activity, as we can take an inquiry into ourselves, and not determined by nature or God.<sup>133</sup> “I” live my life from being in the world to being toward death and “I” am responsible for the life that is mine.

Moreover, *Dasein*, which is being in the world, is its disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*). This disclosedness or openness presents discourse as a primordial existential element. That means *Dasein* in the world, open and related to one another. Self is formed from the openness of this *Dasein*. Or in other words, the relations of *Dasein* form its selfhood. In this way, *Dasein*, as

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<sup>128</sup> See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher, 1962), 149–163; see also Einar Overenget, *Seeing the self: Heidegger on subjectivity* (Dordrecht-Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998); David E. Cooper, *Existentialism* (Oxford UK & Cambridge USA: BlackWell, 1990); Mahon O’Brien, “Leaping Ahead of Heidegger: Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Being and Time,” in *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 22, no. 4, (2014): 534–551, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2014.948719>; K.M. Stroh, “Intersubjectivity of Dasein in Heidegger’s Being and Time: How Authenticity is a Return to Community,” *Hum Stud* 38 (2015): 243–259, DOI 10.1007/s10746-015-9341-9; Nate Zackerman, “Heidegger and the Essence of *Dasein*,” *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 53, no. 4 (2015): 493–516, DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12151.

<sup>129</sup> See O’Brien, “Leaping Ahead of Heidegger,” 542.

<sup>130</sup> Akins, “Commentary on Heidegger,” 114.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., 115.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

being in the world as well as being with its openness, is the foundation for self.<sup>134</sup> A relation or discourse is a form of *Dasein*'s existence.

Regarding the subject, *Dasein* is a historical subject. It is not an ahistorical substance. Whereas subjectivity or self-knowledge comes after being in the world and in relations. Subjectivity could be understood in relation to self-concernfulness.<sup>135</sup> As Derrida said in his lecture on *Being and Time* entitled, "Heidegger: The Question of Being & History, that subjectivity comes after, in the historicity of the existence of *Dasein*." Derrida states:

[...] the dimension of subjectivity supervenes on a historicity of existence, of *Dasein*. The historicity of *Dasein* is originary but it is not originally determined as subjectivity. Which means that it does not originally appear to itself as subjectivity and that it is not originally subjectivity. *Dasein* (existence) is originary history, and it happens in the course of its history that it constitutes itself and appears to itself as subjectivity, for essential and necessary reasons [...]. The fact remains that for Heidegger subjectivity does not supervene upon a non-historical absolute that awakens to it (Substance, Present). It supervenes upon an experience or an existence that is already historical [...].<sup>136</sup>

Thus, subjectivity in Heidegger's philosophy relates to the discourse or relations that form *Dasein* in history. Subjectivity in his philosophy is fundamentally discursive. Or in other words, subjectivity is present and determined by relations.

#### 1.4.2. Karl Jaspers

Karl Jaspers, in explaining his concept of the mode of the encompassing (*das Umgreifende*), analyzes the subject associated with the object. In this analysis, the relation is entered into what he calls the "mode of the encompassing." Encompassing is a form of our awareness of being that underlies our scientific and commonsense knowledge and expressions given in myths and rituals of religion. Encompassing as awareness includes subject-object encounters. This mode can be further described in "immanent mode" and "transcendent mode." Immanent mode is related to or limited to the real state of humans, what they are, what they do and what they know. This mode describes the encounter of subject-object in the empirical realm, where there is self-realization, which can be investigated by science such as sociology, biology and others. There are three kinds of immanent modes, namely *Dasein* (existence), consciousness in general and spirit. *Dasein* is the mode of the everyday concrete being of man among entities.

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<sup>134</sup> Eric VanLieshout, "Heidegger Contra Lacan: The Cut and the Development of Two Theories of Subjectivity," *Sanglap* 4, no. 2 (May 2018): 119.

<sup>135</sup> Atkins, "Commentary on Heidegger," 114; Kees Bertens, *Filsafat Barat Kontemporer Jilid I Inggris dan Jerman* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2014), 210–217.

<sup>136</sup> VanLieshout, "Heidegger Contra Lacan," 117.

*Dasein* exists in the world as an empirical entity.<sup>137</sup> He is the empirical self in the world. Consciousness in general or rational abstract refers to the world as represented in science. Human knowledge of the world in this science is universal and objective and is at an abstract level. Spirit appears as a synthesis between a concrete and historical basis and universal consciousness in general. Jaspers calls it an idea. Just as human beings participate in universal concrete, they are bound in historical unity. Examples of this unity are nation, religion, organization, etc.

*Dasein*, consciousness in general and spirit in immanent mode does not exhaust encompassing. Therefore, encompassing needs to be explained in a mode of transcendence. There are two main divisions in this mode, namely *Existenz* (transcendence mode of subjectivity) and transcendence (transcendence mode of objectivity).<sup>138</sup> *Existenz* has two main characteristics. First, it cannot be described in general as in immanent mode because it is truly unique and as a historical and authentic concrete being. *Existenz* actually refers to an individual person who does or wants something. Second, *Existenz* refers to the basis of the individual self. It is the primordial and spontaneous depth of each self. It is not given and must be actualized by each person. It is also the principle of freedom, creativity and pure spontaneity. The manifestation of *Existenz* does not occur directly and immediately but in the world of the three immanent modes. All knowledge or action occurs in one or more of these modes, and *Existenz* is the principle of creativity and spontaneity in them. Because of that, man as *Existenz* sets the pattern of historical organization at the level of existence, knowledge and understanding, at the level of consciousness and ideas, at the level of spirit, as well as morals, art and religion.<sup>139</sup>

*Transcendenz* refers to the self from being itself. It transcends the natural world of particular objects. The world is an immanent reflection of it. *Transcendenz* is the source of *existenz* because *existenz* is aware of himself being given from *Transcendenz*. So *Existenz* cannot exist without *Transcendenz*. Neither *Existenz* nor *Transcendenz* is an object. They are the source of everything emerges. So to talk about them means to bring them into the domain of consciousness and the structure of subject and object. Here, we will create objects out of them.

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<sup>137</sup> The use of the term *Dasein* from Jaspers can be distinguished from Heidegger's understanding. *Dasein* in Heidegger's philosophy as an empirical entity is truly embedded in the world but has no transcendent experience of *dasein*. In Jaspers' philosophy, the *dasein* that is based on the world is the empirical self, but it can transcend the empirical realm as *existenz*. Jaspers distinguishes between *dasein* and *existenz* and this is not in Heidegger's understanding. Richard F. Grabau, Preface to *Philosophy of Existence*, by Karl Jaspers (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), xviii; see also Onyeuru Okechukwu P., "The Theme of Existence in the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers," accessed July 22, 2022, <https://philarchive.org/archive/OKETTO>.

<sup>138</sup> Grabau, Preface to *Philosophy of Existence*, xvi.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid., xx.

But in his analysis, Jaspers also seems to explain that *Transcendenz* derived from the uniqueness and freedom of *Existenz*. That is why he was called an idealist existentialist.<sup>140</sup>

### 1.4.3. Gabriel Marcel

The starting point of Marcel's philosophy was existence. For him, existence was a concrete situation as a subject in the world.<sup>141</sup> Existence is the pre-conscious level or the level of lived experience without reflection. According to him, in order to "I" reach the meaning of life to its fullest, "I" need to leave the pre-conscious level to real conscious. Moving from a situation that "I" consider fateful to a freely accepted situation. So to speak, "I" move from existence to being. This transition includes 3 phases, namely admiration, reflection and exploration.<sup>142</sup>

For him, the beginning of philosophy was not doubts like Descartes' understanding but admiration and astonishment. This admiration and astonishment toward everything, especially myself, with the incarnation or situation as bodily being that is interwoven with the cosmos. Admiring alone is not sufficient for reflection. Reflection has two kinds. First, reflection must be abstract, analytical, objective and universal, as in science. Next, reflection is carried out in philosophy. This reflection talks about presence, and takes place based on participation and seeks a dialogical rather than a logical approach. The second reflection does not objectify and takes place in the context of a person. This reflection opens the way to exploration, where "I" come into contact with reality. In this phase, "I" take part in being, and "I" accept the reality, including myself, freely.<sup>143</sup>

Marcel, furthermore, distinguished between "I" and what "I" had or between being (*etre*) and having (*avoir*). He means "to have" in the sense of ownership and not in the sense of implication. In the first sense, having means a person or subject (*qui*) as the owner and something is owned (*quid*). Having is part of what Marcel calls the problem, and it is reflected in the first reflection phase that takes place in science. Being is pervaded with a circumstance of mystery, and it is only reflected in philosophy. According to Marcel, "I" is as a mystery and not

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<sup>140</sup> Ibid., xxi; see also Hanna Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine*, ed. with an Inter. Essay. Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1996). Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark, in the interpretative essay entitled, *Jaspers: Arendt and Existenz Philosophy*, in that book, comment, "Here the case can be made for a conceptual similarity between the way in which Arendt via Augustine understand man's true being as ultimately grounded in God (creature in Creator) and Jaspers's mode of the encompassing understood as consciousness in which I understand myself as transcending ordinary, empirical existence."

<sup>141</sup> Bertens, *Sejarah Filsafat Kontemporer: Perancis*, 66.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid., 67.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., 63.



a problem. Mysteries cannot be solved like problems, as rationalism and positivism have done. Mystery cannot be completely understood and always raises new aspects; therefore mystery must be experienced and believed.

One way of explaining being and having is by connecting “I” and the body. The body is not “I,” but the body also cannot be treated by objects or tools. The body is a prototype in the field of having, that is, which is possible to have but not to be owned by something else. Therefore, my body as mine is different from my cat which is outside of my body. What mediates between “I” and my body is sympathetic mediation or feeling.<sup>144</sup> In terms of feeling, the body has absolute priority. That means, to feel something else, the body must first be felt as my body. According to Marcel, feeling is not in the sense of receiving, passively but actively. Accept in the sense of participating, opening up and giving oneself. Thus, feeling means receiving in my territory. Through the body experienced as my body, “I” receive, participate and give myself. Here, Marcel talked on the human Incarnation. Incarnation is participation in the world through the body as my body.<sup>145</sup> This incarnation is the starting point for philosophical reflection and not *cogito* or consciousness, according to Marcel.

Furthermore, according to Marcel, the mystery of being must be investigated from the point of inter-subjectivity, or the relationship between human persons. He conceived that “to exist” means “to exist with others”; “*esse is co-esse*.”<sup>146</sup> Human relations are described by the word presence. The intended presence is not limited in the category of space and time. That presence transcends time, for example in death or in a distant space. This presence can be manifested only in the “I-thou” relationship which emphasizes the contact between persons and not the more functional “I-he” relationship. For Marcel, it is love that realizes this presence, so that the “I-thou” relationship reaches level of “we.”<sup>147</sup> The “I-thou” unity gives rise to a truly communicative communion. This communion can be said to be a presence in its most perfect form, because here “I” and thou are elevated to a new unity that cannot be separated into two parts. It is at this stage that the transition from existence to being is complete.<sup>148</sup> He also emphasized that a philosophical reflection on the presence of other human person leads us to the relationship between “I” and the Absolute Thou or God.<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>144</sup> Ibid., 74.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., 75.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., 76.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., 76–77.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., 79.

From all of these explanations, we can conclude that subjectivity cannot be experienced outside of inter-subjectivity, or so to speak that subjectivity cannot be found outside of incarnation and presence or *co-esse* in the world along with other human person. So, specific ontology, orientated at human person in Marcel's notion, is based on inter-subjectivity relation.

#### 1.4.4. Jean Paul Sartre

When building his existential philosophy, Sartre commented on the materialism of Marxism. He wanted to give the anthropological existentialistic touch to Marxism. It was connected with the acceptance of Marx's notion of man as an alienated self and the need for revolution to overcome this alienation. However, he rejected Marxist materialism. For Sartre, materialism was not an expression of scientific knowledge or absolute truth.<sup>150</sup> The biggest shortcoming of materialism which was not explained by it is the problem of freedom.<sup>151</sup>

Sartre emphasized human freedom based on his analysis of consciousness. For him, consciousness is to be aware of something. That something is a being which manifests itself or is a phenomenon of consciousness. Consciousness is not a being, but it exists only through the process of negation or nihilation.<sup>152</sup> The process of nihilation is the process by which a person becomes aware of an object in front of him and then makes a distance from it, that in front of him is a different object from him. Awareness arises in this process of nihilation and "I" is present every time when one is conscious of an object. Thus "I" or "ego" or "subject" appears at the level of reflexive consciousness and not at the level of pre-conscious reflection.<sup>153</sup> The *ego* becomes a being through the reflection of the consciousness of itself and then the *ego* is made to appear as an object. Because of that Sartre rejected the concept of the transcendental *ego*.<sup>154</sup> For him, Descartes's *cogito* was a pre-reflexive consciousness and there was no self.

Regarding freedom, he emphasized that human freedom precedes human essence and makes it possible.<sup>155</sup> According to him, we are "condemned to be free." Sartre asserted that human freedom is not a property of human nature that was formed later, but freedom is a

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<sup>150</sup> Frederick Copleston SJ, *A History of Philosophy Volume IX: Modern Philosophy from French Revolution to Sartre, Camus and Levi Strauss* (New York, London: Doubleday, 1994), 369.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., 354.

<sup>153</sup> Joseph S. Catalano, *A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1974), 11–12.

<sup>154</sup> Copleston, *A History of Philosophy Volume IX*, 353.

<sup>155</sup> Jean Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, trans. and an intr. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc, 1956), 272.

property of the conscious being.<sup>156</sup> Man is free because he is a conscious being. This freedom makes the man able to create meaning for his own existence. The man also cannot avoid responsibility because his own life is what he makes for himself.

Sartre argued that man first exists and then makes or establishes his essence. Therefore, he rejected the concept of being in itself.<sup>157</sup> This view also shows his disagreement that human nature is contained in the rational soul, which is a product of the popular concept of God as the creator of man.<sup>158</sup> As an atheist existentialist, Sartre believed that there is no God who created man. Therefore, every human being exemplifies the human essence. Every human being is free to do anything, and his actions are the result of free choice. Whatever will happen to oneself depends entirely on his free self. We cannot ignore this freedom because we cannot choose to be free or not free.<sup>159</sup>

From Sartre's notion it can be understood that "I" or the subject of the action is not being in itself because for him being in itself has no sense. The subject of free human action is consciousness. Even more than that, it is reflexive consciousness of an object that forms the essence of man or "I" (self).<sup>160</sup> Therefore, subjectivity is based on this reflexive consciousness.

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<sup>156</sup> Copleston, *A History of Philosophy Volume IX*, 354. Further explanation concerning Sartre's concept of freedom, see also Mark Poster, *Existential Marxism in Postwar France from Sartre to Althusser* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Pietro Chiodi, *Sartre and Marxism*, trans. Kate Soper (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1976); Kate Kirkpatrick, *Sartre and Theology* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017); Sebastian Gardner, *Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness': A Reader's Guide* (London, New York: Continuum International Publishing, 2009); Brian Seitz, "Sartre, Foucault, and the Subject of Philosophy's Situation," *Sartre Studies International* 10, no. 2 (2004): 92–105; Maurice Natanson, "Jean Paul Sartre's Philosophy of Freedom," *Social Research* 19, no. 3(1952): 364–380, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40969303>.

<sup>157</sup> Copleston, *A History of Philosophy Volume IX*, 357.

<sup>158</sup> See Kim Atkins, "Commentary on Sartre," In *Self and Subjectivity* (Charlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2005): 87.

<sup>159</sup> Copleston, *A History Of Philosophy Volume IX*, 358.

<sup>160</sup> Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 260; Catalano, *On Jean-Paul Sartre*; 11–12; Atkins, "Commentary on Sartre," 87–88.

## 1.5. Metaphysical Conception

In this section, I will explain the problem of subjectivity based on the metaphysical interpretation. Metaphysics is a theory of concrete being where the starting point is the primary experience and its object is whatever being is accessible to that primary experience.<sup>161</sup> Metaphysics does not cease at capturing various types of experimental or empirical data but then proceeds to rational discourse, where in this discourse, intellectual analysis and comprehensive reflection are carried out for achieving over empirical realm where are discovered the principle of being and knowledge. Such kind of metaphysics formulated by Aristotle, and later developed and enriched Thomas Aquinas, and in contemporary Polish philosophy special form gave it Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec.

### 1.5.1. Aristotle

The term subjectivity, and other popular terms such as person, self, identity are not clearly explained in Aristotle's philosophy. However, we can relate subjectivity to fundamental terms in his philosophy, such as matter and form, as well as potentiality and actuality.<sup>162</sup>

To explain subjectivity (referring to the subject and activity), we need to investigate Aristotelian concept of substance; and in this process of explanation, how the concept of substance intersects with the concept of matter-form.

For Aristotle, beings given in the experience are composite. Based on the theory of *hylomorphism*, Philosopher from Stagira understood that all beings, both inanimate and animate beings, were composed of matter (Gr. *hylê*, Lat. *materia*) and form (Gr. *morphe*, Lat. *forma*). Form is a principle of material organization. It can occur in two functions, namely in the internal and external function of the material organization. Form that occurs in the function of internal principles of the organization of matter is called nature (Gr. *physis*, Lat. *natura*—giving birth). Whereas, the external function of the organization of matter is called shape. Form in this external function can be found in art products and simple substances that make up the world of inanimate beings.<sup>163</sup> In the context of animate beings, like plants, animals and human being, form with internal functions Aristotle calls soul (Gr. *psyche*), perfection (Gr. *etelechia*) or the first actuality of an organic body (Gr. *energeia*). Thus, he defines the soul as the first actuality of

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<sup>161</sup> Stanisław Kamiński, *On the Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics Metody Współczesnej Metafizyki* (Lublin-Roma: PTTA, SITD, 2019), 57–66.

<sup>162</sup> Cf., Shalom, "Subjectivity," 252–253.

<sup>163</sup> Andrzej Maryniarczyk SDB, *The Pluralistic Interpretation of Reality Notebook on Metaphysics*, vol.2 (Lublin: PTTA, 2011), 37–38.

a natural body which has life in potentiality.<sup>164</sup> Therefore, the soul is the most fundamental principle of life and the act of the body. This soul is firmly connected to the body and cannot be separated from the body. Consequently, it cannot exist without a body. If a man dies, his soul also perishes, which means that the soul is not immortal.<sup>165</sup> Of course, this is also a reaction to the platonic concept, which makes a sharp difference between body and soul. Furthermore, the soul has various faculties in organizing the body, namely vegetative, sensory and cognitive faculties. Here, Aristotle first made a distinction between the forces of the soul for a living being, especially in understanding human being in particular.<sup>166</sup> The special character or function of the soul of each living being can be seen from its acts.

Subsequently, Aristotle rejected Plato's dualistic concept whereby man is only his soul while the body is a prison of the soul. He also rejected the monism of the Ionian naturalists, who understood man as a mere natural product which was an aggregate of primordial material elements.<sup>167</sup> He also rejected Empedocles' assumption that primordial elements formed the soul and that the elements had their own souls.<sup>168</sup> Moreover, also he did not accept the assumption of Democritus that identifies the soul with reason and reason with the atoms that have always existed and provided motion for particular being.<sup>169</sup> For Aristotle, like all being substance, man was being composed by body and soul (matter and form). The human soul is rational that encompasses vegetative, sensory functions, as well as cognitive and volitional functions. Rational soul with cognitive and volitional functions indicates that man appears as being who carry within himself some divine elements.<sup>170</sup> Thus, even though man as product of nature was still the most perfect product.<sup>171</sup> This rational soul makes also a human being a free being in knowing and acting. With a rational soul, human being who even inhabits the world from nature but can grow beyond the world, what means that he transcends the world. Thus, like Fr. Maryniarczyk said "the fact of man's transcendence that Aristotle discovered (although he was

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<sup>164</sup> Aristotle, *De Anima*, trans. and com. Christopher Shields (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2016), I, 412a 25–412b 5; Copleston, *A History of Philosophy Volume I*, 327–328; Krapiec, *I-Man*, 6; Kees Bertens, *Sejarah Filsafat Yunani dari Thales ke Aristoteles*, edisi revisi (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1999), 180; Shalom, "Subjectivity," 253.

<sup>165</sup> Bertens, *Sejarah Filsafat Yunani*, 180–181.

<sup>166</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Pluralistic Interpretation*, 40.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

<sup>168</sup> Aristotle, *De Anima*, II, 404b 10.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 403b 30–404a 5.

<sup>170</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Pluralistic Interpretation*, 43.

<sup>171</sup> Andrzej Maryniarczyk SDB, *The Realistic Interpretation of Reality Notebook on Metaphysics*, vol.3 (Lublin: PTTA, 2015), 114.

not completely aware of it) did not allow for reduction of man solely to be a product of nature.”<sup>172</sup>

On the basis of compositional being, Aristotle also explains substance and accident as reasons for identity and modification or change. Substance can mean a concrete thing that exists individually and independently, and it is synonymous with being which is composed of matter and form. The second meaning refers to the constant and unchanging nature or essence. Substance can also mean the subject of predication. It can also refer to material substrate (matter) and immaterial substrate (form), and can also refer to genus and species.<sup>173</sup>

Substance in sense of nature or essence is understood as foundation of identity and also subject of accidents. Subjectivity is seen in the framework of this compositional explanation of being from substance and accident. Accident means that “which does not exist independently,” that “which belongs to something,” “that has its subject in something,” that “which does exist in a being by necessity.” The term accident refers to a number of types of modifications of the substance. Accidents or modifications of substance are arranged in order of categories such as quantity, quality, relation, time, place, action, passion, arrangement, and possession.

When Aristotle showed that man was compositional being, he also showed that the human soul is not substance. The soul and the body are aspects or principles of functioning of the same substance, man. The soul is the principle of life for the body and the principle or subject of action.<sup>174</sup> But the soul needs the body to manifest its essential functions while, the body needs the soul as the principle of life.<sup>175</sup>

Based on what has been said above, it can be concluded that Aristotle formed his understanding of human being in the framework of the image of the animal. The specificity of the human being as an animal is his rationality, so he is called *animal rationale* (Gr. *dzoon logikon*). Aristotle’s philosophy is still limited to explaining the subject (substance) of being in general. It is related to the metaphysical level in which the being is subject of accidents. Thus, as in the case of all beings, especially living beings, man is also the substance (composed of form and matter) in the sense of an existing individual being, as well as the subject of his activities.

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<sup>172</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Pluralistic Interpretation*, 44.

<sup>173</sup> Andrzej Maryniarczyk SDB, *Discovery of the Internal Structure of Being Notebook on Metaphysics*, vol. 5 (Lublin: PTTA, 2018), 151–153.

<sup>174</sup> See Maryniarczyk, *The Realistic Interpretation*, 114; Krąpiec, *I-Man*, 7; Wojtyła, “Subjectivity and the Irreducible,” 212.

<sup>175</sup> Cf., Krąpiec, *I-Man*, 6.

### 1.5.2. St. Thomas Aquinas

St. Thomas has accepted and followed the concept of dynamism (act-potency), mutability (form-matter) and identity (substance and accident) of being from Aristotle. But he then considered the unsolved problem of the existence of concrete being. For Aristotle, the existence of being is emerging because of the composition of matter and form. As mentioned above that form is the principle of organization of matter or as the actualization of potency in matter. And the source of existence is prime matter (pure potentiality). According to St. Thomas, the dynamism and mutability of concrete being shown that being was contingent. The existence of a contingent being indicates the existence of an absolute being or *Ipsum esse* (existence itself), that is God. As such, God is the source of the existence of a concrete being. For Aquinas, all existing beings are good because they are objects of divine love.<sup>176</sup>

Regarding man, St. Thomas has also followed the concept of man from Aristotle, where man was understood as a *compositum* of the soul and body. Plato has talked about the essence of man as something supernatural. The soul, as a human essence, was imprisoned in the body. Aristotle tried to break down this idea and emphasized the unity of spirit and body. He is more likely to conceptualize man as a product of nature; therefore, he describes the human soul as a form or act of a body that has life in its potentiality.<sup>177</sup>

St. Thomas understands man the same as Aristotle, where man is a composite of form and matter or soul and body. The difference is that Aristotle has an understanding of human being in terms of the “image of an animal,” while St. Thomas analyzes human being by developing “an image of person” based on the one hand on Aristotelian concept of substance and, on the other hand, on the Christian idea of likeness to God in the concept of person. The source of the synthesis of both these aspects of human being was for St. Thomas, the definition of the person of Boethius—“*individua substantia rationalis naturae*” (the individual substance of rational nature).<sup>178</sup> If in Aristotle’s philosophy, the concept of substance explains subjectivity in general, while in St. Thomas’ philosophy, this view is enriched in particular with attention to the problem of the human person as the subject of his activities.

Another difference between Aristotle and Aquinas is in their concept of the soul. Aristotle understood the soul as the principle of life that organizes the body, and the subject of human actions. For St. Thomas, the soul is not only the principle of life and the subject of action

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<sup>176</sup> Stefan Swieżawski, *St. Thomas Revisited*, trans. Theresa Sandok OSM (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), 111.

<sup>177</sup> See Maryniarczyk, *The Realistic Interpretation*, 113.

<sup>178</sup> Maryniarczyk, *Discovery of the Internal Structure*, 179, fn.29.

but the subject of existence. Man not only acts through the soul but also exists through the soul.<sup>179</sup> “I” can exist, accept sensory impressions, “I” think intellectually, “I” make judgments and make free decisions, because of the soul. For Aristotle, the unity of soul and body makes that man exists.<sup>180</sup> But for St. Thomas, the soul is the “first principle” that made man exists, but this soul is “incomplete” in its substantiality because that soul is connected and embedded in the body. However, the unity of the two is not accidental but an essential unity that forms the human substance as a unity or a whole. For St. Thomas, the man was both an individual and a person. The man was an individual pointing to the human species. He was individual thanks to the material factor in him.<sup>181</sup> Meanwhile, man was a person because of his rational soul which pervaded cognitive and appetitive powers. The soul is the principle of personality but it is not a person.<sup>182</sup> However, strictly speaking, soul makes us as a person. The person is a complete human being or *perfectissimum ens* in the created world.<sup>183</sup> According to St. Thomas, the person/self is nothing but a *synolon*<sup>184</sup> or a whole formed by matter and form.

As much as subjectivity is concerned, St. Thomas underlined all human activities come from concrete existing human being, through his/her faculties. As a person whose *humanus intellectus*, or a rational soul with cognitive and appetitive power, and also biological power, man can produce *actus humanus* or *actus personarum* and *actus hominis*. In this way, we can understand that subjectivity in the context of St. Thomas’ thought is determined by a concrete person as a substance who is endowed with rational nature.

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<sup>179</sup> Ibid., 117; Krapiec, *I-Man*, 102.

<sup>180</sup> See Maryniarczyk, *Discovery of the Internal Structure*, 194–195.

<sup>181</sup> Swieżawski, *St. Thomas Revived*, 101.

<sup>182</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I q.75a.4ad2, Corpus Thomisticum, accessed June 14, 2021, <https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth1075.html>. St. Thomas insisted: “Ad secundum dicendum quod non quaelibet substantia particularis est hypostasis vel persona, sed quae habet completam naturam speciei. Unde manus vel pes non potest dici hypostasis vel persona. Et similiter nec anima, cum sit pars speciei humanae.” See also Thomas Aquinas, *The Treatise on Human Nature Summa Theologiae Ia 75–89*, trans. with introduction and commentary Robert Pasnau (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002).

<sup>183</sup> Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I q.29a.3 co; see also Karol Wojtyła, “Thomistic Personalism,” in *Person and Community Selected Essays*, trans. Theresa Sandok OSM (New York: Peter Lang, 1993): 165–175; Swieżawski, *St. Thomas Revisited*, 101–103.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid., 98.



### 1.5.3. Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec

Krąpiec began his analysis of man, in his realistic philosophy,<sup>185</sup> starting from the immediate experience. His orientation is to show that man is a person. Experience, as a starting point, demonstrates human existence, which is a kind of special form of existence, characteristic only for the man-person. Krąpiec starts with the problem of how human intellect first comes into contact with reality. It concerns the spontaneous or pre-reflective knowledge as basis for the cognitive relation between the knowing subject and the known object.<sup>186</sup> He explained two kinds of experience, that is, outer (from outside) and inner (from within) experience of the existence of objects and oneself (“I”). In outer experience the man-subject reveals his specificity among other beings. In terms of inner experience, according to him, the man directly experiences his self. Through it, man as the human subject could be distinguished between “I” and “mine.” Krąpiec emphasizes in this experience immanence and transcendence of “I” in all his “mine,” especially in relation to human action. It means that “I” constantly is in relation to all “mine” and at the same time it is over or beyond all “mine.” In this experience both are given to us in the self-cognition that “I” exists as myself who is the subject of all mine.<sup>187</sup>

Krąpiec provides clarification on the use of the term “mine.” First, in general, mine involves possession of something outside of oneself such as houses, clothing, money, etc. Second, the mine is associated with the act of subjectivity of “I.” For Krąpiec, an act of “I” can be distinguished in physical functions such as eating, breathing, movement, sleeping, muscular activity, etc. In our mind, we say, I am having breakfast, I am having a headache, and my hands hurt and so on. Here, the physical functions and their organs are mine, so we say, my hand is writing, my foot is stepping and so on.<sup>188</sup> Here mine is also distinguished from “I,” the subject and performer of these functions. That way, we say, I am breathing, I am eating, etc. The “I” is the subject of physical functions provided by organs, but “I” cannot be identified with one or a number of organs. Because of that, organs are my organs and bodily functions are my functions. Furthermore, Krąpiec explained that “I,” as the subject and performer of physical functions, is the same “I” who is the subject of cognitive and appetitive functions.<sup>189</sup> All material and spiritual actions are aimed at the same center, the same subject that we recognize as the *ego*, or as “I,”

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<sup>185</sup> More explanation on realistic philosophy, see Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec OP and Andrzej Maryniarczyk SDB, *The Lublin Philosophical School* (Lublin: PTTA, 2010), 10, 30.

<sup>186</sup> See Wojciech Chudy, “Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec in the Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy,” *Studia Gilsoniana* 7, no.4 (October–November 2018): 555, DOI: 10.26385/SG.070428; Faustinus I. Ugwuanyi, “Krąpiec on the Specificity of Man,” *Studia Gilsoniana* 8, no.1 (January–March 2019): 169–180, DOI: 10.26385/SG.080106.

<sup>187</sup> See Krąpiec, *I-Man*, 89.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*, 91.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*

who is the same self. Krapiec emphasizes that actions are an emanation of self-existing “I.” Therefore, “I,” the *ego* is simply a subsistent being. Krapiec stated: “hence, man in his deepest ‘I’ is a subsistent being, i.e., substance that subsist because it is spirit [...] it becomes comprehensible vividly finally through an appeal to subsisting spirit, called soul.”<sup>190</sup> The human soul is an act that organizes matter into a human body in the fundamental sense and as a type of self-existing action. For this reason, in a limited sense, the soul can be considered as a self-existing subject, which does not change the fact that the soul is the main foundation of human ontic identity.<sup>191</sup> Krapiec also explained that this soul is immaterial and immortal because of its subsistence. Human existence belongs to the soul and the body gets it from the soul. Thus, if the body experiences destruction, the soul-ego as a subsisting substance does not experience the destruction.

Primordial facts from our experience are cognitive experiences of “I” who are distinguished from cognitive experience of mine. An “I” as a source, performer and more as a subject of actions is constantly present in all my actions, my mine. Speaking about the subjectivity of “I” means that everyone knows that he/she is the subject of his/her own actions. Krapiec said that “subjectivity or being I is inescapably given us in cognitive experience.”<sup>192</sup> For him, subjectivity cannot be understood to be limited to existential aspects but rather to the ontic structure of action. That means “I” know that “I” exist and realize my existence as a subject that performs my actions. Therefore, the experience of subjectivity, the experience of “I” who exists and is conscious in my actions, must be analyzed in ontic characters that are relation of mine and “I.” The “I,” as the subject of mine, is subsistence “I” in classical philosophy as “I” of a rational nature. The “I” is an expression of the transcendence of person above nature.<sup>193</sup>

“I” as a concrete person, who is present equally in material and spiritual actions, is more conscious, more subjective, and creates actions in the area of moral activity. Here, “I” made a decision through free choice and the same really determined myself to act. Through this action, “I” determine myself and “I” has responsibility for my self-existence. Krapiec says:

As we have already recalled, the area of moral activity, the area of man decision, is the particularly privileged place in which the “I” is as if most conscious, most subjective, and performing and creating my act. For in the act of decision through free choice of such a practically-practical judgment in which I determine myself to action, I grasp with fervor and ardor my own causation. I

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<sup>190</sup> Ibid., 107–108.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid., 321.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid., 323.

perceive how I am precisely causing a new being, which did not exist previously, and for whose existence I am responsible. [...] there is also the conviction which constantly accompanies us about the responsibility for everything which I perform.<sup>194</sup>

Therefore, subjectivity in Krapiec notion is determined by existing conscious “I” or person who is cause of material or physical acts and spiritual action, and it is known in the cognitive experience. Or in other words, we can say that subjectivity can be understood within the framework of Krapiec’s anthropological orientation to person as a subject analyzed from his own mines in his existential experience as a man-person.

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<sup>194</sup> Ibid., 322.

## Chapter Summary

In this chapter, I presented the problem of subjectivity in naturalistic, spiritualistic, existentialistic and metaphysical approach. In each of the above-mentioned philosophical currents, if not directly, there reveals in some way the issue of subjectivity that characterizes the being of the human person. However, usually, these approaches are either too “objective” or too “subjective,” which means they either place too much emphasis on the general (expressed in terms of general ontology) aspects of the human subject or again focus mainly on the inner experience (given only in an individual lived-experience) of human subjectivity.

From the above-presented statements, naturalists viewed man as an object. They ignored human subjectivity in relation to the experience of the internal structure or sub-ontic structures of man. This is a consequence of the emphasis on the empirical approach to understanding man. Man is understood as far as presents the sense perception presents. Therefore, the ancient monists (ancient hylozoists), in their search for *arche* understood that matter was the principle of being that exists, including man. All actions take place only according to the laws of nature. Modern materialists explained the reality of man in a similar way. On the other hand, Marxists saw the human self only as a product of human labor and social relations. Nietzsche understood that the will is “I” which is a synthesis of the process of bringing together elements, and urges in man. In his psychoanalytic theory, Sigmund Freud understood that sexual urges or energy (instincts), which was called libido, are the principal forces of the whole human life. Structuralists like Levi Straus rejected the psychic aspect or the human mind, as well as Descartes’ *cogito* because for him it was only part of the cosmos. Behaviorists viewed human actions only as a response to environmental stimulus. Functionalists regard mental states as causal functions. These naturalists’ views have implications for neglecting moral action and personal responsibility in an ethical context, since there is no place for genuine human freedom. Regardless of the weaknesses of their views, the good thing they found out was their empirical approach to understanding man, but, of course, it was not enough to grasp the complementary truth about man, let alone subjectivity, based solely on that approach.

The philosophers that I classify as spiritualists understood the essence of man as something spiritual or immaterial. Plato saw that man was only a spiritual soul in terms of idea, and the body was not a natural place of the soul. It means that soul has pre-existed the body. Modern and contemporary philosophers emphasize the immaterial property of man as the essence of man and become the basis of human subjectivity. Descartes emphasized *cogito* as the essence of man and the basis of human subjectivity. Kant and Scheler emphasized *a priori*

conditions of human knowledge and emotions as the basis for human subjectivity. These thinkers paid attention to the immaterial aspect of man and ignored the complexity of internal ontic structure and material aspect of man. In their notions there is no concrete “I” or “self” who will have responsibility for his/her actions. Consequently, human subjectivity is only based on something abstract and not concrete. Nevertheless, what is interesting about this group of thinker is their concern for the spiritual or immaterial aspect of man.

Existentialists focused their attention on human existence, through the prism of which they explained not only the being of the human person, but also the whole of reality. Marcel understood that man find himself in mutual relation with others; *esse est co-esse*. Heidegger explains the meaning of being through the meaning of *Dasein*. He conceived that human self-appeared from the relations of being as *Dasein*. The nature of *Dasein* is “being in the world.” Therefore the ontological status of man is determined by “being in the world.” And man realizes himself when he is in relation to other things. Jaspers explains an individual person or self with the term *Existenz*. *Existenz* is the principle of creativity, freedom and spontaneity. Manifestation of *Existenz* is in the immanent mode such as *Dasein*, consciousness in general and spirit. For him *Existenz* derived from *Transcendenz* which is being in itself. Self-awareness or *Existenz* (as the subject or principle of creativity, freedom and spontaneity) and *Transcendenz* take place in encompassing. There was even an understanding shown by Sartre that there was no being that exists in itself. “I” appeared not at a pre-reflexive moment but on a reflexive level, according to Sartre. That way, subjectivity refers to a self or a person who is not being in itself but is formed as a consequence of the way of existence. What is interesting about existentialists is their concern for man. They see a man not only as an object but as a subject.<sup>195</sup> They also oppose human functionalization which is equivalent to the degradation of the human person.<sup>196</sup> The shortcoming of existentialists’s view is their indifference of human ontology.

Metaphysicians emphasized the metaphysical aspects of subjectivity in terms of the *suppositum* or substance. Subjectivity described in the concept of substance by Aristotle, intersects with the concepts of matter and form or body and soul in his theory of hylomorphism. Being is understood as a composite. In the structure of being, the soul is the principle of life and act that governs the body and the subject of all acts. Aristotle sees man in terms of the image of the animal (*dzoön logikon*) and his notion of subjectivity is so objectively related to the concept of substance that it refers to being in general. St. Thomas’ concept of subjectivity is concentrated

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<sup>195</sup> Frederick Copleston, *Contemporary Philosophy Study of Logical Positivism and Existentialism*, (London: Burn Oates & Washbourne, 1956), 134.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, 139.

on man. He describes human being in the image of man as a person referring to Boethius' definition of man ("an individual substance of rational nature"). Man is person because of his rational nature. It is rational because of his soul. A soul with cognitive and appetitive power is not only the principle of life and the principle of body organization and activity but the principle of existence. Before the person acts, he must first exist. Person as a *synolon* with cognitive and volitional power and biological aspects makes him the subject that causes *actus humanus* and *actus hominis*. Here, both Aristotle and St. Thomas show the objective side of human subjectivity which rests on the *substance/suppositum* but pays less attention to the subjective side of man. Or short to speak, they have a few concerns about analyzing the human subjectivity given in the lived experience. Krapiec in his metaphysics of man emphasizes orientation to the person. He describes the person as the essence of man based on direct experience of subjectivity. Or he explains the person from the "I" and mine experience that I am presented or revealed by mine (physical, emotional, cognitive, volitional, and religious acts) and in that cognitive experience, I know that I am person who is the subject of all mines. This experience of subjectivity is an existential experience that belongs exclusively to man and not to other beings.

This preliminary sketch of the complexity of the problem of subjectivity shows that naturalists have reduced man only to an object and denied the facts of the subjectivity problem. Man as a subject (substance) is completely neglected in naturalist thought. Spiritualists and existentialists have paid attention to the problem of man as a subject in relation to his activities. However, they have not presented complementary, rational, and objective arguments to solve this problem. Metaphysicists see the problem of subjectivity clearly and solve this problem in an objective way. They show man as a substance, a subject of the existence and all activities. What is not satisfactory from their explanation is the subjective aspect of the problem of subjectivity or the living experience of human subjectivity. An explanation of the problem of subjectivity in an objective and subjective way is presented by Karol Wojtyła in his anthropology. Of course, Wojtyła did not have direct discussions and was influenced by all the thoughts that I have described. However, all of my presentations are not merely accidental, because Wojtyła is in intense contact in his works with Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics, phenomenology, Kantianism and existentialism. From here, he develop his system of anthropological and ethical thought to oppose naturalist thought, such as behaviorism and Marxism, as well as existentialists, like Sartre.

In the next chapter, I will present the manifestation of subjectivity in experiences of reflection, decision and action. Experience is the starting point because Wojtyła based his

anthropology on realistic metaphysics in which experience is its starting point. Thus, experience finally leads us to find the “I” or person as an individual substance with rational nature, as core of subjectivity.

## CHAPTER II

### MANIFESTATIONS OF SUBJECTIVITY

After obtaining a historical overview of the problem of subjectivity, it will be continued with an exploration of the problem of human person's subjectivity in Karol Wojtyła's anthropological thought. This exploration will begin with a review of the manifestations of subjectivity on the ground of a lived experience of man. I will describe the investigation of the manifestation of the *ego* (using the singular first pronoun I) in relation to actions in the lived experience of man which includes the realm of reflection, decision and action. This chapter presents the manifestation of "I" and actions in these three realms.<sup>1</sup> The question that needs to be answered is, at what moment does the "I" appear or exist as myself? How can the "I" appear as myself in such a moment?

#### 2.1. Manifestation in Reflection

The first part of this chapter describes the manifestation of ontic subjectiveness as the "I" or self in reflection. The ontic subjectiveness, here, is similar to a *suppositum*. Meanwhile, "I" or myself is the same as the experienced subjectivity with the ontic subjectiveness. The difference between the two is conscious experience. This section describes how consciousness and knowledge play a crucial role in experiencing the moment of self-consciousness. Thanks to consciousness and self-knowledge, "I" know, be aware, and experience my ontic subjectiveness or my objective "self" as the subject. Here, in consciousness which has cognitive character, the human subject becomes the "I." So, what does reflection mean here? Reflection, here, is understood in two ways. First, reflection is a cognitive act of the human mind which has a directive reference or intentionality to the object. A reflective mind is useful for the development of understanding and knowledge, including my self-knowledge. Second, reflection in terms of the role or function of consciousness, which has a cognitive character, due to cooperation with the human mind which has cognitive act.<sup>2</sup> Here, the second meaning is more emphasized but remains in relation to the first meaning.

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<sup>1</sup> Pronouns "I" or I with article *the*, myself, and also himself not refer to a particular I or to the author of this dissertation, but designate everyone or every person.

<sup>2</sup> Indeed, reflection as an act of the human cognitive faculty that takes place in self-knowledge can be distinguished from reflection that takes place in consciousness. Reflection in consciousness allows for the experience of the object to be reflected in the act of the cognitive faculties. Meanwhile, the reflection of the cognitive faculty only objectifies the object/I which, without consciousness, is impossible to present experience. I quote Rocco Buttiglione's affirmation: "This is always present in the cognitive process, which Wojtyła understands in an eminently realistic



### 2.1.1. The Role of Consciousness in the Action

I embark on the explanation in this section by explaining the concept of experience in Wojtyła's thought. The manifestation of subjectivity occurs not outside human being but occurs in and through his aspects. It takes place in the human experience. The lived experience of man, first and foremost, is experience of "man has of himself." In this experience man "faces himself." It means he enters into "a cognitive relation with himself."<sup>3</sup> Whatever is experienced by man is always in relation to himself. There is a correlation between cognitive and experiential aspects of human experience, which is also related to consciousness. Thanks to consciousness, man has reflection and experience of himself, his actions, and whatever is involved in the experience. Without consciousness, man and his actions cannot be manifest in human experience.<sup>4</sup> As such, for Wojtyła, the experience of man could not be narrowed only to the sensual experience, like phenomenologists understanding, but it should be also in relation to human mind. He stated as follows:

It is impossible to isolate artificially this experience from the whole range of cognitive acts having man as their object. It is also impossible to separate it artificially from the intellectual factor [...]. Naturally we do not interpret experience here in the purely phenomenological sense, as has often been the practice in the broad sphere of empiricist thinking. On the contrary, the empirical approach adopted by us must not, and indeed cannot, be identified in any way with the phenomenological conception of experience. To reduce the range of experience to the function and the content of the sense alone would lead to deep contradictions and serious misunderstandings [...]. It would be impossible to accept as true that in grasping this fact experience only reaches to the "surface," that it would be restricted to a set of sense data, which in every particular case is unique, while the mind is, so to speak, awaiting these data so as to make of them its objects, which it will then call either "action" or "acting person." On the contrary, it seems that the mind is engaged already in experience itself and that the experience enables it to establish its relation to the object, a relation also, although direct in a different sense.<sup>5</sup>

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way as reflection. But consciousness allows interiorization in the way that is proper to it, that is, by reflection. [...]. One could ask what the difference is between the cognitive reflection on the I on itself which takes place in self-knowledge, and consciousness. It is important to remind ourselves what has been said about the character of consciousness, that is, that is turned toward the interior of the 'I.' it is not limited to mirroring what the 'I' does and what the 'I' is, but it allows us to experience the action insofar as it is an action which personally to us. It is through the consciousness that we experience reality." Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła*, 130–131.

<sup>3</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 3; regarding the issue of experience in Wojtyła thought can be found also in some work such as: Jarosław Merecki, "On the Sources of Karol Wojtyła's *The Acting Person*," *Philosophy and Canon Law* 7, no.1 (2021): 1–15, <https://doi.org/10.31261/PaCL.2021.07.1.01>; Grzegorz Hołub and Piotr Stanisław Mazur, "The Experience of Human Being in the Thought of Karol Wojtyła," *Filosofija. Sociologija* 28, no. 1 (2017): 73–83, <http://mokslozurnalai.lmaleidykla.lt/publ/0235-7186/2017/1/73-83.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> Here, I use the term action refer to the original term used by Wojtyła, *czyn*. This term designates conscious action. Next I will use the terms action or conscious action interchangeably to refer to the term *czyn*.

<sup>5</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 8–10.

Wojtyła also highlights Kant and Scheler's concept of experience. For Kant, experience does not penetrate the essence of things. Meanwhile, Scheler, with his phenomenology, understands that experience penetrates the essence of things.<sup>6</sup> Wojtyła was not at all satisfied with Kant and Scheler's idea of experience because it was not enough for him. For him, phenomenologically understood experience is not sufficient because it has not yet reached the essence of things in the metaphysical sense.<sup>7</sup> Here Wojtyła emphasizes the experience that grew out of the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept. For Wojtyła, the experience contained not only sensual cognition but also intellectual understanding. When we have contact with the object of knowledge, there is contact of the senses but also intellectual activity participates. Thus, we get what Wojtyła calls understanding experience,<sup>8</sup> through the stabilization of the object of experience by the intellectual element.<sup>9</sup> For Wojtyła, there are many individual facts of experience. However, we are not only touching a single moment or fact, but the whole of a given object, such as a human being.<sup>10</sup> Here, the method of induction is applied so that the total experience is the total of individual experiences of the object, and the total understanding of the object is the total of individual acts of understanding. Wojtyła understands induction not in the sense of J.S. Mill as a form of argumentation or reasoning.<sup>11</sup> His view about induction is within the framework of Aristotle's understanding. Induction is understood as the mental apprehension

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<sup>6</sup> Jerzy W. Gałkowski, "The Place of Thomism in the Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła," *Angelicum* 65, no. 2 (1988): 183.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 184; see also Angela Franz Franks, "Thinking the Embodied Person with Karol Wojtyła," *Nova et Vetera* 16, English edition, no.1 (2018): 154–155, [https://www.academia.edu/35814507/Thinking\\_the\\_Embodied\\_Person\\_with\\_Karol\\_Wojty%C5%82a](https://www.academia.edu/35814507/Thinking_the_Embodied_Person_with_Karol_Wojty%C5%82a).

<sup>9</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 6–7.

<sup>10</sup> For Wojtyła this fact does not contradict the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of experience and phenomenology but certainly contradicts the phenomenalist concept of experience. Indeed, the concept of Wojtyła's experience grew fundamentally from the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of experience. However, he developed it by including a phenomenological analysis of human subjectivity. Gałkowski, "The Palace of Thomism," 184.

<sup>11</sup> Copleston explained, "In view of the fact that Mill represents syllogistic reasoning as a process of interpreting a general proposition which is itself the result of induction, it is not surprising that he defines inductive inference as 'the operation of discovering and proving general propositions.' [...] This amounts to saying that to prove a general proposition is to prove that something is true of a whole class of particulars. Hence induction can be defined as 'that operation of the mind by which we infer that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain assignable respects.'" Copleston also added that "Hence in developing a theory of induction it is essential to define idea of causality as clearly as possible. Mill disclaims any intention of concerning himself with ultimate causes in a metaphysical sense. Moreover, as he intends to determine the idea of causality only in so far as it can be obtained from experience, he does not propose to introduce the notion of any mysterious necessary bond between cause and effect. Such a notion is not required for a theory of inductive science. There is no need to go beyond the familiar truth, that invariability of succession is found by observation to obtain between every fact in nature and some other fact which has preceded it." Frederick Copleston, SJ, *A History of Philosophy, Modern Philosophy Volume VIII: Empiricism, Idealism, and Pragmatism in Britain and America*, (New York, London: Doubleday, 1966), 67–71.

of the unity of meaning among the multiplicity and complexity of phenomena or individual experiences and understandings of objects.<sup>12</sup>

The comprehensive knowledge of man and the integral subjectivity of man begins with an analysis of the integral/total experience of man as a “concrete I.” The integral experience of man consists of inner and outer experiences.<sup>13</sup> Inner experience shows that “I” know, am aware and experience myself as the subject and object of my own actions but also experience what is happening in myself. Apart from this inner experience, I also know, am aware and experience other “I” and things. For Wojtyła, these two experiences are different but inseparable, because these two experiences complement each other to gain knowledge of man. However, he embarks on his analysis by paying attention to inner experience as a starting point. Because according to Wojtyła, “man’s experience of anything outside of himself is always associated with the experience of himself, and he never experiences anything external without having at the same time the experience of himself.”<sup>14</sup>

In this section, I would like to delineate the inner experience of the action of person in relation to the presence and role of consciousness in it (in the subsequent section, we will see the manifestation of subjectivity in the lived experience of decision and action). How to understand human subjectivity manifested in the reflection? First of all, we look at human subjectivity in the field of consciousness or rather see the dynamic relation of person and action in the field of consciousness. And then, here, we will also review the status or position of consciousness in man and its role in human action.

Regarding action, Wojtyła claims that there are various elements, in specific ways, which contribute to the constitution of action. One of those aspects is consciousness. In the experience of action, “I” know and am aware my own action as truly conscious action. This kind of experience is also experienced by other I’s. “I” experience the emergence of action through my own choice and decision made consciously. Wojtyła has explained that in order to distinguish consciousness in human action, it is necessary to lead us to the understanding that not only man act consciously, but man does have consciousness of action.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 14; Gałkowski, “The Place of Thomism,” 184–185.

<sup>13</sup> Experience is the self-giving of the intelligible object in cognitive act whatever species of the object or type of its intelligibility. The concept of the phenomenological version of experience is contrary to the concept of the naturalistic version of experience or so-called phenomenalist which emphasizes sense experience. Wojtyła’s concept of phenomenological experience does not contradict Thomist’s version, and also the relationship between internal and external experience which is confirmed in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science. See Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła*, 124, fn.11; Hołub and Mazur, “The Experience of Human Being,” 77–80.

<sup>14</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 3.

<sup>15</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 28.

Concerning consciousness of action in this experience, man knows, is aware, and experiences his action, his consciousness and of his “I” which causes the conscious action. For Instance, the experience “I am aware of my actions” or “I am aware of the actions I have done” indicates the role of consciousness that contribute to create conscious action and “I” as the owner of the consciousness and the conscious action that has been taken. This fact shows that man is not only acting consciously, but he is aware that he is acting and is aware that he has consciousness.<sup>16</sup> Thus, the experience of conscious action, thanks to the role of consciousness, is still associated with “I.” So, consciousness is the aspect that guarantees awareness of subjectivity, awareness of the dynamic relationship between myself as subject, and action as my product. In conclusion, without consciousness, “I” would not experience myself and would not experience it as a subject. And without it, “I” also would not experience the formation of actions and the formation of myself in my actions. Only by consciousness, “I” act as a person and experience the action as act of person.

Furthermore, with regard to the position of consciousness in man, Wojtyła provided a description relating to the above experience, first of all, by referring to the traditional interpretation of the human act, which stated that consciousness was merged in the dynamism of the will (*volutarium*). In the scholastic approach, the consciousness was a characteristic of rationality. The consciousness was contained in the will (*appetitus rationalis*) and was expressed by *voluntarius*. This understanding refers to the definition of *homo est animal rationale* and *persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia*.<sup>17</sup> Wojtyła further develops these concepts and combines them with the complex facts of human experience. First of all, the consciousness belongs to the real man who has a rational nature. It is inherent or incorporated in human existence and specifically in human actions.<sup>18</sup> Because of consciousness, man is aware of his internal and external factuality. It can be said that even without accompanying action, consciousness remains an essential aspect of human person. Wojtyła says:

[...] His awareness is simultaneous with conscious acting and, so to speak, accompanies it. But it is also present before and after. It has its own continuity

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<sup>16</sup> See Ibid., 31.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 30–31. Regarding consciousness, see also Grzegorz Hołub, “The Relation between Consciousness and Emotions in the Thought of Karol Wojtyła,” *The Person and the Challenges* 5, no. 2 (2015): 149–164; Adrian J. Reimers, “Two Anthropological Errors according to Karol Wojtyła,” *Roczniki Teologiczne* LXIX, no. 3 (2022): 37–47; Peter Emanuel A. Mara, “Karol Wojtyła’s Theory of Consciousness,” 1–12, Academia, accessed June 23, 2022, [https://www.academia.edu/1723514/Karol\\_Wojtylas\\_Theory\\_of\\_Consciousness](https://www.academia.edu/1723514/Karol_Wojtylas_Theory_of_Consciousness); Grzegorz Ignatik, *Person and Value: Karol Wojtyła’s Personalistic and Normative Theory of Man, Morality and Love* (Lahman: Lexington Books, 2021), accessed July 11, 2022, [https://books.google.pl/books?id=Pn8qEAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=pl&source=gbs\\_ge\\_summary\\_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.pl/books?id=Pn8qEAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=pl&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false).

and its own identity separate from the continuity and the identity of any particular action. Every action finds consciousness, if one may say so, already there; it develops and comes to pass in the presence of consciousness, leaving behind little trace of its passage.<sup>19</sup>

Besides, from the fact of experience it is found that consciousness is an intrinsic and constitutive aspect of an acting person,<sup>20</sup> and contributed specifically and uniquely to action and constitution of self through action. Wojtyła explains:

I already mentioned earlier that self is not reducible to consciousness alone, although it is constituted through consciousness. Consciousness, and especially self-consciousness, is an indispensable condition for the constitution of the human self. Nevertheless, the real constitution of this self within the framework of the human suppositum ultimately take place as result of acts of self-determination.<sup>21</sup>

Wojtyła elucidated that person is aware and experiences his dynamic relation with his action by consciousness. Here, person not only acts consciously but is aware and experiences his action and himself as a cause of the action.<sup>22</sup>

In experience, there is not only the fact of the close relationship between consciousness and action, but, moreover, there is also the fact of experience that consciousness cooperates with knowledge and self-knowledge. These facts confirm that consciousness is not an autonomous subject and intentional power. However, it plays a significant role in understanding the personal subjectivity of man.<sup>23</sup> It is more of a “subjective content of the being and acting that is conscious, the being and acting proper to man,”<sup>24</sup> and not as an independent self-reality. Of course, this view is contrary to the concept of subjectivism which views consciousness as an independent and autonomous subject. However, for Wojtyła, consciousness must be seen from the perspective of person and his efficacy. Thus, consciousness as a constitutive aspect is present uniquely and specifically in the formation of action. Wojtyła stated that “Consciousness itself does not exist as the substantive subject of the acts of consciousness; it exists neither as an independent factor nor as a faculty.”<sup>25</sup> As such, consciousness is not an intentional power and an autonomous subject. It is more a passive and complex property existing in cooperation with

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<sup>19</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 31.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 231.

<sup>22</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 30–31.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 33–34; see also Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 226; Hołub, “Consciousness and Emotions,” 151.

<sup>24</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 33.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 34.

cognition (knowledge and self-knowledge).<sup>26</sup> Consciousness is limited to reflection on what has been known or it may be said that it is “understanding of what has been constituted and comprehended.”<sup>27</sup> Thus, consciousness does not cognitively objectify either the actions or the person who performs actions.

Furthermore, we experience the fact that consciousness not only assists in experiencing actions and experiencing ourselves, even consciousness itself, but also it facilitates us to reflect on actions when they are born, when they are displayed, even the effects of those actions.<sup>28</sup> Here we can ask again; why man can experience all these facts through consciousness? Or how can all this are contained in consciousness so that man can experience it?

Questions referring to these facts show the function of consciousness as an essential aspect of being human. There are two essential functions, namely mirroring (Pl. *odzwierciedlająca*) or reflective function (Pl. *odbijająca*) and reflexive function (Pl. *refleksywna*). The reflective function is the primary function of consciousness, where consciousness is limited to reflecting or mirroring on what is already known. Consciousness, with its cognitive character, absorbs ideas and information from knowledge and self-knowledge and then reflects on them.<sup>29</sup> Here is the first step of interiorizing inputs from knowledge and self-knowledge. The consciousness helps man to reflect and experience known objects, including actions and himself. This is the moment of objectivization of “I” which is a subject. The consciousness leads man to realize that he is subject and object, as well as his actions. Meanwhile, in the reflected action, consciousness illuminates the relation of action and “I,” that action does stem from “I” as the subject and agent of the action. So, there is recognition and awareness from human being that he is the subject and the agent of his actions. There is a moment of subjectivization here too. This means that consciousness and its reflective function that accompanies every action reveals the subjective character of the action. In this moment, through the reflective function, man realizes his subjectivity as well as his ownership and authorship status in action.

Furthermore, consciousness has a reflexive function enabling the process of reflection which is to “form man’s experience and thus allow him to experience in a special way his own subjectiveness.”<sup>30</sup> That is the essential function of consciousness. The task of consciousness does

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<sup>26</sup> Hołub, “Consciousness and Emotions,” 151.

<sup>27</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 32.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 31.

<sup>29</sup> See Ibid., 41; Hołub, “Consciousness and Emotions,” 150.

<sup>30</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 42.

not stop at reflecting on the interiority of action and the relation of action to “I” which is the inner dimension, but it seems as if it is from the outside. Meanwhile, for Wojtyła, the reflexive function puts more emphasis “on turning back on the subject.” It means that with this function man has experience of his own “I,” also has the experience of himself as subject. With this function, a person reflects and experiences the object of the action and the action itself, but more than that, he experiences himself. This function directs the experience of the action and the object of the action to the dependence on “I.” Because of that, we can “experience the action as action and as our own.”<sup>31</sup> And consciousness also helps the “I” to experience himself as his own self distinct from others. Therefore, in experience, consciousness demonstrates its role to reflect and experience something that is objectively its own. Or in other words, consciousness conditions the subjectivation of the objective.<sup>32</sup> Accordingly, “consciousness makes the subjective experience as the objective experience of action and *ego* possible.”<sup>33</sup>

In addition, the reflexive function guarantees the experience of subjectivity and, ensures the experience of moral values in action. And through the execution of the action, because of this function, man not only experiences the action and the moral values it contains, but also experiences its consequences which is the experience of being a good or bad person. The reflexive function makes actions and moral values become the subjective reality of man, where he experiences himself as the cause of action, as well as the quality of his own morality. Therefore, thanks to the reflective function of human consciousness, man can realize his subjectivity and agency, and because of reflexive function man can experience his subjectivity, agency and also morality.

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> James Taylor, “Beyond Nature: Karol Wojtyła’s Development of the Traditional Definition of Personhood,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 63, no. 2 (December 2009): 424.

### 2.1.2. Consciousness, Self-Knowledge and Self-Consciousness

Consciousness cannot be separated from the faculty of cognition. The human cognition conditions the consciousness and its functions (reflective and reflexive). What the consciousness reflects and experiences is determined by cognition. The consciousness is intimately associated with it.<sup>34</sup> The human cognition plays a role in knowing objective reality. The proper object of cognition is being.<sup>35</sup> It can be something external such as things or others, however, the object that is focused first here, is “I,” in relation to his dynamic relationship with action and also consciousness. This known object will be reflected and experienced by man thanks to consciousness. It means, objects of our cognition, or knowledge and understanding are also objects of the consciousness. The consciousness itself does not have an intentional character to objectify objects and form meaning.<sup>36</sup> Wojtyła claims that consciousness does not have an intentional structure because the intentionality is more of a cognitive act or an act of knowledge which is nothing but the faculty of the human person. Of course, this is different from the tradition of the philosophy of consciousness, which cannot separate consciousness from intentionality. And admittedly, he completely rejects the intentional character of the consciousness, but agrees with the traditional phenomenological idea that consciousness always means awareness of something.<sup>37</sup> Consciousness is limited to its function of reflecting and experiencing objects that are known or understood. However, the known objects and the formed meanings take place in the consciousness. The object that has been known is the content of the consciousness and simultaneously forms it. According to Wojtyła, the knowledge of objective reality obtained from the cognitive faculty determines the level of consciousness of person. Wojtyła states as follows:

The meanings of things and their relations are given to consciousness, as it were, from outside as the product of knowledge, which in turn results from the active constitution and comprehension of the objective reality and is accumulated by man and possessed by him by various means and to different degrees. Hence the various degrees of knowledge determine different level of consciousness.<sup>38</sup>

Meanwhile, self-knowledge is made possible by the role of cognition which objectifies the “I.” The self-knowledge is a form or kind of knowledge that is distinguished from other knowledge,

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<sup>34</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 38.

<sup>35</sup> Karol Wojtyła, *Considerations on the Essence of Man Rozważania O Istocie Człowieka*, trans. John Grondelski (Lublin-Roma: PTTA SITD, 2016), 17–18.

<sup>36</sup> Remigiusz Lucjan Król, *Karol Wojtyła's Philosophy of the Person* (Truskaw: Wydawnictwa Naukowe Sub Lupa, 2017), 24–25.

<sup>37</sup> Mara, “Theory of Consciousness,” 7.

<sup>38</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 35.



in which the self is made an object of intentionality and understanding of cognitive act so that a true self is formed. In the self-knowledge, there is objectification, understanding and meaning of one's self. Or in other words, the self-knowledge is formed when the self becomes the object of the intentionality of intellectual activity. The self-knowledge also objectifies the self in a dynamic relationship with action where there is a causal relationship: self as the cause of action. However, of course, self-knowledge persists in consciousness. The objectification, understanding and meaning of the self cannot occur outside of the consciousness; they must remain connected in consciousness.<sup>39</sup> Thus, the consciousness does not objectify the "I" and actions at all, although it has a close relationship with self-knowledge. The consciousness only serves to create an intimate, subjective unity with the "I."<sup>40</sup> In other words, the consciousness subjectifies the objective "I" in terms of self-knowledge obtained from the process of objectifying cognition. Apart from that, the self-knowledge also objectifies consciousness so that the object is not only the "I" and his actions, but also the person as a being who is aware of himself and aware of his actions. Buttiglione explains:

But this link should not lead us to forget that self-knowledge is always a cognitive act and therefore objectivizes man, in making his own consciousness an object of knowledge. Consciousness itself is the object of self-knowledge in the sense that in cognitive act in which man knows himself, he knows himself as a conscious subject. However, there is a difference between knowing oneself as a conscious subject (in this case consciousness itself is, as it were, objectivized) and being aware of oneself.<sup>41</sup>

Consciousness alone cannot make us aware of anything. It is aware of something because of the intentional act of cognition. This is possible because of intimacy unity with cognition. Additionally, cognition which has intentionality towards the "I" as an object, enables self-knowledge. The self-knowledge contributes to the formation of self-consciousness.<sup>42</sup> This fact shows that the self-consciousness is made possible by the self-knowledge. Or in other words, self-knowledge becomes a condition for self-consciousness. Without the self-knowledge, "I" have no consciousness of myself. Due to the foundation of self-knowledge, "I" can be aware of myself and then "I" can experience myself. Nevertheless, we need to keep in mind that the intentional act of cognition that objectifies self still should be separated from consciousness. In this intentional act of cognition, consciousness, especially the reflexive function, accompanies and cooperates with it so that self-knowledge is achieved. The term "self" is associated with

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<sup>39</sup> Cf., Król, *Philosophy of the Person*, 31.

<sup>40</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 36.

<sup>41</sup> Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła*, 130.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

“experienced subjectiveness.” Consequently, the self-knowledge can be understood as the knowledge of “experienced subjectiveness,” and not merely knowledge of the subject of existence and action.<sup>43</sup>

Thus, man can aware or reflect on himself in relation to his actions in consciousness, which is only possible because of the role of self-knowledge. Here, subjectivity is expressed in reflection also thanks to self-knowledge. But the task of consciousness does not give up at reflecting on the dynamic relation of “I” and action, but experiencing them. In other words, the experience of subjectivity comes from the reflection of being and acting of man. Moreover, through consciousness, “I” am aware and experience the objective “I” as subject as my own “I,” and also experience my actions as a personal action. This means that thanks to consciousness, “I” realize and experience my actions and also my subjectiveness as an internal structure that forms the basis for “self.”

Furthermore, self-knowledge and mirroring function of consciousness allows man to distinguish between action (*actio*) and what is happening within himself (*passio*).<sup>44</sup> Because of action, man experiences moral values. In terms of moral values, the function of consciousness (reflective and reflexive) and self-knowledge allows, on the one hand, to achieve objective awareness of good and evil actions, but on the other hand, it also allows to experience these good or evil actions. And deeper than that they both allow one to experience oneself who is the subject of action, as either good or evil person. Wojtyła explains as follow:

It is also only in connection with his acting (that is, acting) that man experiences as his own the moral value of good and bad (or as is sometimes wrongly said, of the moral and immoral). He experiences them in the attitude he assumes toward them, an attitude that is at once emotional and appreciative. At any rate, he is not only conscious of the morality of his actions but he actually experiences it, often very deeply. Objectively, both action and moral values belong to a real subject, that is, to man as their agent [...]. It is then that man has the experience of good or evil simply in himself, in his ego; he thereby experiences himself as the one who is either good or evil. So we come to see the full dimension of morality in the subjective and personal reality.<sup>45</sup>

At this point, it should be reiterated that man possesses self-consciousness thanks to cooperation between consciousness and self-knowledge. He could know and aware the fact that he is a subject and experience his “I” and his action, even his morality in personal reality. This

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<sup>43</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 45.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 48.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 48–49.

cooperation confirms the manifestation of the subjectivity of human person in the experiential sense.

### 2.1.3. Consciousness, Body and Emotion

Apart from reflecting and experiencing on “I” and action, man is also aware of his body and experiences it. When man reflects and experiences himself and his actions, in some way his body is also involved. Reflection and experience of the body cannot be detached from lived-experience. First of all, man can reflect on his body because he is connected to his self-knowledge. Man, with all his internal structures and also particular vegetative processes, is an object of self-knowledge and consciousness.

Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that awareness of the body is not necessarily directly related to detailed awareness of the organism and all its internal structures, as well as the particular vegetative processes that take place on it. The vegetative potentiality and its dynamism remain outside the scope of consciousness or inaccessible to consciousness. The man subject’s dynamic unity on the vegetative layer is completely unconscious or sub-conscious. The Polish Philosopher explains in *The Acting Person*:

Having the awareness of the body leads indirectly to having the awareness of the organism. But the human being has no direct and detailed consciousness of his organism; he is not conscious of the particular dynamic instances of acts which compose the whole of the vegetative dynamism. These factual instances, these forms of the dynamism of the human subject, remain inaccessible to consciousness. They occur and develop spontaneously without accompaniment of their being mirrored in consciousness.<sup>46</sup>

However, consciousness plays a role in emphasizing the subjective aspect of the body and its dynamics so that the body, all its vegetative potential and dynamism are mine, which also forms the structure of the dynamic subject which is a person.<sup>47</sup> In terms of relation between them, this dynamic unity is first and prior to consciousness with its two functions mirroring and reflexive. This unity at the somatic layer is, first of all, the unity of life and secondly the unity of lived experience.<sup>48</sup> The consciousness expresses lived experience that is the subjective aspect of action

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 90

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 91–93; Franks, “Thinking the Embodied Person, 161–164.

<sup>48</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 91; Karol Wojtyła, “Person and Act,” in *Person and Act and Selected Essays, The English Critical Edition of the Works of Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II*, trans. Grzegorz Ignatik (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2021), 194.

and what happens in man, but “it does not constitute the inner structure of the human dynamism itself.”<sup>49</sup>

With their internal structure and dynamism, organisms can become objects of self-knowledge and consciousness when it comes to sensations. Wojtyła says, “self-knowledge, and with it consciousness, reaches only as far or rather as deep, into the organism and its life as sensations allow it to reach.”<sup>50</sup> This is possible because the body is first the object of sensation.<sup>51</sup> It may be said that the sensations open the door to the entry of self-knowledge and consciousness so that what man feels is immediately aware of. He also continued to explain that “generally the human body and everything associated with it becomes the object of sensations first and only subsequently of self-knowledge and consciousness.”<sup>52</sup> As such, “man not only feels his body, but he is also aware of it.”<sup>53</sup>

Self-knowledge and consciousness have a significant role in illuminating and reflecting the unbreakable relationship and unity between body and “I.” The human body cannot be separated from the whole man and specifically in relation to the action. With the assistance of self-knowledge and consciousness, man knows and realizes that the body is one of the aspects that constitute himself as a whole. It is also with the body that the concrete whole of man is revealed.<sup>54</sup> In addition, Wojtyła claims that the body is the medium for the manifestation of action and the person himself:

It is generally recognized that the human body is in its visible dynamism the territory where, or in a way even the medium whereby, the person express himself.[...] in this way the dynamic transcendence of the person—spiritual by its very nature—finds in the human body the territory and the means of expression. This is confirmed time and again by the action, visible or at least perceptible manifestation of self-determination—that is, of the person’s efficacy—in and by the body. In this sense, the body is the territory and in a way

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<sup>49</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 93.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 51. Wojtyła, gives an example that because of illness that evokes appropriate bodily sensations, man becomes aware of this or that organ or vegetative process within himself.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 52.

<sup>54</sup> As reflected in the classical metaphysical notion that matter, in the context of the anthropology of the body, is the principle of the individuation of being (human being). Ibid., 203; Fr. Maryniarczyk also says: “Individuation is thus a direct consequence of the act (existence), which is limited and determined by the potency (matter). [...] The problem of individuation as such can be encountered in Aristotle’s metaphysics (as an element of Platonism that was not overcome), where forms were by nature general (specific or generic) and acquired their individuation due to matter. Maryniarczyk, *Discovery of the Internal Structure*, 140; see also Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline of the History of Being*, trans. Theresa Sandok (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), 334.

the means for the performance of action and consequently for the fulfillment of the person.<sup>55</sup>

Thus, when man determines himself to the action, he experiences “he owns himself,” “he governs himself,” and expresses it in and by the body, which goes on in action. Here, man is aware and experiences himself who controls and employs his body. Therefore, “the body is not a member of a subjective ego in the way of being identical with the ego; man is not the body, he only has it.”<sup>56</sup>

On the other hand, meanwhile, how to understand the manifestation of “I” in relation to emotions? Two important things will be described here, among others, the role of self-knowledge and consciousness that is prior to emotions and emotions that overwhelm consciousness and influences it so that there is no distance between the two. Emotions, with their particular feelings or sensations that occur in man, are not only reflected in consciousness but also influence the formation, in a special way, of the consciousness of various objects, including the “I” and his action. This fact indicates that consciousness requires feelings involved in shaping actions and relating to the “I.” Indeed, there is a differentiation of the feelings, especially qualitatively, that is, the feelings related to the bodily sensations and the feelings related to the spiritual life of man. In relation to feelings which also play a role in the formation of actions, Wojtyła explained that feelings need to be controlled by self-knowledge and consciousness as well as by will.<sup>57</sup> In terms of the relation between consciousness and emotions, it is understood that if the reflective and experiential functions of consciousness are weakened, what Wojtyła called the “emotionalization of consciousness” will occur. This is a problem where the consciousness loses its distance from emotions so that the consciousness is overwhelmed by the emotions.<sup>58</sup> Consciousness in this circumstance, due to the lack of self-knowledge, cannot capture the factual state of emotions, so that the consciousness cannot reflect the emotions as they really are.<sup>59</sup>

Furthermore, we experience that self-knowledge plays a role in preventing the emotionalization of consciousness so that there is no totality of emotive state in consciousness. Even if the emotion or feelings are stronger than self-knowledge, the consciousness still reflects what happens. However, what happens and is reflected is out of touch with the “I.” Here, man is

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<sup>55</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 204–205.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 206.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 54. In this section, my attention is more directed to the control of self-knowledge and consciousness, although the most effective control in action lies in the will, which will be discussed in chapter 3.

<sup>58</sup> Hołub, “Consciousness and Emotions,” 153.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

aware of the emotion that occurs, but he cannot control it.<sup>60</sup> If man continues to control his feeling through self-knowledge, the feeling that occurs becomes his feeling due to it is connected to his being.<sup>61</sup> This is where the uniqueness of person's subjectivity is manifested because he controls his feelings that are common and connected to his being. Conversely, if a person does not control the feelings, then those feelings are only what happens in him.

Strictly speaking, the emotionalization of consciousness indicates a reduced or diminished role of self-knowledge in consciousness. It causes that man experiences only his feelings, but he does not experience his personal subjectivity, namely, the "I" as a source of experience and center that regulates emotions. The "I" is not at all expressed in the feelings that occur. It means the experienced state is simply the primitive form of subjectivity revealed in a non-personal way.<sup>62</sup> The inability to grasp emotional facts rationally brings consciousness to a dysfunctional stage. Therefore, it has a non-constructive impact on the person. Wojtyła elucidated that self-knowledge is the main factor determining the presence or absence of the emotionalization of consciousness by objectifying emotional facts.<sup>63</sup> On the other hand, man experiences his subjectivity in his feelings which are controlled by self-knowledge. Thus, self-knowledge greatly contributes to the limitation of the emotionalization of consciousness.<sup>64</sup> Therefore, self-knowledge must be strengthened so that it can objectify emotions and can provide cognitive input to the reflective and reflexive functions of consciousness. First of all, self-knowledge as an active force must be centered on "I."<sup>65</sup> "I" with all activities, including emotional activities, becomes the object of cognition. Then, the "I," as a subject, controls all activities rationally and makes them his own, including emotions.

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<sup>60</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 55.

<sup>61</sup> Hołub, "Consciousness and Emotions," 155.

<sup>62</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 55–56.

<sup>63</sup> Hołub, "Consciousness and Emotions," 154.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 149.

<sup>65</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 55.

## 2.2. Manifestation in Decision

The “I” or “self” as a subject is not only manifested in reflection, an act of consciousness realizing human cognition. The awareness of one’s self is even more clearly revealed in the decision-making acts that underlie the conscious and free action of the human person.

### 2.2.1. Consciousness and Efficacy

Wojtyła claims that man has lived experience “I act,” reflected in consciousness. In this experience, he appears to himself as the subject of his own action. This means that the experience of “I act” is subjective. From the objective point of view, the fact that “I act” requires an integral human dynamism internally.<sup>66</sup> The explanation of human dynamism makes possible the structure of potency and act, as we could see in the philosophy of Aristotle.<sup>67</sup> However, “not everything belonging to the human dynamism is reflected in consciousness. For instance, practically nothing of the vegetative dynamism of human body is mirrored in consciousness. Similarly, not all the factors of the human dynamism may be consciously experienced by him.”<sup>68</sup>

As a matter of fact, from the objective side, human dynamism shows that there are two different structures in man, namely human action (*agere*) and something happens in man (*pati*).<sup>69</sup> The two structures are opposite each other. The former shows man’s activeness and the latter shows man’s passiveness.<sup>70</sup> Strictly speaking, human action and something happens in man is the actualization of potency in human dynamism. Both differ in direction and structure of dynamism but have the same source, i.e., man as the dynamic subject. Consequently, both action and something happens in man are manifestations of man-subject. The thing that distinguishes actualization in human action and what happens is the experience of moment of efficacy or “experience being an agent of action.” Wojtyła also explained that the actualization of potential to action is a process of transitioning the order of existence, and this explains some sort of becoming.<sup>71</sup>

In our inner human experience, we experience actions as well as what happens. The difference between human action and something happens in man, as an actualization of potency, is determined by the experience of the moment of efficacy. Efficacy as possessing lived

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 60–61.

<sup>67</sup> The theory of human dynamism will be explained more in the chapter 3

<sup>68</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 60.

<sup>69</sup> In *The Acting Person*, Wojtyła very often uses the term “something happens in man” with “activation” alternately which refers to the same meaning. In this writing I also use these two terms interchangeably.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 62.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 64.

experience of a moment to become an agent of action is a rudimental differentiator between action and what happens.<sup>72</sup> This moment involves consciousness, so that becoming an agent of action is a conscious experience. The contribution of consciousness causes the person is aware and experiences the state of being an agent of his actions. Wojtyła argued that efficacy and consciousness in a specific manner determine human action and human self.<sup>73</sup> That way, when “I” act, “I” experience myself as a subject and agent, at the same time “I” experience my actions shape myself. Furthermore, Wojtyła noted that human action and what happens in man have a form of objective causation.<sup>74</sup> Their crucial difference lies in the participation of consciousness and “I.” In action, consciousness and “I” participate in efficacy, whereas in what happens in man, they do not. It might be more accurate to say that in action, there is an experience of efficacious participation of “I,” while in what happens in man, there is only the objective causation without that awareness and experience of efficacy. Therefore, especially in action, objective efficacy is linked with the experience of efficacy. Here, man appears as a conscious cause of his objective causation. Conversely, in the objective causation of what happens in man there is an absence of the experience of efficacy. Wojtyła says:

The contraposition of acting and happening, of activeness and passiveness, bring forth still another contraposition that arises from having, or not having, the experience of efficacy. Objective efficacy is the correlate of the experience of efficacy, for having this experience opens to our insight the structure of the efficacious ego. But not having the experience of efficacy—when the ego does not efficaciously participate in all that only happens in man—is by no means equivalent to the absence of objective causation.<sup>75</sup>

In the experience of the moment of efficacy, there is an emphasis on the role of consciousness involved in the formation of action and the causal relationship between the person and the action that originates from “I” or person as the subject and the efficient cause. Here, there is self-evidence in the moment of efficacy. Accordingly, thanks to consciousness, in the moment of efficacy, “I” am aware and experience my own “I” as the subject and the efficient cause and also simultaneously, it makes “I” am aware and experience of the status as an agent who conducts and performs the actions. In the experience of efficacy as well, the transcendence and immanence of man in action are revealed. So, “when I act, I am wholly engaged in my acting, in that dynamization of the ego to which my own efficacy has contributed.”<sup>76</sup> The immanent dimension of action explains that action is my action, “I” am identified with its

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 59.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 67.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 68.



purpose and subsequently have responsibility for it. The moment of efficacy and transcendence presents an understanding that “I,” who is the subject, is not only understood as the efficient cause of a number of effects or agents who perform actions, but also a creator of his own self. Here, human subjectivity also is manifested in the experience of the moment efficacy due to the integration and contribution of consciousness.

### 2.2.2. Personal Structure of Self-Determination

In the experience of the dependence of action on the person, there are essential conditions that allow the birth of an action and the manifestation of subjectivity in addition to the role of awareness and efficacy. Self-determination is one of them. According to Wojtyła, “Efficacy alone—the causal dependence of an action on the self—does not tell us the whole story about personal subjectivity.”<sup>77</sup> Self-determination is much richer and broader in explaining the subjectivity of the person than efficacy which is identified with the experience of causation that “I” am the subject or efficient cause of my actions. Even self-determination in the experience of human action includes efficacy and becomes the basis for efficacy as well as a distinction between human action and something happens in man. Meanwhile, consciousness simply serves to reflect and experience self-determination. Wojtyła understood self-determination as another name of freedom.<sup>78</sup> Freedom was primarily not only in the sense of the faculty of the will to a “free choice” but in the sense of determining oneself to act.<sup>79</sup> The freedom in this sense is expressed in the lived experience of “I will”, and it is aptly identified by the

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<sup>77</sup> Wojtyła, *The Person: Subject and Community*, 229.

<sup>78</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 115; Karol Wojtyła, “Participation or Alienation?” in *Person and Community Selected Essays*, trans. Theresa Sandok, OSM (New York: Peter Lang, 1993): 197–207; Tomasz Duma, “Personalism in the Lublin School of Philosophy (Card. Karol Wojtyła, Fr. Mieczysław A. Krapiec),” *Studia Gilsoniana* 5, no. 2 (April–June 2016): 365–390, <http://www.gilsonociety.com/files/365-390-Duma.pdf>; Richard, A. Spinello, “The Enduring Relevance of Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy,” *Logos* 17, no. 3 (Summer, 2014): 17–48. The problem of freedom remains an interesting issue in philosophy, until nowadays. This problem is one of the main themes in modern philosophy, although the origin of this problem dates back to the late antiquity and the early middle ages (St. Augustine). If ancient and medieval philosophy saw the characteristic that distinguishes humans from other beings is the aspect of rationality. In modern times, the hallmark of humans is freedom. Reason is a tool for implementing the initiative of freedom. In modern and even contemporary philosophy the existence and meaning of freedom still remains a problematic theme.

I quote from *The Polish Christian Philosophy in the 20th Century Karol Wojtyła*, “In some case, even the truth of freedom was opposed, the truth being recognized as a threat to human freedom (F. Nietzsche, M. Foucault). Of course, it is true that in modern philosophy, the question about freedom was answered in different, sometimes diametrically opposed ways: some philosopher denied its existence, recognizing human beings as completely determined by their material circumstances, or understanding freedom only as a conscious necessity (Marxism). Others identified the human person as the center of freedom, unrestricted or limited only by mutual consensus (e.g. social contract).” For Wojtyła freedom becomes a central issue in his anthropological analysis and he starts his analysis from the experience of freedom. See Hołub et al., *The Polish Christian Philosophy*, 53–54.

<sup>79</sup> See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 105; Duma, “Personalism,” 377.

experience of “I may but I need not.”<sup>80</sup> As such, the lived experience of “I will” moment indicates the freedom to determine action simultaneously to determine man himself. Regarding action, self-determination shows the existence of a relationship between the will and the person, where the will manifests itself as an essential characteristic of the person to perform acts, and the person manifests himself in a dynamism constituted by the will.<sup>81</sup>

The lived experience of self-determination leads us to discover the person’s internal structure. The person who determines himself presupposes that he owns himself as well as shows that he governs himself. It means that there is self-possession and self-governance in the internal structure of the person. Self-determination can only be possible in the presence of self-possession. Wojtyła states:

Self-determination is possible only on the ground of self-possession [...] because “I will” is an act of self-determination at particular moment it presupposes structural self-possession. For only the things that are man’s actual possession can be determined by him; they can be determined only by the one who actually possesses them. Being in the possession of himself man can determine himself.<sup>82</sup>

On the other hand, lived experience of an act of self-determination, “I will,” reveals and confirms the self-possession merely proper to the person. Thus, self-determination exhibits the existence of the personal structure of self-possession and self-governance. Both self-possession and self-governance are realized in every single act of self-determination, “I will,” and not only the intentional character of human faculty. Self-possession denotes the experience of the person “as one who possesses himself and as the one who is in the possession of himself.” Meanwhile, self-governance points out “one who governs himself and as the one is in a way subjected and subordinate to himself.”<sup>83</sup> In other words, self-possession displays the characteristics of the person, while self-governance plays the function of the faculty that the person employs to serve himself.<sup>84</sup> A person who determines himself at the same time has self-possession and self-governance. He determines himself means he governs himself, and he can govern himself

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<sup>80</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 105; Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 207. In the new translation by Grzegorz Ignatik, this phrase is translated “I can but do not have to.” The reason I prefer the early translation is to maintain consistency in quotations. But I consider that the lived experiences of “I can” and “I do not have to,” as well as “I may” and “I need not,” both designate the lived experience of the moment “I will/want” as a dynamism that is appropriate for the will of human person.

<sup>81</sup> See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 105.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 106.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 190.

<sup>84</sup> See Duma, “Personalism,” 377–378.

because he has own self. So, for Polish Philosopher, the precondition of freedom to determine oneself to act is the concrete “I.”<sup>85</sup>

We experience that the moment of choice and decision is also crucial for self-determination. This moment presents a person who governs himself. The choice and decision in the lived experience of “I will” is a moment where the person governs himself by undergoing specific action. It exhibits that choice and decision are the intrinsic characteristic of the act of self-determination or experience of I will. The experience of personal transcendence is also shown in this moment of self-governance. Transcendence exists in moments where a person governs himself through action as well as forming himself. Furthermore, for Wojtyła, with the experience of self-governance, we found the faculty of the person as the source of all actions directed towards good as well as of the person’s formation.<sup>86</sup> Of course, in the lived experience of the act of self-determination, the subjectivity of human person is expressed in and through the structure of self-government and self-possession. In that act, the person manifests himself as the subject (as someone who owns and governs) as well as the object (as someone who is owned and governed).<sup>87</sup>

The explanation above reveals that consciousness has an important role in the lived experience of the actual act of self-determination. Thanks to the reflexive function of consciousness, the person, in the lived experience of self-determination, experiences himself as the subject and object in the metaphysical sense. And it is because of this function of consciousness that the person then experiences that “he is the one who is determined by himself and that his decisions make him become somebody, who may be good or bad.”<sup>88</sup> So in the lived experience of the act of self-determination, consciousness conditions the subjectivation of the person as an objective being that exists both as the subject and object.<sup>89</sup> It is obvious that consciousness plays a role in conditioning the experience of self-determination and not in guiding it. Consciousness conditions “I” to be aware of myself as the subject and object of my

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<sup>85</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 120

<sup>86</sup> See Ibid., 107. This issue will be discussed more in the chapter 3.

<sup>87</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 108; Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 220.

<sup>88</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 113; Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 213

<sup>89</sup> To understand the term subjectivation, I quote the explanation from Petar Popović: “By the term ‘subjectivation,’ he does not in any way imply some process of subsuming the personal reality under a relativistically construed concept of subjectivity, but, on the contrary, he delineates a subjective ‘lived experience’ of one’s objectivity, made possible by an experiential and “essential ability of an object to manifest or visualize itself. Petar Popović, “Securing the Foundation: Karol Wojtyła’s Thomistic Personalism in Dialogue with Natural Law Theory,” *Nova et Vetera* 16, English edition, no.1 (2018): 239, [https://www.academia.edu/38836115/Securing\\_the\\_Foundations\\_Karol\\_Wojty%C5%82as\\_Thomistic\\_Personalism\\_in\\_Dialogue\\_with\\_the\\_Natural\\_Law\\_Theory](https://www.academia.edu/38836115/Securing_the_Foundations_Karol_Wojty%C5%82as_Thomistic_Personalism_in_Dialogue_with_the_Natural_Law_Theory).

actions, but it is not the main factor that determines “I” to act and the factor that motivates my action. Wojtyła says:

While it is true that the experiencing of the self-determination is conditioned by consciousness, there are no grounds to suppose that it is also guided by consciousness. In point of fact, the guidance of the cognitive function, which is indispensable in self-determination, in the dynamization of the will (as confirmed by experience and supported by philosophical tradition as well as empirical psychology), should on no account be confused either with mirroring or reflexive function of consciousness.[...]. Thus, if self-determination and the whole dynamism of the will are to be guided by anything (this applies first of all to the intentionality of the will, to its orientation toward values or aims in general), then this can only be self-knowledge together with man’s whole knowledge of the existing reality, in particular, his knowledge of values as possible ends and also as the basis of the norms that he refers to in his acting.<sup>90</sup>

The experience of self-determination identified with freedom also represents the experience of the categories of independence and dependency. First, the independence can be understood in terms of “external and internal freedom.”<sup>91</sup> The external freedom means independence from various types of external factors. Person performs his activities freely without physical or mental coercion and fear of sanctions. The meaning of independence does not fully explain freedom because freedom does not only mean external freedom. Internal freedom has a deeper meaning which refers to the basis that makes man a person, namely his nature. This freedom shows that the person is independent from something that is the object of intentionality outside himself. Second, freedom or self-determination is also experienced through person’s dependencies. These dependencies can be seen in two dimensions. The first type is the experience of freedom as an experience of dependence on one’s self. Wojtyła called it “the very foundation of personal freedom” and “for the person’s transcendence in action.”<sup>92</sup> That is, the action will always refer to “I” as the subject and object of the action. We will find it difficult to talk about the experience of freedom or self-determination without “self-dependence,” because it is central to self-determination. The dependence of “I” or person expresses freedom in the experience of “I may, but I need not.” As such, choosing and making decision depend on “I.” Another is dependence on truth. The person depends on truth in terms of self-determination, which is parallel to self-fulfillment, even though that truth does not depend on the person’s self. In the experience of a decision, the person is not only faced with the experience of “I may, but I

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<sup>90</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 113–114.

<sup>91</sup> Hołub et al., *The Polish Christian Philosophy*, 58.

<sup>92</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 118.

need not,” but he must choose the right one, which is presented through the cognition “I want—I should.”<sup>93</sup>

### 2.2.3. Response to the Good as the Motivation of Action

We experience the moment of choosing and decision in the act of self-determination, “I will,” includes motivation. What is meant by motivation is the influence or effect of the motive on the will. Motivation corresponds to the intentionality of the will, so that when “I want something,” “I” will go out towards the object that presents itself to me.<sup>94</sup> It is presented object to “I” as a good which founds its value.<sup>95</sup> In other words, the object of the will determines a perceived value and is captured by person as an objective good. In this way one really experiences that the choice and decision cannot be detach from awareness of value. Thus, the human person in his choices and decision on action is not absolutely undetermined. He is conditioned by the perceived value as the objective good. Through action, person responds consciously to the value. In the moment of decision, a person is aware of the values that motivate him to act or to avoid action. Choosing and decision in every experience of “I will” constitute unique response to the object and its value. Thus, “I” myself appear to be the cause of the response to the object. In relation to this object, “I” govern myself, “I” am the master of myself who govern to respond to the object that presents itself. This experience shows that it is not the object and its value as the actual cause that determines the action, but person or “I” who exercises freedom to determine the action in response to the object and its value.<sup>96</sup> In the act of response to the object, the person reveals himself as the cause which determines himself to action.

The objective good, of course, is strictly connected to the truth. That way person responds to the good in an intelligible way. Here, Wojtyła emphasized the role of cognition in self-determination, or in other words, the role of cognition in the lived experience of choosing

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<sup>93</sup> Hołub et al., *The Polish Christian Philosophy*, 59–60.

<sup>94</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 128.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> In the view of materialistic determinism, human being depends entirely on the world of objects. The material or physical object that determines the action. In the view of moral determinism, freedom is totally denied, it is an illusion and indirectly rejects the person because the physical determines the action. Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 133; see also Tomasz Duma, “The Foundations of The human Person’s Dynamism,” *Verbum Vitae* 38, no. 2 (2020): 441–456, DOI: 10.31743/vv.8944; Krzysztof Stachewicz, “Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy of Freedom,” *Teologia i Moralność* 15, no. 1 (2020): 151–162. DOI: 10.14746/tim.2020.27.1.10; Kevin Timpe, “Free Will,” in *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, accessed June 13, 2022, <https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/>; Norman Swartz, “Foreknowledge and Free Will,” in *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, accessed June 13, 2022, <https://iep.utm.edu/foreknow/>; Carl Hoefer, “Causal Determinism,” in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, accessed June 13, 2022, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/>.

and deciding on action and forming oneself. Person only responds to values that are known and comprehended by the cognition.<sup>97</sup> For Wojtyła, choosing, given in the experience, does not mean intuitive going to a value or moving away from an anti-value but choosing means making a decision based on the cognition of truth.<sup>98</sup> Reference to the truth is the inner principle of making decision. This means that the person as the subject wants to achieve the good in a rational way.

Wojtyła also obtains the description of psychologists that in our experience, we distinguish between actions directed to a single presented object or only one motivating value, which in their terms is called a “simple act of will.” In the simple decision experience, the person does not make a choice. For example, “I will do something” or “I will do A.” There is only a simple decision because the person’s will corresponds to only one object. This experience is different from a situation when many objects are presented or motivating values are to choose from, where these motivating values even contradict each other (A, B, and C, etc ), or in psychologists’ terms, are “compounded or extended.” In this case, there is a complexity of motivation to attract person’s attention. When motivation is complex, the choice of a concrete value is a decision. Or it can be said that the decision is preceded by a kind of choice.<sup>99</sup>

In experience, when the person as a subject is conditioned by the variety of presented objects, or a number of values, he will direct himself to the truth about their goodness. In and through will, a person possesses “inner dependence on the truth about the good,” but he is still “independent of the object of volition.” The independence of the person as a subject is contained in every choice and decision to respond to the truth of the good presented by cognition.<sup>100</sup> Thus, the person and his will are independent in the sphere of intentionality toward an object. However, he is dependent on truth which dependence is inherent in the nature of will. Thereby cognition has a significant role as a condition to present the truth about the good. As such, choosing and deciding among various values is based on the principle of truth. Nevertheless, in deliberation, choosing and decision, the person also experiences the moment of judgment about value.<sup>101</sup> Whenever a person chooses and decides, he has first made a judgment about value because it is a cognitive act that lays the foundation for the relation of will to object. The judgment shows the cognitive transcendence of objects and then becomes a condition for

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<sup>97</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 35; see also Deborah Savage, *The Subjective Dimension of Human Work, The Conversation of the The Acting Person According to Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II and Bernard Lonergan*, Series VII Theology and Religion, vol. 273 (New York: Peter Lang, 2008), 139.

<sup>98</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 35.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 130–131.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 141; Spinello, “Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy,” 36.

<sup>101</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 146.

volitional transcendence in action. This asserts that truth is not only essential in the realm of human knowledge, but is an essential basis for the transcendence of the person in action. When the person or the “I” formulates the judgment, he really experiences himself as an actor who acts cognizing and experiencing the values of the object of cognition. Wojtyła says as follows:

Only with the emergence within the schema of man’s cognitive function of the instance of judgment has man the experience of being the agent of cognition and of thought. [...]. Whenever the person chooses or decides, he has had first to make a judgment of values. [...]. When judging, when formulating judgments, the ego has the experience of himself as the agent—the one who acts—of the act itself of cognizing. But we may also cognitively experience directly the value of the object of cognition.<sup>102</sup>

Moreover, here, the objective truth of good or value becomes subjective because it is associated with person/ “I.” The truth is subjective because the “I” knows and experiences it. The truth motivates the “I” to act and constitute himself. Thus, it can be said that “I,” as the person, who governs himself to the truth of good, which belongs to himself as his mine, constitutes himself in action based on it. Hence, the “I” as subject and agent really manifests himself in the act of cognition, as well as in the act of choosing and deciding based on the recognized truth about the good.

#### **2.2.4. Conscience and Self-Fulfillment**

In inner experience the very basic and crucial thing in the dynamism of human person is self-determination and intentionality integrated with it.<sup>103</sup> We experience that the personal structure of self-determination is the foundation for the performance of action parallel to the fulfillment of action. The performance of the action then leads to self-fulfillment of the person. We also experience that we govern ourselves, and there we appear as conscious subjects and agents who choose, decide and perform an action in accordance with recognized values. Wojtyła insisted, in the experience of performing an action, the choosing and decision of a person are related to intentionality towards value. As he says: “[...] for every action contains within itself an intentional orientation; each action is directed toward definite objects or sets of objects, and is aimed outward and beyond itself.”<sup>104</sup> For Wojtyła, however, the action arises from the efficacy of person, where the person becomes the subject who chooses and decides on the action, not only aimed at objects outside himself, but the action reached the principal and main “object”,

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid., 145–147.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 150.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

called “I.”<sup>105</sup> As such, the performance of the person’s action does not only bring transitive consequences on the external objects, outside himself, but especially internal or immanent intransitive consequences within the person himself.

According to Wojtyła, the primary and essential “object” of action is “I.” Therefore, the action fixed on the value as an object outside oneself immediately returns to the “I.” We experience that the action leads to self-fulfillment. It means the action, through the structure of self-determination, actualizes or constitutes oneself. By appearing as an agent of action, the person forms himself to be good or evil in a moral sense. So, the person becomes morally good or bad because of his actions. Here, Wojtyła has shown that in and through action, the reality of objective value is intrinsically cohesive with person and thus presents a very subjective reality.<sup>106</sup> Through the experience of actions that shape person, in the experience of self-governance and self-possession as the conditions of self-determination, we realize that person is not something but somebody.<sup>107</sup>

Self-fulfillment is achieved when one performs morally good actions, and conversely, non-fulfillment is achieved when evil actions are performed. This axiological fact shows that a person can become good or evil as a result of the expression of freedom or self-determination of the person. Freedom can be exercised rightly by doing good but also wrongly by doing evil. Here, it is important to emphasize the reference to truth. Conscience has a significant role at this moment. Dependence on truth shows the close relationship between the conscience and the personal structure of self-determination. When the person governs himself to act, the conscience reveals the person’s transcendence in the process of self-fulfillment. The function of conscience is to point out the true good in action and create obligations in relation to that good. The function of conscience is more than purely cognitive in that it relates actions to the known truths or subordinates these actions to the truth.<sup>108</sup> Submission to good in truth creates a new moral reality in the person. This reality is normative and is expressed in the formulation of norms and their influence on the action. These norms are norms of action or moral norms. They define the internal obligations. The affirmation of the statement, “X is truly good,” evokes in the conscience and initiates an internal obligation or command to perform an action that leads to the realization of X in that action. Hence, there is the transition from “X is truly good” to “I should do X.” As such, in the conscience, there is unity between the moral truth and obligation which

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., 151.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 68.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., 156.



reveals the “normative power of truth.”<sup>109</sup> Self-fulfillment is realized when these norms that have been formulated in conscience are manifested in action. The person becomes good or bad through the application of these norms in action. The self-fulfillment in action is highly dependent on the conscience. So the issue of the conscience in relation to self-fulfillment and transcendence is not only about the scope of the conscience’s role in fulfilling actions but also the self-fulfillment in actions. In the fulfillment of action, “I” fulfill myself in it if my action is good in conformity with conscience as a normative power of truth. With such morally good actions, “I myself *become* good and *am* good as a human being.”<sup>110</sup> It means by good action, “the moral value reaches to the very depths of my ontic structure as a *suppositum humanum*.”<sup>111</sup> On the other hand, my actions are morally evil if their fulfillment is not in accordance with the conscience, so that the un-fulfillment of myself is obtained. Therefore, a person’s self-fulfillment is not identical with the fulfillment of an action, and it is completely dependent on the moral value of the action, in which conscience has a significant role in subjecting the person to that value as the true good. The fact that “I” have fulfilled myself or that “I” have become a good person is solely because the actions “I” have taken are morally good, and not simply that “I” have fulfilled certain actions.<sup>112</sup>

It should also be underlined that one’s conscience can be mistaken or wrong. This proves that conscience must be closely linked to truth. The knowledge of the truth as a value, as distinguished from fallacy, is provided by the human mind. The role of the human mind helps shape the functioning of consciousness and conscience in terms of self-fulfillment in action. Wojtyła says:

[...] But as we already asserted in the chapter 2, neither the knowledge nor the active evaluation and understanding of truth constitute the proper function of consciousness. This must have bearing upon the interpretation of the person transcendence in the action, in particular in what concerns the function of the conscience, on which in our approach the transcendence depends.<sup>113</sup>

The truth, which is then seen as a normative rule which is exercised by conscience, is rooted in the ability of the human mind “to know the moral truth and to distinguish it from moral falsehood.”<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid., 162.

<sup>110</sup> Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 235.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 159.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 158.

The lived experience of self-determination, in which the person as the subject governs himself to act and achieve his self-fulfillment through action, reveals that the person is a contingent being. For if the person would not be a contingent being, then there would be certainly no possibility of fulfillment or actualization. In this way, the person's contingency status, revealed in the experience of action, is also strengthened from the perspective of ontology and axiology. From the perspective of ontology, the person's self-fulfillment through action shows that he is a potential and not a fully actual being. And from the axiological perspective, the person achieves self-fulfillment only if he reaches moral good and non-fulfillment if reaches moral evil in his actions, showing that he really is a contingent being.<sup>115</sup>

Thus, the role and function of conscience, which is rooted in the personal structure of self-determination, becomes a condition for self-fulfillment in action and further emphasizes that "I" or the person, as the subject of his activities, especially action, is actually manifested in the moment of the act of self-determination "I will," where the "I" chooses, decides and performs actions with reference to the truth, and submit to that truth as an internal norm for the attainment of self-fulfillment.

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 153–154

## 2.3. Manifestation in Action

“Action is the avenue to the knowledge of the person.”<sup>116</sup> The recalled expression refers to the reality of action and the reality of man as a person because in action, conceived in the full sense, a whole person is engaged. This is a project of *The Acting Person (Person and act)* in which the essence of the person is examined by his actions, because he can only be known through his actions.<sup>117</sup> The examination of action shows that action reveals the person and the richness and complexity of the human being as person which comprises the inwardness of the person with the personal structure of self-determination, transcendence and self-fulfillment, integration of psycho-somatic aspects and social dimensions of person.

### 2.3.1. *Actus Humanus* and *Actus Hominis*

In the first section of this chapter, I have described human person as a subject manifesting himself in reflection. Due to consciousness, he can be aware of himself and experience himself. Moreover, it has been shown that person also manifests himself as a subject of decisions made in the lived experience of the self-determination's act. In turn, this section will elucidate how the person, who is the subject of an action, truly expresses himself in his actions. To explain it, we first look at the difference between human action (*actus humanus*) and something that happens in man (*actus hominis*), which, thanks to consciousness, we experience in our lived experience as human beings.

First of all, it is necessary to underline that the concepts of *actus humanus* and *actus hominis* are derived from the metaphysical conception of the dynamism being comprehended in the light of the act-potency theory described and developed by Aristotelians and Thomists. Thus, the interpretation of *actus humanus* and *actus hominis* must be seen in terms of the realistic concepts of classical philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas.<sup>118</sup> Our concern is not with being in general but in particular human being in terms of his proper actualization carried out by actions appropriate to him. In the undertaken analyses the Aristotelian notion of act and potency will play a key role, which, according to Wojtyła, best describe the fact of dynamism as such.

In the light of the Aristotelian theory of act-potency, Scholastics explained human action as *actus humanus*, which was generally understood in the western philosophical tradition as

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<sup>116</sup> Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 232.

<sup>117</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 9–10; Miguel Acosta and Adrian J. Reimers, *Karol Wojtyła's Personalist Philosophy Understanding Person and Act* (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 42.

<sup>118</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 25.

deliberate and purposive action.<sup>119</sup> *Actus humanus* is also directly defined as *actus voluntarius*, which emphasizes human beings as acting subjects, where the action is the concretization of potential that is appropriate for human being. *Actus voluntarius* refers directly to free will, which serves as the dynamic basis of conscious action. This means that *actus humanus* or *actus voluntarius* is a conscious and deliberate act. However, neither *actus humanus* nor *actus voluntarius* contradicts the concept of “act” (Pl. *czyn*) by Wojtyła. These two concepts are in no way contradictory. Both of these terms refer to conscious actions that manifest a certain becoming based on potential of the personal subject, where the source of conscious action is the person. However, the difference is that act (*czyn*) shows more aspects of manifestation or phenomenon without neglecting the ontic structure, where the action functions as a source of cognition of a person.<sup>120</sup> Because action makes possible cognitive access to the person, hence only action can tell us about the dynamism proper to man as a person. Therefore, through an analysis of action we can discover that action is not only *actus humanus* but *actus personae*. Moreover, Wojtyła develops the concept of *actus humanus* of Scholastic by emphasizing the role of consciousness and lived experience of efficacy along with the personal structure of self-determination.<sup>121</sup> In our lived experience, we really realize and experience *actus humanus* or action, and we really experience the role of consciousness and self-determination contribute to create this action, simultaneously experiencing our “I” in relation to this action. Wojtyła endeavors to demonstrate that our own “I” and action on an objective layer are raised and expressed in the human experience due to the role of consciousness.

Meanwhile, *actus hominis* is what Wojtyła called “something happens in man” or “activation.” *Actus hominis* means something happens outside of the moment of personal efficacy. The moment of efficacy or experience of “being an agent” becomes the fundamental difference between *actus humanus* and *actus hominis*. For Wojtyła, the experience of action demonstrating participation in efficacy opened the depths efficacy structure. Meanwhile, something happens in man indicates the absence of the moment of personal efficacy.<sup>122</sup> In human action, one realizes its effect and experiences it, while in what happens in man, one is completely unaware. In *actus humanus* man becomes an active subject, while in something

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<sup>119</sup> Wojtyła explained that action as a proper actualization for human person is expressed in adequate Polish terminology, namely: *czyn* (action). This term already refers to actions that are specifically human person property. Action is only proper to human person and not to other beings, therefore there is no need to add the term human (*actus humanus*) to explain it. In the translated version, *The Acting Person*, the term action is more used to designate *czyn*.

<sup>120</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 25–27; Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 121–123.

<sup>121</sup> Spinello, “Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy,” 31.

<sup>122</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 66–67.

happens in man, he is passive, even though something happens in man is a type of actualization of his own potentiality.<sup>123</sup> Even so, for Wojtyła, human action and something happens in man belongs to human dynamism. So in the experience of *actus humanus*, personal subjectivity is manifested as a whole where man is aware and experiences himself as a subject and agent, and also his action as his mine, while *actus hominis* only manifests either somatic subjectivity or emotive subjectivity, which is without unity with personal subjectivity.

### 2.3.2. Self-Fulfillment and the Transcendence of Person in Action

Through the analysis of action, according to Wojtyła, we get to know the moment of efficacy and the rich and specific structure of subjectiveness of man-person, namely self-determination.<sup>124</sup> Self-determination is a basic dimension of personal efficacy wherein the man in action is seen as a personal subject. We also experience that personal self-fulfillment is achieved through fulfillment of action. Only through action toward a good, person achieves self-fulfillment. Meanwhile, the person will achieve non-fulfillment when he commits evil action.<sup>125</sup> Here, the role of self-determination and attaining the truth of good greatly affects self-fulfillment. Wojtyła also emphasizes the important role of conscience in terms of action and recognition of truth. We experience conscience serves to relate action to recognition of good and to distinguish the elements of moral good in action and awareness of responsibility with respect to this good.<sup>126</sup>

The experience of self-fulfillment as the result of self-determination, with the structures of self-possession and self-governance, in the relation to truth of good and the role of conscience shows the transcendence of person. The person transcends his boundaries and exercises his freedom in the process of self-determination, in which action (*actus humanus*) and self-fulfillment are constituted.<sup>127</sup> Thus, transcendence is not simply directionality toward an external object but a show of self-determination by the person toward self-fulfillment. Admittedly, every experience of man expressed at “I will” shows the transcendence of the person in action because there is a demonstration of self-determination toward self-fulfillment. Wojtyła explains: “For the experience of “I will” contains also self-determination and not only intentionality. The turning to

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<sup>123</sup> Ibid., 68.

<sup>124</sup> Action has a broad meaning that includes human activity as a whole that displays the relationship between subjective and objective aspects of action. Action is a factor that belongs not only to one’s transcendent spiritual faculties or one’s psyche or one’s bodily dynamism but to a personal unity that integrates all of these aspects. See Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła*, 121–123.

<sup>125</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 153.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., 156.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., 119.

any external object that is seen as an end and a value implies a simultaneous fundamental turn toward the ego as the object.”<sup>128</sup> And his further explanation is: “In the human being, in the human self as a personal subject, self-fulfillment and transcendence are inseparably connected. [...], transcendence is as if another name of person.”<sup>129</sup> Self-fulfillment and transcendence of person in action show that self-determination is not only limited to the person determining himself to act but determining the constitution of himself so that he is not only the subject or cause of his actions, or agent who performs an action but the creator of himself.

Thus, the matter of self-fulfillment and transcendence of person in and through action cannot be separated from “I.” The “I” remains the reference in the moment of self-determination and its dealings with consciousness.<sup>130</sup> There is self-reliance in the dynamism of self-determination, which parallels transcendence and self-fulfillment. That way, “I” or the person still reveals himself in action, both in the element of self-determination and self-fulfillment. I quote the affirmation of the Polish Philosopher, “in these actions, through the element of self-determination, the human self is revealed to itself not only as self-possession and self-governance, but also as a tendency toward self-fulfillment.”<sup>131</sup> Once again, it should be said, what Wojtyła elucidated that transcendence and self-fulfillment are realized through self-governance, which then differentiates man from other natural beings. Through self-governance, man, as a personal being, really experiences and realizes himself as the subject or cause of his action. This, of course, is different from the process of vegetative and emotive dynamism, where man does not experience himself as personal being exclusively.<sup>132</sup> Accordingly, self-fulfillment as the fruit of self-determination shows the transcendence of person in which the person first discloses his integration in action. This integration then determines the transcendence in the whole complexity of the psycho-somatic aspects of the human subject or *suppositum*.<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> Ibid., 110.

<sup>129</sup> Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 233.

<sup>130</sup> See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 108.

<sup>131</sup> Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 233.

<sup>132</sup> Duma, “Personalism,” 378.

<sup>133</sup> Hołub et al., *The Polish Christian Philosophy*, 140.

### 2.3.3. The Transcendence of Person and the Integration in Action

First and foremost, only man has experience of transcendence of himself in action. The transcendence of person appears in the structure of self-governance and self-possession. Or in other words, it appears in the experience of efficacy. The transcendence shows that a person owns and rules himself through action. It means that transcendence also shows that a person is both a subject and an object of the action. This experience only belongs to man and could not be found in any other natural being.

There is another aspect that is exposed in the strong overall relationship between person and action, which is constituted by the dynamic structure of self-governance and self-possession, called the integration of person in action.<sup>134</sup> The integration is firmly linked to the personal structure of self-governance and self-possession.<sup>135</sup> Wojtyła called the integration as a complementary aspect of the transcendence of person in action. Complementary here means that without the integration, transcendence is simply a type of structural void, and it not only complements the transcendence to constitute the dynamic wholeness of person and action.<sup>136</sup> According to him, integration is, first of all, between person and action. The fact “I am acting” implies that “I” am totally engaged in my action. This fact demonstrates the transcendence through not only the structure of self-governance and self-possession, but this fact also demonstrates the integration of person in action. As he asserts: “when I act, I am wholly engaged in my acting, [...]. The fact that ‘I am wholly engaged in my acting’ cannot be explained by transcendence alone but requires for its interpretation also the integration of person in the action.”<sup>137</sup> This statement implies that the aspect of transcendence and integration in action could not be separated of “I,” and “I” manifests itself in action, which comprises aspects of transcendence and integration. Meanwhile, regarding the relationship between person and action that have defects from self-governance and self-possession, or the inability to govern and own self, Wojtyła called it disintegration.<sup>138</sup> It denotes the lack of transcendence of human person.

The integration of person in action takes place in the psyche and soma sphere.<sup>139</sup> We really experience it. Integration, here, means that the whole person, through the unity of person

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<sup>134</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 190.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, 193.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, 190.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, 192.

<sup>138</sup> See *Ibid.*, 192–194.

<sup>139</sup> As Wojtyła emphasizes that the object of his analysis is not focused on the complexities of psychosomatic dynamism in detail because it is more suitable to enter into the realm of particular knowledge. The focus of the

and action, enters the psychic and somatic realms. For Wojtyła, various human dynamisms at the psychic and somatic levels participate in human action. In this integration, the dynamism of the psychic and the soma takes an active part on the level of person and action, and not at their own level.<sup>140</sup> In the integration of person and action, the psyche and the soma that take an active part achieve “superior unity.” This unity is not at their level but at the personal level. We experience that action consists of the multiplicity and diversity of dynamism of soma and psyche. In action there is “a new and superior type of dynamism,” which is only appropriate for person. As such, human action is more than just a sum of dynamisms because it is a superior unity in which the integration of psychosomatic aspects complements the aspect of the transcendence of person in action. Indeed, the integration of person and action precedes integration with psyche and soma. Nevertheless, the psyche-somatic dynamism conditions the integration of person and action. It means that integration as a complementary aspect of transcendence allows the realization or actualization of the personal structure of self-governance and self-possession.

Regarding the relationship between person and action based on somatic aspects, the human body is a tool to express or manifest actions and the person himself. By employing the body in action, man shows that he as a person has a self and governs it in his bodily experience.<sup>141</sup> According to Wojtyła, the human body has both inwardness and outwardness, and the use of the term soma covers these two aspects. The inwardness of the human body has a pure somatic dynamism called reactivity, and dynamism, in outwardness aspect is called mobility or motion.<sup>142</sup> These two dynamisms cannot be prevented from functioning as tools for person expresses himself in action. Reactivity refers to the dynamic and instinctive reality in relation to the natural or biological environment that conditions vegetation and reproduction. This reactivity becomes the basic condition for the instincts or drives which possess a definitive direction, such as the instinct of preservation to the vegetative life and to maintain its proper development and the instinct of reproduction. However, these instincts are not limited to somatic dynamism because they affect the human psyche and emotion, and shape the dynamic nature of man and his existence as a whole. Instincts rooted in bodily reactivity occur outside of the person’s efficacy and consciousness because what happens is only the efficacy of the body. They, as a dynamism of the human body, are simply spontaneous and instinctive, and come into contact with consciousness only through “body sensation.” Meanwhile, mobility or motion is strongly

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analysis is on the relationship of person and action as a whole, which of course includes psychosomatic aspects. See *Ibid.*, 200.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, 198.

<sup>141</sup> See *Ibid.*, 206.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, 207.



associated with the ability to react to stimuli. In terms of the integration of person in action, there is a synthesis between action and motion that goes on ceaselessly. In this synthesis, there is an external action, or an action that is expressed concretely and visible by the body's motion.

If the motion from the external aspect of the body is based on reactivity and impulses from the inwardness aspect of the body, without any connection with "I" and consciousness, then, in this case, the motion and reactivity only display the subjectivity of the body, without dependence on the self-determination of person. These are simply something happen in man. Thus, the body, here, becomes the subject of that dynamism without connection of the "I" and consciousness. On the other hand, the subjectivity of person appears when there is involvement or integration between the reactivity and motion of the body in the person's action. Wojtyła states:

The integrity of the man-person consists therefore in the normal, indeed, in the possibly perfect matching of "somatic subjectivity" with the efficacious and transcendent subjectivity of person. Such integrity is the condition of person's integrity in action. Any defect in this respect are a threat to man's unity and may lead to his disintegration; that which is like the body's own subjectivity, the reactive and vegetative subjectivity of the body, is then out of tune with the person as the efficacious subject.<sup>143</sup>

Thus, the integration point out the body, together with reactivity, instincts and motion, becomes a territory and a tool of expression of person himself. Externalization of person in his action takes place in and through his body as means of expression. This experience of person's integration in action reveals the subjectivity of person, which comprises the dynamic totality. However, we can observe various forms of purely somatic disintegration in the scope of action and motion. Disintegration is defined here as a form of absence from specific organs or body parts that cause a disability to make a certain motion. A person who has lost a leg or an arm has difficulty in his actions, but this external situation does not distort his consciousness and eliminate or prevent his self-determination. This implies that the person uses the body to manifest himself in action and controls it. Conversely, purely somatic aspects, such as motion or instinct, have no absolute control over the person.

Another aspect that integrates the person in action is the psyche. The psyche, here, is not immediately understood as the soul in a metaphysical sense but first in a phenomenal sense. Psyche is essentially different from the body, has no external material attributes like the body, and does not have the overall function of the depths of human beings called an organism. The

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<sup>143</sup> Ibid., 212.

psyche has an immaterial function and is internally conditioned and indirectly externalized by the soma, however, it cannot be reduced to the soma.<sup>144</sup> As such, the psyche in this point of view applies as “the whole range of manifestations of the integral human life that are not in themselves bodily or material, but at the same time show some dependence on the body, some somatic conditioning. For instance eyesight, feelings, emotions are not in themselves corporeal, but they show a measure of dependence on and a connection with the body.”<sup>145</sup>

#### **2.3.4. Integration and Emotivity**

The psyche also has, in its nature, emotivity, which includes “the whole wealth of differentiated domain of human emotions, feelings, and sensations as well as with the related behaviors and attitudes.”<sup>146</sup> Just as the soma conditions the psyche, so the emotivity is conditioned by the reactivity. The emotions are not somatic reactions but psychic events, and this also shows the difference between emotive dynamism and somatic dynamism, which are certainly different. However, both have a relationship and influence on each other, and both are equally associated with the operation of stimulus. Soma can react to stimuli and has the ability to feel. Nevertheless, the effect of that ability is not somatic but psychic, expressed in feelings. These feelings or sensations emerge from body’s subjectivity without including consciousness. At the same time, they give rise to psychical subjectivity based on the dynamics of reactivity and include consciousness.<sup>147</sup> These feelings establish access to body’s awareness. Here, Wojtyła emphasizes the cooperation between emotion and consciousness in the experience of the body’s awareness, where sensations or feelings determine that experience. It can be said that they bind consciousness and body. Besides, the feelings of the body that include consciousness remain connected to “I,” or these feelings manifest a self-feeling. When a person holds a hot object, he will express that feeling in the form of “I feel pain.” This example of factual experience of feelings rooted in the body states that, “these sensations reveal to every man not a separate ‘subjectivity’ of the body but somatic structure of the whole subject that he is, of the whole ego.”<sup>148</sup> The feeling of the body is a necessary condition for the integral experience of human subjectivity. The realization of action or personal dynamism still requires awareness of feelings, especially feelings of the body that reveal psychosomatic subjectivity.<sup>149</sup> Or in other words, the

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<sup>144</sup> See *Ibid.*, 221–223.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, 201.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*, 224.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, 228

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, 229.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, 230.

awareness of feelings is an important condition for self-determination. Indeed, the subjectivity of the psyche reveals here its priority over the subjectivity of soma because the first is connected with consciousness and “I.” However, in relation to the integration of person and action, somatic and psychic subjectivity are united in the personal subjectivity. Here, the psychosomatic elements are brought together and express person’s actions.

Wojtyła reminded that man does not only experience feelings about his body but also experiences other feelings, such as moral, religious and aesthetic. There is the experience of sensual as well as spiritual feelings. Here we will touch on the experience of the cognitive function of feeling. According to Wojtyła, there is a spontaneous human sensitivity to values, and this emotivity is the basis for it. Sensitivity does not mean only the sensibility of sight, hearing etc. It is more related to the direction of the intentionality of human feelings, which are deeply rooted in human spiritual life. However, this sensitivity is still an activation that needs to be integrated because it does not refer to the transcendence of person, self-determination and efficacy. For the experience of value, there needs to be integration with consciousness, but for the transcendence of person in action, sensitivity needs integration through the truth. That is why Wojtyła says: “the fusion of sensitivity with truthfulness is the necessary condition of the experience of values. It is only on the basis of such an experience that authentic choices and decisions can be formed.”<sup>150</sup> Emotions, through sensitivity to value, supply the raw material of value to will for its act, that is, choices and decisions.<sup>151</sup> This experience forms the basis for choices and decisions the will makes. The subjective authenticity of feelings or sensations is not sufficient for the transcendence of person in action; there is a need for judgment of reason. Here we need to be reminded that emotions and reason are related to values. The mind, with its cognitive activity, reveals intentionality towards the object (value), “whereas in an emotion we are reacting to a value which we find in that object.”<sup>152</sup> However, the two should not be separated at all, for they complement each other. Emotions have neither knowledge nor desire for values. They only refer to values spontaneously. Therefore, the person’s self-fulfillment in action is not solely from the factor of emotional spontaneity that refers to values but mainly through the relationship to the truth, where there is a need to emphasize the role of reason to guide choices and decisions.

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<sup>150</sup> Ibid., 233.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid., 226.

<sup>152</sup> See Karol Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Grzegorz Ignatik (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 2013), 85–86; Hołub, “The Relation between Consciousness and Emotions,” 152.

Moreover, Wojtyła extends his analysis with the dynamism of the emotion of St. Thomas Aquinas, which is characterized by axiology rather than psychology. St. Thomas emphasizes proportional action towards goodness based on the philosophy of being. According to him, senses are in direct contact with objects and present matter to the mind. Then the mind abstracts the data from the senses so that mental cognition goes beyond the data provided by sensual experience. There is a connection between sensuality and rationality, as in the explanation of St. Thomas about *appetitus* or desire, where *appetitus sensitivus*, in a certain respect, presents an object to *appetitus rationalis* or the will, although sometimes there are difficulties provided by *appetitus sensitivus*. *Appetitus sensitivus* is divided into two, namely concupiscent and irascible appetite, both of which are manifested in terms of the given good or sensual value. Sensual value in terms of concupiscent appetite is only a desired object, while for irascible appetite it is a difficult good because it is an object that is obtained after overcoming certain difficulties. So, each represents a specific sensitive appetite. Paul Ricœur mentions that concupiscent manifests itself empirically through the passion for pleasure and ease. In contrast, irascible manifests itself empirically through passions of ambition, domination and violence.<sup>153</sup> Wojtyła complements them by distinguishing between excitement and affection. Excitement (Pl. *podniecenie*) is an emotive fact that “happens” in the subject and reveals the psychological potentiality. It is different from feelings or sensations and has no cognitive character. It is a type of activation of the human psyche’s emotive that directly does not desire and demonstrates itself in different variations, such as in the form of the excitement of concupiscent and irascible types. Even though in itself it is a psychic state, excitement has somatic settings, and it inheres in a specific reaction of the body and the whole complex chain of reactions of the organism, which are distinctly felt, such as blood circulation, breathing, work of the heart, etc.<sup>154</sup> Meanwhile, excitability (Pl. *pobudliwość*) is the constant capacity for excitement. The excitability appears to be associated with sensibility, but in fact, it indicates a different emotive fact from sensibility. The excitability and excitement constitute a realm in which the “explosion sphere” of emotions or affections occurs in man. It differs from emotivity but indicates the very awakening of emotions which is characterized as explosion. It also shapes a certain form of human emotions, but it does not exhaust all wealth of their variations.<sup>155</sup> Thus, in the case of integration, not only particular excitements are involved but the whole of human excitability since it is emotive property of the psyche. In the analysis of human emotivity, excitement is also distinguished by emotional stirring (Pl. *wzruszenie*). It can

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<sup>153</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 314, fn. 69; Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 347, fn. 4.

<sup>154</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 236; Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 348.

<sup>155</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 237; Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 349.

be an expression of emotions or affections. Both “happen” in human-subject but have specificity in the experience of human life. The excitement seems to be more deeply attached to human sensuality. Even though the excitement and the emotional stirring are accompanied by some kind of somatic reaction, excitement is more inhere in these reactions than emotional stirring does. We experience emotional stirring more as activation and manifestation of pure emotivity, in which somatic conditions are manifested more weakly, and the content of emotional stirring is more often closely associated with human spirituality, such as aesthetic experiences associated with contemplation of beauty, cognitive emotions associated with the discovery of truth and various emotional stirring are associated with the realm of good, in particular moral. This emotional stirring is at the core of various human emotions. It radiates interiorly and crates every time various lived experience of emotions. Every emotion is a certain emotional state of man-subject. Albeit, they are a unique and unrepeatable emotional state that differs every time, for departs from emotional stirring as the original emotive core, arise there similar or identical emotional content but differ in intensity. The emotional content, then, penetrates the will so that there is the transition of an “emotional state” into a “certain emotional attitude.”<sup>156</sup> The different levels of affective life, as already described, have in themselves the possibility of a certain sublimation, in which there is a transformation from one level to another, such as from a level of excitement to a level of emotional stirrings.<sup>157</sup> The distinction of these levels presupposes an interiority of the man-person, an immaterial space, where it is possible to establish the differentiation of the depths of the various levels based on the role of feeling. These levels show the integration of emotional stirrings and emotions in the man-subject, and lead to the efficacy of the person.

Regarding the integration of person in action, we first see the tension between the subjectiveness and efficacy of person. Emotional experiences—emotional stirring, excitement and even passions—are something that happens in human being as a subject in a spontaneous way and are not the result of self-determination and efficacy of person. This does not mean that the whole emotive potentiality in him is the source person’s disintegration in action because human being encounters emotional experiences, feelings or passions that need integration. The integration of tension between psychic efficacy and person efficacy is merged in relation to and role of will and feelings (about the role of the will the discussion will be in the chapter 3). This

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<sup>156</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 240; Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 352.

<sup>157</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 239–242; Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 351–354

integration is a human task that takes place within the personal structure of self-determination.<sup>158</sup> The influence of feelings in the will also has an impact on the creation of a subjective “emotional attitude” in which there is a predominance of psychic immanence over the transcendence of person in action. Emotivity can also impose its value system on will but this is not an obstacle to integration. Integration is possible, and in it, emotions add vividness to efficacy, and to the whole personal structure of self-governance and self-possession.<sup>159</sup>

Consequently, we can firmly reiterate that the integration of person in action takes place in the psychic and physical spheres. In a sense, in integration, the whole person penetrates the psychic and somatic spheres and absorbs various human dynamisms at the psychic and physical levels so that they can take an active part in the level of action of person as the superior unity. On the other hand, without the unity of person in action, and its penetration into the psycho-psychical realm and their various dynamisms, then they remain only as what happens in man-subject.<sup>160</sup>

Furthermore, the integration of person in action, in fact, contains in itself all the elements of psychosomatic complexity. This integration complements the transcendence of person in action realized through self-determination and efficacy towards value.<sup>161</sup> In addition, from the above explanations, integration does not only relate to the unity of the various dynamisms in the actions of person but also reveals the structure and layer of human complexity.<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> Wojtyła claims that this integration is based on realistic thinking, which is certainly different from the pessimistic views of Stoic and Kant which seem to justify the reality of emotivity as a source of disintegration of person integration in action because the action is produced exclusively from the human reason. Nevertheless, human experience that is widely understood and moral considerations do not allow to accept these pessimistic views, such as the anthropological and ethical views of Aristotle against Stoic and Scheler against Kant. Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 243–244; Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 355–356.

<sup>159</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 246; Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 358.

<sup>160</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 199.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid., 225–226.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid., 256.

### 2.3.5. The Transcendence of Person and Participation

In human experience, it is also given that we live and act “with others.” It is a fact experienced by all man. This fact also reveals that man acts together with others in various inter-human or social relations. In acting together with others, the transcendence of person and his integration is demonstrated.<sup>163</sup> In fact, the person achieves real transcendence in acting with others in the form of community. Wojtyła emphasized that in a community where there was a relation of intersubjectivity, the person did not lose his superiority.<sup>164</sup> It could be said that “acting with other men” in the community shows the personalistic value of person and the actions of person. Strictly speaking, the fact that there exists intersubjectivity or social relation is based on the personal subject, and it is intrinsic in person. Wojtyła stated the following:

We will now investigate that aspect of the dynamic correlation of the action with the person which issues from the fact that actions can be performed by human individuals together with others. [...] This of course is a direct and natural consequence of the fact that man lives “together with other men” and indeed we may even go so far as to say that he exists together with other men. The mark of the communal—or social—trait is essentially imprinted on human existence itself.<sup>165</sup>

Thus, a person already has a relationship with others imprinted in his personal existence, and in the presence of other, a person can achieve self-consciousness and self-possession.

According to Wojtyła, the proper way social relations can be realized is through co-acting or participation. Participation is a form of social life that could be formed because of the transcendence and integration of person in action.<sup>166</sup> The transcendence of person in action when the action is performed together with others is the basis or condition for participation.<sup>167</sup> First of all, participation means a positive relation to the humanity of others: “I” experience other man as a person or other man as other “I.” Wojtyła stated: “Another person is a neighbor to me not just because we share like humanity, but chiefly because the other is another ‘I’.”<sup>168</sup> Nevertheless, my experience with other “I” is not the same as my experience of my own “I,” because myself cannot be transferred, and vice versa.<sup>169</sup> Participation, then, can make a person aware, to be oneself and fulfill oneself, in the existence and action with others. Therefore, participation is also understood as “the ability to exist and act together with others in such a way that in this existing

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<sup>163</sup> Ibid., 269–270.

<sup>164</sup> Spinello, “Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy,” 39.

<sup>165</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 261–262.

<sup>166</sup> Duma, “Personalism,” 380.

<sup>167</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 269.

<sup>168</sup> See Wojtyła, “Participation or Alienation?” 201.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid., 202.

and acting we remain ourselves and actualize ourselves, which means our own I's.”<sup>170</sup> So, in the second meaning, Wojtyła emphasized participation as the ability of person to act together with others and the realization of person through such co-action. In the realization, one person does not lose oneself among the other self. Participation understood in this way enables a person to achieve self-consciousness, self-possession and self-fulfillment through action.

The facts above indicate that participation as the actualization of the intersubjectivity (*I-others*) relationship is something that is conscious and experimental, as Wojtyła states: “As can be seen, this is not a purely ontic structure, but a conscious and experimental one as well.”<sup>171</sup> It does not mean that the fact of participation ignores the essence of human being; on the contrary that essence opens a way for participation.<sup>172</sup> However, it is not the essence alone that determines participation. According to Wojtyła, the *I-others* relationship does not arise from the notion of a universal human being. The relationship appears in conscious experience, which is certainly not universal but inter-human, unique and unrepeatable. Thus, the requirement for participation as the actualization of the *I-others* relationship is the awareness that “I” and the *others* are human beings.

Furthermore, with the authentic participation of each person, an interpersonal community is formed. Here, we also experience that the *common good* or real objective good is used as the basis for the formation of community among persons. Wojtyła emphasized that there was a need to consider the subjective moment of *common good*. That is, each “I” in the community chooses and decides the *common good* (health, justice, etc) through self-determination for his own individual interest and the benefit of the community.<sup>173</sup> Here, each “I” governs himself and shows his transcendence in terms of participation in community.

Another fact in the human experience is that there are limitations in participation. There seem to be two reasons for this limitation, i.e., internal and external reasons. The internal reason relates to the lack of participation caused by the person himself as he isolates himself from others and concentrates on himself and his own good. Meanwhile, the external reasons related to the prevailing system in a society which makes the participation of persons impossible. In this situation of the lack of participation, the person does not experience the transcendence of himself and his self-fulfillment.

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<sup>170</sup> Ibid.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid., 201

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

<sup>173</sup> Spinello, “Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy,” 41.



## Chapter Summary

Manifestation of human person's subjectivity occurs in and through his essential aspects and faculties. It is discovered in the experience of man. The experience of man is realized on the external and internal plane.<sup>174</sup> These two experiences are inseparable and must be associated with "I."<sup>175</sup> There is no experience outside of the "I." The recognition of "my own I" and "other I," or something external, rests on experience of man. In this experience, the "I" manifests himself as both the subject and the object, and especially experiences himself "uniquely and unrepeatable."<sup>176</sup> For Wojtyła, experience of man requires the involvement of cognition.<sup>177</sup>

Experience of man shows that "I" or person could be reflected and experienced through special characteristic, i.e., conscious and free action. It is proper dynamism of human being to apprehend man as a personal being. As Wojtyła says: "an action presupposes a person."<sup>178</sup> The action is a result of a number of aspects and faculties of person. One of them is consciousness which plays an important role in understanding human subjectivity. Consciousness is not the "I" and not the ultimate cause of action, but it contributes to the arising of conscious action. Consciousness as a person's property has two important functions, namely reflective (mirroring) and reflexive (enabling the process of reflection). Because of these two functions, the person can be aware and experiences himself and everything outside himself. It helps a person reflect and experience on action, others and things in relation to himself as the concrete "I." In consciousness, the human subject transforms to become a human "I." Thus, "I" or "self" appears at the moment of self-consciousness. This self-consciousness is also possible because of self-knowledge that stems from the act of human cognition. With the help of self-knowledge and self-consciousness, the person can reflect, be aware of, and experience his psychosomatic aspects (emotions and body) as his own, especially in his action.

Another fact that reveals the experience of a human person's subjectivity is a moment of decision. With the unification of aspects of consciousness and self-determination in the moment

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<sup>174</sup> See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 7.

<sup>175</sup> Problem of subjectivity in contemporary philosophy is utterly crucial, especially in the question of "I" or "self." There are some thinkers who reject metaphysical self, such as Thomas Metzinger and J. Prinz. Metzinger state that there is no such thing as a self. Notion of self does not refer to any observable thing in the world. Self is not real. Experience of self is only experience of one's own body. So, experience of self is illusion. "I" that is, no-one. Subjective status especially "I"/ "self" only correlated to brain function. Meanwhile, J.Prinz insists that experience of self depends on sensory apparatus. We can't experience "I"/ "self" outside of our senses. He said, the self is absent if we look for it, but is always already there in each act of looking. See Anna Karczmarczyk, "Investigating Subjectivity Introduction to the Interview with Dan Zahavi," *Avant* 5, no.1 (2012): 110–111.

<sup>176</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 3.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid., 11.

of efficacy, a person is truly aware and experiences himself as subject who chooses and decides action toward objective good. In the act of self-determination in cooperation with consciousness, a person experiences self-governance and self-possession. At this moment, he is more aware of and experiences himself when he governs himself to act. A person also experiences conscience that plays a role in pointing to the true good, avoiding evil and creating obligations that must be obeyed in order to achieve self-fulfillment. The experience of self-fulfillment as well as the formation of oneself as a good person occurs when one obeys conscience to conduct good actions.

The subsequent fact that reveals the subjectivity of the human person is the experience of person's action which expresses human transcendence and is associated with integration. The experience of integration first occurs between a person and his own action, where he is present in action and, at the same time, action reveals the person himself as a subject. The experience of transcendence is the lived experience of self-governance and self-possession structures and the lived experience of integrating person into action. "I" experience that "I" govern myself, at the same time claiming that "I" own myself and also "I" am fully engaged in my actions. The next experience of integration is the integration of person's actions in the psychosomatic aspect. In this integration, the person's action enters the psychosomatic realm so that this aspect is raised to the level of experience of action and not merely the experience of "what happens in man." The experience of transcendence in person's action and its relation to the integration becomes the basis for acting together with others what Wojtyła calls participation. Participation is a form of realization of ability to act with others in social or inter-subjective life that has its roots in transcendence and integration of person in action. Participation based on this transcendence is the foundation for community. In participation, we experience that the *common good* (objective good) is a condition for the realization of an inter-subjective community. Here, the objective *common good* is achieved by persons for their own and collective interests. Thus, it can be said that the transcendence of person becomes more real in his participation with others.

Accordingly, the experience of personal subjectivity as an experience of "myself," which is different from experiences of "other own self," manifests in the sphere of experience of reflection, decision and action. Thus, my own "I" is present in the moment of reflection, decision and action, and it is not either "other I" or "collective I." This is the inner experience, which, of course, forms the basis for external human experiences. Outer experiences will always be encompassed by inner experience since there is no experience as such outside of "I." Wojtyła stated, "a human being never experiences something outside himself without experiencing, in a

sense, himself in that experience.”<sup>179</sup> In addition, it is important to keep in mind that apart from subjectivity manifested in reflection, decision and action, there is also subjectivity in what happens in man, such as the psychosomatic aspects. We experience emotions or feelings, reactivity, mobility, etc. However, psyche and soma subjectivity as primitive subjectivity will reach the highest level when integrated with personal subjectivity. That means “I” can experience myself in psychic and soma activity when it comes to action. Therefore, personal subjectivity can manifest in the psychosomatic aspects if these aspect are associated with action.

These facts then lead us to the questions concerning the principle or cause of person’s subjectivity that manifests itself in human experience. What is the true principle or cause of human subjectivity? Is it something outside of man or within himself? Is it based on something essential in man, or is it based on some accidental properties? Is the basis of subjectivity something material or immaterial? These kinds of questions will be analyzed in the next chapter.

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<sup>179</sup> Ibid.

## CHAPTER III

### PERSON AS THE ULTIMATE CAUSE OF SUBJECTIVITY

The previous chapter presented the manifestation of the human person's subjectivity given in the experience. In subsequent analyses, the attention will focus on explaining the metaphysical principles of personal subjectivity. Therefore, the current chapter will show the existence of causal conditions of the fact of human subjectivity. This means that the exploration of the problem of subjectivity in Wojtyła's anthropology proceeds from factual phenomena to the discovery of the principle or cause of subjectivity.

#### 3.1. Man as *Suppositum*

The basis of Wojtyła's Anthropology is Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics complemented and enriched by phenomenology. The principle or cause of the subjectivity of the human person is explained in the light of the theory of substance or *suppositum* and human dynamism. An explanation of the experience of subjectivity or the experience of subject and activities, ultimately leads to a stable subject in itself, namely man as *suppositum humanum*.<sup>1</sup>

##### 3.1.1. *Suppositum Humanum*

The concept of the *Suppositum* or subject in a metaphysical sense has its roots in the philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas.<sup>2</sup> In his metaphysical commentary to Aristotle's V book of metaphysics, St. Thomas used the term substance (*sub-stare*) translated from Greek word *hypokeimenon* (*hypo*: under, *keimenon*: what lays; *hypokeimenon*: what lay under) which

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<sup>1</sup> The term *Suppositum* which was used in Karol Wojtyła's *magnus opus*, *Osoby i Czyn*, and became so important in Wojtyła's analysis of thought, was completely omitted in the English translation by Andrzej Potocki and edited to definitive text by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *The Acting Person*, and replaced by English terms which is considered equivalent to the suppository concept, such as ontic structure or basic ontological structure. cf., Grzegorz Hołub, "The Human Subject and Its Interiority. Karol Wojtyła and the Crisis in Philosophical Anthropology," *Quien*, no.4 (2016): 56, fn. 24,

[https://www.academia.edu/30652672/The\\_Human\\_Subject\\_and\\_Its\\_Interiority\\_Karol\\_Wojty%C5%82a\\_and\\_the\\_Crisis\\_in\\_Philosophical\\_Anthropology](https://www.academia.edu/30652672/The_Human_Subject_and_Its_Interiority_Karol_Wojty%C5%82a_and_the_Crisis_in_Philosophical_Anthropology); Jameson Taylor, "Beyond Nature: Karol Wojtyła's Development of the Traditional Definition of Personhood," *The Review of Metaphysics* 63, no. 2 (December 2009): 422, fn.30.

However, the essays in the book *Person and Community Selected Essays* translated by Theresa Sandok OSM this term is preserved and not completely eliminated. For example, in one of the essays entitled *The Person: Subject and Community*.

<sup>2</sup> See Rocco Buttiglione, "The Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła has Two Main Features," *Pontifical Academy of Social Science, Acta 11*, (Vatican City, 2008): 44–45; Hołub, "The Human Subject," 56.

means what lay under something else.<sup>3</sup> Aristotle himself, in the V book of his *Metaphysics*, has proposed four meanings of substance which can be seen in the following quotation:

We call “substance” both simple bodies such earth, water, fire and all their varieties, and in general all bodies and things composed from animals and demons, and the parts of their bodies. [...]. In another meaning, “substance” is the internal cause of being in things such as the soul for an animal. We also call “substances” certain elements of such things, namely the parts of them that limit them and give them an individual character, and the removal of which is tantamount to the destruction of the whole. Thus in the opinion of certain people, the following are substances: the surface for the body, the edge of the surface, and in general according to them number is of the type, since there would be nothing without number, which describes everything. Finally, what a thing is, and what is apprehended in the definition, is also called the substance of each particular thing.<sup>4</sup>

In the treatise, *Categories*, Aristotle also mentions another meaning of substance designate first (a particular thing) and second substance (genus):

Substance in the strictest, primary, and most important degree is that which cannot be predicated of a subject, and cannot be found in a subject. For example, a particular man or a particular horse. Species, to which substances in the first meaning as well as these species’ genera belong, are called second substance. For example, a particular man belongs to the species “man” and “animal” is genus of species; and so “man” and “animal” are called second substance.<sup>5</sup>

Aquinas accepted and followed all the meanings of Aristotle’s concept of substance by providing several changes and developments. However, we will only focus on some of the changes and developments made by St. Thomas. The concept of Aristotle was then reduced by St. Thomas to have more or less two main modes of substance.<sup>6</sup> The reason is that the second meaning of substance of Aristotle’s notion, namely the internal cause (substantial form), can be

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<sup>3</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle VI*, trans. John P. Rowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company: 1961), 5.10. 898–905; Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Metaphysics*, 5.10. 898–905, St. Isidore e-book library, accessed January 26, 2023, <https://isidore.co/aquinas/english/Metaphysics5.htm#10>; see also Buttiglione, “The Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła,” 44–45.

<sup>4</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980), 1017b 10–23; Cf. Arystoteles, *Metafizyka*, ed. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Andrzej Maryniarczyk on the basis of the translation of Tadeusz Żeleźnik (Lublin: PTTA, 2017); Aristotle, *The Metaphysics*, trans. John H. McMahon (Mineola, New York: Dover Publication, 2007); Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. W.D. Ross, vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924); Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. C.D.H. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2016). For further explanation on this issue, see Maryniarczyk, *Discovery of the Internal Structure*, 152; Frederick Copleston S.J., *A History of Philosophy Vol.1 Greek and Rome* (New York: Doubleday, 1962), 302–309; John F Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 200–205, accessed on October 2, 2020, <https://books.google.pl/books?id=TAvhcCGg7SUC&pg=PA203&lpg=PA203&dq=suppositum&source=bl&ots=g p5sMNj9Jy&sig=ACfU3U1e2WEeTIF8eoZQoQUYC9YnuzVkIw&hl=pl&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjpkKI-Manu5XsAhUHsaQKHQfQBSwQ6AEwB3oECAMQAg#v=onepage&q=suppositum&f=false>.

<sup>5</sup> Maryniarczyk, *Discovery of the Internal Structure*, 153.

<sup>6</sup> Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, 201.

combined with the fourth meaning, namely substance as “essence or quiddity,” and the third meaning can be excluded because it is more inclined to relate to accident or property. The first meaning in Aquinas’s conception is substance as a concrete thing that exists individually and independently and is synonymous with being.<sup>7</sup> According to this first meaning, the term substance in Aquinas’ terminology expresses what the Greek term *hypostases* has meant, namely *suppositum* that is to be a subject. Therefore, *suppositum* refers in the first place to the individual concrete being, which Aristotle called the first substance (Gr. *ousia prote*). The second meaning is substance as essence, quiddity or nature of things (Gr. *ousia*, Lat. *essentia*), expressing, above all, being in a universal sense conceived of by Aristotle as the second substance<sup>8</sup>

The conception of the substance leads us to an understanding of the principle of subjectivity. Wojtyła accepted and followed the *suppositum* concept of traditional Aristotalian-Thomistic philosophy. In short, the *suppositum* can be understood as a particular thing that exists or as a being existing as a subject. The *suppositum* as a subject means that it is the subject of existence and activity.<sup>9</sup> All substantial beings including human being fall under this metaphysical sense of subjectivity. The specificity of human being in this metaphysical concept is as a rational being, such as Aristotle’s concept *homo est animal rationale*. If man is a *suppositum*, then he is the subject of existence and all activity which is proper to him.<sup>10</sup> This is the meaning of metaphysical subjectivity, the *suppositum humanum*. Metaphysical subjectivity is either “through-the phenomenal” or “trans-phenomenal.” It means that through phenomena, we can turn to the whole human being as the subject of his existence and activities. In addition, *suppositum humanum* is also a “guarantor of identity of this human being in existence and activity.”<sup>11</sup> For Wojtyła, the *suppositum* serves to express human subjectivity in a metaphysical sense.<sup>12</sup> In this metaphysical sense, human being is still seen from an objective point of view. Human being is an object among other objects in the world; nevertheless, his subjectivity is completely different from that of other beings, which is revealed in his characteristic mode of existence and activity.

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<sup>7</sup> See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1017b 23–25; see also Maryniarczyk, *Discovery of the Internal Structure* 152; Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, 201–203.

<sup>8</sup> See Maryniarczyk, *Discovery of the Internal Structure*, 152; S. Marc Cohen, “Substance,” in *Blackwell Companion to Philosophy A Companion to Aristotle*, ed. Georgios Anagnostopoulos (West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2013): 197–200; Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, 203.

<sup>9</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 57; Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 157; Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 222; Hołub, “The Human Subject,” 56.

<sup>10</sup> Wojtyła, *The Person: Subject and Community*, 222.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 223.

<sup>12</sup> Taylor, *Beyond Nature*, 422.

Wojtyła also accepted the Thomistic view that man is a person.<sup>13</sup> He follows concept of person defined by Boethius, *persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia*. This definition expresses human person as an individual and as substantial being with rational nature. This definition has become a permanent part of the metaphysics of human being; however, it does not pay particular attention to the uniqueness of essential human subjectivity as a person, primarily from a subjective point of view. In these terms, the subjectivity of human person is something that is objective.<sup>14</sup> Consequently, the subjectivity of human being is seen more from the outside than from within.

According to Wojtyła, the metaphysical subjectivity or *suppositum* turns into a proper subjectivity of human action, which means personal subjectivity.<sup>15</sup> This last sphere of subjectivity creates the basis for all human dynamism appropriate for man, especially the activities of man as person. The dependence of efficient subjectivity on ontic subjectivity shows that the person is constituted in the metaphysical realm. So it can be said that the *suppositum humanum* manifests itself as a person, or in other words, the metaphysical subjectivity manifests itself into personal subjectivity.<sup>16</sup> Man as *suppositum* becomes the subject of existence and activities, but the full activity of man occurs in the stage of developing as a person. Of course, the subjectivity which is appropriate for person also belongs to man by nature since man is a person because of his nature.<sup>17</sup> The rational nature of the human *suppositum* makes “personal subjectivity” possible.<sup>18</sup> Thus, for Wojtyła, “subjectivity is a kind of synonym for the irreducible in human being.”<sup>19</sup>

Subjectivity in the personalistic sense includes several important aspects that characterize a person, such as consciousness, self-consciousness, knowledge, freedom or self-determination and conscience.<sup>20</sup> Regarding action as a conscious activity of the person, the role of consciousness is very important. If we look at traditional anthropology, consciousness is somewhat abandoned. Indeed, there was little space for analysis of consciousness in St. Thomas’ “objective view of reality.”<sup>21</sup> In St. Thomas’ conception, consciousness is more related to objective reality so that “it would be difficult to speak in his view of the lived experience of a

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<sup>13</sup> Wojtyła, “Subjectivity and the Irreducible,” 212.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> See Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 224.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 225.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Spinello, “Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy,” 22.

<sup>19</sup> Wojtyła, “Subjectivity and the Irreducible,” 211.

<sup>20</sup> Spinello, “Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy,” 22.

<sup>21</sup> See Wojtyła, “Thomistic Personalism,” 170; Spinello, “Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy,” 22.

person.”<sup>22</sup> For Wojtyła, consciousness allows self-experience which is the key to personal action or *actus personae*.<sup>23</sup> Consciousness has a significant role for personal subjectivity. In and through consciousness, the existence of person and his action are reflected and experienced.<sup>24</sup> Thus, subjectivity does not only occur in the realm of metaphysical objectivity, in which man becomes the acting subject, but also in the realm of consciousness, where the person as the subject experiences his action and inner happening.<sup>25</sup> In other words, I am fully manifested through action due to the consciousness.<sup>26</sup> This does not mean that consciousness appears as an independent subject, but rather it plays an essential role in understanding the subjectivity of person. Here, Wojtyła uses phenomenology to provide a way of describing consciousness as an important aspect of subjectivity. We find that the person becomes both the active agent and the subject of experience thanks to consciousness. Thus the person is not only a *suppositum* in the metaphysical sense but is a personal subject who experiences himself, his actions and their effects.

Accordingly, Wojtyła emphasized not only the objectivity of the *suppositum* like the Aristotelian-Thomistic view, but he underlined the relationship between human objectivity, as a *suppositum* (*suppositum humanum*) and person (human self), with the experience of subjectivity. In other words, he emphasized the objective and subjective side of subjectivity, or he accentuated the objective and subjective aspects of the *suppositum humanum*. That means he saw man from outside and inside. The emphasis on man’s objective and subjective perspectives then results in a more or less complete idea of man as person. This is a new way of Wojtyła to rethink *suppositum* that has been overlooked in traditional views. In his reinterpretation, he showed man as a person who is utterly somebody, in colloquial language, who experiences his subjectivity and not only as something or an object among other objects in the world.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Wojtyła, “Thomistic Personalism,” 171

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 226.

<sup>25</sup> Wojtyła, “Subjectivity and the Irreducible,” 213.

<sup>26</sup> See Wojtyła, “Participation or Alienation?” 198–199.

<sup>27</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 74.



### 3.1.2. Human Dynamism

Wojtyła was deeply indebted to Aristotle. He followed not only Aristotle's notion of substance, which Aquinas had interpreted, but also the notion of the dynamism of being.<sup>28</sup> In the philosophy of Aristotle, the notion of dynamism comes from the term *dynamis*, which has a broad meaning, such as strength, power, mightiness, ability, potentiality or a potential state.<sup>29</sup> The equivalent to this term in Latin is *potentia* which denotes faculty or power.<sup>30</sup> Aristotle, then, understood dynamism as "a certain kind of motion." He described it as an "actualization of potency as such."<sup>31</sup> For the meaning of this dynamism, he elucidated potency as a source of dynamism and as a compositional factor of being. Unlike Aristotle, who explained the dynamism of all beings, Wojtyła used terms act and potency to explain human dynamism. According to Wojtyła, "dynamism, as we could see, refers primarily to that 'actual dynamization of man-subject' which issues from within and may have the form either of acting or happening."<sup>32</sup> Meanwhile, on the other hand, potentiality is "the source itself of this dynamization of subject."<sup>33</sup> Potentiality or faculty is inherent in subject and it "comes to the surface in one or other form of the subject's dynamization."<sup>34</sup>

To explain human dynamism, Wojtyła uses the *actus-potentia* theory which he considered the most appropriate tool for explaining of dynamism. For him, the experience of man is the basis for analysis in the light of the *actus-potentia* theory. Wojtyła explains that in the experience of man there are facts of man-act. These facts are given to us first in the lived experience of "I act." Thus, whoever acts (he, she, you as I) is understood to be "on the ground of experiencing our own acting, in I act."<sup>35</sup> Especially through analyzing the experience of the efficacy of human actions, we find that there are significant differences between the two basic forms of human act, namely the fact man act (*actus humanus*) and the fact what happens in man (*actus hominis*), as a realization of the dynamism that is appropriate for man. Both have different objective structures; one shows activity and the other passivity but both have one direction, "from within." Both are the dynamism of man, where man is a dynamic subject, but they are different because the man-act is at the level of the subjectiveness of conscious "I," while what

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<sup>28</sup> Taylor, "Beyond Nature," 417.

<sup>29</sup> See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1019a15–1019b20; 1045b35–1048a20; see also Duma, "The Human Person's Dynamism, 442; Maryniarczyk, *Discovery of the Internal Structure*, 47–49.

<sup>30</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 86; see also Duma, "The Human Person's Dynamism," 442.

<sup>31</sup> Maryniarczyk, *Discovery of the Internal Structure*, 56.

<sup>32</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 86.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 60.

happens is based on a substantial subject or *suppositum*.<sup>36</sup> Of course, the dynamism of man-acts and what happens in man implies the existence of *potentia* and *actus* as in the philosophy of Aristotle. In the context of dynamism that is appropriate for man, Wojtyła reiterates potency (faculty or power), is “something that already is but also is not yet: as something that is in presentation, is available, and even ready at hand but is not actually fulfilled.” *Actus* is “actualization of potentiality, its fulfillment.”<sup>37</sup> Meanwhile, “dynamism is nothing else but a being’s passing from the state of potency to the state of act.”<sup>38</sup> It seems clear from this definition that potency cannot be separated from act, or vice versa. The dynamism of the subject, as the actual dynamism of the man-subject either in the form of action or what happens, is derived from this potentiality. In short, potency is the source of the dynamism of the subject.<sup>39</sup> Dynamism is given directly to us in experience; meanwhile, potency as a source is given indirectly. The same thing was explained by Rocco Buttiglione: “what from an ontological point of view is potency is, from a phenomenological point of view, dynamism. Potency and dynamism refer to the same reality in different ways; dynamism speaks of the structure of acting and happening, potentiality of the underlying reality of such a structure.”<sup>40</sup>

Potency and act, as causes of dynamism, require the existence of a concrete being. Potency and act are two forms related to the existence of being. Wojtyła stated as follows: “what exists as a possibility may, because it thus exists, come into existence in an act; and conversely, what came into existence in the act did so because of its previous existence as potentiality.”<sup>41</sup> In particular, regarding the human *suppositum*, Wojtyła is concerned with the relation between existence and activities. To explain this, Wojtyła uses a metaphysical reduction method complemented by phenomenology. Regarding the methods used, Wojtyła expressed his concern for the data from the reduction process and added a phenomenological description, which then allowed the discovery of the ontological structure of the person. The data from the experience of the man act that has been given are then reduced to reach the reason or basis for the dynamism structure. To explain the problem of man-act in relation to the theory of act-potency, furthermore, Wojtyła also uses the principle in the philosophical adage from the scholastic period, *operari sequitur esse*.<sup>42</sup> The principle reveals that the *operari* is the result of being, as well as a proper place of knowledge of being. In other words, through *operari* we can get to

<sup>36</sup> Duma, “The Human Person’s Dynamism,” 444.

<sup>37</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 63.

<sup>38</sup> Duma, “The Human Person’s Dynamism,” 446.

<sup>39</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 63–64.

<sup>40</sup> Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła*, 139.

<sup>41</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 64.

<sup>42</sup> Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 223.

know being. Here, *operari* refers to all the activities in the human *suppositum*, both man acts and something happens in man. Thus, the *operari* displays the total dynamism of human being which enables us to arrive at a correct understanding of human subjectivity.

In particular, with regard to human action, we find that Aristotle's concept of *actus-potentia* has also been developed and reinterpreted in scholastic, well known as the conception of *actus humanus* or deliberate action.<sup>43</sup> Wojtyła's conception of action, of course, was rooted in this traditional concept. However, he completes it in the light of his theory that in or through action, man as a person manifests himself that only himself is the subject or efficient cause of man-act. Thus, the thought of Wojtyła does not go against traditional concepts at all but develops and complements them.

He argued that the fact man-acts requires an integral dynamism of man. This dynamism, of course, characterizes an actual being or an existing human being, "for something to act, it must first exist."<sup>44</sup> There are three types of dynamism that are appropriate for man as an actual and concrete being. Firstly, vegetative dynamism which deals with the situation of the body. Second, psychic dynamism which deals with all human emotions and passions. Third, the dynamism that is appropriate for a free personality, which is expressed in being the efficient cause of one's own actions.<sup>45</sup> These three dynamisms are related to each other so that the concrete actions of man are the result of their interconnection.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, for Wojtyła, the structures man-acts and what happens, as a manifestations of dynamism, are understood as *operari*. *Operari* is a secondary act in relation to the act of existence as the first act of being, which is also the main basis for action. In the light of *actus-potentia* theory, the direct cause of the *operari* must be the potency which correlates with the first act of being, called the existence of being. Thus the actualization of potency is nothing else but the actualization of the existence of being.<sup>47</sup> However, in the context of the specificity of man as a person, *operari* is specifically understood as conscious action. As we know, therefore, conscious action can only be associated with person and not with other beings.

Then, how to explain the dynamism of the person? The dynamism proper to man as a person is called "the dynamism of action."<sup>48</sup> The dynamism of a person is correlated with the faculties which determine action. First of all, there is emphasized here that the nature or essence

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<sup>43</sup> Taylor, *Beyond Nature*, 417.

<sup>44</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 73.

<sup>45</sup> Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła*, 139

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> See Duma, "The Human Person's Dynamism," 446.

<sup>48</sup> Wojtyła, "The Person: Subject and Community," 224.

of being is the source of dynamism. Because of his nature, man exists as a person and can perfect himself. Nature is what determines the potency or faculty that gives rise to action.<sup>49</sup> The appropriate *operari* of human person directly indicates a personal being that reveals to be in action itself and reveals to be an efficient cause of action.<sup>50</sup> Analysis of a man-act or personal action leads us to discover the potencies inherent in personal existence, which is the basis for the fulfillment of personal being. Here, ultimate potency is the will which allows one “to want” in a moment of efficacy.<sup>51</sup> However, the will always depends on “I.” As such, in the moment of efficacy, not only the action is formed but also the efficient cause, that is person.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, due to the will, the integration of nature (acts of psycho-emotive and somato-vegetative potencies) takes place in the performance of action and fulfillment of person. Psycho-emotive and somato-vegetative potencies are aspects of human subconsciousness whose dynamism is integrated into the conscious action of person, thanks to the will in correlation with consciousness. Wojtyła says: “the existence of subconsciousness and the functions it perform indubitably indicates that consciousness is the sphere where man most appropriately fulfills himself.”<sup>53</sup> In addition, the person’s action through the will, where person governs himself, includes motivation, which is the truth about the known value. That means the will depends on the truth. Reason plays a role in presenting that truth to the will. Dependence on truth makes the fulfillment of action also has a moral character. The conscience confirms that the fulfillment of action and person depends on the truth.

Furthermore, especially in the dynamism of man-act, there is a moment of efficacy which is based on self-determination.<sup>54</sup> In this dynamism, a person appears as an agent responsible for his action because he is aware of himself as a subject and agent in the moment of efficacy; he is aware of a causal relation between himself and action. Meanwhile, in the dynamism of what happens, there is a lack of efficacy. Hence, there is no responsibility in the dynamism of what happens in man. It means that in action, man appears as the active subject, while in what happens, man appears as the passive subject so that he abandons responsibility. Wojtyła states: “When acting I have experience of myself as the agent of responsible for this particular form of the dynamization of myself as the subject. When there is something happening in me, then

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<sup>49</sup> Duma, “The Human Person’s Dynamism,” 447.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 450.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 120.

dynamism is imparted without the efficacious participation of my ego.”<sup>55</sup> These explanations of the proper dynamism of man as a *suppositum* and as a person lead us to a deeper analysis of the personal being and its faculties which determine action.

### **3.2. Man as a Personal Being**

Man is not only limited to reality as a substance or being among other beings, with a rational soul as the difference. More than that, man is a unique, irreplaceable and incommunicable personal being. As such, he is the subject of all personal phenomena. The particular manner of existence, activities unique only to humans, subjective efficacy, and moral consciousness have their roots in him as a personal being.

#### **3.2.1. Person as the Subject of His Own Existence and Action**

The most important questions that Wojtyła posed in his anthropological considerations were: Who is the man? Why is a human being called a person? What are the essential elements that make up man a person? What does it mean that the person is the subject of his existence and actions? In contemporary anthropological research, it is most often taken into account that human being is a material object of various kinds of empirical science. These empirical sciences discuss and examine human being from various aspects. There are various particular materials derived from the scientific approaches used by scientists, but they cannot provide a comprehensive understanding of the whole human being, especially to arrive at the idea that man is a person. Of course, we do not underestimate the tremendous contribution of science to the exploration, discovery and explanation of particular aspects of human being. However, to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of man as a person, as well as the appropriate subjectivity of the human person, it is undoubtedly philosophy that has a significant role to play in this task, without underestimating the contribution of science. In traditional philosophy, man is conceived as a *suppositum*. It means that he is the subject of existence and activity or dynamism that is appropriate for him. Here, he is the subject of both the dynamism of what happens and the dynamism of action. Furthermore, in the anthropological sense, man is not only a *suppositum* or an existing individual being but also a personal being. In the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, personal being is the proper type of being a man. In this tradition, the specificity of man as a personal being is highlighted and shows that he is a most perfect being in the natural world. This specificity first shows that man, as a person, is formed as a being by rational nature, and he is

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 66.

identified as *suppositum* so that from the beginning, man is someone who exists and acts.<sup>56</sup>

Wojtyła writes:

In the first and fundamental approach the man-person has to be somewhat identified with its basic ontological structure. The person is a concrete man, the *individua substantia* of the classical definition. [...] The concept of person is broader and more comprehensive than the concept of the individual, just as the person is more than individualized nature. The person would be an individual whose nature is rational.”<sup>57</sup>

Moreover, nature cannot be divorced from a person. Nature is embedded to the person. All the dynamism that takes place in man, both actions and what happens, is rooted in this nature. Nature inherent in a person becomes the basis of the cohesion of all dynamism. Thus, all dynamism rooted in nature or humanness “must also be really personal,”<sup>58</sup> for both action and what happens in man. This also exhibits that to be a person and realize of all human dynamism belongs to a person could be possible only because nature and its properties are the conditions. The activity of human dynamism can be brought about by properties which are faculties/powers that belong to human nature and are determined by it. Wojtyła states: “humanness or human nature is equipped with the properties that enable a concrete human being to be a person: to be and to acts a person.”<sup>59</sup>

Therefore, as an individual substance with rational nature, person is the subject of his existence and activity. Wojtyła further states: “The person, the human being as the person—seen in its ontological basic structure—is the subject of both existence and acting.”<sup>60</sup> That means, the structure of dynamism of action and what happens are rooted in the person. Person is the ontological basis for his existence and dynamism. That way, human existence and all actions and what happens are not merely individual but personal.<sup>61</sup> The specificity of man as a personal being in the Aritotelian-Thomistic tradition above is still limited to objective understanding. Man as a personal being who is the subject and efficient cause of all their activities can only be seen from external experience. Therefore, Wojtyła highlights and underlines internal experiences to complement the classical view to enrich or deepen the understanding of man as a personal being. Here, he also emphasizes man as a personal being that can only be analyzed and discovered through action or *operari* that is appropriate for the human person. Action is an entry

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<sup>56</sup>Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 224–225.

<sup>57</sup>Wojtyła. *The Acting Person*, 73.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., 84.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., 74.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid.

point to discover and to cognize conscious subjectiveness in moments of efficacy and ontological subjectiveness or *suppositum*, which is the subject of what happened. But more than that, in that action, man as a personal being reveals himself in action as an efficient cause, and he really experiences this fact.

I reiterate, here, that for Wojtyła, man as a person means he is an *individua substantia* as in Boethius' definition. However, for him, person is not only a concrete individual but also unique and unrepeatable. Here he shows how the classical view also shows the side of autonomy, uniqueness and irreplaceable or untransferable to someone else in the definition of Roman Law, *persona est sui iuris et alteri incommunicabilis* (person is a being which belongs to itself and which does not share its being with another).<sup>62</sup> This definition states that the person has natural qualities that make him *incommunicabilis*. First of all, he is unique and unrepeatable because he is a concrete human being (*individua substantia*) who has a "rational nature." Apart from that, the man-person is unique and unrepeatable because, in the ontological structure, man determines himself to achieve fulfillment as a person.<sup>63</sup> This is an objective and realistic view that constructs an objective human person idea based on external experience. It states that person is completely different from other natural beings. St. Thomas Aquinas stated that with a clear statement, *persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura, scilicet subsistens in rationali natura*.<sup>64</sup> However, this concept remains insufficient because the rich and complex aspects of human interiority do not have a more special place in this sense. Wojtyła recognized this gap and developed this aspect of interiority to complement the traditional view. The fact of

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<sup>62</sup> Duma, "The Human Person's Dynamism," 447. For further and deeper explanation of this definition see John F. Crosby, *The Selfhood of the Human Person* (Washington: Catholic University of America, 1996); Peter J. Colosi, "The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II, with Emphasis on His Indebtedness to Max Scheler," <https://peterjcolosi.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Colosi-Personal-Uniqueness-Wojtyła-Scheler.pdf>. John F. Crosby In this book also explains the difference between communicable and incommunicable in general and specifically with regard to the human person. Communicability means referring to what is common, general and universal. Socrates and Plato are human beings who have something common, namely human nature which is certainly owned by both of them and every human being. But they contain not only what is common but also incommunicability. Incommunicability refers to what is "not-common" and what is real and not general. Incommunicability is often also identified with unrepeatable. Incommunicability states that individual being through the antithesis of what is general or universal and unrepeatable expresses individual being through the antithesis of other individual beings of the same kind. Specifically, in the human context, humanity or human nature is communicability, which in a certain sense transcends human being and makes it common for all human beings. On the other hand, if there is absolutely no incommunicability in a person himself, then he is not an individual being but exists only in relation to a general idea. I add, here, that communicability and incommunicability in human beings are actually not contradictory or collide at all, however, complement and enrich the principle of identity that a human being is different from other living beings and at the same time as a human being, he is unique and different from other human beings.

<sup>63</sup> Cf., Andrew Nicholas Woznicki, S.Ch, *The Dignity of Man as A Person* (Michigan: Society of Christ, 1987), 146.

<sup>64</sup> Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I q.29 a.3 co, <https://www.corpusthomicum.org/sth1028.html>; see also Alfred M. Wierzbicki, "Karol Wojtyła's Philosophy on the Issue of Modernity," *Acta Universitatis Lodziensis, Folia Litteraria Polonica* 3/53 (2019): 178; Duma, "The Human Person's Dynamism." 447.

lived experience “I act,” which means “I” am the efficient cause of action and self-actualization,<sup>65</sup> indicates that man is unrepeatable and unique. Therefore, in the experience of “I act” (self-determination) man really experiences himself as unique and unrepeatable in action. Thus, a unique person as someone, here, also is more emphasized in an ethical sense, “although in the ontological sense the human being is a ‘someone’ from the very beginning.”<sup>66</sup>

### 3.2.2. Person as the Basis for the Synthesis of Efficacy and Subjectivity

Action and what happens in man with their structures reveal and cut across in phenomenological experience but synthesize together in the metaphysical field.<sup>67</sup> Synthesize means here to join or to unite. As explained above, both are sourced from the person as the *suppositum*/subject. The dynamism of the both is synthesized in the field of metaphysics because it has an ontological basis that is the person who has an actual and concrete existence.<sup>68</sup> The notion of person, which is the individual substance with rational nature, expresses the completeness of man. So, he is an individual, well known as something, but also concrete unique and unrepeatable, well-known also as somebody. The completeness of man as a person discloses that he is the basis and source of all proper dynamism of man.

According to Wojtyła, the synthesis between action and what happens in man on the basis of the ontological structure (*suppositum*) at the same time indirectly is a synthesis between efficacy and subjectiveness.<sup>69</sup> The synthesis does not obscure the divergence between both at all. The efficacy, or moment of being an agent, which is structurally connected to action and subjectiveness which is structurally connected to what happens in man at the phenomenological level have an ontological basis in the person. Here, Wojtyła corrects phenomenology with traditional metaphysics. This is also Wojtyła’s criticism of Scheler’s anthropology, which insists person as a unity of actions that have different essence and the absence of a moment of efficacy in a person’s action.<sup>70</sup> Scheler merely views the person as a passive subject or as a place or ground for such actions.

From Wojtyła’s explanation of the synthesis of efficacy and subjectiveness, it can be understood that both have a basis and source in man-person. Man-person is not only the subject

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<sup>65</sup> Karol Wojtyła, “Personal Structure of Self-Determination,” in *Subject and Community Selected Essays*, trans. Theresa Sandok, OSM (New York: Peter Lang, 1993): 189.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 192.

<sup>67</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 74.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 74–75.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 75.

<sup>70</sup> See Taylor, “Beyond Nature,” 421.



of the dynamism of what happens, but also the subject and agent of action. Wojtyła states: “this is the reason why the human being, even while he is the agent in acting, still remain its subject. He is both the actor and the subject, he has experience of himself both as actor and the subject [...].”<sup>71</sup> In other words, person is not only a *suppositum* or metaphysical subject but he is also an agent or phenomenological subject.<sup>72</sup> Regarding the dynamism of action, the person appears as a conscious agent. He acts consciously and is aware of his action. The role of consciousness here is to help a person experiences himself as a subject and agent of his action and reflects on it. Therefore, from this synthesis, we find that person is not only a *suppositum* or subject of the dynamism of happening or, so to speak, as something, but also as the subject and agent of his conscious action. And more than that, person also realizes that he is “conscious I” who is aware that he is subject and object of his action.

### 3.2.3. Person as the Moral Subject

This section highlights person not only as a *suppositum* (being), and a conscious subject (conscious being) but also a moral subject (moral being). The question that needs to be answered in this section is what is the reason that the person can be called a moral subject? Furthermore, what is the reason for the action of a person that can be called a moral action? It has been explained in the previous section that action is explained according to the metaphysical categories of act and potency and is associated with an efficient cause. The person is the efficient cause of either good or evil action and is responsible for it. This will also be explained further in the next section relating to self-determination and self-fulfillment.

Wojtyła analyzes and criticizes conception of morality in the view of Kant and Scheler. Wojtyła’s critique is mainly regarding the understanding of moment efficacy, which cannot be separated from the anthropological understanding developed by these two thinkers (in chapters one and four, there are also some references to Kant and Scheler’s views). In Kant’s thought, man is explained as a *homo phenomenon* (empirical man, lower man or *człowiek empiryczny*) who lives in the world of phenomena and *homo noumena* (man as such, higher man or *człowiek jako taki*) who lives in the noumenal world. The *homo phenomenon* is associated with animality, which contains an instinctual capacity to survive as individuals and species in the phenomenal world. Natural law and natural human tendencies are decisive and play a significant role in the world of the *homo phenomenon*. Wojtyła says:

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<sup>71</sup> Wojtyła. *The Acting Person*, 75.

<sup>72</sup> Cf., Taylor, “Beyond Nature,” 427.

If we locate a given act in the world of phenomena (*phaenomenon*), then it must be conditioned by the law of nature, whereas if we conceive it as an act in itself (*noumenon*) then it must be free, since beyond phenomenon the natural principle of causality does not hold force.<sup>73</sup>

On the other hand, *homo noumenon* is closely related to the humanity and personality of man. Humanity includes the capacity for goals, finding and determining the means to achieve these goals. Meanwhile, humanity includes the capacity to establish moral laws and then encourage them to obey and implement them. Both of these abilities are regulated or determined according to reason<sup>74</sup> so that man is a rational subject. *Homo noumenon* is the subject of freedom and morality. Or in other words, freedom and morality can only be understood and discussed in the sphere of *homo noumenon*. Kant emphasized that reason is the main source of the determination of all goals and moral laws and their implementation. In relation to the will, he asserts that the will is only a force that drives or carries out the orders of the mind, even the will can be understood as equivalent to practical reason. The emphasis on reason as the source or authority of morality leads to neglect of various irrational or natural experiences and circumstances. For Kant, these things cannot have the authority of morality. Because they only supply representations that create reality as a phenomenon with a particular and contingent character. Reality as an essential and universal *noumenon* is not produced by them but by reason. The moral law must be universal, absolute, and unconditional. Therefore, it purely only comes from an authoritative source, namely reason.<sup>75</sup> Thus, it can be said that the person is only a moral subject who obeys and implements the moral law as an obligation that comes from reason alone.

Scheler, with a phenomenological approach, describes a solid and harmonious relationship between man and the experience of value, which he calls *der material Wert* (material or objective value).<sup>76</sup> These values are objects of lived experience that can only be captured through intentional feeling. Value is a phenomenological fact which is only the object

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<sup>73</sup> I include the quote in Polish version: "Jeżeli bowiem dany czyn umieścimy w świecie zjawisk (*phaenomenon*), wówczas musi on być uwarunkowany prawami przyrody, jeśli natomiast pojmiemy go jako czyn sam w sobie (*noumenon*), wówczas może być wolny, gdyż poza zjawiskami przyrodniczą zasadą przyczynowości nie obowiązuje." Karol Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures*, 64.

<sup>74</sup> See Grzegorz Hołub, "Persons as the Cause of Their Own Action: Karol Wojtyła on Efficacy," *Ethical Perspectives* 23, no. 2 (2016): 262, DOI:10.2143/EP.23.2.3157183.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 264.

<sup>76</sup> Wojtyła uses the Polish expression of objective value to refer to the material value in Scheler's concept to avoid misunderstanding. In everyday speech, the term material is usually contrasted with immaterial in the physical sense. However, this meaning in Scheler's writing is more intended as an opposition to the form in the peripatetic philosophical tradition. Values are objective because they form the objective content of an intentional action. Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures*, 29.

of feeling (*Fühlen von Werten*).<sup>77</sup> The values are also in a hierarchical order, and the issue of which value is ranked high or low has to do with intuitive insight. In relation to the concept of man, as a phenomenologist, Scheler does not recognize metaphysical categories such as substance, accident and also act and potency.<sup>78</sup> Therefore, he defines the person not as a substantial being which is the efficient cause of activities. The person is only a unity of lived experience that characterizes the intentionality of action towards objective values. It is simply a “subject of experience and not an efficient cause of act” at all.<sup>79</sup> Scheler emphasizes the meaning of person as follows:

As the following will show, one thing in this definition is entirely correct: namely, the person must never be considered a thing or a substance with faculties and powers, among which the “faculty” or “power” of reason etc., is one. The person is rather the immediately co-experienced unity of experiencing; the person is not merely thought thing behind and outside what is immediately experienced.<sup>80</sup>

And in terms of morality, moral values are not in the hierarchical arrangement of the ranking of objective values. Moral values are only combined immediately with the set of objective values. It means that moral values only appear as a result of preferences for values in their hierarchical arrangement. When actions are directed to objective values, that is where moral values appear or, in Scheler’s expression, moral values appear “on the back” of actions that seek to realize these objective values.<sup>81</sup> Thus, the person as a moral subject in Scheler’s concept is not an efficient cause that creates moral value through the actions of its internal faculties but on the contrary the person is only a passive subject of intentional feelings which then includes moral values. Wojtyła notes as follows:

Scheler holds that the efficacy of the person cannot be affirmed on the basis of phenomenological experience. In other words, the person does not have lived experience of himself as an efficient cause. The person’s acts are not fruits of his efficacy but are lived experiences without any roots in efficient causality, experiences which in the eyes of the phenomenologist compose a unity, and he calls this unity of lived experience of the person.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement A Historical Introduction*, Second Edition, vol. I (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 257; John Paul II, *Man and Woman He Created: A Theology of Body* (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 2006), 68.

<sup>78</sup> Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures*, 27.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 47–48.

<sup>80</sup> Max Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and non-Formalism Ethics of Values A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism*, trans., and ed., Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1973), 371.

<sup>81</sup> Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, 254.

<sup>82</sup> Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures*, 52–53. Polish quotes: “Scheler utrzymuje mianowicie, że na podstawie doświadczenia fenomenologicznego nie można stwierdzić sprawczości osoby. Innymi słowy: osoba nie przeżywa

Therefore, in Scheler's view, a human being is a good person depending on the direction of intentional feelings towards a higher objective value, and vice versa a person is evil if he is directed to the lowest objective value. The lived experience of morality has absolutely nothing to do with efficient causality because the person loses his dynamic character as a consequence of the construction of human understanding solely phenomenological.

Wojtyła accepted the Thomistic notion: "Morality is not the most strictly connected with thought; thought is merely a condition of morality. Directly, however, morality is connected with freedom, and therefore with the will."<sup>83</sup> The origin of action is in "moment efficacy" where the person becomes the subject and agent who creates and performs an action or a moment person governs himself to choose and decide a certain action. The moment of efficacy involves free will. Morality is associated with this action because there is an involvement of freedom. Here, freedom is not only understood as a moment that is appropriate for man but as a factor or a constitutive component of moral action. Freedom determines the whole structure of moral becoming; good or evil actions in a moral sense are based on freedom and also man's becoming good and evil through action is rooted in freedom.<sup>84</sup> The freedom, which is the root of formation of moral person, is an attribute of human will. Meanwhile, the will is an aspect and faculty of the person. The person expresses his freedom through the will. The freedom of a person, which is expressed through the will toward value, brings within him "the element of moral responsibility."<sup>85</sup> Responsibility appears as an expression of obligation to value. Here, the obligation is understood as the "normative power of the truth," which is manifested in response to values.<sup>86</sup>

In addition, the person's actions through a free will cannot be separated from the role of the intellect. In determining and deciding actions on known objects, the intellect plays a role in informing the truth of good (*bonum*) to be chosen by the will. Through the will, the person chooses and decides on the object to be addressed and then determines the means to achieve it. From a moral perspective, the object or value that is addressed determines the moral quality of the action as well as determines the fulfillment and unfulfillment of self. Or in other words, the choices and decisions of the person towards good or evil values make the action good or evil, while making a person good or evil. In addition, the fulfillment (performance) of actions has a

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siebie jako przyczyny sprawczej. Akty jej to nie są owoce jej sprawczości, lecz tylko pozbawione sprawczego korzenia przeżycia, które układają się w oczach fenomenologa w jedność przeżycia właśnie nazywa on osobą."

<sup>83</sup> Wojtyła, "Thomistic Personalism," 172.

<sup>84</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 99.

<sup>85</sup> Wojtyła, "The Person: Subject and Community," 228.

<sup>86</sup> Duma, "The Human Person's Dynamism," 452.

moral character because of the role of conscience, where the dependence of action on the truth of the good is shown in the role of conscience.<sup>87</sup> We know that conscience depends on truth and that it functions to relate action to the known truth of the good and to form “a meaning of obligation” in relation to goodness. Self-fulfillment depends on the truth of conscience, which is “the source of the norms of action.”<sup>88</sup> However, we also ask, what is moral value in Wojtyła’s view? He stated that moral values (good or evil) are what make man good or evil and which make man as man or as good or bad person. Here, Wojtyła reduces moral values to humanity, where man becomes man exclusively through moral values.<sup>89</sup> We can be good teachers, good dancers, good actors, good tennis players and so on, but to be a man as a man or as a good human person we can only through moral values. So Wojtyła explains moral values in the context of being and becoming man through actions. Man becomes good or evil depending on whether his actions are morally good or evil. Here the experience of morality is closely connected with the moment of efficacy. Therefore, the human person is not only the subject of activity but also the subject of moral values.

Thus, from all these explanations, it can be concluded that the person is indeed the subject of moral action in the sense of being an efficient cause through his faculties. And, indeed, all actions that are created by the person through the will towards values are known to have a moral character because they are consciously and freely carried out and in cooperation with reason and conscience.

The problem of person as a moral subject in Wojtyła’s philosophy is not only explained by a metaphysical approach but also by a phenomenological approach that gives space to conscious experience. In his theory of action, Wojtyła has clearly distinguished action and what happens in man. Action is conscious and voluntary. That means, first of all, the person, due to consciousness, becomes aware of himself, which determines the action and is aware of the object which motivates him to act. A person is aware of himself and the object because he has knowledge of them. Furthermore, the action of a person is voluntary because the known object is an object of the intentionality of will. Action is a response of the will to a known object. In action, there is a lived experience of causal efficacy, i.e., the experience of “I” who is causing

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<sup>87</sup> See Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 286; Duma, “The Human Person’s Dynamism,” 451–452.

<sup>88</sup> Wojtyła distinguishes the norms of ethics, the norms of logic and aesthetics. Only norms of ethics which correspond to morality, bear upon man’s action and upon man as a person. The norms of logic and aesthetics never have such a strong effect on man, because they are not norms of acting, of the action but only of knowing and producing. See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 157.

<sup>89</sup> Karol Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Theory of Morality,” in *Person and Community Selected Essays*, trans. Theresa Sandok, OSM (New York: Peter Lang, 1993): 145.

the action to achieve a certain known end.<sup>90</sup> This explanation indicates the essential elements that characterize the action of the person, such as consciousness, free will and cognition, as well as the object or purpose of action.

An action is conditioned by consciousness. Through the mirroring function of consciousness, one reflects on the action when it is created and when it is performed, even the internal and external effects of action. In this function, consciousness reflects whatever is objectified cognitively.<sup>91</sup> It means consciousness only reflects the cognized or known object. Due to the role of cognition, the person cognizes and reflects his I and external objects. In terms of action, the person decides on an action that refers to truth of the known object, or more precisely, recognized as value. As such, the action of person through free will cannot be separated from the role of cognition. Cognition is also the condition of the act of will.<sup>92</sup> The will of person creates action refers to a cognitively known value. The intellect plays a role in informing the truth of good so that it can be chosen by the will. Through the will, the person chooses and decides the value to be aimed at and then determines the means to achieve it. From a moral perspective, the truth of the intended object or value determines the moral quality of the action as well as determines the fulfillment and nonfulfillment of self. Or in other words, the person's choice and decision to lead to good or evil values make that action good or evil, as well as make a person good or evil. It means, "when performing an action the person fulfills himself also from the ontological point of view."<sup>93</sup> Besides, personal fulfillment of "I" in action, reveals that the "man is a contingent being."<sup>94</sup>

Meanwhile, another function of consciousness allows the person to experience himself as a subject and actor and simultaneously experience his conscious action. Wojtyła says: "consciousness allows us not only to have an inner view of our actions and of their dynamic dependence on the ego but also to experience these actions as actions and as our own."<sup>95</sup> So through this function, a person experiences himself as someone who performs good or evil action, and at the same time, he experiences himself as someone who is good or evil.<sup>96</sup> Consciousness, therefore, accompanies the activity of will but, it does not control or guide will at

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<sup>90</sup> Spinello, "Karol Wojtyła's Philosophy," 28.

<sup>91</sup> Wojtyła, "The Person: Subjek and community," 227

<sup>92</sup> See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 139–141.

<sup>93</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 153.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., 153–154.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 51.

<sup>96</sup> Spinello, "Karol Wojtyła's Philosophy," 28.

all.<sup>97</sup> According to Wojtyła, failure to recognize these differences will inevitably lead to “subjectivism and idealism.”<sup>98</sup>

### **3.3. The Integration of Nature in Person**

As human persons, we have a unique way of existence and activity in this visible world. The rational nature of the human person determines distinctiveness or specificity in existence and activities. The activity that most demonstrates the uniqueness of man as a person is an action. This action reveals the aspect and faculty of the rational nature, which is none other than the faculty of the person, namely the will. The act of self-determination as an act of will has a very decisive role in the integration of all human aspects in action and acting together with other persons in the community.

#### **3.3.1. The Will as the Faculty of Person**

First of all, we need to explain the term nature as understood by Wojtyła. He distinguished nature in terms of metaphysics, phenomenology and also phenomenism (empiricism). In phenomenological and phenomenistic notions, nature is “equivalent to the subject of instinctive actualization,”<sup>99</sup> or as the subject of what merely happens. Here, nature refers to what has been actualized by excluding the role of the person as the subject who act and as an author of action.<sup>100</sup> Meanwhile, in a metaphysical sense, nature means “more or less equivalent to the essence of a thing taken as the basis of all the actualization of thing.”<sup>101</sup> Thus, nature is not narrowed to what happens as in the view of phenomenology. Nature in the metaphysical sense is integrated into person, or it is inherent in person, as was said in the definition of person by Boethius. Therefore, nature in the metaphysical sense means nature which lies on the basis of the synthesis of action and what happens, that is, man as a person. Here nature affects the dynamism that is appropriate for man. Meanwhile, from a phenomenological perspective, nature only refers to a certain domain of actualization of human dynamism. In this case, nature refers only to what is happening in man. Apparently, there is a philosophical conflict that arises where we confront person and nature in a phenomenological sense; it is as if, on the one hand, the person as the source of action stands above nature but, on

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<sup>97</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 114.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> Karol Wojtyła, “The Human Person and Natural Law,” in *Person and Community Selected Essays*, trans. Theresa Sandok, OSM (New York: Peter Lang, 1993): 182.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

the other hand, in a certain sense, opposes it.<sup>102</sup> This conflict will be discussed at the end of this chapter.

Here, however, we are investigating and reviewing, in particular, human nature and its faculties. Human nature, which is inhered in person, is equipped with faculty that enables man to become a person; to exist and act as a person.<sup>103</sup> We shall discover here the will as one of the faculties of the person. Before that, we need to look at a number of views that narrow the understanding and role of the will. Hume opposed the traditional view that the will is a faculty whose activities are directed by principles derived from reason. For him, volition is only one of the impressions, a very immediate impression of the mind and not an efficient faculty. So it is an absurdity to speak that the will has the ability to act because it is only an impression of the mind and the content of internal experience. Kant and Scheler have also removed the dynamic character of the will and its autonomous ability to produce action. In the system of Kant, the will solely implements the moral law that comes from reason, and according to Scheler, the will only realizes the value felt by the intentional feelings. Other thinkers also reduced the will, such as Spencer, who understood the will as associations of images, or Münsterberg, who reduced the will to sensations of muscular tension, and Wundt, who defined it as feelings.<sup>104</sup>

Wojtyła totally disagrees with the idea of reducing the role of the will in human activity. He countered this by referring to the views of psychologists from the school of volitional psychology, who use an experiential approach to will, and St. Thomas Aquinas, who uses a metaphysical approach. Narziss Ach distinguishes the element of will from other psychic elements by showing what he calls the actual moment or simple act of will, which usually takes the form of “I do in fact will.” In this lived experience, there is a subjective self along with an object or goal for which the self wants that goal in appropriate action. Through research into this fact, Ach emphasizes the causal role of the will that expresses the personal self. In addition, A. Michotte and N. Prüm paid attention to the motivation problem in study and research. They not only consider the simple act of will but are concerned with the whole process of the action of the will, from the stimulus and appearance of the motive to decision-making. There are also representatives of psychologists from Poland, such as Mieczysław Dybowski and Edward Abramowski. Dybowski studies and researches performance as a factor that brings about the

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 84.

<sup>104</sup> Johannes Lindworsky, *Der Wille: Seine Erscheinung und seine Beherrschung* (Leipzig: Barth, 1923), 1–4; see also Karol Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Will in the Analysis of the Ethical Act,” in *Person and Community Selected Essays*, trans. Theresa Sandok, OSM (New York: Peter Lang, 1993): 5.



completion of the will process that has been initiated from the lived experience of wanting. Meanwhile Abramowski observes and studies the problem of controlling emotions which he understood as an expression of the power of will.<sup>105</sup>

In the classical approach, St. Thomas Aquinas has provided objective insight into the will through his objective analysis of human reality, especially the human soul. According to him, the human soul operates not by itself but through its faculties. There are two faculties of the spiritual substance of the soul, namely will and reason. These faculties of the soul are subordinated in man to the whole *compositum humanum*.<sup>106</sup> He explained that the activity of the will has two basic sources of actualization, which he calls *motio quoad exercitium* and *motio quoad specificationem*.<sup>107</sup> Regarding the first, he explained that volitional activities originate from the will itself or constitute a natural movement of the will. Will is basically an *appetitus* that has a tendency towards something that is good. Therefore the will does not need external impulses so that it operates. Ultimately only the act of the Creator who has endowed the will with such an essence can encourage the will. For the second basic source, he explains that the will is not only *appetitus* but *appetitus rationale*. The will is *appetitus rationale* because the rational desires constitute its essence. The rationality of the desire of the will is adjusted or coordinated with the mind because the mind makes judgments about the object of desire. Since the appropriate objects for a reason are beings and truth, its task, in cooperation with the will, is to objectify the truth of good for the will and direct the will's inclination to the true good, which stands among all other goods. The will in itself already has an *appetitus* to the object, and by cooperating with reason, the will gains enlightenment about the good that ought to be the object of its desire.

Wojtyła agrees with the concept of will as a faculty of St. Thomas, which is confirmed by the findings of psychologists from the school of psychology of will who have proven the existence of will through experimental research. According to Wojtyła the concept of the will of St. Thomas and a number of psychologists are more likely to emphasize *appetitus* or intentionality towards external objects or goals. Wojtyła completes it with the objectification of the person himself as a consequence of the action or the actualization of the will. To achieve a

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<sup>105</sup> See Wojtyła, "The Problem of the Will," 5–8; Wojtyła, *Considerations on the Essence*, 101; Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures* 53–54. There are a number of other names for psychologists, but, here, I will mention only four names and their views on will which are studied from lived experience. These four psychologists have been able to represent their other colleagues who also pay serious attention to the existence and role of the will in human activity which shows that the will is a psychic element that is different from other elements.

<sup>106</sup> Wojtyła, "The Problem of the Will," 14.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 14–15. Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures*, 118–119.

strong understanding and interpretation of the will, Wojtyła argues that “indeed, it is impossible to understand and interpret the will except within the personal structure.”<sup>108</sup> Through the act of self-determination, the personal structure is shown where the person governs himself with the power of will. In the moment of efficacy, where “I” realize that “I” am subject and agent of an action, what reveals my transcendence as a person, there is no separation between person and nature. This moment indicates the faculty that constitutes being and acting of man at the level of person.<sup>109</sup> At this moment, the person as subject acts based on his nature or humanness, which possesses the faculty. This faculty can be said as power or potency, called will. It is not only a property of the person but is an essential aspect and power that strives towards an end.<sup>110</sup>

Conscious action and what happens in man are the actual dynamism that comes from the potency of man-subject.<sup>111</sup> Regarding the analysis of the dynamism of conscious action, it is found that the faculty which is appropriate for causing it is the will. Will is the potency to cause this state of actual dynamism. It is embedded in human nature or humanness as a potency or faculty. Thus, the will is not only as the property but also as the faculty or power of person that causes the dynamism of action.

In the context of action, will as faculty and essential aspect of person with the objectiveness of self-determination and volition correlates with cognition and consciousness. Cognition performs an objectifying function to guide the will because “nothing may be the object of the will unless it is known.”<sup>112</sup> However, according to Wojtyła, “the reference to truth” is the inner principle of the will to choose and decide.<sup>113</sup> In this way, the response of will to the motive, that is, to value, presupposes a reference to truth. There is, here, accordance between inner principle of will and objectifying function of cognition. Meanwhile, consciousness carries out the subjectifying function. Through consciousness, a person reflects and experiences either inward or outward objects that are known, due to cognition. So, strictly speaking, this elucidation unveils that action shows the integral dynamism of will, where cognition and consciousness accompany will to create the action.

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<sup>108</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 107.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., 85.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., 122.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., 86.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., 114.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 137.

### 3.3.2. The Cause of Self-Determination and Transcendence

In the previous section, I mentioned that will is the faculty or power of the person. As a faculty, the will has a rational desire (*appetitus rationale*) which has an intentional character to objects or values outside of itself but is also able to objectify itself from its own person. The action of the will in the concrete moment “I will” which includes “I may but I need not” reveals one’s personal structure of self-determination.<sup>114</sup> For Wojtyła, the problem with self-determination lies at the heart of his study of the acting person.<sup>115</sup>

The act of self-determination contains the moment of freedom identifiable with the experience of “I may but I need not.” Here self-determination is another name of freedom to choose and decide or identifiable with “deliberate choice and decision.”<sup>116</sup> Analysis of self-determination leads us toward the will as “person’s power of self-determination.”<sup>117</sup> Through the will one can choose and decide action towards value-end. It means that an act of will contains self-determination and intentionality to an object. So, self-determination—in the sense of choosing and deciding—could be executed only by means of a will. Hence, the will is the power of person that causes an act of self-determination.

Self-determination shows the essential structure of person, namely self-possession and self-governance. Self-possession is the ground for self-determination. “I will” is an act of self-determination that presupposes a structure of self-possession.<sup>118</sup> In any particular action “I will” of self-determination must be correlated with the structure of self-possession. As such, self-determination reveals the objectiveness of a person as consciously acting I; simultaneously, it shows I as referential object.

Furthermore, the self-determination of person makes self-governance possible. Meanwhile, self-governance is only possible on account of a structure of self-possession. By self-determination, one governs and constitutes himself. Wojtyła states that “the person is, on the one hand, the one who governs himself and, on the other, the one who is governed.”<sup>119</sup> Here, the person as the subject governs himself, as well as he is the governed object.<sup>120</sup> In self-determination, self-governance occurs because of the will of person. Will is the power which

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<sup>114</sup> See Wojtyła, “The Personal Structure,” 190; Wojtyła, “Participation or Alienation?” 199.

<sup>115</sup> Wojtyła, “The Personal Structure,” 188.

<sup>116</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 123.

<sup>117</sup> Wojtyła, “The Personal Structure,” 190.

<sup>118</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 106.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., 108.

guarantees all of this process takes place in person. Wojtyła claims: “in self-determination the will is present first of all as essential of the person and only then as a power.”<sup>121</sup>

From the explanation of the structure of self-determination (self-governance and self-possession) above, it is revealed that that is the structure of person and not something else. It means “self-determination is the property of person,” which “is realized through the will.”<sup>122</sup> Here, Wojtyła insisted, self-determination is not limited only to the property of the will, but it is the property of the person. Wojtyła states: “it is the person’s freedom, and not just the will’s freedom, although it is undeniably the person’s freedom through the will.”<sup>123</sup> It seems, Wojtyła follows St. Thomas’s notion of the distinction between substance and accident and between soul and its power. Self-determination is not limited only to the will, which is the accident, but also it belongs to the person who is a substance.<sup>124</sup> It means the person is the ultimate cause of action by means of the faculty of will.

Moreover, we see the relation between self-determination and transcendence, both of which are based on free will as a power of person. The term transcendence in philosophy has many meanings. In metaphysics, it refers to being which transcends categories and forms the foundation for them. It also refers to property or transcendental values that exist in being, including the truth, the good and the beauty.<sup>125</sup> In epistemology, transcendence means going beyond the subject and reaching out to the objectivable realm where the actions come out of the cognizing subject.<sup>126</sup> Here, transcendence is explained in terms of the act of self-determination of the person in action. Transcendence (Lat. *trans-scendere*) etymologically means to go beyond the limit or threshold. A subject goes beyond its boundaries to an external object. What Wojtyła emphasizes in the context of the action of the person is transcendence which is both a fruit of self-determination and, at the same time, a property of the proper dynamism of the person. There are two forms of transcendence, namely horizontal and vertical transcendence. What is meant by horizontal transcendence is when there is an intentionality of the will to be directed towards an object or value. This is the transcendence that is more focused on paying attention to traditional philosophy in analyzing the will. In addition, by exercising freedom through the will to choose and decide, and not just intentionality towards objects, a person fulfills his actions as actual

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 107.

<sup>122</sup> Wojtyła, “The Personal Structure,” 190.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> See Andrzej Maryniarczyk SDB, *Rationality and Finality of the World of Persons and Things Notebook on Metaphysics*, vol.4, trans. Hugh McDonal (Lublin: PTTA, 2016), 139–141.

<sup>126</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 179; Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 232–233.

fulfillment and also determines or fulfills himself: “I am not only the efficient cause of my acts, but through them I am also in some sense the ‘creator myself.’”<sup>127</sup> This is the main thing, according to Wojtyła, in the context of action, which he calls vertical transcendence, and not merely volitional intentionality or perception of external objects or horizontal transcendence. The transcendence of the person in action, whether horizontal or vertical, occurs because of the execution of the act of self-determination by the will. Thus the action of the will as a faculty of the person is not only limited to intentionality towards the object, but there is activity and effort that is seen through the act of choosing and deciding on the external value-end and also the value of the personal self. The act of self-determination by the will not only displays the reality of personal self-efficacy but also explains the reality of making oneself good or bad through action. That is the personalistic value of action, where the person as the subject becomes good or evil is determined by his actions.

Transcendence as the fruit of self-determination by the will, where the person transcends his structural limitations in the process of acting, cannot be separated from self-fulfillment as an autoteleology of action. The act of self-determination shows not only the structure of self-possession and self-government but also a tendency towards self-fulfillment. Self-fulfillment is achieved when there is fulfillment (Pl. *pełnia*) of the action which is equivalent to performing an action (Pl. *spełniać czyn*). Wojtyła also emphasizes the important role of the human mind and of conscience so that the transcendence of the person is realized in the fulfillment of actions that have an impact on the fulfillment of the person’s self. The human mind supports the will and its activities by transmitting knowledge or cognitions about truth. The given knowledge or cognition is a condition for the will to choose and decide. Wojtyła claims:

Knowledge appears there as condition not only enabling but also influencing choice, decision making, and more generally the exercise (and mechanism) of self-determination; it is the one condition of person’s transcendence in the action. We have already seen how this transcendence springs from the relation to truth.[...]. We see thus how cognition plays the role of one of the conditions of will.<sup>128</sup>

It means that choices and decisions always require judgment of the value of objects that have been known thanks to the human mind’s abilities. Thus the transcendence of the will towards its

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<sup>127</sup> Wojtyła, “The Personal Structure,” 191.

<sup>128</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 140–141.

object in action is conditioned by the cognitive transcendence of the human mind towards known objects.<sup>129</sup>

Furthermore, the first principle of conscience is “do good and avoid evil.” In conscience, the truth is presented as a source of moral obligation so that the act of self-determination, which means not only being free to desire but free to choose and decide, is directed towards the truth of good.<sup>130</sup> The basic direction of transcendence appears in the compatibility of action with the principle of conscience where a person through his conscience goes beyond himself to the true good. A person fulfills himself as a good person through the fulfillment of his good actions in accordance with the conscience. So self-fulfillment depends not on fulfilling actions but on morally good actions. Therefore, the person as the subject of the action is responsible for his moral actions. The fulfillment of morally good actions results in self-fulfillment or what Wojtyła also calls felicity. Therefore, self-fulfillment through action refers to self-determination and truth, and not vice versa, emphasizing only self-determination without truth. Wojtyła says:

The fulfillment of the person in action depends on the active and inwardly creative union of truth with freedom. Freedom alone, as expressed in the simple “I may but I need not” does not seem to be rendering man happy in itself. Within these terms freedom is but a condition of felicity, albeit to deprive man of his freedom is equivalent to endangering his felicity. Thus felicity has to be identified not with the availability of freedom as such but *with the fulfillment of freedom through truth*.<sup>131</sup>

Thus in Wojtyła’s notion, felicity comes from the self-fulfillment of the person through action where the act of self-determination by the will takes place in accordance with the truth. Or in short, felicity stems from the execution of freedom in truth by the will. Therefore, felicity is not the same as pleasure. Wojtyła agrees with Scheler’s idea that felicity is a “spiritual instance” while pleasure is merely “sensual or material.”<sup>132</sup> And what he means is that felicity refers to the personal structure and is closely related to the transcendence of the person while pleasure is more related to the natural structure of the individual. The formulation of the felicity concept is

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<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 146

<sup>130</sup> Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 233–235; John Paul II, *Veritatis Splendor*, accessed May 27, 2022, [https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf\\_jp-ii\\_enc\\_06081993\\_veritatis-splendor.html](https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor.html). Pope John Paul II says in the *Veritatis splendor* no. 32 that the tendency of modern schools of thought that emphasizes absolute freedom as a source of value so that there is a tendency to give authority to individual consciences the prerogative to determine the criteria for good or evil actions. There are a number of people who have adopted the concept of subjective moral judgment radically. Such a view is quite in line with individualist ethics, where each individual is confronted with his own truth, different from the truth of others. Taken to an extreme, this individualism leads to the rejection of the idea of human nature. Whereas Conscience in its primordial reality as an act of one’s intelligence, whose function is to apply universal knowledge of the good in certain situations and thereby express judgments about the right behavior to choose here and now.

<sup>131</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 175.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., 178.

achieved through an objective (metaphysical) and a subjective approach. Wojtyła completes the objective view represented by Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, and the subjective views of Jeremy Bentham and Max Scheler. In St. Thomas' objective view, happiness is understood in terms of being (rational being) and its perfection or of the good. And objective goodness is inherent in the real perfection of being. As such, objective perfection is the foundation of the happiness of rational being.<sup>133</sup> From Bentham as an empiricist, happiness is closely related to purely subjective goodness. For him, happiness is nothing but the maximum sum of sensual pleasures. Happiness is achieved when there is a maximum lived experience of pleasure that coincides with a minimum lived experience of pain/suffering.<sup>134</sup> While for Scheler, happiness is associated with the experience of emotional life towards value. The depth of happiness that is greater or less depends on the emotional depth shown by the man in his lived experiences towards values.<sup>135</sup>

### **3.3.3. The Transcendence and Spirituality of Man**

The transcendence, which is the fruit of the act of self-determination, expresses the spiritual element of man as a person. Therefore, human spirituality can be known through the analysis of the person's transcendence. The proper dynamism of man as a person refers to the man's faculties, which are will and reason. Regarding the transcendence of the person in action, the element of human spirituality is expressed by the will in cooperation with reason. These faculties, with their actualization, reveal the spiritual dimension of man. The term spirit or spiritual means that which is immaterial and cannot be reduced intrinsically to matter. But this term here, in the first place, is not meant to be the opposite of materiality. However, spirituality is more understood as everything that composes or constitutes transcendence and is also understood in terms of the spiritual basis that unites man as a person with his complexities.

The reference to the person's transcendence and to the spiritual element leads us to the objective view that man is composed of both spiritual and material elements. The human person, as a corporeal and spiritual being, reveals unity as well as complexity.

In his analysis of the transcendence of the human person, Wojtyła seems to take into account the Thomistic concept of man as a being composed of body and soul, where the human soul is metaphysically treated as the form and act of the body. In this view, the soul is an

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<sup>133</sup> Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures*, 613–614.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, 615.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, 618.

incomplete substance, and its union with the body forms man as a complete substance.<sup>136</sup> The soul is the principle of life as well as the principle of existence and transcendence that causes unity. As such, the spiritual soul underlies the unity and life of a concrete person or “embodied” somebody. The soul is said to be spiritual due to its activity, which is internally free from materiality, capable of acts of cognition and free and purposeful acts of the human will. That means the spiritual soul is rational because it has the main powers of rationality, namely reason and will.<sup>137</sup> Referring to the constitutive spiritual factor of human nature makes it possible to demonstrate that human nature and its rationality are not the results of the process of sublimation of the human organism’s matter. As “distinct,” the soul co-exists and cooperates with the elements of organism of the human body. Such spiritual soul, we do not experience directly but through the actualization of its faculties, in terms of Wojtyła especially through the will as the cause of the transcendence of the person in action. He said the following:

It is to metaphysical analysis that we owe the knowledge of the human soul as the principle underlying the unity of the being and the life of a concrete person. We infer the existence of the soul and its spiritual nature from effects that demand a sufficient reason, that is to say, a commensurate cause. In this perspective it is evident that there can be no such thing as a direct experience of the soul. Man has only the experience of the effects which he seeks to relate with an adequate cause in his being.<sup>138</sup>

A crucial contribution of Wojtyła, supplementing the Thomistic view of the human soul, is the emphasis on the role of inner experience in discovering and learning about human spirituality. The inner experience confirms the comprehension of the spiritual soul, which is an ontic condition of the human person’s transcendence in action. As was mentioned previously, the personal transcendence is revealed in the consciousness, self-determination, comprehension of truth, and conscience as a normative principle, as well as in the feeling of moral obligation and responsibility. All the conditions of human action mentioned above indicate its spiritual nature. So no one has direct contact with the spiritual soul or knows it directly or relates to it

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<sup>136</sup> Wojtyła, *Considerations on the Essence*, 139; see also Andrzej Maryniarczyk SDB, *The Realistic Interpretation of Reality Notebooks on Metaphysics*, vol.3, trans. Hugh McDonald (Lublin: PTTA, 2015), 113–127; Maryniarczyk, *The Pluralistic Interpretation*, 42–44.

<sup>137</sup> Intellect and will which are faculties of the soul cannot be measured quantitatively because they do not have extension in space and spatially integrated parts like material being. Spiritual being in its physical structure is simple and has no expansion and it is not composed of parts. This trait reveals the immortality of the soul. After death the body undergoes destruction and decomposition. The soul remains immortal because of its spirituality. Indeed, the immortality of the soul is the truth of faith contained in Divine Revelation. However, this is not solely a matter of faith because the immortality of the soul is a religious truth that can be achieved also by the efforts of reason. So indeed human being can reach the truth more adequately based on the basis of the truth of divine revelation. Plato also briefly explained the truth of this immortality outside of revelation and gave rational arguments for this truth. Wojtyła, *Considerations on the Essence*, 133–135.

<sup>138</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 186.



with the sensory experience. According to Wojtyła, we can achieve and accept the existence of the soul only because of the path of metaphysical reflection on the analysis of the human lived experience of transcendence and the integration of the person in action.<sup>139</sup>

### 3.3.4. Self-Determination and Person's Subjectivity

In the notion of metaphysical subjectivity, there is an understanding of the relation between the existence of human being and his action. Existence is the first act of man (or the main factor of being in a general sense), and it is the first and fundamental factor of the realization of human dynamism.<sup>140</sup> The existence of human action depends on and flows from the existence of man. Their relation expresses existential causality. It is revealed in the Latin adage *operari sequitur esse*. If *operari* is specifically conceived as conscious action, then its existence only flows from the existence of the person. More precisely, it could be said action is the result of person's self-determination. For this reason, action is the basis for the disclosure and understanding of the person. Wojtyła states:

In its basic conception, the whole of *The Acting Person* is grounded on the premise that *operari sequitur esse*: the act of personal existence has its direct consequences in the activity of the person (i.e., in action). And so action, in turn, is the basis for disclosing and understanding the person. [...] I question only—as I did in my “conclusion remarks” to the discussion—the legitimacy of his interpretation of *The Acting Person*.<sup>141</sup>

Thus, there is no better place to understand person, than through conscious action. Conscious action is an appropriate field to know the person as the efficient cause. Man reveals himself as a person primarily in and through action.<sup>142</sup>

Furthermore, action emerges in the moment of efficacy or the moment where the person becomes the efficient cause. The moment of efficacy is based on self-determination. It only takes place if the person determines or governs himself through the power of will. So, in the moment of efficacy, the person becomes the subject and agent who perform the action. Therefore, in the act of self-determination, we discover subjectivity which is proper to man as a person. Through self-determination, the person appears as an agent who governs himself to act toward fulfillment of oneself through achieving value. That means, because of self-determination person is free to choose, to decide and to perform an action as an agent. So, Wojtyła shows that self-

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<sup>139</sup> Ibid., 257–258; Wojtyła, *Considerations on the Essence*, 121; Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła*, 166.

<sup>140</sup> See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 73.

<sup>141</sup> Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 260, fn. 6.

<sup>142</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 224.

determination reveals the person as a subject and agent of action as well as simultaneously subjectivity of person.

Wojtyła further emphasizes that the act that arises from the actualization of self-determination by the will becomes a suitable venue to gain knowledge about the person because the person indeed appears in the action. Wojtyła said, “when I act, I am wholly engaged in my acting, in that dynamization of the ego to which my own efficacy has contributed.”<sup>143</sup> However, the “I” that appears in action is not only limited to the explanation of self-determination that causes transcendence in action but is also complemented by the explanation of integration.

### 3.3.5. The Cause of Integration

Through his analysis of action, Wojtyła shows that to have an adequate insight into the wholeness of man, we have to embrace two significant moments in the relation of person and action, that is, integration and co-acting (participation). Due to the importance of these moments for understanding the subjectivity of the human person, more space should be devoted to them, first addressing considerations of the problem of integration and, in a separate section, the issue of co-action with others.

Etymologically the term integration (Pl. *integracja*) comes from the Latin adjective *integer*, which means whole or complete. In Polish, there are words that are compatible with integration, namely *scalanie* (unifying) and *scalenie* (unification). *Scalanie* indicates the process of forming the whole from the parts, while, *scalenie* indicates the result or effect of the formation process. So integration refers to the whole of something, and to integrate means to put the parts together to make a whole. The definition refers to the existence of processes and results. The etymological meaning of the word integration is still maintained and used in science and philosophy. However, in Wojtyła’s discussion, the term integration is not primarily meant to be limited to the unification into a whole of previously unconnected parts but refers to the realization or manifestation of a whole and unity on the basis of some complexity.<sup>144</sup> This meaning is intended in the discussion of the integration of the person in action.

As far as integration is concerned, the action makes various aspects of human being take place in it. The wholeness of man is engaged and exhibited in the integration of person in action. The concept of integration shows that every action contains a synthesis of efficacy and subjectiveness of self/I. Efficacy may be viewed as the domain of manifestation of

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<sup>143</sup> Ibid., 192.

<sup>144</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 191; Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 297–298; Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła*, 157.

transcendence and subjectiveness as the domain of manifestation of integration.<sup>145</sup> The moment of integration in man takes place in the realm of person and action in correlation to “person’s intrinsic structure of self-governance and self-possession.”<sup>146</sup> Through self-governance, a person appears as a governing subject as well as a governed object, in and through his own action. Here, self-governance presents an active moment (a governing subject) and a passive moment (a governed object) as a requirement of integration. Thus, integration occurs through the action of a person who leads to himself as an object. Here, “I” as subject and object cannot be separated from action, and action as such is not a simple sum of dynamism, but the effect of self-governance.<sup>147</sup> Buttiglione states that “Through the integration of person in action, the passive side of person is submitted to the active side.”<sup>148</sup> This integration occurs thanks to self-governance, where the person transcends himself beyond his boundaries, which is nothing but an act of will in cooperation with reason, and this act of will is an act of the person.

Furthermore, the integration takes place in the psychical and somatic realm. Psyche and soma in empirical sciences are understood as what happens in man.<sup>149</sup> Similarly, these properties of the human being are recognized in the light of phenomenological analyses. In this context of understanding of human nature as what happens in man, the integration conflict between nature and person has been mentioned in the previous section. Consequently, this leads to an inadequate meaning of man as the implications of empirical data without any connection with personhood.<sup>150</sup> Hence, integration of these two aspects (soma-psyche) can only be understood in relation to person and action to get a complete understanding of man. In the integration, the actualization of the whole human being through person and action enters into the psychosomatic realm.<sup>151</sup> Strictly speaking, integration here means “a complex unity,” in which “a person subordinates to his self-governance both the sphere of his psyche and the sphere of his somatic.”<sup>152</sup> Through self-governance person integrates psychosomatic aspects into action or through it transcends what happens in man in these two aspects. In this way, through person and action, the moments of transcendence and integration converge. Thus, according to Wojtyła, the moment of psychosomatic integration complements the transcendence of the person in action due to the act of self-governance. Nevertheless, we have to stress here that “without integration,

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<sup>145</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 191; see also Duma, “Personalism,” 379–380.

<sup>146</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 193.

<sup>147</sup> See Duma, “Personalism,” 379.

<sup>148</sup> Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła*, 157.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, 158.

<sup>150</sup> Cf., *Ibid.*

<sup>151</sup> See Duma, “Personalism,” 380.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, 379.

[...] without support in concrete existence,”<sup>153</sup> “[...] without integration transcendence remains, as it were, suspended in a kind of structural void,”<sup>154</sup> as it was mentioned in previous chapter. Thus, in the context of analysis of the dynamism of man, Wojtyła argues that the fact “I act, I am wholly engaged in my acting” cannot be explained by the transcendence of the person in action alone but also require integration of the person in action.<sup>155</sup>

First, it is worth to make a few remarks about the integration of person in action in the sphere of the somatic aspect. As explained in chapter two, the term somatic refers to the inwardness or dynamic aspect of the organism that determines the vitality and the systems and functions of the whole organism, as well as to the outward aspect of the body or the shape and coordination of the body’s parts for mobility. Both of these somatic aspects serve the integration of the person in action. In the moment of integration, the person exteriorizes himself in action through the aspect of the soma. So it can be said that through the integration of the person in action, the soma of the human being is a field for expressing himself. In this integration, the soma can express the personal structure of self-governance and self-possession only because of the power of the will to exercise choices and decisions that are subordinated to the truth. Here, the subjectivity of the body enters into personal subjectivity due to the act of self-governance.<sup>156</sup> On the other hand, if there is no involvement of the will that causes the transcendence of the person in action, then the dynamism of the human body does not proceed from self-determination, so what happens is only activation or subjectivity of the body. In other words, without correlation with person and action, reactivity and dynamism are still what happens in man inasmuch the efficacy of the person does not enter into it. Wojtyła says as follows:

As we have indicated, the dynamism of the human body as such does not depend on the self-determination of the person. It is instinctive and spontaneous. The body and organism constitutes its dynamic source, that is, its effective cause; the will is not its cause, for the dynamism of the body does not proceed from person’s self-determination. This why we do not disclose it directly and immediately in the experience “man acts,” which reveals the efficacy of the person, but it is to be found in the experience “something happens in man,” where efficacy of the person is absent. [...]. The dynamism and the vegetative vitality appropriate to the body happen within the person independently of his self-determination and without any active participation of the will.<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła*, 157.

<sup>154</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 190.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, 192.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, 212.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, 210–211.

However, we must remember that the subjectivity of the body, which is not integrated into the action, does not then make the body an independent subject outside of the man-person. It doesn't change the fact that the body's reactive and vegetated subjectivity, which is activation, remains a subjectivity that occurs in man as a *suppositum*.

Subsequently, regarding the psychic aspect, the understanding of the transcendence of the person in action is strengthened by transcending and integrating the psyche. Psyche is not meant, here, in the metaphysical sense identified with the soul. The dynamism of the psychic is essentially emotive and cannot be reduced to aspects of the body. It can be accurately distinguished from the vegetative process in the organism's body, because psychic activity can be reflected in consciousness. However, the fact is that psyche is conditioned by somatic and thus emotive by reactivity, hence so often we speak of "psychological reactions."<sup>158</sup> Emotivity is similar to reactivity or the ability to react, which is strictly connected with the stimulus function, but emotivity is more like an "ability to feel." Due to feelings which are related to consciousness, one experiences one's own body, the existence of one's true self and being in the world. In terms of physical subjectivity, it emerges together with feeling based on the body, and it is included in consciousness.<sup>159</sup> Moreover, emotive dynamism also has a strict relation with personal dynamism; however, both do not lose their specificity.

Emotions are the main aspects of the manifestation of psychic dynamism, such as desire, excitement and stressing emotion. The highest expression of psyche is the sensitivity of value. Emotions are very sensitive even to spiritual values, namely truth, goodness and beauty.<sup>160</sup> Emotions allow a person to feel value spontaneously and intuitively. However, someone who feels value in subjective authenticity needs to be integrated into "truthfulness of value," due to personal self-realization requiring the agreement of subjective and objective elements of the value experience. Wojtyła states, "the fusion of sensitivity with truthfulness is the necessary condition of the experience of values. It is only on the basis of such an experience that authentic choices and decisions can be formed."<sup>161</sup> The objective truth, which is the result of judgment of one's reason, is a concern for personal value experiences. It can be said that emotions with the character of spontaneous sensitivity supply like a special raw material of value to the will, where in the choice and decision, the will always refers to the response of the reason. Thus, personal self-realization does not fall into subjective feelings of value. The objective value that has been

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<sup>158</sup> Ibid., 225; see also Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła*, 161–162.

<sup>159</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 228.

<sup>160</sup> Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła*, 162

<sup>161</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 233.

illuminated by the reason plays a crucial role in the realization of the personal self. In this case, it is the certainty to do what is objectively right, and that means going against all subjective feelings and even sacrificing them. Wojtyła, here, wants to show the weakness of Scheler's value theory, where he prioritizes the role of emotions over values, while aspects of reason and will are secondary and only follow emotions.

Integration of a person in action on the basis of psychological aspects is accomplished when sensuality and emotionality are subjected to the self-governance of the person. It means that through the actualization of volitional action, which demonstrates the transcendence of the person, the psychic aspect is incorporated into the integration of a person in action. Without this transcendence, the psychic aspect with its emotions is just what happens in man. Moreover, the integration of the person in action on the basis of an appropriate emotion for human psyche is achieved through a skill, namely a virtue which contains an essential element of moral values and a reference to norms.

Hence, the complexities of the psychosomatic aspects of human beings can integrate into the action of a person only when they yield to the will. If they do not surrender to follow the direction and control of the will, then integration as a complement to transcendence will not occur. Without subordination to the will, they merely fulfill their proper dynamism in the realm of "something happens in man."

### **3.3.6. The Principles of Participation in the Community**

In this section, we will explore the connection between the subjectivity of person and the structure of the human community in which many of I exist and act together to promote self-fulfillment as human persons. From traditional anthropology, we know that man possesses rational and simultaneously social nature. However, how to construe in what way social nature encompasses inter-personal or social life? First and foremost, we aim to examine the main element in the community, which is participation. In Wojtyła's conception, it is a theory of community life. It concerns philosophical foundations that justify the existence of the human community in the deepest sense, as well as the specificity of the most basic dimensions of community life.

In a colloquial sense, participation means more or less "taking part," for instance taking part in a meeting, mass, course, etc. Wojtyła stated as follows:

This concept has a certain colloquial sense, which is the most broadly known and used. It also has a philosophical sense.[...] We state the fact in a most

general and in a sense statistical way, without reaching the foundations of this taking part. *The philosophical sense of “participation,” however, requires us to seek these foundations.* In this meaning, the term participation, as corresponding to the Latin *participatio*, has a long and rich history in the language of both philosophy and theology. Of course, in the present study we follow the philosophical sense of the term and concept participation, for we are concerned not only with externally stating the fact—the partaking of a concrete man in some action “together with others”—but also with reaching the foundation of this partaking.<sup>162</sup>

Participation is a form of social life that is formed due to the transcendence and integration of the person in action. Here, the will is included as the cause of the transcendence of the person in action. Transcendence and integration can only take place thanks to the faculty of will. Only because of the faculty of will, person can command himself to act towards others or values. Without the transcendence and integration, which are the fundamental characteristics of the acting person, thanks to the faculty of will, a person cannot act in relation to others. It means that participation is expressed only through self-determination, in which the person chooses and decides on the action towards the value, chosen and fulfilled also by the other person. The Polish philosopher notes:

Acting “together with others” thus corresponds to the person’s transcendence and integration in the action, when man chooses what is chosen by the others or even because it is chosen by others—he then identifies the object of his choice with the value that he see as in one way or another homogeneous and his own. This is connected with self-determination, for self-determination in the case of acting “together with others” contains and expresses participation.<sup>163</sup>

Wojtyła conceived participation in two ways. First, participation is “a property of the person.” As property, participation expresses itself in the ability of man to give existence and activity a personal dimension when existing and acting together with others. Second, participation is a positive relationship to “the humanity of others.”<sup>164</sup> The humanity of others here is not intended as an abstract idea of man but as a personal self that is unique and irreplaceable. In this way, participation means connecting with others as particular and concrete human beings and not just being related to humanity in general or what makes others human.<sup>165</sup> It appears that the basis of participation “is not people’s essence as a member of human species but their personal subjectivity.”<sup>166</sup>

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<sup>162</sup>Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 385

<sup>163</sup>Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 270.

<sup>164</sup>Wojtyła. “The Person: Subject and Community,” 237.

<sup>165</sup>Ibid.

<sup>166</sup>Ibid., 238.

Existence and acting together with other people are not enough to be called a community. It can be called a community if coexistence and cooperation contain the fundamental character of the transcendence of the person who shows personal subjectivity. It means that community cannot be understood only in terms of the multiplicity of subjects but as a specific unity of multiplicity, where there must be a special value of community identified with *common good*.<sup>167</sup> As far as the *common good* is concerned, the issue of self-determination is also debated, whether it is determined by the person or by the community. One can formulate the issue differently, namely in the form of the question about the relationship between the community and the auto-teleology of the human person which is related to self-fulfillment, whether self-fulfillment by the auto-teleology of the person itself is replaced by the teleology of the community. Solving this problem, Wojtyła explains two dimensions of community, namely the interpersonal dimension of the community or *I-thou* (I-other) relationship and the social dimension of community or *We*. Community based on participation is contained in these two relations. First, the *I-thou* relationship has an essential structure, namely a relation to another, where I refer to thou as an object and, vice versa, in the same way.<sup>168</sup> Participation occurs or is expressed in this relationship when there is a reciprocal relationship where the full experience of interpersonal relations occurs. However, if only my unilateral relation to thou takes place, for Wojtyła the real experience of interpersonal relations will still be present because the experience of *I-thou* relationship, even without reciprocity, still shows participation in the humanity of others. *I-thou* interpersonal relationships are elementary forms that are appropriate for all forms of *I-thou* relationships, such as *I-thou* relationship of a married couple, *I-thou* relationship of mother and child and so on. In addition, I and thou are not only existing subjects but also acting subjects. I experience a relation to thou in the activity where thou is the object, and vice versa. It appears that in my objective relation to thou not only objectivity is experienced but also my own subjectivity. Wojtyła calls it, “the objectivity (action and interaction) serve to confirm the agent’s own subjectivity,” so that in this relationship an “authentic subjective community.”

In *I-thou* interpersonal relations, the ethical meaning of community is expressed. It means, through this relationship, I and thou must present themselves to each other and reveal the deepest structure of self-possession and self-governance that culminates in efforts to achieve

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<sup>167</sup> Ibid., 239–240.

<sup>168</sup> Wojtyła in his writing entitled *The Person: Subject and Community* explains that the *I-thou* relationship which shows participation in the community is only limited to the analysis of the area of inter-human relations. Thus, his analysis of the *I-thou* relationship does not enter the area of the relationship I as human and God as unconditional Thou for human I. However, for him this relationship is very important because God’s relationship as unconditional Thou for human I is the basis of personal mode of existence of human being. See Ibid., 261, fn.17.



self-fulfillment through acts of conscience and transcendence. The ethical meaning of this community is shown by acceptance and affirmation of personal subjectivity between them and their responsibility to one another. Because self-fulfillment in this relationship is formed due to the role of conscience and transcendence, “I” am responsible for myself as well as others “I.” Wojtyła states:

In this way, within the context of I-thou relationship, by the very nature of interpersonal community, the person also become mutually responsible for one another. Such responsibility is a reflection of conscience and of the transcendence that for both the I and thou constitutes the path to self-fulfillment and, at the same time, characterizes the proper, authentically personal dimension of community.<sup>169</sup>

Thus, the reality of the relationship presents the authentic personal character or dimension of the community so that this relationship deserves to be called “*communio personarum*.”<sup>170</sup>

In the *communio personarum*, the *common good* becomes the basis for living together.<sup>171</sup> Every person is by nature subordinated to the realization of the *common good* because it is a guarantor not only of the bond that determines the community but also of the development of the personal good of every one of the members of this community. The bond that connects a community based on the *common good* and oriented towards the personal good is love. According to Wojtyła, love consists in “firstly to notice a person and what is good for him, and secondly transcend one’s own egoism and direct oneself toward another man.”<sup>172</sup>

The second dimension of the community concerns the relationship in the form of *we* or the social aspect of the community. The social dimension of community which is indicated by the pronoun *we* refers to many subjects or many human beings or many selves and the unique subjectivity of the multiplicity of subjects. In the relation of many human I, it is the *common good* which determines the actions of the subjects.<sup>173</sup> Thanks to the *common good*, I and thou discovered their mutual relationship and established a new union between them, for example, in the case of a married couple. Thus, the *common good* also becomes the objective basis for living together.<sup>174</sup> As an objective basis for living together, the *common good* is also based in relation to the truth of the good. *Common good* also corresponds to personal subjectivity, where the transcendence of human *we*, which is nothing but the structure of human I, does not contradict

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<sup>169</sup> Ibid., 246.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., 245–246.

<sup>171</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 280; Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła*, 170.

<sup>172</sup> Duma, “Personalism,” 381.

<sup>173</sup> Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 247.

<sup>174</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 280–283.

but corresponds to the *common good*. This means that my relationship to the *common good* actualizes my transcendence as a person. As such, the *common good* corresponds to the social community proper to human *we* and personal transcendence proper to human “I.” Therefore, for Wojtyła, “through the common good, the human I more fully and more profoundly discover itself precisely in a human *we*.”<sup>175</sup> But we still need to keep in mind that the *common good* and social community as a *we* are understood in an analogous way from proportionality so that the *common good* of a family is something different from the *common good* of a nation or social group. Here, every human I or person recognizes and accepts the *common good* as belonging and always tries to realize it in the reality of the social community. It appears that in this social community, the personal subjectivity of human “I” is not crushed or eliminated in the multi subjectivity of human *we*. It can be said that the personal subjectivity of human “I” develops in multi-subjectivity and maintains our social community as a *communio personarum*. Of course, creating this kind of community requires the genuine commitment of the will of individual members, hence Wojtyła emphasizes that “the social community of the *we* is given to us not only as a fact but also always a task. All of this, in turn, confirms that the subject as a person has a distinctive priority in relation to community.”<sup>176</sup>

From these descriptions, it can be understood the connection between the subjectivity of the person and the structure of the human community through participation. Community is based on the participation of the person through the transcendence of action thanks to the faculty of will and corresponds to the truth of good which is the common good. The concept of community as clearly departs from individualism and totalism. *Communio personarum* which is based on participation and the objective common good is above all a special way to practice love. Love is an adequate response to the value of the person.<sup>177</sup> In front of the person as a good, only love as an appropriate response that forms adequate attitudes. In the community other human beings are seen as another I and as neighbors who attract one for a special response that is love. Wojtyła states: “the person is a kind of good to which only love constitutes the proper and fully-mature

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<sup>175</sup> Wojtyła. “The Person: Subject and Community,” 250.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid., 252.

<sup>177</sup> See Jarosław Merecki, “Some Remarks On The Philosophy Of Love In Dietrich Von Hildebrand And Karol Wojtyła,” *Roczniki Filozoficzne Tom LX*, no.3 (2012): 6; Duma, “Personalism,” 381. Wojtyła (as Pope John Paul II) continue to insist the significance of love in his encyclical letter *Redemptor Hominis*: “Man cannot live without love. He remains a being that is incomprehensible for himself, his life is senseless, if love is not revealed to him, if he does not encounter love, if he does not experience it and make it his own, if he does not participate intimately in it.” See John Paul II, *Redemptor Hominis*, 10, accessed on September 14, 2021, [https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf\\_jp-ii\\_enc\\_04031979\\_redemptor-hominis.html](https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_04031979_redemptor-hominis.html).

relation.”<sup>178</sup> In this way, Wojtyła could claim that Christian love of neighbor is nothing else than an expression of natural participation in the community.

In his consideration on community, one more important element should be noted, namely, the alienation which can take place not only in totalitarian systems or in individualism. In terms of Wojtyła, it happens if we live and act with other people without genuine participation. Thus, alienation is the antithesis of participation, where everyone cannot fulfill themselves in the community both in interpersonal and social relations. For this reason, alienation means depriving the human person of what is most proper and due to him. Alienation causes others to remain as other, stranger and even an enemy. And more than that, in alienation, there is a distortion and disappearance of the “lived experience of humanity.” Therefore, the prevention of alienation should be one of the most important tasks of every community.

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<sup>178</sup> Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 25; Merecki, “Some Remarks,” 9; Duma, “Personalism,” 381; Acosta and Reimers, *Karol Wojtyła’s Personalist Philosophy*, 124.

## Chapter Summary

On the ground of all analysis in this chapter, I reiterate that proper human subjectivity, according to Wojtyła, occurs on two levels, which are the level of metaphysics and the level of phenomenology. At the level of metaphysics, man is *suppositum* or subject of his existence and activities. Here, he appears as an objective autonomous being. At the level of phenomenology, the human person “experiences himself as such and therefore he is the subject in the strictly experiential sense [...] he also experiences his action as acts of which he himself is the agent.”<sup>179</sup> Thanks to consciousness and especially its reflexive function, man appears as a subjective autonomous being who has experience of himself as a subject, which makes his being fully subjective.<sup>180</sup> So we can conceive that subjectivity is the ground of actualizing the dynamic relation between person and action.

In traditional Thomistic philosophy, man is *suppositum* and he becomes a person because of his nature. Person is really an individual substance with a rational nature as defined by Boethius. Hence, a person is really the subject of his existence and activities. Besides that, person is also “a conscious I.” He is aware of himself as the subject of his actions and what happens. For Wojtyła, person is not only “individual I” (who is the subject of his existence and activities) and “conscious I” (who is aware and experience himself as subject and all of his activities) but also the moral being in relation to his action.

The studies on the anthropological thought of Wojtyła have confirmed and in a deeper sense shown that subjectivity could be understood only by analyzing the proper dynamism of man as a person. The appropriate dynamism of a person is dynamism of an act. This act comes from the potency of will in correlation with reason, consciousness and conscience to lead to the fulfillment (performance) of the act and the fulfillment of the person himself. So personal dynamism is caused by a primary cause, namely will, which has a dependence on “I” and on the truth of value. The cooperation of the will with the essential elements characterizes the conscious action of the person. Through conscious action, we discover and know a person, with his internal structure, as an efficient cause. We find that the person is the subject of his existence and activity, whether it is conscious action or what happens. It means that through action, we enter into the sphere of the subjectiveness of “conscious I” (in the moment of efficacy) and also into the subjectiveness of *suppositum* (in what happens).

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<sup>179</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 57.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

Wojtyła still emphasizes that conscious action is a product of the will that shows or manifests a person. If the will is an essential aspect and faculty of the person, then, strictly speaking, the person is the ultimate cause of conscious action. Thus the fundamental characteristic of the human person, namely transcendence is explained in light of the action of the will. Through the will, a person can choose and decide (self-determination) about actions which have the impact of self-fulfillment, which Wojtyła calls vertical transcendence. In other words, through the will, the person exercises his freedom in order to accomplish his fulfillment. In this way, transcendence is the fruit of self-determination, whereby one leads oneself towards performance of an act and self-fulfillment.

Thanks to the act of will, in man also takes place the integration, or one could say after Wojtyła, “integration of person in action.” The integration of soma-vegetative and psycho-emotive dynamism can only be understood in relation to the integration of a person in action. Through self-governance person integrates psychosomatic aspects into action. Self-governance allows for the unifying of moments of transcendence and integration. The unification of moments of transcendence and integration, through self-governance, thanks to the faculty of the will, presents an adequate understanding of human being and also an integral human subjectivity.

Investigation of an acting person leads us not only to the problem of subjectivity but also inter-subjectivity. Perfection of personal fulfillment lies in co-acting or participation. Participation is a form of social life that is formed due to the transcendence and integration of the person in action. Without transcendence and integration, which are the fundamental characteristics of an acting person, a person cannot act with others. Inter-subjectivity or community among persons based on participation indicates that the basis for living and acting together is the *common good*.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KAROL WOJTYŁA'S CONCEPTION OF SUBJECTIVITY**

After the presentation of the manifestations and principle or cause of the human person's subjectivity, it is now the place to consider the significance of Karol Wojtyła's view regarding this problem. His personalist concept of subjectivity has a number of consequences or implications in several areas, including the area of anthropology itself, ethics, social life, and culture. A closer look at these consequences and implications will make it possible to discover even more fully the concept of the subjectivity of the human person formulated by him, both its realism based on experience and the universality expressed in rational discourse.

#### **4.1. Consequences for Anthropology**

The concept of man has always been an intriguing issue in scientific discussions in philosophy and other fields of science. There are various interpretations of human being. However, in philosophy, a number of central questions are always asked, such as: "Who is a human being?" "What is the essence of human being?" "What are the main characteristics of a human being so that it is called human being that distinguishes it from other living creatures/being?" These questions are asked to achieve an adequate concept of man; however, finding an adequate answer to such questions is not easy, which confirms the history of reflection on man. Wojtyła's considerations on man, especially in the aspect of subjectivity also were an attempt to achieve an adequate understanding of human person and, at the same time to create an adequate and integral anthropology as a conception of man and to avoid the so-called anthropological mistake which is an erroneous or reductionist view on the human being. The approach to man in the aspect of experience and metaphysical principles makes Wojtyła's anthropology unique compared to other conceptions; therefore, it is worth taking a brief look at the importance of this proposal.

#### 4.1.1. Metaphysical Understanding of the Constitution of Human Person

The person, who is constituted in the realm of metaphysics, is the concrete “I.” He is also a whole or unity which has an ontological basis. Wojtyła admits that man becomes a person because of his nature, and it determines human features that differentiate man from other beings, particularly in the aspect of the action. Human nature has components that characterize the specificity of man as a personal being, among others: rationality, freedom, subjectiveness, emotionality, morality, sexuality, social character, creativity and spirituality.<sup>1</sup>

It has been mentioned in the previous chapter that understanding of integral subjectivity will lead us to an integral understanding of man as a person. There is a primordial subjectivity in the realm of nature and in the realm of the conscious person. In the realm of nature, namely somatic and psyche domains, subjectivity takes place in unity with the ontic being or *suppositum* without personal efficacy. Meanwhile, personal subjectivity contains a transcendence of person in a moment of efficacy that creates an action which then enters into the psychosomatic realm. Through the act of will, psychosomatic subjectivity, with all its complexities, is integrated with the personal subjectivity. The integration confirms that man cannot be reduced to mere biological or spiritual aspects because he is composed of both. Man is an integral unity of all his aspects and complexities. Unity, here, does not mean that man is merely a collection of different and separate aspects or a “bundle of aspects”<sup>2</sup> but rather a unity which has an ontological basis. The understanding of person as the ontological basis of subjectivity invalidates a number of assumptions that Wojtyła was a Cartesian or a dualist. The dynamism of what happens in man and the dynamism of human action indicate that man has two different domains, or it can be said that man is divided into two worlds. It is true that Wojtyła accepts the existence of these “two worlds” in man, but his concept of man is completely opposite to the dualistic view. The dynamism of action as a form of “dynamic activity” and what happens as a form of “dynamic passivity” comes from the within one human being; both come from the same “dynamic subject” or *suppositum* which is the source or basis of both.<sup>3</sup>

The concept of man as a person that Wojtyła developed is also indeed to oppose an anti-personalistic system of thinking that contradicts the nature of person. In such a system participation is absent, which leads to the inevitable result of alienation as the antithesis of participation. An anti-personalistic system of thinking has been proposed in Wojtyła’s time,

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<sup>1</sup> See Duma, “Personalism,” 372.

<sup>2</sup> Cf., Hołub, “The Human Subject,” 60.

<sup>3</sup> Grzegorz Hołub, “Karol Wojtyła and René Descartes. A Comparison of the Anthropological Positions,” *Anuario Filosófico*, 48/2(2015): 345.

among others, by Marxism. Marxists proposed a collective form of existence of man as a fundamental and final form. In this view, it is a society determines the individuality of a particular human being and shows how to act in real social situations. Thus, the social relations, in which the crucial is work, create specificity of human being. Hence, self or person is only a function of social relation.

In order to better see the difference between Wojtyła's approach and the Marxist approach (which, by the way, currently has many continuators) in terms of the ontological foundations of the constitution of the human person, it is worth to recall conceptions of Martin Buber and John Macmurray, which are, obviously, very different from Marxist's notion but they emphasize the significant role of social relations or encounter in the formation of self. Of course, this is very different from Wojtyła's notion, in which he claims his acceptance of traditional anthropology that person is an individual substance with rational nature. Man is a person thanks to his nature, so when he enters into a relationship, he already carries within himself the status of a person. He has existed as a person before he entered into a relationship or dialogue. Indeed, Wojtyła accepts that in the experiential and axiological realm, the person shapes himself in action so that he becomes a good person or a bad person. Meanwhile, Buber constructs his idea of the person rooted in the Neoplatonic tradition, which is certainly different from the Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of man. For Buber, the relation is the fundamental basis of reality. Man cannot enter into existence and fulfill himself without encounter and relation. Human existence cannot exist outside of "between-reality" because for Buber "the sphere of 'between' [...] is a primal category of human reality."<sup>4</sup> Regarding the concept of *I-thou*, it is revealed that the relationship or the sphere of *I-thou* has existed "since the beginning" because "the beginning is relation." In an *I-thou* relationship, the two "I's" or persons are literally constituted by one another, as he stated, "through the thou a man becomes I."<sup>5</sup> Even so, both of them do not lose their identity because they are in "the sphere of between." This relation does not eliminate their differences and similarities. And between "I" and "thou" lies love which leads to a kind of personal bonding so the "I" is not the "isolated I" but part of the social product, where love also contributes to constitutes the "I."

Buber and Wojtyła emphasize the same thing, namely love as a mature form in intersubjectivity relations, although it is still recognized that the two have different understandings of love, where Buber sees love as "a happening, which cannot be foreseen or

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<sup>4</sup> Grzegorz Hołub, "The Person in Dialogue, The Person Through Dialogue," *Filosofija. Sociologija* 27, no. 1 (2016): 5.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.



prepared for” and Wojtyła understands it as “the result of conscious attempts on the part of persons.”<sup>6</sup> As he states:

This objective common good is the foundation of love, and the persons choosing this common good together at the same time subordinate themselves to it. Thanks to this, they bind one another with the true, objective bond of love, the bond that enables them to liberate themselves from subjectivism and from egoism inherently concealed in it. Love is a union of persons.<sup>7</sup>

So love in a mutual relationship is an attempt to find an objective common good and not something that has been made and happens spontaneously.

Meanwhile John Macmurray adheres to the ideas of Plato and Aristotle, but in building his concept of the person he does not employ metaphysical methods at all. Macmurray also refused to identify self or person with *res cogitans* of Cartesian. According to him, self or person is an active agent. As an agent, the person cannot be understood theoretically but practically and his behavior can only be understood in terms of a dynamic social reference, therefore the pure individual self is fiction.<sup>8</sup>

Macmurray stated that the social sphere is a place where a person is. Being in a relationship is a necessity and being outside of the relationship means that a person or self does not exist at all. In that relation there is a reciprocal relationship between the two sides who are both persons. Both as person or self are constituted in this mutualistic dialogue. He stated, “the other in this constitutive relation must itself be personal. Persons, therefore, are constituted by their mutual relations to one another. ‘I’ exists only as one element in the complex ‘you and I.’”<sup>9</sup> So, the person and his existence are created in relation.

Of course, the application of different approaches and methods to human analysis brings different results about human essence and his origin, even for those who differ in their approach but share the same orientation as to the achievement of understanding of man as a person. Wojtyła and the Marxists are examples of the application of different approaches that ultimately lead to different understandings of human being. Wojtyła, Buber and McMurray are examples of those who share a common orientation towards man as a person but have very different understandings of the origin of the person or self.

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 11

<sup>7</sup> Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 22–23.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

#### 4.1.2. Complementarity of the Philosophy of Being and the Philosophy of Consciousness

Wojtyła's philosophical thought developed in the context of modern philosophical trends and Christian traditions. In his intellectual and philosophical journey he came into contact primarily with Thomism, Kantianism, positivism, phenomenology and existentialism. Since Descartes, the trend of philosophical thought has shifted from metaphysics to epistemology. Such dynamic developments in the philosophy of consciousness have thrown Thomistic realistic metaphysics to the margins as unproven intellectual speculation. As a result of this influence a number of Thomists underwent various attempts to combine Thomism with positivism, phenomenology and existentialism.<sup>10</sup>

Wojtyła does not contradict metaphysics and the philosophy of consciousness. He reconciles the two and wants them to complement each other. With a phenomenological description, he analyses facts or phenomenon given in experience and then is looking for the ontic foundation for them on the ground of metaphysics. The collaboration between the philosophy of consciousness and the philosophy of being in his philosophical work he emphasized, especially in the philosophical analysis of person.<sup>11</sup> The philosophy of consciousness describes the manifestation of human subjectivity or personal human life, but its weakness is that it does not build a metaphysical foundation for the described phenomena, so it does not reach the existence of the real world and man. Meanwhile, the philosophy of being provides the basis for the existence of the world and man, and explains their nature. Through the combination of these two domains in building his own philosophy, he overcomes the opposition of these two philosophies and the reduction of philosophy to epistemology as conducted by

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<sup>10</sup> Hołub et al., *The Polish Christian Philosophy*, 29.

<sup>11</sup> There is much debate that questions Wojtyła's status as a Thomist or as a phenomenologist. I agree more with the view that he is neither a Thomist nor a phenomenologist, and not narrow only also to a philosopher of being. He uses Aristotle's philosophy, Thomistic and Phenomenological approaches in building his own philosophy, his personalism. Cf. Piotr Jaroszyński, "Karol Wojtyła: A Thomist or a Phenomenologist?" *Studia Gilsoniana* 10, no. 1 (January–March 2021): 151; Taylor, "Beyond Nature," 416.

Another remarks, indeed, from the beginning of his philosophical career, he was fascinated by Thomistic philosophy and the philosophy of consciousness. He applies the approach of these two philosophies in his work. For example, in his doctoral dissertation on Saint John of the Cross, he touched on or deepened the aspect of the experience of faith, the mystical experience that takes place in the internal experience of the person, then harmonized and developed it with a number of interpretations of the philosophical and theological theory of St. Thomas Aquinas. Furthermore, in his Habilitation work on Max Scheler, he examines and critiques the phenomenological approach to the experience of morality and the perception of person agency based on Thomistic metaphysics. In his *magnum opus*, *Person and Act* (The Acting Person), he combines the two approaches. In this work, there is a critique of the philosophy of consciousness from St. Thomas' realistic philosophy of being (as in the Habilitation and Lublin Lectures). Another critical attitude is the discovery of the benefits of the phenomenological approach to enrich the anthropological and ethical philosophy of St. Thomas. See Hołub et al., *The Polish Christian Philosophy*, 30–31.

many modern and contemporary thinkers. On the other hand, he also does not limit philosophy to only metaphysical analysis by Thomists.<sup>12</sup>

The collaboration of these two approaches in his philosophical works also shows an attempt to overcome the strong contradiction between empiricism and apriorism. This contradiction are connected with a discussion about the role of the senses and reason in human knowledge that has been taking place since the beginning of philosophy, which was further sharpened by modern and contemporary thinkers. Apriorism emphasizes reason as a source of knowledge and not in experience. Meanwhile, empiricism basis on experience as a source and criterion for objective knowledge. Radical empiricists increasingly narrowed experience to sensual experience as a source of knowledge.

This aforementioned contradiction also leads to the dichotomy of knowledge which is considered as objective knowledge accompanied by the division of sciences into empirical-inductive, formal, analytical and deductive. Here, autonomously practiced philosophy has no place, let alone metaphysics. Philosophy can only be cultivated as a philosophy of some kind of science.<sup>13</sup> So, there is a crisis in epistemology which then has an impact on a crisis in ethics where it is difficult to find a metaphysical and anthropological basis in this domain. The connection between ethics with anthropology and metaphysics has been undermined. As such, morality and its basis or criteria are difficult to explain when they have no ontic justification. It is not surprising that the consequence of this was the reduction of ethics to psychology or sociology of morality, mainly under the influence of positivism. The ethics that explains what is good and evil, what should be the norm and the foundation of normativity and moral obligation are replaced with only a description of behavior and the psychological and sociological situations that affect it.<sup>14</sup>

According to Wojtyła, the experience can be understood more broadly than in the narrow empirical understanding of experience which is limited to sensual impressions. The experience also should not be reduced only to the act of sensory cognition (*percipi*), which ignores the metaphysical aspect of the existence of real objects. Therefore, for Wojtyła, experience is not limited to the contact between the senses and phenomena. It is the rich in form and content cognitive relation of the knowing subject with the world or object that exists and is objective independently. In this experience, there are not only aspects of reality or objects that are

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 32.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 33–34.

<sup>14</sup> See Ibid., 34–35.

highlighted but deeper than that, namely the existence and nature of objects. The object is, first of all, man himself, who is at the same time the object and subject of cognition.<sup>15</sup>

The combination of the philosophy of being and the philosophy of consciousness, as well as a proper starting point in the anthropological analysis, helps to capture and understand human being comprehensively. The initial step of adequate anthropology is the analysis of experience, where experience is understood in a broader sense, as mentioned above, and not in a narrow one as in naturalistic reductionism and apriorism.<sup>16</sup>

To get a correct and comprehensive understanding of man based on the analysis of subjectivity, the anthropological concept that is built must embark from the experience of man as its starting point.<sup>17</sup> This is what Wojtyła has done. The starting point of his philosophy is the experience of man and not of *a priori* or abstract ideas. The experience becomes the basis for analyzing the appropriate dynamism of the person as an access to apprehend the understanding of man. He begins by analyzing action in terms of internal human experience because, for him, whatever man experiences, either inside or outside himself, must be associated with the “I.”

In analyzing internal experience, Wojtyła has concern to the significant role of consciousness that accompanies the will in constituting action in the moment of efficacy. Wojtyła accepts the fact that consciousness is an aspect of the person that has a direct relationship to human “I.” On the other hand, he rejected subjectivism and also the radical idealism with principle “*esse equal percipi*” or “to be is the same as to be constituted by consciousness.”<sup>18</sup> These principles lead us identifying accidents or aspects of being with being in itself. Therefore, the absolutization of consciousness as an autonomous subject is a serious mistake. Consciousness merely plays a significant role in reflecting and experiencing subjectivity. Wojtyła claims:

Consciousness is not an independent subject, but it also plays a key role in understanding the personal subjectivity of human being. It is impossible to grasp and objectify the relation between the *suppositum humanum* and the human self without taking into consideration consciousness and its function. [...]. Being a subject (a *suppositum*) and experiencing oneself as a subject occur on two entirely different dimensions.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid; see also Merecki, “On the Sources,” 2.

<sup>16</sup> Cf., Hołub and Mazur, “The Experience of Human Being,” 81–82; M. G. Kokhanovska, “Adequate Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła,” *Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research*, no. 14 (2018): 172–179.

<sup>17</sup> See Jarosław Merecki, “Moral Experience, Ethics and the Christian Faith in the Thought of Tadeusz Styczen,” *Open Insight V*, no. 7 (enero 2014): 241.

<sup>18</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 46.

<sup>19</sup> Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 226–227.

In addition, Wojtyła made a difference in his approach to experience as the starting point of his philosophy, which is characterized by a realistic phenomenological method in the relation to a naturalistic method. The naturalistic method is well known as phenomenistic, which relies on sensual and empirical aspects. The method employed by Wojtyła “contributes to transphenomenal understanding; it also contributes to a disclosure of the richness proper to human existence in the whole complex *compositum humanum*.”<sup>20</sup> Meanwhile, naturalistic thinking tends to introduce a distinction between “human biological life and life of the person.”<sup>21</sup> Peter Singer, for instance, claims the former to be a “member of the species *homo sapiens*” who carries a set of tools for human experience and knowledge. Meanwhile, the man in the latter sense has also personal characteristics. Singer says: “these two senses of ‘human being’ overlap but do not coincide.”<sup>22</sup> In the naturalist framework of thought, the beginning and end of human life as a biological human being or a member of a species and person are very different. Biological man is a reality that outlasts the reality of a person. The person and his constitutive characters do not appear at the beginning of human biological life and always disappear before the death of biological life.<sup>23</sup> Then, what is about interiority or internal human experience? For naturalists, “interiority is not the extra-natural sphere,” or there is no “independent reality as spirit, self or I.”<sup>24</sup> They deny the existence of this reality because the empirical or sensual methods they employ cannot enter into apprehending this reality. The concept of self or person is only associated with the bundle of various characteristics associated with the “higher brain and the nervous system.”<sup>25</sup> Therefore, the existence of the person or “I” is merely determined by the role or essential function of the human brain. Thus, the totality of man is reduced to only biological aspects, which can only be known by “external” methodology.

Wojtyła in combining the metaphysical approach to being with the philosophy of consciousness presents an anthropology that aims to discover the truth about man and to creatively recover and strengthen the proper place of man in the world.<sup>26</sup> As far as the analysis of the person is concerned, we can find that Wojtyła recognizes the substantialist concept of the person in that he is a subject that exists in itself, for itself and all activity springs from it. Even social manner of existence and activities with other people come from this subject. For Wojtyła, anthropology aims not only to develop an objective view of man but also to understand oneself

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 216.

<sup>21</sup> Hołub and Mazur, “The Experience of Human Being,” 77.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 78.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 79.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> See Wierzbicki, “Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy,” 173.

and others and undertake concern for all human beings.<sup>27</sup> Thus, the anthropology that has been cultivated by Wojtyła has not only a theoretical dimension but also an existential one. For this reason, he developed personalism by synthesizing the philosophy of being and the philosophy of consciousness.<sup>28</sup>

#### 4.1.3. Towards Integral Anthropology

Wojtyła said that the crucial problem of our era is not the problem of cosmology or philosophy of nature but anthropology and ethics.<sup>29</sup> Therefore, his philosophy is wholly anthropological. There are two reasons for this claim, namely, man is the center of his philosophical research, and the core of his thought is the philosophy of anthropology.<sup>30</sup> His anthropological thought emerged at a very important time in the history of Poland when there was a longing and need for reliable anthropology. Related to this, Wojtyła's anthropological considerations are to harmonize the objective and subjective aspects of human being that complement each other, which we specifically encounter in *The Acting Person*, in an effort to obtain the correct understanding of man. It should also be kept in mind that Wojtyła had a complex intellectual path, as he was in contact with modern and contemporary philosophical trends and even sciences, especially psychology. However, one should remember in particular as well that his philosophical anthropological thought is exceptionally integrated with theology or the light of divine revelation, as he explains in his *Considerations on the Essence of Man*.

Through analysis of human activities, it is confirmed that the human person is the cause of his all activities. The analysis of person and action also leads to the discovery of the essence of the human person, namely the substantial spiritual soul. This rational soul is the guarantee of man as a person. For Wojtyła, the soul is the principle of life, the principle of existence, as well as the principle of transcendence of the person. Then, intellect and freedom as essential and irrevocable internal properties of the soul place the human person superior to everything else in the visible world.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, the spiritual soul of person, as the principle of internal and external life, distinguishes him from other beings. The goal of the human person is not his

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 174.

<sup>28</sup> We can find this claim in the many comments of many scholars who concern about Wojtyła's thoughts. See also Tadeusz Styczen, "Kardynał Karol Wojtyła-Filozof Moralista," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 27, no.2 (1979): 28–29; Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła*, 118; Merecki, "On the Source," 1–2; Duma, "Personalism," 371–372; Wierzbicki, "Karol Wojtyła's Philosophy," 174; Hołub, "Karol Wojtyła and René Descartes," 346.

<sup>29</sup> See Wojtyła, "The Person: Subject and Community," 220; cf., Merecki, "On the Sources," 2–3.

<sup>30</sup> Jan Galarowicz, *The Anthropological Studies of Karol Wojtyła*, trans. Jan Kłos, 252, [https://dlibra.kul.pl/Content/29497/32\\_the\\_anthropological.pdf](https://dlibra.kul.pl/Content/29497/32_the_anthropological.pdf); Jałoch-Palicka, "Spiritual Substance," 131.

<sup>31</sup> Karol Wojtyła, "On the Dignity of the Human Person" in *Person and Community Selected Essays*, (New York: Peter Lang, 1993): 178.

productivity or creativity but the truth, because he is rational being, and the good because it is the object of free human will.<sup>32</sup> The existence of the soul with its internal properties guides a human person to absolute truth and goodness, that is God as an absolute being. However, for Wojtyła, there are truths which are inaccessible to the natural faculties of reason in the rational investigation. Those truths include not only the internal life of God, but also of man, especially his origin and destiny that called “strict mysteries.”<sup>33</sup> It is the Revelation that uncovers the supernatural realm of knowledge in which the human mind operates not because of the light of its natural powers but exclusively from the supernatural light of faith. Thus, faith establishes a new ability of cognition that exceeds the ability and potentiality of human reason and provides divine knowledge to reason. However, Wojtyła emphasizes that although the human reason has been illuminated by faith, the truths as strict mysteries that have been revealed through Revelation are not exhaustively understood by the human reason. He asserts:

Strict mysteries are those truths whose existences neither human reason nor any created reason at all can in any measure know without Revelation, and whose essence it cannot penetrate even with Revelation. Nevertheless, Revelation brings us closer to the mystery. And although we certainly cannot understand how the Three Persons exist in one Divine Nature, possessing it absolutely fully and undividedly, so nevertheless thanks to Revelation we approach very closely to the basic fact that in God there is an internal life, that says what this life is like, and finally that that which we call Divinity means the nature of God not only as that of First Cause and Prime Being but as the proper source and basis of the entire incomprehensible tri-personal internal life.<sup>34</sup>

Then, how to explain the essence, origin, and dignity of man in the light of Divine Revelation? These things find their full confirmation in the fact of Revelation. Regarding human essence, Wojtyła asserts: “the human essence lies, in principle, in a sphere totally accessible to rational understanding, there are no strict mysteries to reveal on that subject.”<sup>35</sup> So, for Wojtyła, through rational investigation, we can achieve that despite there are certain difficulties. However, the accessibility into the sphere of human essence through rational investigation,

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<sup>32</sup> Wojtyła, “On the Dignity,” 179.

<sup>33</sup> Wojtyła, *Considerations on the Essence*, 167.

<sup>34</sup> Polish text: “Tajemnice ściśle są to prawdy, których istnienia rozum ludzki ani żaden w ogóle rozum stworzony, bez Objawienia nie może żadną miarą posnać, a których istoty nawet po Objawieniu nie może przeniknąć. Niemniej Objawienie przybliży nas do Tajemnicy. I chociaż z pewnością nie możemy zrozumieć, w jaki sposób Trzy Osoby istnieją w jednej Naturze Bożej, posiadając Ją bezwzględnie całą i niepodzielną, to jednak dzięki Objawieniu przybliżyliśmy się mocno do samego zasadniczego faktu: że w Bogu jest życie wewnętrzne, jakie ono jest – i wreszcie, że to, co nazywamy Bóstwem, oznacza naturę Boga nie tylko jako Pierwszej Przyczyny i Pierwszego Bytu, ale jako właściwe źródło i podstawę całego owego niepojętego życia wewnętrznego trójosobowego. Ibid., 194–195.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 169.

which is meant by Wojtyła is through philosophical investigation.<sup>36</sup> And the kind of philosophy considered for appropriate investigation of human essence is the philosophy of being.<sup>37</sup> Meanwhile, human essence, origin, and human dignity as a person find their full confirmation in the fact of Revelation. We see Divine Revelation in traditions and Sacred Scriptures, especially the New Testament, which contains the life and teachings of Jesus and the Apostles. Jesus himself is the highest Revelation and from Him we derive the truth of the knowledge of God. Revelation itself is an expression of God's thoughts, especially about the truth of Himself and man. Because of Revelation, the man knows the internal life of God, that He is a personal being. This is a reality that is a mystery to rational and philosophical research so that the philosophy of being can only define God as an absolute being, the prime being, the first cause whose essence is subsistent existence (*esse subsistens*).<sup>38</sup> As a personal being, God, through Revelation, communicates his thoughts and plans. It is so clear that through Revelation, God enters into the realm of human existence and redeems man with Divine grace.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, through Revelation, the man knows that he was created in the image and likeness of God (*Imago Dei*). Because of Divine grace, man is not only a creation in the likeness of God but as a "son of God." Nature or essence of man shows that he is a creation in the likeness of God, but because of grace, he acquires the dignity of being a son of God. The essence of this grace is participation (*koinonia*) in the essence of God and sharing in the internal life of God. So, there is a real relationship between man and God, as is the relationship between a son and a father. Participation in the actions of the Divine supernatural internal life brings about the supernatural or theological virtues of man, i.e. faith, hope and love. Faith is the fruit of participation in Divine cognition. With the element of grace in man, it becomes a proper basis for man to know God and love God. This is the manifestation of the internal action of the supernatural life of man. With this virtue of faith, man can properly know God in the light of the supernatural Divine and look at created beings with the "eyes of God." The virtues of hope and love are the fruit of participation in God's love. By virtue of hope, we thirst for God as the highest virtue and hope that it will help

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<sup>36</sup> Polish philosopher appreciates the contribution of sciences for achieving the knowledge of man but he insists that they are unable to apprehend human essence. He explains: "in this way, our knowledge of the human soul and thereby knowledge of the essence of man acquires a mark of accuracy. It results from the direct connection of philosophical reflection with experience." Ibid., 33.

<sup>37</sup> Wojtyła (John Paul II) accentuates the significance of philosophy of being developed by St. Thomas in achieving the understanding of the truth of man. He says: "Looking unreservedly to truth, the realism of Thomas could recognize the objectivity of truth and produce not merely a philosophy of 'what seems to be' but a philosophy of 'what is.'" John Paul II, *Fides et Ratio*, 44, see also no. 5, accessed on February 26, 2023, [https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf\\_jp-ii\\_enc\\_14091998\\_fides-et-ratio.html](https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091998_fides-et-ratio.html).

<sup>38</sup> Wojtyła, *Considerations on the Essence*, 191.

<sup>39</sup> Wojtyła, "On the Dignity," 179.



us achieve ultimate happiness. Love joins us internally with God through a supernatural bond of friendship.

Does Divine grace destroy the nature/essence of man? According to Wojtyła, sanctifying grace constitutes a real supernatural character of our spiritual soul. It is not a new power but a new situation, a new source of extension and activity within it. Wojtyła states:

The very being of the soul acquires a new identity through sanctifying grace, its very being become new. This does not mean that grace in some way destroy the natural characteristic of its spiritual subject, which is the human soul. It preserves them by all means, it develops them, ennobles them and, upon them, being based directly on them, on the very essence of human spirit, it creates that new source of life, already not human but Divine, in man, it creates the very basis for that being “partakers of the Divine Nature” of which St. Peter speaks.<sup>40</sup>

Thus, from philosophical investigations, in which Wojtyła refers his roots to Thomistic philosophy, the truth about man is obtained that he is a person who, as composed of soul and body, is a complete substance. The soul, as the cause of the personal existence of every human being, is created by the Absolute.<sup>41</sup> Hence, the human person’s existence comes from Divine existence. Thus Wojtyła’s anthropology, which is based on philosophical foundations, emphasizes that man remains “a spiritual and material co-existence.”<sup>42</sup> Meanwhile, from the theological basis, which refers to the biblical themes of creation, redemption and consummation, the man who is the person was created by God as an image of God. He is also adopted as a son of God because of God’s sanctifying grace, and therefore the human soul has the ability to receive life in God. As Wojtyła says: “a man who has grace, then, who has been adopted as a ‘son of God,’ carries something of Divinity in himself and, on that basis, participates in the internal life of God.”<sup>43</sup>

Consequently, Wojtyła’s anthropology is an integration of philosophical and theological thought that discovers and explains the integration of natural order and supernatural Divine order in man. From Wojtyła’s thought, we get an adequate understanding of human being derived from the philosophical anthropology based on harmonious cooperation of the philosophy of

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<sup>40</sup> Wojtyła, *Considerations on the Essence*, 209.

<sup>41</sup> See Jałoch-Palicka, “Spiritual Substance,” 109–110.

<sup>42</sup> See John Paul II, “Humans are Spiritual and Corporeal Beings,” *Interdisciplinary Encyclopedia of Science and Religion*, accessed November 7, 2022, <https://inters.org/John-Paul-II-Catechesis-Spiritual-Corporeal>; see also Elzbieta Osewska, Józef Stala, Krzysztof Bochenek, “The Relationship between Religion and National Culture in Poland in the Light of John Paul II’s Philosophical and Theological Reflection,” *Religions* 13, no. 33 (2022): 9, <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13010033>.

<sup>43</sup> Wojtyła, *Considerations on the Essence*, 197.

being and the philosophy of consciousness, which is complemented and confirmed by a theological understanding of man.

## **4.2. Consequences for Ethics**

Analysis of subjectivity shows that from nature man is a moral being. The action of the personal subject is the proper field in which human morality can be explained. Furthermore, the philosophical study of subjectivity leads us to understand ethics as a normative theory of moral obligation or moral value of human action. Nevertheless, according to Wojtyła, ethical reflection is not only about considering specific moral problems concerning human behavior but also about the problem of ethics itself, especially its normative nature, which requires referring to anthropological and metaphysical foundations. Therefore, the analysis of the concept of subjectivity brings several consequences for ethics.

### **4.2.1. Metaphysics of Man as the Foundation for Ethics**

First of all, we need to look at three terms that are often interchangeably used but have different meanings, namely morality, the science of morality and ethics. Morality “designates more or less the same thing as the moral life, and moral life is quite simply human life, both individual and social, understood in the light of norms.”<sup>44</sup> Morality is concerned with the practical life of man. Man is characterized by it because he evaluates his conscious and free actions in terms of their value. As a further consequence, human moral life becomes an object of the science of morality and ethics. The difference is that the science of morality descriptively approaches moral life, while ethics approach morality in a normative way.<sup>45</sup> Therefore, in ethics, one defines what moral good and evil are and what moral norms and values are. As Wojtyła states:

Thus it defines norms, i.e., it pronounces judgments about what is good, and what evil, and it gives the grounds for these judgments, i.e., it shows why it is so. In this manner, the difference between the descriptive science of morality and ethics, the normative science of morality is clearly drawn. Nonetheless in everyday speech people may say “the science of morality” while what they have in mind is “ethics,” just as they may say “ethics” and have in mind “morality.”<sup>46</sup>

As a science, ethics is a collection of assertions and judgments concerning human conscious and free actions, that is always carried out by an individual person, but at the same time has a social

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<sup>44</sup> Karol Wojtyła, *Ethics Primer Elementarz Etyczny*, trans. Hugh McDonald, (Lublin: PTTA, 2017), 19.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid; Wojtyła, *Man in the Field*, 54.

<sup>46</sup> Wojtyła, *Ethics Primer*, 19–21.

dimension.<sup>47</sup> If human action, both in the individual and social dimension, is the main subject of ethics research, then it becomes clear that the concept of the subjectivity of the human person explaining human action in the above-mentioned aspects must be of fundamental importance in showing the ontic foundation of ethics. Referring to the being of the human person as a moral subject allows rational explanation not only of what morality is, but also the functions of its basic components like moral consciousness, norms, obligation, and above all its main goal, which is the fulfillment of a human person.

Therefore, according to Wojtyła, the proper basis for scientific ethics is the philosophy of being.<sup>48</sup> The philosophy of being becomes a proper basis because the problem of the meaning of human life is closely related to the problem of human being and of being in general. In particular, moral actions reflected in ethics are explained in the light of the theory of act and potency belonging to the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy of being. Of course, for Kant and his followers who rejected the philosophy of being, the theory of act-potency in relation to moral action had no real meaning. However, in this case, the ethical theory is formulated *a priori* way and assumes a purely character. Therefore, for ethics to remain not only rational but also realistic, it must be constructed on the basis of the reflection on man and his fulfillment.<sup>49</sup> Such an approach to ethics must necessarily focus on human action, which cannot be understood without referring to the categories of act and potentiality based on the philosophy of being. Wojtyła highlights this approach because, for him, there are modern and contemporary philosophical thoughts that tend to separate ethics from its adequate foundation. He has stated as follows:

It is not surprising, therefore, that ethics, especially in the traditional approach, has always assiduously concerned itself with action and man. Examples can be found as early as in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. And though in modern philosophy particularly in contemporary philosophical thought, there is visible tendency to treat the problem of ethics somewhat apart from anthropology (this terrain is now being explored by psychology and moral sociology), the total elimination of anthropological conclusions from ethics is not possible. The more a philosophical reflection becomes comprehensive, the more of the anthropological question tend to appear.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 23; Karol Wojtyła, "In Search of the Basis of Perfectionism in Ethics," in *Person and Community Selected Essays*, (New York: Peter Lang, 1993): 45–56.

<sup>48</sup> Wojtyła, *Ethics Primer*, 29; Wojtyła, "In Search of the Basis," 54–55; Wojtyła, *Man in the Field*, 52; see also Styczen, "Kardynał Karol Wojtyła," 28; Labert Uwaoma Nwauzor, "Ethics Primer-Elementarz Etyczny," *Studia Gilsoniana* 7, no. 2 (April–June 2018): 365–372.

<sup>49</sup> Wojtyła, *Ethics Primer*, 31.

<sup>50</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 12.

In addition, ethics is not only concerned with the normative aspects of what is good and evil, and answers questions such as what ought to be done, why should be done what is defined as good, but also reflects perfectionism which is an important aspect of moral life. It means that ethics reflects the person who acts and actualizes moral fulfillment by the act itself. The perfectionistic aspect of ethics is found when the philosophy of being is the basis of reflection. So we can see how Wojtyła refers to the ethics of Aristotle and St. Thomas which is closely associated with the philosophy of being. Aristotle, for instance, primarily sees good in the context of being. In empirical experience, being has a purpose that is good. Good is an object of desire, therefore, good is associated with nature of being. The perfectionism of being is found in the relationship between being and good as an end. Aristotle's ethics is about man in relation to the good as an end fit for his rational nature. Human activities are focused on good (Lat. *bonum honestum*), which are in accordance with rational nature and bring happiness.<sup>51</sup> Aquinas affirmed the relationship between good and being, as in Aristotle's thought, that good is the goal of being because it makes being perfect. He linked the philosophy of being with the dynamism of reality. Therefore, the perfectionism of being is the actualization of the potency of being or would like to say the actualization of the existence of being. As such, being is called good because of the fullness of the existence it realizes. Thus, all existing beings are good. Conscious activities which are actualizations of the rational nature that correspond to good contribute to moral perfection, while those that do not correspond to it produce moral evil. So, perfection in the moral sense in St. Thomas' ethics flows from the philosophy of good which is immersed in the philosophy of being.<sup>52</sup>

Wojtyła is aware that human activities with a telic end and the meaning of life are not concerned by particular science with a positivistic approach. In this regard, he also highlights a tendency that connects ethics and evolutionism. For him is clear that if there is acceptance of the evolutionary hypothesis in ethics, there will also be acceptance of relativism. According to the evolutionist hypothesis, man is the product of the evolution from primitive animal form, thus ethical facts and moral experience are the developed form of primitive reactions of animals. Relativism in ethics will occur if evolutionary hypothesis is applied in ethics so that what happens is "total mutability of ethical principles, of views on what is right or wrong [...] what is good today will be bad tomorrow, and vice versa."<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> See Wojtyła, "In Search of the Basis," 47.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Wojtyła, *Ethics Primer*, 31.

From what has been said, it should be noted that ultimately the entire issue of the foundations of human morality, explained in the field of ethics, comes down to understanding the human person as a subject of the action. A narrow view of the human person, and especially the questioning of his subjectivity in conscious and free action, inevitably leads to numerous and insurmountable difficulties in the field of ethics. Their consequence is usually relativism, which cannot be avoided without basing the principles of ethics on the being of a human person

#### **4.2.2. Moral Experience as the Point of Departure for Ethics**

Human action embraces the particular form of a lived experience called moral experience. In this experience, the person experiences himself, his own “I,” as the efficient cause of the moral good and evil in action, and through this, the person experiences the moral good or evil of his own “I.” Lived experience has an empirical character, and on this empirical fact, ethics as science is based. According to Wojtyła, ethics, as normative science, is also an empirical science because it is based on authentic moral experience.<sup>54</sup>

In terms of Wojtyła, the moral experience serves as an empirical starting point for ethics. Moral experience is associated with a view of human action, which is based on the theory of act-potency. According to him, Aristotle and St. Thomas have employed the concept of act-potency in the philosophical interpretation of moral experience. Moral experience, as a certain actualization of a person who acts personally, is essentially the actualization of the potency of will under the direction of reason. Therefore, the moral experience that contains moral actions as the actualization of volition potency is the starting point of ethics as a science.

Of course, the idea of moral experience, which is based on the philosophy of being, is in opposition to the core idea of the moral experience from Kant and Scheler, which Wojtyła has criticized. Kant especially emphasized the role of reason in his philosophy. He believed knowledge is formulated within *a priori* conditions or categories derived from reason. Regarding the moral experience, he highlights the experience of obligation.<sup>55</sup> This obligation is based on the moral law or imperative category, which is an *a priori* form of practical reason. Moral action comes from *a priori* form of practical reason. Thus, good or evil is determined by the *a priori* form of universal practical reason and not empirically. Or in other words, moral life is formed from the form of *a priori* practical reason. Here, Kant failed to sharply separate practical reason

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<sup>54</sup> Karol Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Separation of Experience from the Act in Ethics,” in *Person and Community Selected Essays*, (New York: Peter Lang, 1993): 23.

<sup>55</sup> Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Separation,” 27.

and will as faculties. Instead, he identifies will with practical reason, and the will is “devoid of any innate dynamism of its own.”<sup>56</sup>

Scheler criticized Kant’s experience of a moral obligation by emphasizing value as an essential element of moral experience. Scheler affirmed that experience has the character of personal action. However, in Scheler’s concept action is not similar to action in the metaphysical sense as the actualization of potentiality. The action he meant was more in the sense of phenomenology, namely intentional action. This action is aimed at the objective value in the experience. This intentional action is the basis for the interpretation of moral experience. For Scheler, the only value is the objective content of moral experience. This is a form of rejection of Kant’s moral obligation, which does not care about the relationship of value or good to moral experience.

Value as a primordial element of objective reality can only be apprehended in emotional experience. Only feeling allows us to make personal contact with values in objective reality. It means intentional actions that are aimed at values possess emotional nature. Acts of cognition and will are secondary and become part of *a priori* emotional power. Acts of will have absolutely no moral value. Value does not become the object of the will. Will is only a function of the emotional life that realizes the perceived value. Moral values arise not from the role of the will but from emotions. Thus, the essence of moral experience is not the efficacy of a person but the emotional experience of values.

For Wojtyła, Scheler failed to understand and explain the efficacy of the person, where a person, through the role of will, becomes the efficient cause of action. Scheler’s whole philosophy is lacking in explaining the concepts of motion, change and actualization<sup>57</sup> in terms of the dynamism of the faculty of will. To show the weakness of Scheler’s ethics that subordinated the dynamism of the will, as well as the neglect of the dynamism of the will in Kant’s ethics, Wojtyła makes reference to traditional philosophy as well as to the contemporary school of psychology of will with prominent figures such as Narziss Ach, Albert Michotte, Edward Abramowski, Mieczysław Dybowski, Władysława Mielczarska, and Józef Reutt. They base their investigations on the inductive-empirical method and argue that the discovery of volition occurs in the context of phenomenological experience. For example, Ach highlights the actual moment of an act of will in the form of “I will,” “I can,” “I must,” or “I ought.” There are two elements of psychic life in this actual moment, namely, the subjective self in the lived

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid; Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Will,” 7.

<sup>57</sup> Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Separation,” 41.

experience and the object that becomes the goal or motivation of the action. We encounter the will immediately in the experience of this actual moment in which we experience ourselves as the efficient cause of our actions.<sup>58</sup> The lived experience of the efficient cause of the phenomenologically manifested will is the same fact for the point of departure of ethics. The moral experience arises in the lived experience of the efficient cause of the person. Or in other words, the efficacy of the person is the basic element of moral experience, where moral values arise. Therefore, moral experience implies a living experience of the efficacy of a person in which the will manifests itself phenomenologically. Thus, Wojtyła, in line with the opinion of psychologists, understands that the will can be achieved through the analysis of moral experience.

Moreover, for Wojtyła, the phenomenology of will, as in the theory of Ach and his colleagues, is not sufficient to explain the interpretation of moral experience that forms the basis for ethics as a normative science.<sup>59</sup> Therefore, we need to consider the concept of human action, as developed by St. Thomas, in terms of the moral experience. St. Thomas underlies the theory of human action based on the theory of act-potency, which explains changes that take place in all beings. Every change is a form of transition from potency to act. A conscious human action, for St. Thomas, is a moral experience because it is an act of the will. Act of the will is the realization of the potentiality because the will is the potency or faculty of the soul.<sup>60</sup>

In terms of moral experience, it is difficult to speak of responsibility from the ethical point of view of Scheler, which emphasizes consciousness and ignores the theory of causality (act-potency) in the philosophy of being. In Wojtyła's personalist ethics, moral actions are the actualization of the potentiality of the will. Will is the potentiality of rational nature, which is only appropriate for a man who is a person. Therefore, morality as an effect of volitional action reveals the person's responsibility. A person is responsible for his morality because "person is not only subject in which moral good and evil occur, but also the efficient cause of that good and evil."<sup>61</sup>

To examine this issue in more detail, we can look at the moment of efficacy where the person becomes the efficient cause of actions. Morality is the irrevocable aspect of the action. This is possible because of the natural relationship between the dynamism of the will and the

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid. Wojtyła, "The Problem of the Will," 20.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Karol Wojtyła, "Human Nature as the Basis of Ethical Formation," in *Person and Community Selected Essays*, (New York: Peter Lang, 1993): 97.

truth of good. Morality is only possible with the cooperation of appetitive and cognitive power. Responsibility is associated with morality because a person creates moral good or evil through will in the moment of efficacy. Thus, morality belongs to the person's responsibility because it exists in relation to the act of the will in the moment of efficacy.

#### 4.2.3. Person and the Human Nature as the Roots of Morality

In metaphysical cognition, the notion of nature is equivalent to the essence of something. It is understood as the basis for its activity. Activity can be conceived as an "extension or continuation of existence" (*operari sequitur esse*), and on the other hand, the content of this activity is "an expression or externalization of the being's essence." Therefore the activity of each being is determined by its nature. Man has a rational nature, and because of that, he is a person as defined by Boethius. All of human activities are determined by rational nature. Accordingly, only this rational nature can form the basis of morality, and only the person can be the subject of morality.<sup>62</sup> Therefore, for Wojtyła, morality is something that is natural and necessary in man.

Human nature is the basis or root of morality because its faculties include reason and free will. The reason is the ability to form general concepts and make judgments as well as the ability to know the truth in terms of good.<sup>63</sup> Morality exists because of the relationship of comprehended truth about good to various goods, which are object of human action (*actus humanus*). Thus, morality is an inseparable aspect of human action.

Meanwhile, free will enables or conditions morality because of its relation to reason. On account of this reference to reason and truth, St. Thomas calls the will *appetitus rationalis*. The will is an appetitive power or source of desire that wants good, but it is blind, therefore it needs the directive role of cognitive power, and this relationship occurs naturally.<sup>64</sup> The will plays a role in choosing a particular good from among many recognized goods. Choosing as an act of will corresponds to the moral formation of man. The person is shaped through moral good and

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> We can see the relationship of intellect and will through the illustration of Fr. Woroniecki quoted by Fr. A Krapiec in the book *Conversations with Father Krapiec on Man*. Fr. Woroniecki illustrated the co-operation of will and intellect with the example of a giant but blind strong man taking on his shoulders a paralysed man who can see and saying to him "let us live in symbiosis: you show me where to go and what to do and how, and I will do what I please." *Conversations with Father Krapiec on Man*, trans. Weronika Hansen (Lublin: PTTA, 2012), 77.



deformed through moral evil. Thus, the will is not only a faculty of human nature as well as a faculty of the person who only creates action, but also a kind of ability to become.<sup>65</sup>

So, the role of reason and will as the powers of human nature shows them as the conditions of moral norms. Reason in defining and promulgating rules of action is based on rational nature and the good ends sought by rational nature. The will is tasked with realizing an orientation towards goodness through moral norms recognized by reason.

Wojtyła formulates the conception of person and nature as the basis of morality and as a response and criticism of Scheler's ethical theory of values, which is not suitable for Christian ethics and also for scientific ethics, Marxist ethics, independent ethics developed in Poland by Tadeusz Kotarbiński and Thadeus Czeżowski, and Science of Morality proposed by Maria Ossowska.<sup>66</sup> For Wojtyła, ethics based on empiricism, apriorism, emotivism and positivism have limitations to talk about ethics as a normative science and nature as a basis for morality.

In particular, he commented on the independent ethics of Kotarbiński, an atheist and materialist who strongly criticized religious views on life. Kotarbiński asserts that an independent ethic must be independent from religion, from the assumptions of a worldview and the opinions of others.<sup>67</sup> The emphasis of the independent ethic is more in line with the emphasis on the role of subjective conscience. The normative content of this ethics is quite close to Christian ethics, but the error lies in the denial of the existence of God. Wojtyła says: "If it is a question of the content of the independent ethics, then everyone may easily see that the principle or moral ideals contained therein are quite simply the principle and ideals of Christian ethics minus all which in it refers to God, which make up its religious character."<sup>68</sup> For Wojtyła, ethics cannot be separated from religion because human nature as the basis of morality cannot be separated from the existence of God. He further emphasizes: "religion, like ethics, is also a large measure something which blossoms from the human nature [...] The rational nature of man himself forms the basis not only of ethics but also of religion.[...] In this way religion, the

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<sup>65</sup> Wojtyła, "Human Nature," 99.

<sup>66</sup> Hołub et al., *The Polish Christian Philosophy*, 85.

<sup>67</sup> See Andrzej Szostek, "Is Tadeusz Kotarbiński's Independent Ethics Program Important Nowadays?" trans. Anna Krotkiewska-Zagórska, 154–155, *Repozytorium Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego*, accessed on July 28, 2022, <http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/8088-538-7.13>. Concerning independent ethics, see also T. Kotarbiński, "Zagadnienia etyki niezależnej," in *Pisma etyczne*, ed. P. Słomczyński (Warszawa 1981): 140–149; T. Kotarbiński, "I principi di un'etica indipendente," *Rivista di filosofia* L, no.1 (1959): 3–14; Merecki, "Moral Experience" 244–246; Ryszard Wiśniewski, "Intuitionism in Contemporary Polish Ethics. Part II. Elzenberg – Ingarden – Wojtyła – Styczeń – Przełęcki," *Ruch Filozoficzny*, LXXVI (2020): 49–78, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/RF.2020.022>.

<sup>68</sup> Polish text, "Jeżeli chodzi o samą treść etyki niezależnej, to każdy łatwo zauważy, iż zawarte w niej zasady czy też ideały moralne to po prostu zasady oraz ideały etyki chrześcijańskiej minus to wszystko, co w niej odnosi się do Boga, co stanowi o jej religijnym charakterze." Karol Wojtyła, *Ethics Primer*, 224–225.

worship of God, belongs to program of natural morality. Religion does not primarily imply ethics, but ethics does primarily imply religion as the elementary sign of justice.”<sup>69</sup>

The close relationship of human nature, as the source of man’s action, with the person who is the subject of this action, expressed, among other things, in the integration of nature in a person, allowed Wojtyła to show that the foundations of moral norms should be sought in human nature itself, and not in external factors, and the true source of the fulfillment of action in accordance with these norms in a subject capable of conscious and free action, which is a human person.

### **4.3. Consequences for the Understanding of Social Life**

In the previous considerations, the importance of the concept of human subjectivity formulated by Wojtyła in the field of philosophical anthropology and ethics was emphasized. In the current section, attention will focus on the consequences of subjectivity understood in this way for social life. It is primarily about showing the basic role of the human person in creating interpersonal relationship, then the participation as a principle that allows the constitution of an authentic community, and finally, the results of the lack of participation, among which alienation is the most fraught.

#### **4.3.1. Person and Community**

This section highlights the concept of person which significantly determines the understanding of the community. In other words, the understanding of the community has its basis in the concept of person, and indeed we can speak about community in a more meaningful way only in the light of the person. The way to apprehend a proper understanding of person and community is through personal subjectivity analysis because only this aspect allows us to capture the human I and its relationships, both interpersonal and social. The analysis of the subjectivity in Wojtyła’s anthropological consideration leads us to the demonstration of the understanding about person and community as well as authentic relation between the two. Through this analysis we obtain that person, in Wojtyła understanding, is a complete substance. He is the *suppositum* or subject of his existence and action, and the subject of experiences. As a

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<sup>69</sup> Polish text: “Przecież religia podobnie jak etyka też jest w zasadniczej mierze wykwitem natury ludzkiej.[...] Sama rozumna natura ludzka stanowi podstawę nie tylko etyki, ale również i religii. [...] W ten sposób religia, cześć Boża, należy do programu naturalnej moralności. Nie przede wszystkim religia implikuje etykę, ale przede wszystkim etyka implikuje religię jako elementarny przejaw sprawiedliwości.” Ibid., 226–227.

conscious subject, he realizes and experiences himself as reveals in performing actions towards the *common good* and become the basis for the fact of authentic inter-subjectivity relationship.

Wojtyła realizes that his theory of person has a significant role in various fields. One of them is the social field. Through his theory of person, he wants to show the deepest reasons and conditions of the social nature of man. This effort to go beyond the superficial understanding of human being is only a member of a species or an individual. Polish philosopher acknowledges that man, as a person, has a social nature. It means that man does not live alone but with others. In short, he lives and acts together with others. However, there is a form of social life that is unique only for man as person, so that togetherness with others does not only appear as the multiplicity of the same species like by animals which also live and work with the members of the same species. Because according to him, the above understanding is still limited to an objectivist approach, which has not explained a full truth about personal existence. The social and relational dimensions of human being, which are conditioned significantly by understanding the internal structure of human personal existence, have not been included. Thus, there is an insufficiency in this understanding because the uniqueness and wealth of the human person has not been fully exposed. Because of that, a deeper exploration is needed to see the social dimension of human being related to the internal structure of his personal existence. In the front of many forms of human society arises the question of which from them are more appropriate to realize the personal potentiality of human being, and which lead instead to its degradation. The problem concerns the foundations of such forms of social life that would be most appropriate for a man as a person. By analyzing this issue, Wojtyła discovers the principle of community, which can be applied to all forms of social groups. It is about the principle of participation, which determines the existence of a human community oriented towards the *common good*. This principle is one of the important expressions of the personal structure of self-determination. The lack of participation leads to the non-formation of the community

Taking into account the conducted above considerations about the subjectivity of the human person, attention should now be focused on the role of the subjectivity of the human person in shaping the community based on the principle of participation, where the personal structure of self-determination can be a condition for the structure of the human community. In short, it is about showing that the community based on interpersonal and social relations can only be created by a personal subject. Wojtyła says:

We can speak meaningfully of community only in the light of persons, which means only in the context of the person as the proper subject of existence and

activity, both personal and communal, and only in relation to the personal subjectivity of human being, because only this aspect allows us to grasp essential property of human I's and their relationship, both interpersonal and social.<sup>70</sup>

As such, the person constitutes a community through an act of self-determination and realizes his self-fulfillment in the community. It means that the community does not constitute a man to be a person or a self and should not be the basis of how the person determines or decides about a certain way to exist and act. That is why Wojtyła said about human communities: “their social and communal nature is rooted in the nature of person and not vice versa.”<sup>71</sup> In addition, community is an essential reality for human coexistence and cooperation, and it serves as a fundamental norm for such coexistence and cooperation in various systems of interpersonal and social relationship on account of the principle of participation. This principle shows the fact of the role of personal subjectivity which guarantees a strict connection between person and community.

Moreover, personal subjectivity refers to the dynamic correlation between a person and action, a fundamental reality that conditions a person to act together with others.<sup>72</sup> This fundamental reality is the basis of all actions that have a social, communal and inter-human feature. Thus, the person's actions in different social groups or communities still belongs to him. Therefore, subjectivity, which shows the dynamic correlation of action with the person, is a condition for forming the community. Without personal subjectivity, the community is disappeared.

#### **4.3.2. Participation as a Constitutive Factor of Community**

Wojtyła's most important contribution to reflection on human social life is the concept of participation formulated by him. In his view, a real human community is formed by the person in and through participation. It was shown earlier that understanding the subjectivity of the human person plays an important role in the theory of participation. At this point, it is necessary to look at the consequences that the theory of participation understood in this way brings to the understanding of human community, which plays a key role in shaping social life.

It should be emphasized again here that Wojtyła analyzes community in the context of person's action. The theory of participation is seen from the perspective of philosophy,

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<sup>70</sup> Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 253.

<sup>71</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 319.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

especially the philosophy of the person. According to Wojtyła, participation in the human community in the history of philosophy explained by reference to the human nature. The idea of participation was introduced in philosophy by Plato to explain the relationship between the one and many, or forms (ideas) and images (sensible things) to answer the central problems in pre-Socratic philosophy, namely change and movement.<sup>73</sup> For Plato, every form is a unity able to be “divided over many.” Forms are present in or present to sensible things, from which they are separate.<sup>74</sup> Sensible things are copies or participation in forms as universal realities that don’t change, while sensible things are the subject of change.<sup>75</sup> In short, participation in Plato’s notion explains the relation of forms (ideas) and sensible things in which all things that have the same name share the common nature of the species.<sup>76</sup> Aristotle criticized the Platonic view of participation which asserted a thing coming into being depends on external form and its destruction depends on withdrawal from that form. For Aristotle, the participation of sensible things in eternal forms is insufficient in explaining the problems of change and movement. He emphasized the immanence of form in sensible substances and the causality of the individual singular in the process of natural becoming.<sup>77</sup> St. Thomas overcomes Plato’s notion of the vertical participation and Aristotle’s principle of the real composition and the real causality in finite being by developing his own original notion of participation based on the concept of *esse* as *actus essendi* which makes it possible to pass from finite being to infinite Being. For him, the most fundamental aspect of metaphysical participation is participation in *esse*. Therefore, there are essential elements in his notion of participation, which are still related to *esse*, including: the concept of act and potency, unicity of the substantial form in all bodies, living beings and man himself with his spiritual, the real distinction between essence and *esse* or act of being in creatures, and participation in relation between creatures and their creator.<sup>78</sup> In relation to *esse* as a fundamental aspect of participation, St. Thomas developed the notion of participation as a form of causality. Thus, the participation developed in the Platonic and Thomistic traditions is more in a metaphysical sense to explain the reality of beings, in contrast to the direction emphasized by Wojtyła, namely participation from an anthropological perspective.

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<sup>73</sup> See Cornelio Fabro, “The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of Participation,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 27, no. 3, trans. B. M. Bonansea (March 1974): 454, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20126484>.

<sup>74</sup> See Plato, *Phaedo*, 100d, Perseus Digital Library, <https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DPhaedo%3Asection%3D100d>.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 102b; see also Maryniarczyk, *The Monistic and Dualistic Interpretation*, 94–100.

<sup>76</sup> Fabro, “The Notion of Participation,” 454; Andzej Maryniarczyk SDB, *On Causes, Participation, and Analogy*, vol. 6, trans. Hugh McDonald (Lublin: PTTA, 2017), 90–91.

<sup>77</sup> Fabro, “The Notion of Participation,” 457.

<sup>78</sup> See Ibid., 463–468.

For Wojtyła, the social nature of man, with the concept of nature, is an objective approach that does not seem to show the full truth of personal existence. Social nature in this sense indicates as if it is only accidental for every human being thus evincing the absence of the experience of the uniqueness and unrepeatability of every human being. An understanding of the social dimension of the human being must go beyond the objective understanding of the human person. An example is the metaphysical approach to the person by Boethius and continued by St. Thomas which is important and useful. Nevertheless, for Wojtyła, this understanding needs to be complemented by references to experience in order to achieve the whole subjective specificity of the person.<sup>79</sup>

Wojtyła also intends to use the concept of participation to determine the foundation of acting together with others, namely the person himself. Another motive is to show that everything that forms the personalistic value of an action (the performance of the action itself and the realization of the transcendence and integration of the person contained in it) is realized because of the action together with others.<sup>80</sup> It has been discussed previously that participation begins with self-awareness and self-ownership as well as awareness of the presence of the other as another “I,” and self-determination is the essential factor for every action that is performed consciously by oneself. Participation itself has at least the meaning of “basically serve to express the property by virtue of which we as persons exist and act together with others, while not ceasing to be ourselves or to fulfill ourselves in action, in our action.”<sup>81</sup> Or it also can be said as “the ability to exist and act together with others in such a way that in this existing and acting we remain ourselves and actualize ourselves, which means our own I’s.”<sup>82</sup> For Polish philosopher, this notion of participation does not have much in common with the Platonic and Scholastic notion.<sup>83</sup> So, participation is understood as a potentiality or ability that must be actualized and there we also talk about participation as a task. In other meaning, participation is not only related to humanity or the essence of human beings, but more than that, to the awareness that the others are another “I” and neighbor who are unique and unrepeatable.

Wojtyła explains the form of participation associated with the *I-other* and *we* relationship. In the *I-other* relationship, the “I” is the concrete subject of the action and not the content of consciousness, although in and through consciousness “I” experiences itself. The other is also another “I,” which is the subject of the action. The reality of the other is not only in

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<sup>79</sup> Hołub et al., *The Polish Christian Philosophy*, 75.

<sup>80</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 269.

<sup>81</sup> Wojtyła, “Participation or Alienation?” 200.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

the knowledge of being “human” but the lived experience that is given to the “I” that the other is also another “I,” or neighbor. Indeed, the concept or knowledge of human beings has not created the *I-other* relationship, but it fundamentally opens the way to the lived experience of the other as “I.” So, the *I-other* relationship is not made yet but is in potentiality and must be actualized so that it is a particular task.<sup>84</sup> The actualization of participation in humanity in relation to the *I-other* relationship proceeds from the awareness of the similarity of humanity which is then achieved in the lived experience of the other “I” as a person, so that this relationship is unique and irreplaceable. Furthermore, the realization of participation does not stop at self-awareness and self-possession but continues to self-determination. Participation is not only limited to self-awareness, which allows one to possess oneself as well as awareness and experience of other “I,” but more than that, it is related to self-determination. Self-determination is the basis and core of participation. Therefore, according to Wojtyła, “I possess myself not so much through becoming self-conscious as through self-determination. It tells me of full subjectivity and of the objective unity of actions with the being that I am as their subject. Thus it—self-possession—attests to my own ‘I’ as a person.”<sup>85</sup>

What fully reveals the “I” or person as the subject is an action. Authentic human action affirms the personal structure of self-determination. Self-determination in the case of action together with others implies and expresses participation.<sup>86</sup> Participation is a concrete way of being and acting with others. In other words, participation is a concrete way of forming a community. Without participation, there is no community. Participation occurs when the dynamic correlation of action with the person is demonstrated together with others. It means that participation is rooted in the person. It is a property of the person that determines the person to exist and act with others.<sup>87</sup> Due to the corresponding participation with transcendence and integration of the person in action, it is possible for a person exists and acts together with others and achieves self-fulfillment. It means that the participation of persons in *I-other* relationship is an essential factor of the constitution of the community, and because of participation, the community becomes truly an “authentic subjective community.” This is the first way of understanding participation. Participation as a property of the person that is realized by being and acting with others is expressed through authentic attitudes such as solidarity and opposition,

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<sup>84</sup> See *Ibid.*, 200–201.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 202.

<sup>86</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 270.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 326; see also Alfred Marek Wierzbicki, “Reading the Text of the Human (Glosses on Plato, Karol Wojtyła and Margaret S. Archer): 127–136; Słomka, *The Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła*, 51–64; Dean Edward A. Mejos, “Against Alienation: Karol Wojtyła’s Theory of Participation,” *Kritike* 1, no. 1 (June 2007): 71–85, DOI:10.25138/1.1.a.5.

which then leads to dialogue. The principle of dialogue does not avoid tension and conflict but raises what is right in difference or what is the source of goodness for man. This is in contrast to non-authentic attitudes of participation, such as conformity and abandonment. In the authentic attitude, transcendence and self-determination are shown, but in the non-authentic attitude, transcendence and self-determination are ignored.

Wojtyła insists that the community is not a substantial subject of the action.<sup>88</sup> Being and acting together with others (community) does not form a new subject but only introduces a new relationship among persons who are the real and actual subjects. The subject of one's subjectivity is "conscious 'I' or person" which is associated with the subject of other's subjectivity i.e., "other conscious I's." Consequently, community is not a subject in inter-subjectivity.

Moreover, participation is in the form of *we* relationship. The pronoun *we* indicates the social dimension of the human being as distinguished from the interpersonal dimension in *I-other* relationship. In the *I-other* relationship, it directly indicates the person himself, and indirectly indicates plurality. Meanwhile, the relation of *we* directly refers to plurality and indirectly to persons belonging to plurality. The *we* relationship indicates a collection consisting of individuals who are persons.<sup>89</sup> The term community refers to the community of action that is conditioned by the community of being. In this perspective, there are objective and subjective sides of the community. An objective community of action is defined according to the goals that bring a person to act together with others. A subjective community of action is related to the subjective moment of participation, where everyone realizes that they are acting together towards an objective goal. The objective goal is the *common good*. It refers to the good that is shared by all members of the community. Each social group can have a different *common good*, but the common condition is the reference to the truth about this good so that it becomes a real *common good* that deserves to be reached by persons. Accordingly, the *common good* can also be understood in two senses, objective and subjective. In an objective sense, it is the goal of common acting by a group of persons. And in a subjective sense, it is associated with participation as a property of the acting person. So, in the *we* relationship, there is a fact of the plurality of subjects, but there is also a reality of unity which is constituted by them based on the *common good*. Thus, the *common good* can be identified as the goal of the community. Each

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<sup>88</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 277.

<sup>89</sup> See Wojtyła, "The Person: Subject and Community," 246–251; Wojtyła, "Participation or Alienation?" 200.



person fulfills himself in the community because of the unification of the person's participation in accordance with the *common good*.

Person and “the others” in the community are not only members of the community that exist and act together based on the *common good* to be achieved, but also they are neighbors. Wojtyła said, “every neighbor as belonging to a community and every member of a community as neighbor.”<sup>90</sup> Talking about neighbors, emphasis is given to the very fundamental interrelation of human beings in their “humanity.” Even though one is a member of different communities, the shared humanity becomes the basis for the community. Every member of the community is a neighbor because of the sharing of humanity, even though in the community, there are various levels of intimacy and closeness to each other. This is the second meaning of participation.

As far as the system or status of neighbors and members of the community are concerned, which expresses the social nature of human beings, love appears to coordinate coexistence and action with others. The evangelical commandment of love, “thou shalt love,” says what is necessary for the community that is formed. The conscious realization of commandment leads to the certainty that the community is truly human. The commandment of love has the role of the rule to exist and act with others in order to avoid the danger of alienation. This commandment must be placed within everyone so that the good actions and existence with others can be realized. Wojtyła emphasizes: “The commandment to love defines the proper measure of the task and demands that all people—persons and communities—most posit for themselves so that all the good of acting and existing ‘together with others’ can be truly realized.”<sup>91</sup>

From the explanation above, it can be understood that community, as a community of being and acting, is formed in and through participation, in the *I-other* and *we* relationship, showing the personal structure of self-determination. Participation, as a constitutive factor of the community is the effect of self-determination, showing the crucial role of subjectivity, in which the human person is the subject that determines how to act with others towards the *common good* to achieve self-fulfillment in the community.

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<sup>90</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 351.

<sup>91</sup> Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 414.

#### 4.3.3. Alienation as the Absence of Participation

Considering broadly and formulating the original concept of participation, Wojtyła also made a significant contribution to the reflection on the problem of alienation of the human person as the opposite of participation. The term alienation was introduced into philosophy in the 19th century by Georg W. F. Hegel and adopted by Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx. In Feuerbach's philosophical thought, religion has alienated human being from himself. Religion is only a projection of human mind which has caused human being to be unable to be himself. Therefore, for him, man can end his alienation and become himself if he abolishes religion. For Marx, Feuerbach has not yet explained the real reason human being is alienated from himself. According to Marx's philosophy, human being is alienated by his products, namely the economic system, politics, property and work, and even religion. What must be done is to transform the world of human products, change the economic and political system, and overcome the influence of religion on human life.<sup>92</sup> In this way, alienation has become a widely discussed aspect of modern anthropology and contemporary thinking about man.

According to Wojtyła, alienation should be analyzed from the perspective of participation in *I-other* and *we* relationship. How alienation relates to the *I-other* and *we* relations? If "participation is a property of each 'I,' by virtue of which 'I' fulfill itself by existing and acting together with others" in interpersonal community *I-other* and social community *we*, then alienation is the opposition of participation.<sup>93</sup> It is the antithesis of participation in interpersonal and social communities. Therefore, for Wojtyła, we cannot speak of alienation on the basis of the definition of species of man, but of man as a personal subject. Alienation is "essentially a personalistic problem."<sup>94</sup> Alienation occurs in two ways in terms of social and interpersonal relations.

First, alienation appears as a neglect of concrete ways to exist and act together with others that affirms the personal structure of self-determination. In the social dimension, alienation arises when the multiplicity of human subjects, which are particular I's, are unable to develop appropriately in the direction of the authentic *we*. In this state, man exists and acts together with others, but he does not find himself as a subject and does not fulfill himself, because he has distanced himself or because society through faulty structures does not provide a basis for self-fulfillment, or ignore his rights to these needs. Alienation in this social dimension

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<sup>92</sup> Wojtyła, "Participation or Alienation?" 205.

<sup>93</sup> Wojtyła, "The Person: Subject and Community," 255; see also Mejos, "Against Alienation." 75–76.

<sup>94</sup> Wojtyła, "The Person: Subject and Community," 255.

narrows and even eliminates the human *we*,<sup>95</sup> where every “I” is a subject. The meaning of this alienation can be associated with defective social, economic, political, or international systems. For Wojtyła, the way to fix this alienation is not only political, economic or sociological but must be in a personalistic way. That means the man who exists and acts together with others needs to find certainty about the meaning of participation and try to realize it.

Second, alienation appears as a neglect of the humanity of man, which is indicated by the term neighbor.<sup>96</sup> In the personal dimension or *I-other* (thou) relation, “alienation as antithesis of participation signifies a constriction or annihilation of everything through which one human being is another self for another human being.”<sup>97</sup> In this interpersonal relationship, the other person is a neighbor or another “I.” However, in alienation, the neighbor or the other “I” is a stranger or even an enemy. Examples of this alienation are found in horrific historical facts such as in concentration camps. This alienation causes the loss of the lived experience of humanity. In fact, based on the most fundamental “principle of humanness,” the “I” can participate in both interpersonal and social communities. However, the avoidance of the fundamental principle indicates that there is a limitation or even complete abolition of participation as a neighbor and member of the community.

In addition, Wojtyła’s understanding of participation as the actualization of the *I-others* relationship is also contrary to individualism.<sup>98</sup> The characteristic of this idea is a self-sufficient. Relationships with other people are merely incidental. In the view of individualism, a person is only an isolated individual who is focused on his own interests and goodness. Community only exists to protect individual rights from interference by others without an ontological reality based on a person. Thus, individualism is totally contrary to the nature of the person. So to speak, individualism is also another kind of alienation which abandons the structure of self-determination to participate with others.

So, alienation causes the human being is losing personal subjectivity. In alienation there is a negligence of the possibility of the experience of the person being the subject of his actions, whereas in interpersonal and social communities, the subjectivity of the person plays a very important role. Wojtyła said: “alienation as the antithesis of participation, and thus its opposite or negation, does not so much ‘dehumanize’ the human being as an individual of the species as it

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 256.

<sup>96</sup> Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 354; Wojtyła, “Participation or Alienation?” 206; Mejos, “Against Alienation,” 75; Słomka, *The Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła*, 197–207.

<sup>97</sup> Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 256.

<sup>98</sup> Spinello, “Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy,” 42.

threatens the person as a subject. On the other hand, participation as antithesis of alienation confirms and emphasizes the person as a subject.”<sup>99</sup> Thus, alienation ignores the transcendence and self-fulfillment of the person in action. The Person does not experience transcendence and fulfillment of himself and others in alienation. It can even be said that alienation is a danger that destroys human social nature, which is expressed in the membership of the community and neighbors.

#### 4.4. Consequences for the Understanding of Culture

Pope John Paul II, during a visit to UNESCO Headquarters in Paris on June 2, 1980, said: “A culture without human subjectivity and without human causality is inconceivable: in the cultural field, man is always the first fact: man is the prime and fundamental fact of culture.”<sup>100</sup> This statement reveals that it is impossible to talk about culture without a man because culture originates from man and belongs only to man and not other living entities. Therefore, in this section, I will show the consequences of the concept of the subjectivity of the human person in conceiving culture.

##### 4.4.1. Person as the Subject and the End of Culture

In the beginning I would like to present Wojtyła’s view concerning understanding of man in terms of praxis and then discuss the relationship between culture and human praxis, which of course, implies subjectivity. Praxis here is synonymous with work. It is more of a modern term for action.

In his writing entitled *The Problem of the Constitution of Culture through Human Praxis*, Wojtyła directly mentions the understanding of Marxists as a disguise of atheism which ignores the *Divinum* in the name of *humanum*, especially regarding praxis in relation to the creation of the human self. For him, this controversy is the context in which he reflects the idea of the constitution of culture through human praxis.<sup>101</sup> He confronts Marxism directly from the fountainhead of all western interpretations of Marx, namely *Theses on Feuerbach*.<sup>102</sup> Through this idea, the Polish philosopher intends to show that man as a person is the determining subject, and culture develops in the self-determining dimension of the subject.

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<sup>99</sup> Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 255.

<sup>100</sup> John Paul II, Address to UNESCO, 8, *Interdisciplinary Encyclopedia of Religion and Science*, accessed July 30, 2021, <https://inters.org/John-Paul-II-UNESCO-Culture>.

<sup>101</sup> Karol Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Constitution of Culture through Human Praxis,” in *Person and Community Selected Essays*, (New York: Peter Lang, 1993): 265.

<sup>102</sup> Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła*, 293.

Marxists “proposes a collective form of existence for the *humanum* as both the fundamental and final form.”<sup>103</sup> Human existence is not placed before the action of man; on the contrary human existence is the effect of human work. Self is the effect of the work. In this sense, human existence is not placed on the metaphysical level but on the social level. The metaphysical subjectivity is radically refuted in Marxism.<sup>104</sup> This is replaced by collective subjectivity revealed through praxis.

Then, how to talk about praxis without leaving the existence of the subject in a metaphysical sense? It is a problem that Wojtyła emphasizes and explores as an evaluation of the concept of Marxism in terms of praxis and the creation of the human self. Wojtyła examines the problem of praxis with reference to the philosophy of action of St. Thomas Aquinas, where human action is necessarily transitive (*transiens*) and intransitive (*intransiens/immanens*). Action is transitive insofar as it relates to objects in the external world. In contrast, action is intransitive insofar as it forms the subject itself. Wojtyła states as follow:

It is transitive insofar it tends beyond the subject, seeks an expression and effect in the external world, and is objectified in some product. It is intransitive, on the other hand, insofar as it remains in the subject, determines the subject's immanent quality or value and constitutes the subject's essentially human fiery.<sup>105</sup>

As far as work or praxis is concerned, for Wojtyła it is possible as long as man exists. He refers to the famous saying of scholastics, *operari sequitur esse*. Wojtyła's thought, which is deeply rooted in the Thomistic tradition, fosters the innovation that human existence precedes action. However, man manifests itself in action and work is a place for the realization of humanity of man.<sup>106</sup> Thus, the understanding that praxis defines and determines the subject and eliminates the metaphysical aspect of the subject (*suppositum humanum*) is an absurdity. According to Wojtyła, if we want to talk about the constitution of human culture through praxis, then our first footing is that man must be understood in terms of metaphysics and praxiology.

Wojtyła first reiterates St. Thomas' notion about the meaning of culture that, in reality, is a characteristic of human life, especially in relation to the transitive and intransitive of human praxis.<sup>107</sup> No other entity in the visible world has these characteristics. He says: “man lives a

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<sup>103</sup> Wojtyła, “The Constitution of Culture,” 265.

<sup>104</sup> Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła*, 298.

<sup>105</sup> Wojtyła, “The Constitution of Culture,” 266.

<sup>106</sup> Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła*, 301.

<sup>107</sup> In ancient Greek the concept of culture was understood in terms of cultivating land (*cultus agri*) as well as efforts to transform human interiority (*cultura animi*). Plato was the first to distinguish two types of culture, namely material or external which includes food, clothing, techniques and so on, which was embodied by Hephaestus, and

really human life thanks to culture. Human life is culture in the sense to that, through it, man is distinguished and differentiated from everything that exists elsewhere in the visible world: man cannot do without culture.”<sup>108</sup> We cannot speak of culture in terms of the life of animals, plants and inanimate objects in this world. Culture is unique to man. It is a specific way of manifesting human existence and being.<sup>109</sup> In short, it touches human existence and being. In the classical sense, only man with rational nature has culture. With the distinctive faculties belonging to rational nature, man can cultivate culture, especially reason which has an important and definite role in seeing human goals.<sup>110</sup>

Of course, Wojtyła’s innovative concept contradicts western tradition, which has given a privileged position to the objective aspect of work in which man is the master of nature. Meanwhile, the subjective aspect is not appreciated and given a place, even though in and through human praxis, people realize themselves. How, therefore, to explain culture in terms of human praxis, which has objective and subjective aspects? Which aspect is more related to culture in Wojtyła’s view?

For Wojtyła, culture is constituted by man as a person through praxis. And the purpose of culture is for the human person himself. Culture develops principally in the dimension of the self-determining subject. With the created culture, man lives a truly human life that is different from other creations. He says: “Man who, in the visible world, is the only ontic subject of culture, is also its object and its term [...]. Man, and only man, is the ‘protagonist,’ or architect of culture: man, and only man, expresses himself in it and find his own balance in it.”<sup>111</sup> Culture in Wojtyła’s thought should be understood in two senses, namely, “culture of human works” and “human culture” or more precisely “culture of person.”<sup>112</sup> The culture of human works, covering various types of products, is constituted through the transitive aspect of the action. Meanwhile, the culture of person is constituted through the intransitive aspect of the action. Human actions form these two cultures simultaneously. However, for Wojtyła, the cultivation of the internal life or the formation of the qualities/values of person deserves to light up in the act of creating

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internal or spiritual which was found in the search for obtaining wisdom through philosophy, art and religion embodied by Athena. Wojtyła also follows this tradition but he focuses more on the specifics of human action as in the philosophy of activity of St. Thomas Aquinas, transitive and intransitive of human action. See Dariusz Radziechowski, “Culture of the Person and Culture of Works According to Karol Wojtyła,” *Logos I Ethos* 1, no. 56 (2021): 89-90, DOI:<http://dx.doi.org/10.156333/lie.3940>.

<sup>108</sup> John Paul II, Address to UNESCO, 6.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Cf., Piotr Jaroszyński, *Science in Culture*, trans. Hugh McDonald (Amsterdam-New York: Radopi, 2007), 219–220.

<sup>111</sup> John Paul II, Address to UNESCO, 7.

<sup>112</sup> See Radziechowski, “Culture of the Person,” 89.

external objects. Wojtyła Says: “Culture is basically oriented not so much toward the creation of human products as toward the creation of the human self, which then radiates out into the world of products.”<sup>113</sup> Culture is always in an essential and definite relation to “what man is” or to the being of man, and furthermore concerns the relation to “what he has.” Speaking about culture, the emphasis is “in first place in relation to man then only in a secondary and indirect way in relation to the world of his products.”<sup>114</sup> As such, culture is closely related to being and having, which man as a person, through praxis, forms and creates.

So from the explanation above, according to Wojtyła, the priority of the man-person as the subject of activity has a fundamental significance for the formation of culture through praxis. The priority of man-person as a subject is understood in a metaphysical and praxiological sense.<sup>115</sup> In a metaphysical sense, the action comes from an already existing subject. Thus, praxis comes from the subject and is determined by the subject. Or in other words, praxis requires man as subject, and not vice versa. Therefore, man as a person exists as the ontic cause of culture.<sup>116</sup> In the praxiological sense, we speak on the transitive and intransitive of human action. Whatever we make in our actions and whatever effects or products we simultaneously “make ourselves” in it too. In this praxiological sense, the essence of praxis is found in self-expression or self-realization and self-fulfillment (auto-teleology), and at the same time, the formation of a more human external reality takes place. Thus, the culture that is constituted through praxis can be understood and defined only through the metaphysical and praxiological priorities that describe human subjectivity. So, culture is not limited to praxis and its products but emphasis the person as the subject of his praxis and the formation or fulfillment of self through praxis and the humanization of the environment. Consequently, the constitution of human culture depends on the reciprocal relationship between the authentic causality of the person to the culture, and the actual constitution of culture through human praxis, because man does not merely, by his existence, cause the culture. Likewise, in the same way, the formation of the self involves the reciprocal relationship between the ontological fact of the person as *suppositum* and the praxeological fact of the person constituting himself.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Wojtyła, “The Constitution of Culture,” 265.

<sup>114</sup> John Paul II, Address to UNESCO, 7.

<sup>115</sup> Wojtyła, “The Constitution of Culture,” 266–267.

<sup>116</sup> John Paul II, Address to UNESCO, 7; see also John Corringan, “The Problem of the Constitution of Culture in the Thought of Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II, Academia, accessed on August 15, 2022, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313074093\\_THE\\_PROBLEM\\_OF\\_THE\\_CONSTITUTION\\_OF\\_CULTURE\\_IN\\_THE\\_THOUGHT\\_OF\\_KAROL\\_WOJTYLAJOHN\\_PAUL\\_II](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313074093_THE_PROBLEM_OF_THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_CULTURE_IN_THE_THOUGHT_OF_KAROL_WOJTYLAJOHN_PAUL_II).

<sup>117</sup> Wojtyła, “The Constitution of Culture,” 267.

There are two important things that are criticized here in relation to the constitution of culture through praxis in the modern and even contemporary era, among others: man as a tool in praxis and not as a goal, and praxis which only tends to transform the world. Strictly speaking, the man in relation to praxis cannot be deprived of his auto-teleology, as the Creator of man intended.<sup>118</sup> In praxis, man cannot be associated as a tool, but, on the contrary, he is the subject of praxis in a metaphysical sense, who forms himself in his own action, which shows the intransitive side of human activity in a praxiological sense. This also means that the intransitive side of human activity is more important than the transitive side. Here, Wojtyła states that “in other words, that which conditions the value of human beings and comprises the essential human quality of their activity is more important than that which is objectified in some product or other and serves to transform the world or merely exploit it.”<sup>119</sup> Therefore, for him, society or civilization that is only concerned with the priority of products and consumption alone is a civilization of “death of humanity,”<sup>120</sup> because the human being is not only consumer but creator by nature. Thus, a praxis that makes man a tool and a praxis that is solely oriented to the transformation of the world and its exploitation is not the basis for the constitution of culture. Because such praxis does not make the man more human, and it does not make the world a proper place for man, as stated by the Second Vatican Council, “to make the world more human place,” or “to make human existence in the world more human.”<sup>121</sup>

Thus, the role of the subjectivity in relation to the constitution of culture and the goals of culture are revealed through human priority over praxis which is understood in the metaphysical and praxiological sense. In the metaphysical sense, the praxis that constitutes culture reveals and explains the human person is the subject who creates culture. In a praxiological sense, a person is the subject through his praxis forming himself or fulfilling himself and creating a more human external reality. Here the formation and purpose of culture occurs in the transitive and intransitive dimensions of praxis showing the significant role of the human person’s subjectivity.

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<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 266–267. Wojtyła refers to Kant’s thought, “act in such away that the person is always an end and never a means of your action,” and also he refers to Decree of Vatican II Council, *Gaudium et Spes* 24, “the one creature on earth that God willed for itself.”

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., 272.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 268.



#### 4.4.2. Towards True Humanistic Culture

This section presents a brief analysis of the role of subjectivity in the constitution of a true humanistic culture, in which universal values become the reference, and also an analysis of the religion signaling the important role it plays in achieving that constitution.

If culture is constituted through praxis, then the question arises: what is the reference for praxis so that it is said that praxis is appropriate to constitute a culture? The praxis that constitutes culture must conform to the rational order. Such praxis has a deep connection to truth, good and beauty. This relationship has a disinterestedness and non-utilitarian character. Disinterestedness means selflessness. In this relationship, a man directs himself beyond all personal interests and benefits. The praxis that is being carried out is in relation to the *bonum honestum* and not a utilitarian good (*bonum utile*) or benefit for oneself. The transitive aspect of creative activity or praxis should remain in a disinterested openness at truth, good and beauty. Along with this, the praxis that includes its external products is radiation of the openness of humanity to the values mentioned. And for Wojtyła, this openness is truly internal and it is an immanent activity of the soul. He quotes a passage from *Promethidion* of Cyprian Norwid, “beauty exists that we might be enticed to work,” which is to show that the eternal source of culture that springs forth from the human soul.<sup>122</sup> Therefore, according to him, culture is not only constituted through praxis which has disinterestedness and inner reference to truth, goodness and beauty, but also, at the same time, human praxis in its authentic form is determined through culture.<sup>123</sup>

As far as culture is concerned, Wojtyła maintains that human being, like other beings, experiences death as a natural necessity. However, only human being is aware of this necessity. And the meaning of this death appears in relation to the hope of immortality. The culture constituted by the praxis solely for *bonum utile* is doomed to exhaustion. Meanwhile, praxis possessing the power of communion with disinterested truth, good and beauty, which also emphasizes the intransitive aspect, seems to be immortal and inexhaustible. Immortality does not mean that the name of creators of the works born of that communion are remembered from generation to generation, but more importantly people from different generations rediscovers the intransitive in themselves.<sup>124</sup> So, intransitivity here means, in a sense, immortality.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> Ibid., 269–270.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., 271.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., 272.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

It has been explained in the previous section that in relation to the human person as the subject and the goal of culture, Wojtyła firmly stated that human being creates culture, lives and needs culture and shapes himself through culture. Culture is the proper way of human existence as well as a confirmation of humanity. In the other worlds, culture exists only by human being, and for himself.<sup>126</sup> Regarding the constitution of culture, there are the crucial roles of the transitive and intransitive elements of human action. Thus, Wojtyła emphasizes culture in relation to the transcendence of the person towards universal values as a personalistic principle of culture's formation. When talking about culture in relation to universal values, he called it "the true culture" as a "complete culture" which is in opposition to "shattered culture." In his address to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, Wojtyła/ John Paul II states:

Contemporary culture demands *a constant effort to synthesize knowledge and to integrate learning*. Of course, the successes which we see are due to the specialisation of research. But unless this is balanced by a reflection concerned with articulating the various branches of knowledge, there is a great risk that we shall have a "shattered culture," which would in fact be the negation of true culture. A true culture cannot be conceived of without humanism and wisdom.<sup>127</sup>

This indicates the existence of various kinds of culture, even anti-culture or culture of death, as Wojtyła explained in *Evangelium vitae*, which challenges the modern and contemporary world because it presents the cultural relativism and even aversion to values. Therefore, there is a need for the cultural renewal towards the true culture because the future of humanity depends on a culture. For Wojtyła, the human person remains the center of culture because he is the subject and goal of the culture. In this position, the human person who presents a way of life that is closely related to the universal values presents this "true culture." According to him, in and through the true culture, man expresses and fulfills himself completely. In so doing, man also lives a human life freely and responsibly. In this way, the true culture is closely related to religion. Religion has a significant role in the constitution of the true culture. For him, both have an organic and constitutive essential relationship that contributes to the extension of reality which can be defined as concrete expressions of culture in history. Wojtyła states:

*The presence of the Apostolic See in your Organization—though motivated also by the specific sovereignty of the Holy See—has as its justification above all in the organic and constitutive link which exists between religion in general and*

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<sup>126</sup> Osewska, Stala, Bochenek, "Religion and National Culture," 10; see also Pontifical Council for Culture, "Towards a Pastoral Approach to Culture," accessed February 16, 2022, [https://www.vatican.va/roman\\_curia/pontifical\\_councils/cultur/documents/rc\\_pc\\_cultur\\_doc\\_03061999\\_pastoral\\_en.html](https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/cultur/documents/rc_pc_cultur_doc_03061999_pastoral_en.html).

<sup>127</sup> John Paul II, "Address to the Plenary Session on 'The Emergence of Complexity in Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry and Biology,'" *The Pontifical Academy of Sciences* (October 31, 1992), accessed February 7, 2023, <https://www.pas.va/en/magisterium/saint-john-paul-ii/1992-31-october.html>.

Christianity in particular, on the one hand, and *culture*, on the other hand. This relationship extends to the multiple realities which must be defined as concrete expressions of culture in the different periods of history and all over the world. It will certainly not be an exaggeration to state in particular that, through a multitude of facts, the whole of Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals—bears witness, in the history of each nation as in that of the whole community, to the link between culture and Christianity.<sup>128</sup>

In this constitutive relationship between culture and religion, it can be said that religion is an element of culture's formation because religion leads human being to God, the absolute truth, and shapes human being according to God's ideas.<sup>129</sup> In such a constitutive relationship, Wojtyła amplifies his conceiving that religion is primarily a specific relationship between human being and God<sup>130</sup> which has a dominant role in the constitution of culture and not merely a field or product of culture. I would like to exemplify some quotes to affirm Wojtyła's understanding. On the one hand, he shows the necessary direction of human relation towards God, which is appeared in his desire to know Divine truth. He emphasizes: "God has placed in the human heart a desire to know the truth—in a word, to know himself—so that, by knowing and loving God, men and women may also come to the fullness of truth about themselves."<sup>131</sup> And to religious people from various traditions, God places within them what is called *semina Verbi* (seeds of the Word)<sup>132</sup> to search Divine truth. Thus, the dimension of religiosity has been embedded in human nature so that, for Wojtyła, the human being recognizes himself as moral being but also religious being.<sup>133</sup> On the other hand, God also communicates Himself to the human being, especially in the full Revelation through Jesus Christ so that the human being knows the truth of God and also the truth of himself, as Wojtyła says: "Revelation therefore introduces into our history a universal and ultimate truth."<sup>134</sup> He also states: "Christ certainly desires faith. He desires it of man and he desires it for man. To people seeking miracles from Him He would respond: 'your faith has saved you.'"<sup>135</sup> In turn, about Christianity he claims: "Christianity is not only a religion

<sup>128</sup> John Paul II, Address to UNESCO, 9.

<sup>129</sup> Osewska, Stala, Bochenek, "Religion and National Culture," 12.

<sup>130</sup> Such an understanding might be juxtaposed with an interesting explanation from the American philosopher, Mortimer J. Adler about Religion, who thinks that religion cannot be narrowly treated as just a branch or field of culture but rather as a special relationship to God, in which the human being freely seek to transcend his natural dimensions and through the faculties of the human soul unite with the Divine Person. See Tomasz Duma, "The Great Ideas: Causes of Human Transcendence or Enslavement?" in *The Great Ideas of Religion and Freedom A Semiotic Reinterpretation of the Great Ideas Movement for the 21st Century*, ed. Peter A. Redpath, Imelda Chłódna-Błach and Arthur Mamcarz-Plisiecki (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2021): 144.

<sup>131</sup> John Paul II, Introduction to *Fides et Ratio*.

<sup>132</sup> John Paul II, *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*, ed. Vittorio Messori, trans. Jenne McPhee and Martha McPhee (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), 81.

<sup>133</sup> Cf., *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>134</sup> John Paul II, *Fides et Ratio*, 14.

<sup>135</sup> John Paul II, *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*, 193.

of knowledge, of contemplation. It is a religion of God's action and men's action."<sup>136</sup> Thus, a number of short excerpts above are a description of Polish philosopher's thought which explain his understanding of religion in the relational sense between the human being and God. Religion in this sense is really significant for the formation of culture because it presents the true knowledge about creations, human being, and God. Therefore, Wojtyła highlights the fundamental relationship between the truth of Gospel and the human being in his very humanity, which is the foundation for the creators of cultures. In this way, faith and human freedom in relation to the truth of the Gospel plays an important role in the formation of the true culture, which has implications for the self-fulfillment and social transformation because "the purpose of the Gospel, in fact, is 'to transform humanity from within and to make it new.'"<sup>137</sup> In addition, regarding Christianity, Wojtyła maintains that culture is not only a means of living and expression of faith but it, in many ways, also determines Christians live out their faith. Starting from these bases, it is certain that the creators of cultures must consider the final and paramount consequence of the creating culture, namely, man as a particular and autonomous value. Wojtyła says:

I am thinking above all, Ladies and Gentlemen, *of the fundamental link between the Gospel, that is, the message of Christ and the Church, and man in his very humanity.* This link is in fact a creator of culture in its very foundation. To create culture, it is necessary to consider, to its last consequences and entirely, man as a particular and autonomous value, as the subject bearing the transcendence of the person. Man must *be affirmed for himself*, and not for any other motive or reason: solely for himself! What is more, man must be loved because he is man.<sup>138</sup>

This explains that religion and culture both emphasize the main goal, namely the fulfillment of human self. Religion (Christianity) directs a human person in culture in achieving holiness or *sacrum* for his self-fulfillment. The attainment of the self-fulfillment is the synthesis of the act of human freedom and religious faith towards the pursuit of truth.<sup>139</sup> In this way, the self-fulfillment is tantamount with felicity or beatitude that derives from the intercourse with God and the communion with Him.<sup>140</sup> On the other hand, the narrowing of the understanding of human freedom, religion and truth keeps people away from self-fulfillment and is the main cause

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<sup>136</sup> Ibid., 128.

<sup>137</sup> John Paul II, *Evangelium Vitae*, 95, accessed January 12, 2023, [https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf\\_jp-ii\\_enc\\_25031995\\_evangelium-vitae.html](https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae.html).

<sup>138</sup> John Paul II, Address to UNESCO, 10.

<sup>139</sup> Cf., Arkadiusz Gudaniec, "Karol Wojtyła on Semiotically Expressing the Great Ideas of the True and the Good," in *The Great Ideas of Religion and Freedom A Semiotic Reinterpretation of the Great Ideas Movement for the 21st Century*, ed. Peter A. Redpath, Imelda Chłódna-Błach and Arthur Mamcarz-Plisiecki (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2021): 77.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., 90.

of different forms of human enslavement.<sup>141</sup> Thus, the fruit of cultural work that is open to the truth of the gospel is the perfection of human being who ultimately refers to God and finds fulfillment in Him. This is what Wojtyła calls “true culture” or complete culture which expresses the whole of man as spiritual and material coexistence. It is this culture that creates the new society he envisioned for the world, namely a “civilization of love.” A civilization that is far from relativism and anti-value tendencies.

Moreover, the relationship between religion and culture shows that cultural renewal towards a true humanistic culture involves Divine assistance and is not merely one person’s effort. In fact, in this relation, the creative power behind the creation of culture is expressed, namely God’s grace. Wojtyła writes: “Grace awakens, frees, purifies, orders and expands the creative powers of man. While it invites asceticism and renunciation, it does so in order to free the heart, a freedom eminently conducive to artistic creation as well as to thought and action based on truth.”<sup>142</sup>

In addition, for Wojtyła, a culture that makes faith its strength shows that faith is not only a private and individual matter but becomes a culture that has an impact on the life of the wider community. He testified how he was formed deeply in Polish culture, which was rooted in Christianity, where faith had entrenched and became a force that defeated antihuman culture sponsored by the totalitarian regime. He claims:

In all that I am now proclaiming, which I will develop still further, my words express a particular experience, *a particular testimony* in its kind. I am the son of a Nation which has lived the greatest experience of history, which its neighbors have condemned to death several times, but which has survived and remained itself. It has kept its identity, and it has kept, in spite of partitions and foreign occupations, its national sovereignty, not by relying on the resources of physical power, but solely *by relying on its culture*. This culture turned out in the circumstances to be more powerful than all other forces.<sup>143</sup>

Consequently, based on all the above explanations it can be said that, for Wojtyła, the convergence of the principle of the transcendence of the person with openness to the universal values is at the heart of the constitution of culture. The realization of universal values such as truth, goodness, beauty with faith and human freedom conditions the constitution of the true humanistic culture which is nothing but a personal culture synonymous with moral culture. The

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<sup>141</sup> See Duma, “The Great Ideas,” 151–154, 157–159.

<sup>142</sup> John Paul II, “The new PCC’s tasks: dialogue with non-believers and the inculturation of faith,” accessed February 19, 2023, [https://www.vatican.va/roman\\_curia/pontifical\\_councils/cultr/documents/rc\\_pc\\_cultr\\_doc\\_20000126\\_jp-ii\\_addresses-pccultr\\_en.html#10](https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/cultr/documents/rc_pc_cultr_doc_20000126_jp-ii_addresses-pccultr_en.html#10).

<sup>143</sup> John Paul II, Address to UNESCO, 14.

constitution requires true knowledge about creations, man and God, and this is where religion plays a significant role and contribution as the constitutive element of culture. In the end it needs to be underlined that for the Polish philosopher man is the prime and fundamental fact of culture; he who carries within himself personal transcendence is the subject and the goal of the culture. He lives human life freely and fulfills himself in and through the culture as a result of the convergence of his transcendence with the universal values. Thus, the role of the human person's subjectivity remains very essential and appears in the constitution of the true humanistic culture.

## Chapter Summary

The analysis and explanation of Wojtyła's notion of subjectivity, made in the section above, have consequences for anthropology, ethics, social life and the constitution of culture.

First, from the analysis of the concept of subjectivity, we can achieve enlightenment on the concept of man as a person. Anthropological studies rooted in metaphysics and equipped with a philosophy of consciousness guarantee to be able to conceive man as a person. As a person, he is wholeness, composed of body and soul. And the starting point of anthropological studies is direct experience of objects, especially in relation to "I" as both subject and object. Therefore, Wojtyła began the anthropological analysis of the internal experience of human action. He realized that integral anthropology was not limited to the basis of metaphysical studies. This basis should exist in anthropological studies but is not sufficient. It needs to be enriched and strengthened by other philosophical trends such as phenomenology, existentialism and Kantianism, as well as by other approaches, such as science and especially theology in order to achieve an integral anthropology.

Second, the analysis of the concept of subjectivity has implications or consequences also for ethics. Ethics as a normative theory of morality should be rooted in the metaphysics of man. Through metaphysical discovery, we can find and explain the person as the subject and actor of moral action. Morality is also rooted in rational nature. Due to human rational nature and its faculties, the person appears as both the subject and object of his actions. Hence, he is also responsible for the act of morality as well as the formation of himself. Through the analysis of subjectivity, we understand that ethics as a normative theory must start from moral experience and that moral experience is the experience of "I will" or the experience of self-determination.

Third, the overview of the concept of subjectivity also leads us to an understanding of social life. Human nature is both rational and social. In terms of Wojtyła, social nature is expressed through the participation where it expresses the self-determination and transcendence of human person. That means participation is the property of the person. Community or existence and action with others only occur when there is participation from each person. It can be said that subjectivity conditions inter-subjectivity. This participation can be at the level of being a member of a social group and at the level of humanity. The absence of participation is alienation. Alienation shows that the person loses subjectivity.

Fourth, the explanation of the concept of subjectivity also leads us to the understanding of the constitution of culture. According to Wojtyła, man as a person is the subject and goal of culture.

For him, the constitution of culture is principally related to the self-determining subject. The constitution of culture is understood in terms of two types of priorities from man as the subject of activity, namely metaphysics and praxeology. In a metaphysical sense, the action comes from an already existing subject. Praxis as a form of culture stems from the person as a subject and is determined by him. In a praxiological sense, the actions of the person immediately shape himself. In a praxiological sense, the essence of praxis is found in self-realization (auto-teleology) and the formation of a more human external reality. Culture constituted through praxis can be defined only through the metaphysical and praxiological dependency on the person that describes human subjectivity. As such, culture is not limited to praxis and its products but the problem of subjectivity. In addition, subjectivity analysis leads us to true culture. True culture indicates disinterestedness with truth, good, beauty and faith in relation to the transcendence of the human person. True culture is not limited to the culture of productivity, but the “culture of person” that presents the civilization of love. On the other hand, human praxis that does not have the character of disinterestedness and is only oriented towards *bonum utile* will not present the true humanistic culture.



## Conclusion

The study of the problem of subjectivity is still crucial and relevant because it is closely related to the conception of human person. The most important achievements in the field of provided research on the understanding of subjectivity in Karol Wojtyła's approach include the following. Firstly, the research aimed to formulate an adequate concept of subjectivity based on the metaphysics of man, and the comparison of influential philosophical theories which are limited to confining the problem of subjectivity in the realm of consciousness, often conceiving the latter in a purely naturalistic way. Secondly, the comprehensive understanding of human person's subjectivity provides the achievement of a correct understanding of human being among various types of concepts of man, especially reductionist. While exploring of the subjectivity problem in our research we arrived at the understanding that man as a person (self or concrete "I") has the perfection of being in the order of nature. This has been seen and formulated by St. Thomas Aquinas in his famous and enchanting dictum, *persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura, scilicet subsistens in rationali natura* (person signifies what is most perfect in all nature, that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature).<sup>1</sup> As a person, he is a substantial being who is the subject of his actions and of what happens in him. Wojtyła reiterates the constitution of man as a person as the basis of efficacy and subjectiveness by referring to the Thomistic tradition that the constitution of man as a person does not first occur at the level of either consciousness or praxiological, but at the metaphysical level. In other words, we may say that it is not because of mental processes (consciousness, reason) or actions or relationships that make the human being a person, but because of his nature. In addition, the person is the subject of experience in which he can experience his subjectivity and also experience another person as other "I." Thirdly, the achievement of the understanding of the person as a subject has consequences for the responsibility for all products that come from him. He is responsible for all conducted moral actions, for the community of actions that seek the common good, and also for the cultural and technological products that have been created. Fourthly, the achievement of a correct understanding of human being as a person from the analysis of the problem of subjectivity affirms that person himself is an "end" which should not be used and exploited as a tool for the achievement of certain goals based on interests of political ideologies or economic orientations. This understanding also reminds and guides us to always love and respect other people, regardless of race, gender, religion, social and political affiliation

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<sup>1</sup> Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I q.29 a.3 co; see also Wieszbecki, Introduction to *Man in the Field of Responsibility*, x–xi.

and so forth, and not to treat others as tools or enemies, remembering that those are others “I” or neighbors who have the same value and dignity. Fifthly, the comprehensive understanding of man based on the philosophical investigation on the problem of subjectivity of human person, and equipped by theological reflection can be the personalistic norm for the political, economic, and social system or even for the whole culture. The sixth main result of this study is to provide satisfactory answers to the challenges of theories such as subjectivism and idealism, theories or ideologies and their concrete practices which jeopardize human existence such as an extremely individualism (as in a liberal system) and anti-individualism (as in Nazism and Communism system). This study is also important to face the most recent challenge in our era, i.e., the presence of artificial intelligence or transhumanism.

The undertaken analyzes confirm that the problem of the subjectivity of human person belongs to the central issues of Wojtyła’s anthropological reflection. He alone says: “Many of the analyzes present in *The Acting Person* are closely connected with the problem of the subjectivity of human person; one might even say that they all in some way contribute to an understanding and disclose of this subjectivity [...]. The problem of subjectivity of human being is a problem of paramount philosophical importance today.”<sup>2</sup> To reach an understanding and justification of this subjectivity problem, Wojtyła combines two philosophical traditions in his anthropological thought, namely the tradition of the philosophy of being from Thomism as the basis for his framework of thought and the philosophy of consciousness or phenomenology as a supplement.

Based on the philosophy of being, Wojtyła claims that subjectivity should first be understood in the realm of metaphysics. For him, the human person is a *suppositum*. That means he is the subject of his existence and activities. All human activities, both actions (*actus humanus*) and what happens in man (*actus hominis*/activation) originate from the human person as the source. He followed Boethius’ definition of person, *Persona est individua substantia rationalis naturae*, and made it the basis of his theory of the human person in *The Acting Person*. Man is a person because of his rational nature or essence, and this is in line with what he explained in his *Considerations on the Essence of Man*, that rational nature refers to rational mental cognition and rational free will, which is described there as the spiritual character or faculty of spiritual substance which is the essence of the human person called the soul.<sup>3</sup> Wojtyła also enriches the basic theory of the person by following the claims of St. Thomas Aquinas that

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<sup>2</sup> Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” 219.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Jałoch-Palicka, “Spiritual Substance,” 107.

the person is an *incommunicabilis subsistentia*. That means the person who is a substance is also unique and unrepeatable. For Wojtyła, the concept of subjectivity based on this approach is something objective.

Wojtyła really appreciates the understanding and justification of subjectivity in the realm of metaphysics. However, for him, this is still only developed from an objective perspective without involving the categories of person's subjective lived experience. Therefore, he enriches the understanding of the metaphysical concept of subjectivity by appreciating the role of the philosophy of consciousness. With the role of consciousness, the person has a personal lived experience of himself as the subject of his activities and experiences these activities as his own. Thus, Wojtyła's concept of subjectivity is a combination of the concept of subjectivity in the realm of metaphysics and phenomenology. It exhibits that Wojtyła's subjectivity "is not just the metaphysical objectivation of human being as an acting subject, as the agent of acts, but the revelation of person as a subject experiencing its acts and inner happenings, and with its own subjectivity."<sup>4</sup> Of course, this makes it clear that Wojtyła's concept of subjectivity is not the same as subjectivism which absolutizes consciousness as an autonomous subject, because for him consciousness is only an aspect or accident which cannot exist independently from the person as a self-subsisting being. So, the absolutization or substantialization of consciousness and its contents is an anthropological error. In addition, the understanding and justification of the concept of subjectivity in the realm of metaphysics and philosophy of consciousness developed by Wojtyła is also against Marxist concept of human being, which was propagated and enforced by totalitarian communism. The Marxist conception of man as the sum of social relations is also a kind of anthropological mistake.<sup>5</sup>

The purpose of Wojtyła's analysis of the problem of subjectivity of the human person is the achievement of understanding and justification of the truth about man as a person. This personalistic understanding is not the antinomy of the cosmological understanding of man, but on the contrary, enriches and expands it because human being is not only defined according to a species but as a concrete self, a self-experiencing subject. Here he shows that the subjectivity of the human person, which originates in the person, is irreducible and should not be reduced to anything else but can be revealed or manifested.

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<sup>4</sup> Wojtyła, "Subjectivity and the Irreducible," 213.

<sup>5</sup> See John Paul II, *Centessimus Annus*, 13, accessed September 14, 2021, [https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf\\_jp-ii\\_enc\\_01051991\\_centessimus-annus.html](https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centessimus-annus.html).

The person manifests himself in reflection, decision and action. In and through consciousness, the person realizes and experiences himself thanks to the contribution of self-knowledge. Because of consciousness, we can call ourselves “I.” Moreover, a person experiences himself more as a person (concrete “I”) and as a subject when he determines himself in the moment of decision and when he conducts action to achieve self-fulfillment. This asserts that the person manifests himself in and through his properties and faculties. Specifically, in action, the person reveals himself through the will. Through the role of the will, the person governs himself to act on the basis of the truth of good that is obtained through knowledge for the sake of self-fulfillment. Because of the will, the transcendence and integration of the person in action, as well as self-fulfillment in the community through participation can be realized. It is the act of the will that makes a person morally good or bad. Thus the will is the faculty of the person, in cooperation with other properties and faculties, which is proper to manifest the person in action.

In the end, I conclude that the concept of the subjectivity of human person in the realm of metaphysics and philosophy of consciousness developed by Wojtyła leads to a correct understanding of man as a person. The personalism developed by Wojtyła is based on his acceptance of Thomistic personalism. He adheres to the Thomistic notion of person, and uses it as the basis to develop his own understanding of person in which, for him, to be a person is more than to be a subject of the existence and action (*suppositum*) in objective point of view. The subjectivity of human person, of course, goes beyond *suppositum* alone and engages the subjective human experience. The person who is the conscious subject reveals himself in his performing of action. Accordingly, what is unique from Wojtyła’s concept is that another method is used as a new way to achieve man-person as a substantial being, that is, the phenomenological method as a supplement to the philosophy of being of Thomism. Another intriguing thing from Wojtyła’s intellectual path is his openness in contact with philosophical trends, science and especially theology, to support his endeavor to achieve a correct understanding of man. A further important achievement of the presented study is showing the significance of Wojtyła’s concept of subjectivity in crucial areas of reflection on man in the individual and social dimension, starting from philosophical anthropology, through ethics, to understanding social life and culture. All of these exemplify the specificity of Wojtyła’s reflection on the subjectivity of the human person; this is also a novelty of the conducted research I present in this dissertation.

I have completed the research on the problem of subjectivity by analyzing Wojtyła's thought in this dissertation, but I realize that in my research, there are certain areas of Karol Wojtyła's anthropological study that I have not explored further for obvious reasons of subject matter and scope of limitations. Therefore, I recommend further research in a number of areas of Wojtyła's anthropological thought which include, among others, the existence of the human soul in relation to the material and spiritual aspects of man, the significance of the body for the understanding of the human person, and the explanation of the irreducibility of subjectivity and morality of the human person as a resistance to the concepts of subjectivity and morality in the area of artificial intelligence.

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## Abstract

This dissertation presents a critical overview of a crucial problem in Karol Wojtyła's anthropological thought, namely the problem of the human person's subjectivity. The main objective of research on this problem is to achieve an adequate understanding of Wojtyła's conception of subjectivity, which will eventually arrive at an adequate understanding of human being. To achieve this goal, there are three main issues that need to be investigated, dissected and presented in this dissertation, including: the manifestation of the subjectivity in the human experience, the principle or cause of human person's subjectivity, and the significance of Wojtyła's conception of subjectivity.

The achievement of Wojtyła's conception of subjectivity, through research and review of these main issues mentioned above, is supported and elaborated with the use of metaphysical explanation and phenomenological description method, and equipped with text analysis and historicity method. The metaphysical explanation method addresses the facts given in experience by finding the causes that justify the existence of these facts and their essential contents. These facts are actions of the human person given in experience. This method guarantees the discovery and explanation of the reasons for the facts of human actions. In the context of explaining the problem of subjectivity, it is about something that cannot be reduced, which is nothing but the principle of the subjectivity of the human person. The phenomenological method allows an interpretation and description of the lived experience of the subjectivity of the human person, namely the lived experience of a conscious personal subject and its manifestations in its activities. Meanwhile, through the method of text analysis, Wojtyła's conception of subjectivity can be discovered, dissected and then reconstructed in this dissertation. And by using the historicity method, the main concepts of subjectivity in the history of philosophy can be extracted and presented in this dissertation.

The results of the research presented in this dissertation affirm that Wojtyła understands subjectivity at the level of metaphysics and phenomenology. At the level of metaphysics, man, as a person, is *suppositum* or the subject of his existence and activities. Here, he appears as an objective autonomous being. At the level of phenomenology, the human person experiences himself as such and therefore he is the subject in the strictly experiential sense. He also experiences his actions as acts of which he himself is the agent. Thanks to consciousness and especially its reflexive function, man appears as a subjective autonomous being who has experience of himself as a subject, which makes his being fully subjective. At this experiential

realm, subjectivity is manifested in the moments of reflection, decision and action. In these moments a person is given in experience as a “self” or “I.” In particular, through action, a person fully reveals himself as a subject and agent. The description of the manifestation of human subjectivity leads to the apprehension of a correct understanding of the principle of human subjectivity, namely the person. Regarding this principle and the adequate understanding of man as a person, Wojtyła adhere to the objective Aristotelian-Thomistic view about man. He accept Aristotle’s notion that human being is a rational animal. The Polish philosopher also follow Boethius’ definition of person, *persona est individua substantia rationalis naturae*, and made it the basis of his theory of the human person. He also adopt St. Thomas Aquinas’ claim that the person is an *incommunicabilis subsistentia*. However, these objective views are not enough in explaining the uniqueness and richness of the man as a person. Therefore, Wojtyła enriches and expands the objective view of Aristotelian-Thomistic traditions by asserting the lived experience or the subjective experience of man. The Polish thinker asserts that the man-person as *suppositum* uniquely reveals himself in the performing actions, and realizes and experiences himself as a subject and agent. And through the actions the person can be captured and understood as the subject. As such, the action is a proper dynamism belonging only to the human person, simultaneously is the proper place of the knowledge of the person. In turn, through the analysis of subjectivity leads us to the discovery and understanding of the man as a person with all of his wealth and complexity. It is this personalism that Wojtyła develops based on the metaphysical method supplemented by phenomenology, and his openness in contact with philosophical trends, science and especially theology. Besides that, Wojtyła’s personalist conception of subjectivity also displays significant consequences for anthropology, ethics, social life and culture. All of these exhibit the specificity of Wojtyła’s conception of subjectivity in his anthropological thought, which I present in this dissertation.

## Abstrakt

Niniejsza rozprawa przedstawia krytyczne spojrzenie na kluczowy problem antropologicznej myśli Karola Wojtyły, jakim jest problem podmiotowości osoby ludzkiej. Głównym celem badań nad tym problemem jest doprowadzenie do adekwatnego zrozumienia Wojtyłowskiej koncepcji podmiotowości, co ostatecznie doprowadzi do adekwatnego zrozumienia istoty ludzkiej. Aby osiągnąć ten cel, w rozprawie należy zbadać, przeanalizować i przedstawić trzy główne zagadnienia, w tym: przejawy podmiotowości w doświadczeniu człowieka, zasady względnie przyczyny podmiotowości osoby ludzkiej oraz znaczenie Wojtyłowskiej koncepcji podmiotowości.

Osiągnięcie Wojtyłowskiej koncepcji podmiotowości, poprzez badanie i przegląd wyżej wymienionych głównych zagadnień, jest wspierane i rozwijane metodą wyjaśniania metafizycznego i opisu fenomenologicznego oraz oparte na analizie tekstu i metodzie historyzmu. Metafizyczna metoda wyjaśniania odnosi się do faktów danych w doświadczeniu i polega na poszukiwaniu przyczyn, które uzasadniają istnienie tych faktów i ich istotną treść. Te fakty to działania osoby ludzkiej dane w doświadczeniu. Metoda ta gwarantuje zatem odkrycie i wyjaśnienie przyczyn faktów ludzkich działań. W kontekście wyjaśnienia problemu podmiotowości chodzi o coś, czego nie można zredukować, co jest niczym innym jak zasadą podmiotowości osoby ludzkiej. Metoda fenomenologiczna pozwala na interpretację i opis przeżywanego doświadczenia podmiotowości osoby ludzkiej, czyli przeżywanego doświadczenia świadomego podmiotu osobowego i jego przejawów we właściwych mu działaniach. Metoda analizy tekstu wykorzystywana jest do odkrycia, analizy, a następnie zrekonstruowania Wojtyły rozumienia podmiotowości osoby ludzkiej, podczas gdy metoda historyzmu ma na celu wydobycie i przedstawienie ujęcia Wojtyły na tle głównych koncepcji podmiotowości w historii filozofii.

Przedstawione w rozprawie wyniki badań potwierdzają, że Wojtyła pojmuje podmiotowość na poziomie metafizyki i fenomenologii. Na poziomie metafizyki człowiek jako osoba stanowi *suppositum*, czyli podmiot swojego istnienia i działania, skutkiem czego jawi się jako obiektywna i autonomiczna istota. Na poziomie fenomenologii osoba ludzka doświadcza siebie jako takiej, a zatem jest podmiotem w sensie stricte empirycznym. Doświadcza także swoich czynów jako aktów, których sam jest sprawcą. Dzięki świadomości, a zwłaszcza jej funkcji refleksyjnej, człowiek doświadcza własnej bytowej autonomii, co czyni jego bycie w pełni podmiotowym. W tej sferze doświadczenia podmiotowość przejawia się w aktach refleksji,

decyzji i działania. W tych momentach osoba jest dana w doświadczeniu jako „ja”. W szczególności poprzez działanie osoba w pełni objawia się jako podmiot i sprawca. Opis przejawów podmiotowości człowieka prowadzi do uchwycenia właściwego rozumienia zasady podmiotowości człowieka, jaką jest osoba. Odnosząc się do tej zasady i adekwatnego rozumienia człowieka jako osoby, Wojtyła uwzględnia obiektywne arystotelesowsko-tomistyczne stanowisko na temat człowieka. Akceptuje pogląd Arystotelesa, odwołujący się do kluczowej roli rozumności, jak też podąża za Boecjuszową definicją osoby *persona est individua substantia rationalis naturae*, z której uczynił podstawę swojej teorii osoby ludzkiej. Przyjmuje również twierdzenie św. Tomasza z Akwinu, że osoba jest *incommunicabilis subsistentia*. Te obiektywne poglądy nie wystarczają jednak do wyjaśnienia wyjątkowości i bogactwa człowieka jako osoby. Dlatego Wojtyła wzbogaca i poszerza obiektywne spojrzenie na ludzką osobę w tradycji arystotelesowsko-tomistycznej, poddając analizie przeżyte, czyli subiektywne doświadczenie człowieka. Polski myśliciel twierdzi, że człowiek-osoba jako *suppositum* w sposób niepowtarzalny objawia się w sprawianiu czynu, w którym realizuje i doświadcza siebie jako podmiotu i sprawcy. Jedynie poprzez analizę czynu osoba może zostać uchwycona i zrozumiana jako podmiot. Jako taki, czyn jest właściwym dynamizmem należącym tylko do osoby ludzkiej, jednocześnie będąc właściwym miejscem poznania osoby. Z tego względu analiza podmiotowości prowadzi do odkrycia i zrozumienia człowieka jako osoby z całym jej bogactwem i złożonością. Tego rodzaju personalizm Wojtyła rozwija w oparciu o metodę metafizyczną uzupełnioną fenomenologią i otwartość na inne nurty filozoficzne, naukę, a zwłaszcza teologię. Poza tym personalistyczna koncepcja podmiotowości Wojtyły ma również istotne konsekwencje dla antropologii, etyki, życia społecznego i kultury. Wszystko to ukazuje specyfikę koncepcji podmiotowości Wojtyły w jego myśli antropologicznej, którą przedstawiam w tej rozprawie.